Summary: Knight’s Move
Romedio Graf von Thun-Hohenstein
In the spring of 1944 in Yugoslavia the German armed forces and their allies had to face a growing partisan army involving them in permanent defensive battles in Dalmatia, Montenegro and Albania. On the other hand, the Germans in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia succeeded in driving back Tito’s formations in the north and west of the river Drina. On 9th May the OKW confirmed that an attack on Tito’s headquarters would represent an opportunity to paralyze Tito’s control and administrative machinery.
On 12th May the 2nd Supreme Command of the 2nd Armoured Army laid down the details for the planned operation which was called "Knight’ Move”. The decisive point was the element of surprise in the beginning of the operation. The Yugoslavian forces in Drvar were not as strong as could be expected when considering the fact that Tito’s headquarters and the three allied military missions were there. Because he was afraid of German air strikes Tito resided in a cave inside the mountain ridge surrounding Drvar on all sides.
The attack started at 0630 on 25th May 1944. The German general thrust was directed against the town centre which was defended fiercely by the partisans. At about 0845 the Germans crushed the Partisans’ last resistance, and at 9000 they had taken Drvar without being able to pinpoint Tito’s headquarters. Tito had spent the night in a hut near the cave and drew back into the cave system when the German attack began.
When the resistance became fiercer at noon, the Germans had succeeded neither in tracking down Tito, his staff, or the allied military missions, nor in capturing them. Facing this situation, the commander of the German operation ordered those forces of the battalion which were still fit for action to withdraw towards the churchyard and to prepare for defence. In fact Tito and his immediate staff had already left at about 1115 without heavy losses.
Whereas with "Knight’ Move” the German command and control had let the last opportunity slip to hit Tito’s Partisan movement decisively, the British realized the danger for Tito at once and reacted with two immediate steps. The first was heavy airborne fire support for the partisans assuming - even for the Germans - vast proportions, and the second was a landing operation with a strong contingent of British troops against the island of Brac. At British instigation Tito left Yugoslavia towards Bari, from where he was taken to Vis immediately to set up his headquarters there.
The lessons of "Knight’ Move” are easily learned. Although the paratrooper battalion put into action met the military expectations, it was put into action regardlessly and was virtually worn out after the mission. The decisive point, however, was the fact that as reconnaissance approached Tito’s real whereabouts had remained unknown. Thus, the operation’s main objective was missed. The underrating of the partisans’ fighting strength, together with their swift reaction to the landing, substantially contributed to this failure.
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