

II. Post-Conflict Rehabilitation in the New International System

1. The United Nations and NATO: Comparing and Contrasting Styles and Capabilities in the Conduct of Peace Support Operations

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Introduction

For several years, research and field practice have been converging on consensus that, without appropriate provision of security—for local belligerents who are set to disarm, for the public of the host country whose peace is being restored, and for the international civilians who work to restore it—international efforts to rehabilitate war-torn countries will be futile wastes of resources. Several regional organizations are building up their capacity to provide such security but there are at present just two international organizations that can recruit, manage, and sustain peace-keeping forces in the more volatile of post-war settings: the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The UN has been in the peacekeeping business for more than half a century, although most of its experience during the Cold War involved so-called ‘traditional’ operations whose job was to monitor conflicted borders and/or negotiated zones of separation between hostile military forces. Cold War NATO, on the other hand, was a collective defense alliance focused on keeping the Soviet Union out of Western Europe. Deterrence and preparations for major combat were its major preoccupations, over all of which hung the threat of nuclear war.

Many organizational priorities and relationships have changed since the Cold War ended, and the pace of change seems only to be accelerating. The UN first began to undertake complex peace operations on a regular basis in the early 1990s. Nearly all UN operations begun since 1999 function under so-called ‘Chapter VII mandates,’ which permit more ro-

bust use of force by UN troops than was formerly the case.³⁴ NATO no longer faces a conventional military threat but has expanded its membership to 26 states, including all of the European members of the Warsaw Pact whose forces it used to face down. The alliance has been reorienting itself, meanwhile, to be a robust provider of post-conflict security and stability.

This chapter compares and contrasts the approaches and the abilities of the UN and NATO as post-conflict security providers. It does so in two passes. The first is a brief point-by-point comparison of the two organizations' origins, purposes, definitions of 'the enemy', politics, and capabilities for post-conflict peace building, during and after the Cold War. The second is a more focused look at the two institutions' capabilities and experience in using military forces to promote post-conflict security. The final section looks toward the roles that each may play in this field in years to come.

A Point-by-Point Comparison

The UN grew out of the World War Two alliance against the Axis Powers, designed to be a global collective security organization that would deter future wars and its initial enemy was interstate aggression.

NATO grew out of the failure of the UN to perform as initially designed, owing to the Soviet Union's status as a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council, the body that would have to vote to condemn aggression and orchestrate an international response. NATO was designed to assure the collective defense of Western Europe in part by codifying the commitment of the United States to that defense. Unlike the UN, therefore, NATO was very specifically territorially based and territorially oriented. Like the UN, it was designed to deter

³⁴ Complex operations integrate many civilian components and usually military forces under a single, civilian-led structure of authority, generally to implement a peace agreement negotiated by the host country's formerly belligerent parties, either with or without international mediation. Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to deal forcefully with threats to or breaches of international peace and security.

and resist aggression, but only from a very specific source: the Soviet Union and later – from the other forces of the Warsaw Pact.

The evolved purpose of the UN includes support for human rights, national sovereignty, and self-determination—objectives that are in constant tension. As an organization of sovereign members, it has championed de-colonization, but as an organization increasingly made up of former colonies or pieces of defunct empires (such as the states, that emerged from the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union), the UN has had difficulty coping with subsidiary self-determination—once independent, the leaders of newly independent states tend to resist the independence or autonomy bids of their own sub-national groups.

The evolved purpose of NATO is to promote military stability and political development in and around Europe and points east. It has done so primarily by bringing new members into the alliance. It is not clear that it has many more options to exercise along that track.

The evolved enemies engaged by the UN are bad governance and political instability, disease, poverty, fear, oppression (notwithstanding the poor governing habits of several dozen of its member states), organized crime, and terrorism. The recent report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change defined terrorism without making exceptions for political objectives.

NATO's evolved enemies include global terrorist organizations, fundamentalist tyranny, and aggressive hyper-nationalism. The role of main ideological threat, that used to be played by communist totalitarianism is now played mostly by radical Islamism that targets Western ideals, institutions, and allies, but other notions of radical nationalist superiority backed by coercive force (the erstwhile project for a Greater Serbia, for example), qualify as well.

During the Cold War, the enemy (from the West's perspective) was inside the UN's tent, with first one and then two vetoes on the Security Council. For NATO, the enemy was just across the inner-German border, but it was also watching within. The principal Cold War internal se-

curity problem for NATO, in other words, was espionage. In the later Cold War years, violent domestic terrorist groups like the Red Brigades and Bader-Meinhoff Gang required urgent internal security attention from various NATO member states but were not a focus of NATO per se.

In the post-Cold War order, the most dangerous enemy is outside the UN's tent. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) called for UN member states to take measures to counter terrorist action and to report on their progress to the rest of the membership. Potential terrorists (several members of the 9/11 hijacker teams, for example) have lived and worked inside NATO's tent, however, and the very fabric of the open societies that comprise that tent made it possible. Since people, not tanks, are the basic means of delivering the new threats, border security, internal security, intelligence and surveillance have become the prerequisites of defense but they also have the potential to weaken the fabric of the open societies they are intended to defend, the same openness that Europe and America are trying to inculcate in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.

UN actions are subject to global cross-pressures from rich, poor, and in-between states, but the Security Council has global legitimacy, regardless of the current debate about its size and makeup. It authorizes not just UN-led peace operations but those led by others, including NATO, peacekeeping in Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as the coalition occupation and reconstruction of Iraq. NATO, as it takes in new members, has increasing regional legitimacy and benefits from the regional awakening and energy directed toward the post-Cold War process of consolidating democratic governance and military cooperation. It does not necessarily have much legitimacy, however, operating outside its own territorial sphere unless it functions with a UN mandate, nor would some of its members, old and new, participate in such operations without UN authorization.

The UN is capable of deploying much more than military forces. For its complex operations it routinely recruits and deploys election specialists, human rights investigators, civilian police and other criminal justice per-

sonnel, either to monitor and reform local criminal justice systems or, more rarely, to administer them. NATO is not multi-functional in this way, nor does it do governance.

The United Nations can set up and manage an integrated mission post-conflict rehabilitation but cannot create the initial stability needed to implement such a mission. NATO can in principle create stability in small, unstable situations, or follow US initiatives to that end in larger places, but it cannot provide an integrated approach to peace building. For that it must rely on other institutions. The UN is one of them.

The United Nations

The United States cannot and does not give its full attention to every crisis in the world, whether the need is for peacekeepers or for other assistance. The world's other powers, individually, have even more limited resources than Washington, and regional organizations outside Europe have as yet little operational capacity and even fewer financial resources. So, short of writing off millions of people in the poorest and worst governed parts of the world, governments pool their resources in the United Nations and its operating agencies³⁵.

The UN is more than the Security Council or the General Assembly, especially in post-conflict settings. It is also a loosely structured, increasingly well-coordinated system of agencies that protect refugees, distribute emergency food, immunize children, promote human rights, and organize peacekeepers as well as political and electoral advisers for states in distress or in transition from war to peace. UN humanitarian agencies such as the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the World Food Program have standing mandates to help in humanitarian emergencies. With the acquiescence of governing authorities and a sufficiently permissive security environment, they can act quickly during a crisis. Several have emergency procedures designed to dispatch small rapid re-

³⁵ The first 3 paragraphs of this section are drawn from William J. Durch, 'Picking Up the Peaces: The UN's Evolving Post-conflict Roles', The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (Autumn 2003), 195-197.

sponse teams on 24 hours notice. More than 90 percent of UN humanitarian agencies' funding takes the form of voluntary contributions from governments, however, so while these agencies have the authority to act quickly, they may only have the immediate reserves to act briefly unless donors send money quickly.

UN political and security entities, on the other hand, cannot act without Security Council authorization, in the form of a mission mandate, in the case of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Development entities like the World Bank or UN Development Program will not move into a post-conflict setting without some signal (such as a statement by the President of the Council) that gives them political cover to engage. Their funding, on the other hand, comes largely from the 'assessed' contributions of member states, which those states are obligated to pay under the terms of their membership in the UN.

A now half-century-old collection of international organizations, the UN system has had ample opportunity to accumulate many barnacles on its ship of states, a hard-to-maneuver lash-up of barges, warships, fishing trawlers, and pirate skiffs. Lacking the sovereign authority of a nation state to manage its own spending and to trim functions that have grown obsolete, the UN has trouble losing weight, although many governments have the same problem. Given the way the UN system is constituted, there is no disinterested, authoritative party able to generate member state support for the institutional reform proposals made periodically at the initiative of the Secretary General. Thus, a major consolidation of Secretariat bureaus proposed by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in 1993 was blocked by the General Assembly, while many reforms proposed in 1997 by incoming Secretary General Kofi Annan, accepted in principle by member states, were frustrated in practice by the same states' reluctance to relinquish micro-management of UN structures and operating budgets.

In March 2000, as the UN faced yet another crisis of confidence in its ability to manage complex peace operations, Annan commissioned the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by UN Undersecretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi. The Brahimi Panel, although tasked to

assess and make recommendations on the full range of UN conflict-related activities, from conflict prevention through post-conflict peace building, chose to focus its limited time and resources on peacekeeping operations invited in to implement peace accords. Its report, released in August 2000, emphasized measures needed to create an effective international security presence. The Panel was writing as UN peacekeepers had begun once again to deploy in large numbers into sub-Saharan Africa. Condemning countries that treated UN operations like military soup kitchens – as places where ill-equipped troops could find uniforms, food, housing, and UN reimbursements – the Panel stressed states' responsibility to contribute well-equipped, well-trained, and well-disciplined troops to UN operations. The Panel also stressed the need to increase the ability of UN Headquarters – primarily but not only DPKO – to plan, recruit for, deploy and manage complex operations. It also emphasized the UN's need to have much greater ability to process analytically all of the open-source information about current and potential conflicts and crises that flowed through the organization daily but tended to settle in its quietest pools, unnoticed³⁶.

Nearly five years since the release of the Brahimi Report, DPKO has roughly doubled in size, to the point where it would be able to manage well and in timely fashion most of the tasks assigned to it by the Security Council during the mission surge of June-October 1999. The same is true of its partner offices in the Department of Management, which submit its budgets, recruit its Headquarters staff, and sign the procurement contracts for most of the non-military goods and services that the Organization sends to the field. The Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, set up in 2003 to support the deployment of one complex operation of 10,000 persons each year, exceed what was recommended in this area in the Brahimi Report³⁷.

³⁶ United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

³⁷ See William J. Durch et al., The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003).

Altogether, DPKO now has about 600 people to plan and manage all aspects of its operations. A majority of them work in the Office of Mission Support (OMS), which recruits civilian mission personnel and arranges for transport, other logistics, and communications support for both military and civilian elements of operations. In the last five years OMS has nearly doubled in size. In the same period, the DPKO Military Division has more than doubled in size but still consists of just 64 officers and 20 support staff, of whom perhaps 20 officers plan the military components of UN peace operations. Similarly, the Civilian Police Division in DPKO has tripled in size since 2000 but still consists of just 20 officers and 5 support staff to recruit, test, and manage the deployment and rotation of more than 6,000 civilian police³⁸.

DPKO has even less planning capacity for the civilian substance of its missions other than criminal justice. While OMS is good at providing logistics support, transport, and communications – the things needed to enable a mission – DPKO has no civilian planning office. This helps to explain the recommendation in the December 2004 High Level Panel Report for a new Peace Building Commission and ‘peace support office’ in the UN Secretariat.

As DPKO has grown, so has the demand for complex new UN peace operations in unstable and dangerous places. History and the Security Council conspired to generate the equivalent of five major new operations between July 2003 and July 2004. The Council:

- Doubled the size of the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to 10,800 troops, with the new troops mandated to subdue the marauding militias of the country's far north-east Ituri District, then increased it by a further 5,900 troops and

³⁸ United Nations, Proposed Budget for the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59730, 8 March 2005, and United Nations, Proposed Budget for the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Question, A/59/784, UN, 18 April 2005.

police to cope with unrest in the provinces bordering Rwanda and Burundi;

- Established a new, very large (15,000-troop) operation in Liberia, which had been looted to its foundations by eight years of civil war and six years of subsequent theft of public assets by warlord-president Charles Taylor;
- Gave the UN responsibility for peacekeeping in Burundi, in a handoff from a financially-strapped African Union mission;
- Directed DPKO to take over peacekeeping in Cote d'Ivoire from the Economic Community of West African States, to absorb some of its troops, and to triple the size of the mission overall;
- Gave the UN responsibility for peacekeeping in a rapidly-decaying Haiti, taking a handoff from a temporary, US-led force; and
- Authorized the deployment of 10,000 troops and 700 police for the UN Mission in Sudan, to implement the peace accord designed to end two decades of bloodshed in the southern part of that country.

Thus, between July 2003 and July 2004, UN deployments of uniformed personnel (troops in units, military observers, and civilian police) grew by 57 percent. Between July 2004 and July 2005, the total will have increased again by one third³⁹. These are not sustainable rates of increase and DPKO, since the latter half of 2004, has been pleading with the Council and member states not to send any more business its way⁴⁰.

As of 30 April 2005, there were 18 UN peace operations in the field with 66,500 troops, military observers, and civilian police; 4,500 international civilian personnel; and 8,500 'national' staff (locally-hired civilians).

³⁹ UN DPKO, 'Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Civilian Police Personnel', online at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/. Accessed May 30, 2005.

⁴⁰ See, for example, United Nations, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/608, UN, 15 December 2004, para. 4.

Full deployment of the UN Mission in Sudan would bring the mid-2005 totals to roughly 76,000 troops and police, and 13,000 civilians⁴¹.

For these and all the other recent operations in dangerous and unstable places, most of the troops have been contributed by South Asian and African states. Among developed states, only Ireland and Sweden presently contribute combat units to any of the post-civil war UN operations in sub-Saharan Africa. Civilian contractors have long since made up some of the difference in transport and logistics support; DPKO has well over 100 standing 'systems contracts' for support of its operations, not least for rapid supply of the ubiquitous 4-wheel-drive vehicles that are the majority of its mission motor pool.

The UN has enjoyed a notable degree of success in some of its recent operations. East Timor (Timor Leste) now has its own government, to which authority was returned in May 2002 after just under two years of UN civil administration. The follow-on UN support mission closed its doors, in turn, three years later. Its operation in Sierra Leone recovered from a near-disastrous start, with critical short-term assistance from British paratroopers and sustained British training and advice to the Sierra Leone army, but also following key changes in the UN operation's military leadership and troop contingents. MONUC, in the DRC, began as a protected observer mission overseeing separation of forces in a land as large as Western Europe but has evolved into a much more complex operation directly involved in the maintenance of public security in the country's volatile northeast and eastern provinces, bordering Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. MONUC's Ituri Brigade, composed primarily of troops from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, has been credited with taking a more forceful approach toward containing and disarming that region's violent tribal militias⁴². Members of the temporary French-led coalition force that the Ituri Brigade replaced in August-September 2003 were favorably impressed by the training and professionalism of the UN

⁴¹ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'Background Note', DPKO Website at: <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>, 30 April 2005.

⁴² Marc Lacey, 'UN Forces Using Tougher Tactics to Secure Peace', New York Times, 23 May 2005, A1.

forces that were to replace them, in fairly stark contrast to hand-off experiences in other operations ten years prior⁴³. Regrettably, Ituri has also been the locus for some of the worst instances of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers that have surfaced in recent years.

Disciplinary problems typically peak as demand for peace operations peaks. At the last operational peak, in the early- to mid-1990s, operations in Bosnia, for example, were beset by the shady dealings of some troop contingents. Later, in Kosovo, where the UN Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) is responsible for enforcing the law, business establishments involved with human trafficking – and hence, organized crime – began to grow right along with the international military and civilian presence. Eventually UNMIK created a Trafficking Prevention and Investigation Unit (TPIU) that drew up a ‘off limits list’ for international personnel that included 200 establishments by January 2004. According to the TPIU, both UNMIK police and NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) personnel were industry clients as late as 2003. Amnesty International reported that members of one KFOR contingent (since withdrawn) from a major, non-NATO power were repeatedly alleged to have been involved in trafficking and the use of trafficked women, with no evidence of disciplinary action. Another major power contingent repatriated five of its soldiers in 2003 on suspicion of involvement in trafficking and a third told Amnesty that it was ‘taking measures’ to address what Amnesty called ‘credible allegations about the use of trafficked women’ at this contingent’s principal bases⁴⁴.

The UN itself has typically dealt with issues of sexual misconduct quietly and bilaterally, especially regarding military personnel, since its member states retain exclusive authority to discipline their own troops. By the summer of 2004, however, quiet wasn’t cutting it.

⁴³ Interview, European Union Council Secretariat, Brussels, May 2005.

⁴⁴ Amnesty International, ‘Protecting the Human Rights of Women and Girls Trafficked for Forced Prostitution in Kosovo’, Amnesty Website at: <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR700102004>, 6 May 2004, ch. 6.

The first New York-based investigative team to visit MONUC, from the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services, spent the summer confirming allegations initially documented by the operation's personnel conduct officer⁴⁵. The second outside team, led by Jordan's permanent representative to the United Nations, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al Hussein, visited the mission area in October 2004. Upon his return, Zeid was appointed the Secretary-General's special adviser on sexual exploitation and abuse, to work with troop contributing countries on compliance with UN conduct rules. His report, issued in late March 2005, offered detailed recommendations on how to apply UN rules against exploitation and abuse more effectively, on how to deter future violations, and on how to more effectively investigate and punish violations that do occur⁴⁶.

Part of the UN's problem lies in poorly-trained and poorly-led troops but also in the fact that its forces' operating environments present serious moral hazards, not only in the Congo but in a dozen other desolate places around Africa and, potentially, around the globe. No other major organization presently deploys forces – overwhelmingly young and male – in such close and continuing proximity to large numbers of displaced persons – disproportionately female and youth. Displaced persons seek out that proximity for greater security from local violence but, unless properly managed and monitored, proximity increases opportunities for abuse. The Zeid Report suggested practical, functional solutions such as more secure perimeter fencing, military police units drawn from countries not providing other military units to an operation, closer supervision of off-duty personnel, and better provision for those troops' recreation. Better, universal training of all personnel in expected standards of conduct for members of a UN peace operation, and contingent commanders who take seriously the risk and reality of sexual exploitation and abuse, would also help stem the problem⁴⁷.

⁴⁵ Jane Rasmussen, 'MONUC: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, End of Assignment Report', DPKO Best Practices Unit Website at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/>, 25 February 2005, 2.

⁴⁶ United Nations, A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, A/59/710, United Nations, 24 March 2005, paras. 15-22, 32-35, 41.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

UN management could have done more, much sooner, both in setting out a policy governing exploitation and abuse and in seeing to it that the policy was carried out. The UN's limited ability to enforce such policies with respect to troops and police, seconded from governments, means that member states who are serious about the conduct of peace operations and about the reputations of the people they send to those operations need to get serious and stay serious about training and discipline.

NATO

America's partners in the North Atlantic Alliance have been casting about for a decade looking for a threat and a mission sufficiently beefy to replace the territorial threat embodied by the massed tank armies of the Soviet Union, and to justify its heavy management, planning, and collaborative structures. Although NATO policy, planning, and command and control structures have slimmed down somewhat since the Soviet Union's demise, substantial elements remain. They have had fewer forces to manage, however, as the military muscles of most western European members of NATO have atrophied over the past 10-15 years. The same low military spending that limits EU efforts to rebuild or restructure European defense also limits NATO. Eight separate strands of defense 'transformation' attempt to boost and/or rationalize European countries' defense production and collaboration, but whether budgets will expand to match the demands of transformation remains to be seen. The Alliance has nearly doubled its membership in the past decade, reaching 26 members in March 2004. At its recent summit in Istanbul NATO affirmed that 'the door to membership remains open'⁴⁸.

Since December 1995, NATO has been involved in significant peace-keeping operations, starting with 60,000 troops to implement the military elements of the Dayton Accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by deployment of nearly 50,000 troops in Kosovo by September 1999. Since August 2003, NATO has been running the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. A training program for the

⁴⁸ NATO, Istanbul Summit Reader's Guide (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, October 2004), 19.

Iraqi army began in late 2004, and a rapid-reaction capability, the NATO Response Force, reached initial operational capability at about the same time, offering a reminder that contemporary NATO is not just about peacekeeping.

NATO in Bosnia: IFOR and SFOR

NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) was a twelve-month operation, consistent with US President Bill Clinton's promise to his domestic constituency that this would be the case. Following Clinton's re-election in November 1996, IFOR did indeed come to an end, but many of its forces segued into the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR). Through mid-1997, IFOR/SFOR stuck to a strict and narrow interpretation of its mandate, separating the respective forces of Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Bosnian Federation, cantoning heavy weapons, patrolling the internal Zone of Separation, and otherwise functioning as a very heavily-armed but cautious and traditional-type peacekeeping operation. That posture, combined with a lack of effective and apolitical police presence – either local or international – allowed Serb authorities and their local muscle to drive the ethnic Serb population out of Federation-held parts of Sarajevo, Bosnia's capital city, as IFOR first deployed. This was not the best way to start a major new peace operation and reflected not only NATO conservatism, but also the disaggregated and relatively weak posture of the international civilian side of peace implementation. Dayton gave elections work to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), police monitoring and training (but not law enforcement) to the UN, population returns to the UNHCR, and political oversight to something called the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which reported to a Dayton creation called the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)⁴⁹.

Eight months after Bill Clinton was re-elected and two months after Tony Blair took office as UK Prime Minister, Gen. Wesley Clark as-

⁴⁹ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia, and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 'The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina', http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379, 14 December 1995, Annexes 1B thru 11.

sumed command of NATO and the Alliance's view of its mandate in Bosnia became a little more expansive. SFOR began to search for and seize 'persons indicted for war crimes'; to take action in support of OHR, such as seizing violence-inciting Serb broadcast facilities and providing a secure environment for elections. Dayton implementation authority remained lopsided, however, in terms of the relative powers accorded to the military and the civilian implementers. That imbalance was also redressed somewhat in 1997, when the PIC gave OHR broad new powers. These did not immediately alter the internal balance of power between nationalist and moderate factions in any of the three main confessional communities and organized crime maintained its grip on the Bosnian economy. The military situation was sufficiently stable, however, that NATO could progressively reduce its forces from the initial 60,000 troops in late 1995 to about 20,000 troops five years later and to just 8,000 by mid-2004. In December of that year, NATO ended its major military presence in Bosnia, turning over peacekeeping duties to a 7,000-strong European Union force. NATO maintains a headquarters unit of about 150 personnel in Sarajevo, however, focused on 'defense reform in the country, counter-terrorism, apprehending war-crimes suspects, and intelligence gathering'⁵⁰.

If armies prepare for the last war, they also deploy for it. The heavy mechanized presence of IFOR reflected prevailing NATO operational philosophy as well as its political-military history and traditional foes. The divisions that deployed into Bosnia in late 1995 were left over from the 40-year standoff in central Europe. The forces that they came in to contain and disarm – primarily Bosnian Serb – had been built on that model but had nowhere near their implied fighting power, inasmuch as command and control were relatively primitive and air power essentially non-existent by comparison with what NATO could bring to bear. NATO could have used this overwhelming superiority as cover for immediate Special Forces action to apprehend 'persons indicted for war crimes' and the Bosnia Serb leadership in particular. It could have an-

⁵⁰ Plamen Pantev, et al., 'Balkan Regional Profile: The Security Situation and the Region-Building Evolution of Southeastern Europe, No. 68', ISIS Website at: http://cms.isn.ch/public/docs/doc_10513_259_en.pdf, December 2004.

anticipated the need for early and capable policing, determined, that neither the UN's mandate, nor its track record argued that it would or could do an effective job of maintaining initial public order. Therefore it could have rounded up substantial numbers of military police to deploy in key contested areas: Sarajevo, Mostar, and Brcko, in particular. Had it maintained public order and aggressively rounded up war criminals, backed by the firepower of its main force elements, extremist elements on all sides might have been stymied at an early date. This evidence of the international community's determination to enforce Dayton might have given moderate local politicians the courage to create responsible government in Bosnia within a single, common border at a much earlier date and at much lower international resource investment.

NATO in Kosovo: KFOR

In Kosovo, NATO reprised its role as principal security provider after long-simmering tensions exploded into violence: a guerilla war by Kosovo Albanian militants against Serb authorities, a Serb backlash apparently designed to drive out the 90 percent ethnic-Albanian population in Kosovo, and a 78-day NATO bombing campaign against Serbia to make it cease and desist. The air campaign proved as unsettling to America's NATO allies as it was damaging to Serb infrastructure. The allies saw in action what they had known for some time: that European NATO was, for the most part, far behind the United States in its ability to suppress air defenses and deliver precision-guided weaponry from the air; that it lacked the ability to communicate securely and effectively with ground forces; and that if its forces could not be moved by road or rail to an area of operations, they could not be moved.

Although NATO used force against Serbia without prior authorization from the UN Security Council (a Russian veto having been anticipated), it turned back to the UN to authorize the deployment in Kosovo of NATO peacekeepers and to provide a temporary government for Kosovo – while leaving it, nominally, a province of Serbia and Montenegro. In mid-2005, all international security- and governance-related activities in Kosovo still function under Security Council Resolution 1244, which, unlike the mandates for most UN peace operations, has no expiration

date, an approach that allows the veto to halt any effort to shut the operation down.

As in Bosnia, NATO forces in Kosovo stand apart from the rest of the international effort. Unlike Bosnia, they coordinate with a more integrated hierarchy of civilian institutions. The United Nations lead UNMIK, a collaborative effort with OSCE and the European Union. The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) holds ultimate executive and legislative authority. UNMIK police enforce the law and carry arms. Several states have contributed special police (gendarmerie) units with heavier arms, equipment, and crowd control training.

NATO forces peaked in September 1999. By February 2004, the numbers of troops had declined to about 18,600. The following month, however, coordinated violence erupted against the relatively few Serbs still remaining in Kosovo, and against their property. KFOR and UNMIK police did a relatively poor job of handling the disturbances, testament both to the reluctance of military forces to get involved in ‘policing’ tasks, and to the fact that even having modern militaries from developed democratic states – which would include most of the contingents in KFOR – will not guarantee good performance in the face of a poorly-anticipated threat or disdain for the measures required to meet it⁵¹.

NATO in Afghanistan: ISAF

Although begun as UN-authorized coalition of the willing, ISAF always derived most of its troops from NATO members. Having the Alliance as its planning and support backstop gives the operation more solid grounding as well as access to standing political-military deliberative bodies other than the UN Security Council. Having NATO at the helm has facilitated ISAF’s progressive – if still cautious – expansion outside the capital, Kabul. Such expansion was opposed by Washington for the first year of US operations in Afghanistan, on grounds that peacekeepers de-

⁵¹ Ben Lovelock, ‘Securing a Viable Peace: Defeating Militant Extremists – Fourth Generation Peace Implementation’, in Jock Covey, Michael Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2005), 147.

ployed in the provinces could be a liability to US forces, presenting targets for the Taliban or local warlords and perhaps generating requirements for rescue operations. Washington's comfort level with NATO management had risen by early 2005 to such an extent that there were discussions about the greater 'synergy' between ISAF and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom⁵².

NATO branched out from Kabul in 2004, adding troops to enhance security during the October 2004 presidential election and establishing or assuming control of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) – civil-military elements varying in size from 50 to 500 personnel – in key cities in the northeast, north, and central parts of Afghanistan where the Taliban and al Qaeda have been least active. These are, however, areas where opium poppy production has been increasingly taking hold⁵³. In 'stage two of its expansion, NATO established a PRT in the western city of Herat (easier to do after the ouster in late September 2004 of Herat's longtime strongman, Ismail Khan) and two other northwestern towns⁵⁴. Stage three was to set up a PRT in the key southern city of Kandahar, while stage four would involve taking over PRTs run by the US coalition in the volatile southeast and east, bordering Pakistan.

⁵² NATO, 'Press Conference by NATO Secretary General, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer Following the Informal Meeting of Defence Ministers, Nice, France', NATO Website at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050210e.htm>, 10 February 2005.

⁵³ Suppressed during the final year of Taliban rule, poppy production has ballooned since the ouster of the Taliban in late 2001. According to survey data from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, production of opium gum in Afghanistan soared to 3,400 tons in 2002, 3,600 tons in 2003, and 4,200 tons in 2004, accounting for 87 percent of world production. Over 500,000 Afghan families participate in growing poppy, and cultivation has been spreading rapidly despite desultory government efforts to prevent it. Poppy is a very productive and drought-resistant weed and Afghan family farmers turn to it for want of other revenue-producing crops. UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the Counter Narcotics Directorate Government of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004 (Vienna, Austria: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, November 2004), fact sheet.

⁵⁴ Amin Tarzi, 'Analysis: Karzai Turns Warlord Into Potential Ally', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Website at: <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/01/6fa72a58-e856-4818-827d-ab4cdb698710.html>, 19 January 2005.

In an unusual first for NATO, the military alliance has appointed a Senior Civilian Representative to the Afghan government. He ‘carries forward political-military aspects of the Alliance’s assistance’, and ‘works closely with ISAF, the United Nations, and other coordinating bodies’. Functioning much like a personal envoy of the UN Secretary General or, for that matter, a national diplomat, the civilian rep gives the North Atlantic Council direct eyes and ears in Kabul. His appointment symbolizes NATO’s recognition that its military role in Afghanistan has primarily political objectives. Indeed, ‘NATO’s aim is to assist in the emergence of a secure and stable Afghanistan, with a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, integrated into the international community and cooperating with its neighbors’⁵⁵.

NATO in Iraq: Diminished Forces, New Training Commitment

As of mid-March 2005, NATO members other than the United States deployed roughly 15,500 troops in Iraq; of these, about 8,800 were British. Numbers were down from the previous summer, however, and would decrease further through 2005. The Netherlands withdrew its 1,400 troops in early 2005, Hungary pulled out 300 troops in December 2004 and Spain left shortly after the Madrid train bombings of March 2004 and a subsequent change of government. Italy announced in March 2005 that it would begin to withdraw its 3,000 troops in September. Poland, lead nation of the Multinational Division Central-South Iraq, reduced its forces by one-third, to 1,700, in February 2005 and planned further reductions in the summer⁵⁶. Some of these cuts doubtless reflected the difficulty – military and political – faced by these nations in maintaining their ground commitments beyond one rotation in Iraq for each unit designated for deployment. Some cuts may also have reflected the added stress and risk of the intensified insurgency, which grew throughout 2004. Attacks appeared to ease off after national elections in January 2005, while elected assembly members worked to form a new government, but escalated once again in April and May, targeting in particular Iraqis working for or with the new government.

⁵⁵ NATO, *Istanbul Reader's Guide*, 10.

⁵⁶ Global Security.org, ‘Non-US Forces in Iraq – 15 March 2005.’

At the Istanbul Summit in mid-2004, NATO ministers agreed to a request from the interim government of Iraq for military training assistance. An interim NATO mission with 50 to 60 personnel was deployed by August and mission personnel cycled rapidly through Iraq on two to three month assignments while groundwork was laid for a larger, 300-person NATO Training Mission for Iraq (NTM-I). That was approved by the North Atlantic Council on November 17, 2004, and activated by the military commander of NATO (SACEUR) on December 16th⁵⁷. NTM-I was to be kept from overlapping or conflicting with the Coalition's Security Transition Command by Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, who commands both.

NATO Response Force

As a signal, perhaps, that NATO will remain ready to do more than peace support operations, it has been standing up the NATO Response Force (NRF). Declared to have reached initial operational capability with 17,000 affiliated personnel in October 2004, the NRF is anticipated to grow to 24,000 by the time it reaches planned full operational capability in October 2006. The NRF is intended to be able to deploy on five days' notice with the ability to sustain itself for 30 days⁵⁸. National forces committed to the NRF train for six months and then remain on-call for another six months before rotating out to other duties.

Although NATO brochures state that the NRF will comprise over 20,000 'troops', this is a multi-branch force that is planned to include an aircraft carrier battle group, amphibious task group, naval surface action group, and an air component 'capable of 200 combat sorties a day'. A typical US-style carrier battle group might deploy 5,000 sailors, plus 2,500 personnel associated with its air wing and its 70 aircraft. A US Marine Amphibious Ready Group, with typical naval escorts, has about 2,800 sailors and 3,200 Marines. A Surface Action Group may consist of two missile destroyers and a frigate, embarking altogether about 950 sailors⁵⁹.

⁵⁷ NATO, 'NATO's Assistance to Iraq', online at: <http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq-assistance/index.html>, 22 February 2005.

⁵⁸ NATO, *Istanbul Reader's Guide*, 57.

⁵⁹ Global Security.org, 'US Navy', online at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/index.html>.

Added up, the floating portion of the NRF is thus likely to comprise around 8,700 naval personnel and 3,200 combat troops (Marines), or about half of the projected total force. This will work fine if NATO needs to project force within about 3-400 nautical miles of the ocean littoral, which is the general ground attack and fighter escort radius of the US Navy's principal fighter/bomber, the F/A-18, and of its heaviest-lift helicopter, the CH-53E⁶⁰. Deeper inland (say, Darfur, Sudan), things become more problematic as all aircraft would require in-flight refueling.

The land forces component of the NRF is to be a brigade-sized force, perhaps interchangeable with the EU's 1,500-soldier 'battle groups' (which will likely be drawn from comparable countries or country coalitions; there is only so much equipment and so many troops to go around). The brigade is intended as a first-in, first-out force, to be replaced by follow-on NATO forces kept at less-high rates of readiness.

Rapid deployment of those NRF troops not aboard the Amphibious Ready Group, and deep inland deployment of those elements as well, will require strategic airlift. European members of NATO have little strategic airlift on hand. The UK has leased four US C-17 heavy cargo aircraft pending the deployment of the Airbus A400M medium air-lifter in 2009-2012⁶¹. A German-led NATO airlift consortium of 15 nations, meanwhile, has plans to charter six Russian/Ukrainian An-124-100 'Ruslan' heavy air-lifters. The United Nations makes extensive use of commercial charters of these and other ex-Soviet heavy cargo aircraft to carry its peacekeepers and their equipment around the world, and aid agencies use them for responses to far-flung disasters like the December

⁶⁰ Global Security.org, 'F/A-18 Hornet', online at:

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-18-specs.htm>.

⁶¹ Each A400M will have double the lift capability of a C-130 Hercules, the mainstay military cargo aircraft in European NATO and European Union military inventories today. With a maximum cargo capacity of 37 metric tonnes, the new aircraft will not be able to carry a main battle tank but it will be able to transport a pair of wheeled, light armored vehicles or up to 116 paratroopers. It is designed to be capable of quick (2-3 hour) reconfiguration as a probe-and-drogue tanker for air refueling operations vital to forward-based fighter-bomber operations. Airbus Military, 'A400M: Technical Specifications', Airbus Website at: <http://www.airbusmilitary.com/specifications.html>, 2005.

26, 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The use of Russian aircraft by the NATO alliance potentially to ferry troops to a crisis within spitting distance of Russia's borders is, depending on one's perspective, either deeply ironic or symbolic not only of the evaporation of East-West differences but of the power (and utility) of defense-related commercial outsourcing.

NATO sealift is in a comparable state of dependency. The post-Istanbul 'reader's guide' to the Summit noted that NATO sealift commitments consisted (as of December 2003) of 'assured access to three ships, one or two Danish ships, and the residual capacity of four British ships'⁶². The US military, through the Military Sealift Command, has access, by contrast, to eight active roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) fast cargo ships; 36 maritime pre-positioning ships; 35 ships of the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force; and 78 ships in the Ready Reserve Force, including 31 RO/RO technically able to be activated in one to three weeks⁶³. While European NATO may be able to move its NRF land component by sea, reinforcing it in a timely fashion would be extremely difficult without use of American sealift.

The question of the availability of follow-on forces should the NRF (or the battle groups) be deployed is a very real one, especially if the initial deployment is an 'opposed entry', for example, against a campaign of genocide or ethnic cleansing. NATO's current plans are to reach a point where 40 percent of its member states' forces are deployable (vs. an estimated 10-15 percent, on average, today), and eight percent can be sustained in the field on a continuing basis. (Thus 24 percent would be committed to the deployment cycle at any one time; a continuing deployment equal to eight percent in the field, drawn from a 40-percent-deployable force, would allow troops just back from the field to sit out more than one rotation before being redeployed.)

⁶² NATO, *Istanbul Reader's Guide*, 51.

⁶³ IISS, *The Military Balance, 2004-2005* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 26. Also Federation of American Scientists, 'US Ready Reserve Force', FAS Website at: <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/rrf.htm>, October 1998.

NATO's Operational Overhead

NATO operates with the overhead of modern national military forces plus the overhead of a half-century of accumulated Alliance bureaucracy and working methods. With more members, a less-focused threat, budget problems, technology gaps, and a need to consolidate defense production, at least within Europe, NATO is likely to find its decision-making processes ever more time-consuming, which is fine if the objective is to keep international staff and diplomats busy, but not fine if the objective is to rapidly transform the Alliance's procedures, capabilities, and operations to be more agile and adaptable to a fairly unpredictable threat picture.

The politics and coalition building on which European politicians appear to thrive could be increasingly frustrating for a get-it-done superpower. NATO decision processes can be very time-consuming, especially when consensus is required, although, as Paul Gallis notes in his study of these processes, what NATO means by consensus is not unanimity but closer to consent-by-acquiescence (the 'silence procedure') in which a formal vote is not taken; rather, states objecting to a decision must, in effect, cast a veto by means of a letter to the Secretary General of NATO⁶⁴. Although much is made of the five vetoes on the UN Security Council, the North Atlantic Council has, in effect, 26 vetoes.

Observations and Conclusion

NATO and the United Nations have already worked side by side in several contemporary peace operations. NATO has provided and managed the military components in post-Dayton Bosnia and in Kosovo, cooperating closely with the civilian peace operation in the latter case. That cooperation proved less than perfect, however, during the orchestrated ethnic riots of March 2004. In Afghanistan, NATO ISAF operates in coordination with both US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, which has a mandate to coordinate political and technical assistance to the Afghan government as well as UN

⁶⁴ Paul Gallis, NATO's Decision-Making Procedure (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 5 May 2003), 2–3.

agency operations in that country. In each of the three cases just noted, NATO forces operate with UN Security Council authorization, that is, with a United Nations mandate, which gives NATO its maximum potential political legitimacy when operating beyond its immediate geographic neighborhood. In principle, NATO could provide military forces for inclusion in a civilian-led, integrated UN peace operation, although it is not clear that NATO decision makers would wish to so subordinate their forces to UN decision making, even if NATO countries were presently more in the habit of contributing troop contingents to UN operations bilaterally. NATO could usefully provide more oblique assistance to UN operations by offering intelligence assets (space, ground, or airborne), should build more effective, day-to-day links between its planning staffs and UN DPKO's small Military Planning Service. Finally, NATO might take a look at the UN's system of reimbursements for troop contributors and for compensating wear and tear on contingent-owned equipment. Most operational costs for participation in NATO peacekeeping ventures are borne by troop contributing states unless they negotiate bilateral support arrangements with third parties (as did the United States and Turkey for Turkey's first turn at leading ISAF in 2002). Many of NATO's newer members, in particular, are still building and transitioning their economies and a system that would routinely compensate them for active participation in peacekeeping, paid for from a fund to which all NATO members would contribute on a sliding scale based on national wealth, could boost their participation levels in peace operations as well as their rate of operational integration into NATO itself.