

# **Peacekeeping Forces Today and Tomorrow Regional Capacity Building - the European Union Model**

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the kind words of introduction. It is a privilege and a pleasure indeed to provide an overview of the European Union model and to demonstrate what the EU has to offer as a regional organization in contemporary crisis management to this year's Austrian Blue Helmet Forum.

## **The European Union**

The European Union has evolved over decades based on the European Union Treaties which have been adjusted many times. As a result, the EU has become a complex and complicated institution. You may be aware of the “European House” and its three pillars. Of particular importance, in terms of regional capacity building to deal with the contemporary security environment, are pillar 1 encompassing the European Community, and its Commission, and pillar 2 representing the Common Foreign and Security Policy including the European Security and Defense Policy, based on inter-governmental structures, that is the consensus of 25 Member States supported by the General Secretariat of

the Council of the European Union, the Head of which is the Secretary General and High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana.

It has been recognized that the European Union has become a global actor sharing in the responsibility for regional and global security. The EU is the most extensive and developed model of political integration of states based on law and freedom. It is also the world's largest aid donor, and it is a top trading power. The European Member States sharing similar economic and strategic interests must be prepared, willing and capable to support, protect or defend these interests, if necessary, in particular in view of the recent developments in the strategic environment. In other words, the EU has acquired a strategic dimension.

## **Security Strategy**

In meeting the needs of this new strategic dimension and building its capacity, there are a number of principle requirements that have been identified. There is a requirement to set the overall political, strategic and conceptual framework within which the EU will conduct its business. This is reflected in the new European Security Strategy (ESS) approved by the European Council in 2003. It signals a new approach, building upon the concepts of responsibility, prevention, capability and partnership in both a regional and a global scale.

## **European Security Strategy- Key Threats**

The key threats the EU is facing are not unique to the EU. In fact they are very similar to those identified in NATO's Strategic Concept of 1999. None of the key threats is of a purely military nature, but rather a complex, multi-dimensional, and dynamic character. In some cases they are interrelated. The worst case would be a combination of all. Equally, no crisis region looks like another; rather each is unique. Consequently, the EU believes that none of the threats can be dealt with by purely military means; and each crisis region requires an individual, tailored, whilst comprehensive response. Also, threat prevention cannot start too early.

## **ESS Imperatives for the European Security & Defense Policy (ESDP)**

As a consequence, the ESS has set clear imperatives for the European Security and Defense Policy: The EU is determined to become more active, more capable, and more coherent, willing to work with Partners upon which it is also relying. Three strategic objectives have been set:

- a) First, given the nature of the new threats, the EU must engage early; the ambition is to act, whenever possible, before a crisis occurs or escalates.
- b) Second, the EU puts particular emphasis on creating stability in its strategic neighborhood; the aim is to promote an arch of well-governed states from the East to the Mediterranean region.

- c) Finally, the Strategy underlines the importance of international law and the role of the UN, for which the term “effective multilateralism” has been coined.

In order to meet the strategic challenges the EU draws on a variety of suitable means that should complement each other in a coherent way throughout the **entire crisis management process, from conflict prevention and crisis resolution to cessation of conflicts and post-conflict stabilization.**

### **ESDP Reality**

On the basis of the political-conceptual framework described thus far, within a few years of its creation ESDP has now become reality. And I would like to dwell on that briefly. It is true that the ESDP is in its infancy, but a lot has been achieved. ESDP is in the field. Since 2001, the political-military structures, the Brussels based ESDP planning and decision making “machinery”, which I will come on to shortly, is up and running.

The NATO-EU arrangements substantiating their strategic partnership have passed their first tests. A number of exercises were conducted simulating the preparation of EU-led operations both with and without recourse to NATO. In total, seven civil and military missions have been successfully launched in the past five years. And the capabilities development process has a fresh impetus.

## **ESDP Structures - Situation Assessment, Planning Capacities**

Having provided a little of a contextual background, I will now move on to have a look at the EU's ESDP decision making structures. In 2000 in Nice, the European Summit decided to establish new ESDP structures within the overall institutional framework, consisting of:

- The Policy and Security Committee (PSC) performing political control over and strategic guidance on every ESDP operation,
- The EU Military Committee (EUMC) providing military advice to the PSC and exercising military direction of all military activities within the EU framework,
- And the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) providing civilian advice to the Policy and Security Committee (PSC).

These key Committees are supported by the General Secretariat of the Council, i.e. the General Directorate External Affairs supporting the PSC and CIVCOM, and the EUMS working for the EUMC, whilst at the same time providing in-house expertise for the SG/HR at the political-strategic level. As a result, we, in the EUMS, are serving two masters, the EUMC and Mr. Solana. (Note also the Policy Unit (can be considered as the expanded Cabinet for the SG/HR) and the Joint SITCEN.) Being parochial for a moment, the EUMS is a true multinational unit commanded by a Director General (a three-star general officer) and currently consisting of 5 Divisions

and some 150 staff provided by all Member States and serving on a nominally 3-year rotational basis. The flag officers are selected by the EUMC and appointed by the SG/HR. Our main operational functions are early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning.

## **Crisis Management Process**

As I alluded to earlier, the EU is able to bring a unique combination of means and instruments, both civil and military to bear on the management of crises and potential crises. Institutionally, the EU strives towards a consistent overall approach towards crisis management with consensual decision making as its basis. As you might expect, there is a comprehensive process required to provide the necessary agreed direction and guidance. The key to the EU's process is its phased approach to crisis management which enables the development of a common political understanding of the potential crisis and the subsequent determination of whether EU action is considered appropriate. If it is, then an ad-hoc, cross-body, Crisis Response Coordinating Team, will draft the EU's high-level Crisis Management Concept which, once approved by the Council, is the catalyst for more detailed strategic options, be they military, civilian or police. This illustrates the process, using military strategic planning as a basis. It shows the range of planning products on the left axis from the high-level CMC to the production of CONOPS and the range of bodies that produce, assess, agree and approve the various stages of the EU's response.

## **EU - Military Command and Control – Options**

Because the Union does not have a standing C2 structure (other than the Military Committee and the EUMS in Brussels), when a crisis is being identified and an EU action is deemed appropriate, the EU will compose an ad hoc military chain of command for the conduct of the particular CMO. One of the first issues that will need to be resolved is the designation and appointment of the Operation Commander and the respective OHQ.

Currently, two basic command options for EU-led crisis management operations have been developed: those with or without recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities. The first one is founded in the so-called Berlin-plus arrangements agreed upon by the EU and NATO in March 2003 – interestingly in the midst of the transatlantic and intra-European rifts on Iraq. In this case, DSACEUR is appointed the EU Operations Commander acting at the military-strategic level with SHAPE acting as host to the EU Operations HQ (OHQ).

For the latter case, the so-called autonomous EU operations, a number of EU Member States have offered their national HQ facilities to potentially provide a basis for an EU OHQ and Force HQ (FHQ) respectively, with multinational augmentation. At present 5 Member States - France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the UK - have committed an HQ, to act as host to an EU OHQ, to the Headline Goal Force Catalogue.

## **EU - Military Command and Control – Structure**

To this end and regardless of the chosen command option, HQs will have to be activated, augmented and fully integrated in a command structure consisting of a mixture of permanent (largely Political and Strategic level bodies) and non-permanent elements. The key decisions are taken by the Council, which may delegate the Political Control and Strategic Direction of the operation to the Political & Security Committee. The EU Military Committee, assisted by the Military Staff advises the PSC. The Chairman of the MC has a special role in the chain of command, acting as the point of contact for the OpCdr. In principle, a three-level military command chain exists. The Op Cdr, appointed by the Council, with his non-deployed OHQ at the military-strategic level, is responsible for planning the operation, forming and preparing the force, coordinating the deployment and for the conduct of and support to the operation. The Force Commander, with his Force Headquarters - comparable to a NATO CJTF-HQ - which will be deployed into theatre, is responsible for the conduct of the operation in theatre, at the operational level. Finally, at the tactical level, the required number of component commands, also deployed into the area of operations. As I said earlier, this command chain is generic and every operation will have a command chain specifically tailored to its requirements. It may well be that in a number of cases a more direct two-level chain may be sufficient, or that additional specific component commands may need to be set up. Obviously each level will also have to establish the necessary horizontal links with Member States, local authorities, International



Organizations and non-governmental organizations impacting on the operation.

## **Crisis Management Tasks – Capabilities**

In response to a crisis, the EU's particular characteristic is its capacity to mobilize a vast range of both civilian and military means and instruments. In 1999 the EU set itself the Headline Goal 2003 aiming at developing the capability required to deploy a joint/combined contingent of up to corps size within 60 days. Based on the forces assigned by Member States to the Force Catalogue 2003, the EU's assessment is that it now has the operational capability across the full range of the so-called Petersberg Tasks, i.e. from humanitarian operations through peacekeeping to peace enforcement - limited and constrained by a number of significant shortfalls. These deficiencies are more or less the same ones that the European NATO Allies also suffer and pertain mainly to those strategic capabilities that are essential for rapid deployment and sustainment of operations far abroad. The progress achieved by the European Capability Action Plan to address options for remedying the shortfalls by rationalizing Member States efforts in a very tight budget situation so far is limited. This disappointing result and the evolving strategic environment gave reason for the EU to move capability-building to a new dimension. In 2003 it decided that it needed to look beyond the near future and set new goals for the further development of ESDP capabilities with a horizon of 2010, reflecting the European Security Strategy and drawing on lessons

learned from EU-led operations. Thus, new tasks have been added, reflecting the EU's comprehensive approach to crises management.

## **Military Crisis Management Operations**

**Since 2003 the EU has conducted three military operations:**

- **Operation CONCORDIA** in Macedonia followed the NATO Operation ALLIED HARVEST and was the first one under 'Berlin-Plus'.
- **Operation ARTEMIS** in East Congo was the first autonomous one in support of the UN with France acting as a framework nation. It showed that the EU is capable of launching an operation on short notice and deploying forces in a difficult environment in order to respond to an acute crisis until the UN forces were able to take over. ARTEMIS made the case that there was a role for ESDP in Africa, and it had a significant impact on ESDP capabilities development.
- Finally, **Operation ALTHEA** was launched end of last year as a follow-on to NATO's SFOR. Up to now, it is running smoothly and performing successfully. A few days ago, the first six-monthly review has been submitted by both the EU Special Representative, Lord Ashdown, for the political and civilian aspects, and the EU OpCdr, General Reith, for EUFOR.

## **Military Capabilities - "Headline Goal 2010" (HG2010)**

The "Headline Goal 2003" is to be succeeded by a "Headline Goal 2010", now clearly focusing on rapid response and bringing qualitative criteria to bear. The EUMS is now developing new, complex scenarios, based on operations involving separation of parties by force, embargoes, disarmament, military advisory roles, post conflict stabilization or consequence management after a natural or man made disaster to include a terrorist attack, in order to determine the capabilities required and to identify illustrative Force Packages to support an effective response to crises. The European Defense Agency for integrated defense capabilities development is designed to help Member States to better coordinate and synchronize defense strategy, capability development, budgets and system investment and research and technology efforts. As of last summer, the Agency is up and running. It will work for harmonization of military requirements, establish benchmarks and deadlines for achieving the "Headline Goal 2010" and foster industrial cooperation on armaments, in order to put the aims into practice. Moreover, it will contribute to a longer-term vision which requires an integrated approach including Member States military planners, industry, and academia, economic and social institutions. For me, the Agency's approach looks similar to that of Concept Development & Experimentation (CDE) within the scope of NATO's Transformation philosophy.

## **Military Capabilities – “Battle Group Concept (BG Concept)”**

The EU Battle Group Concept, as initially proposed by France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, is a salient model and specific form of the EU’s rapid response elements providing the minimum militarily effective, coherent joint force package capable of stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations. The United Nations have already expressed an interest, with particular reference to the African theatre. The ambition is to be capable of sustaining two concurrent BG operations on a permanent basis, out of a set of 13 BG the Member States have committed themselves to provide by 2007. Since the beginning of this year the EU is capable of launching one BG operation. Work is currently underway on the range of potential missions, on the involvement of individual Member States, on C2 arrangements, training and certification of forces concerned and the relationship with the NATO Response Force (NRF), which is also drawing on the same pool of national forces. That said it is important to note that rapid response is a complex issue, involving advance planning, efficient decision taking and implementation and not just in the military area but also in the civilian area.

## **Civilian Capabilities**

Military capabilities are important but the experience in the Balkans and in Afghanistan shows that a combination of civilian and military means is needed in order to be successful. Within its civil-military approach the EU has

established six priority areas to support the civilian dimension of crisis management: police, rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring and those special capabilities required to support EU Special Representatives in the various regions.

At the end of last year the EU Member States committed themselves to assign quite an impressive number of civilian experts to the various priority areas, and of them agreed to create a multi-national European Gendarmerie Force capable of filling a specific gap between police and military capabilities in the field. However, currently the EU would be unable to deploy at short notice ‘hard’ civilian missions of a larger scale into crisis areas. Member States’ capabilities need to be drawn from scarce resources committed in domestic affairs. There are no coherent, structured, trained and equipped units on stand-by yet and, thus, not readily available or rapidly deployable.

## **Civilian Crisis Management Operations**

On the civilian side, four civilian operations have been launched since 2003. The EU Police Mission in BiH, is now complementing the military Operation ALTHEA. The EUPOL PROXIMA in Macedonia followed the EU Operation CONCORDIA. Last year saw the rule of law mission EUJUST in GEORGIA. EUPOL in Kinshasa will be complemented soon by the advisory and assistance mission EUSEC to the DRC in support Security Sector Reform initiatives there.

## **Civilian Capabilities – Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008)**

Therefore, the EU decided to adopt the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. It defines strategic parameters for civilian crisis management for a systematic development of civilian capabilities. Generally, the approach is modeled on what has been done in the field of military capability planning and will lead to the creation of generic multi-functional Civilian Capabilities Packages.

### **Civilian / Military Co-ordination**

This leads me to a brief excursion on a concept which is crucial for success of coherent civil-military crisis management, which has become something of a mantra in Brussels but, at the same time, is our biggest challenge: co-ordination. Given the multitude of instruments, bodies and actors involved in complex ESDP planning and conduct of operations; given the legal and institutional constraints within the EU, a remarkable portion of daily efforts has to be spent ensuring proper co-ordination. Ideally, there should be a culture of co-ordination in everybody's mind, however, there is a saying in Brussels that "everybody calls for co-ordination but nobody wants to be coordinated". In order to enhance both the EU's capacity for coordinated strategic planning for joint civil-military operations and its capacity to run operations autonomously a Civilian-Military Cell is being set up within the EUMS. At the same time, with a view to further improving the EU-NATO relations, transparency and mutual assistance, a

permanent EU Cell at SHAPE as well as a permanent NATO Liaison Element at the EUMS is being established. Within this new division military and civilian personnel are able to work within the same structure and contribute their respective experience to the planning process from the very outset. Its main task is to conduct Strategic Contingency Planning on request of the SG/HR or the PSC. Additionally, it is envisaged that the Cell will also form the key nucleus of the EU Operations Center, located in Brussels, which can be activated through multinational augmentation provided by both the EUMS and Member States, for joint civil-military operations of a limited scale and of limited associated risk. If developed carefully and successfully the Civil-Military Cell including the inherent Operations Center capacity could give the EU the unique capability of a focal point, compared with other multinational organizations, to use all available resources in a concerted manner for all phases, from conflict prevention to post conflict stabilization. Moreover, as a consequence of the Civ-Mil Cell establishment, in future the EU will be able to count on three command and control options for crisis management operations, not merely the two that I showed you earlier.

### **Civilian / Military Co-ordination - BiH Example**

Just to give you a practicable example: The General Concept for the EU mission in BiH, including a military component, had to be coordinated:

a) **In-house:** within the General Secretariat between the

- EUMS and a number of civilian directorates,
- b) **Inter-pillar**: between the Secretariat and the Commission, and
  - c) **Between** the Member States in the EUMC, CIVCOM, and the PSC.

In theatre both the EUSR and EUPM are placed in the civil chain of command up to the SG/HR, whereas COMEUFOR is reporting to CEUMC through the OpsCdr. Nevertheless, the EUSR has to promote overall political guidance to ensure that both EUFOR and the EUPM are supporting the overall EU policy in an optimal manner. The co-operation with the Head of Mission of the Commission in BiH remains a challenge and has to take account of the universal notion: “who pays sets the rules”.

## **International Co-operation**

Whilst of course the EU, with its range of crisis management instruments, could act alone, the complexities and size of potential contemporary crises mean that, not only is it desirable, but quite often necessary to act in concert with other International bodies to make best effect of what are ultimately limited resources and so avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Such an approach is well demonstrated by the EU's current engagement with various international and regional organizations. The EU has a strategic partnership with NATO under the "Berlin-Plus" arrangements, where under certain circumstances the EU has recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities.



This format is the second of the two command options I described earlier and is currently demonstrated by the EU operation being undertaken in Bosnia with EUFOR. Of course the EU-UN relationship is very important and is being taken forward under the guise of a Joint-Declaration. Issues that are at the heart of ongoing work are the use of the EU Battle groups to provide a 'rapid response' bridging capability to UN missions, ESDP support to wider DDR/SSR initiatives in Africa - an issue that is probably beyond the capabilities on any one international organization, and EU support to international Disaster Relief, recently brought to the fore by the aftermath of the Indonesian tsunami. Last but by no means least; the EU is actively involved supporting the African Union in Africa, particularly with regard to Sudan/Darfur. Whilst contributing to the crisis management in Sudan, it can also be considered as contributing to regional capacity building in terms of indirectly supporting the building of AU capabilities.

## **Training and Exercises**

But of course none of this can be achieved without training and practice, testing and validating of concepts and procedures and so I will now turn to Training and Exercises. Here is an overview of the 'big picture' of the EU's approach to Training and Exercise issues which is seen to comprise of three major elements:

- Education - teaching of basic skills and knowledge, normally a national responsibility;

- EU-oriented training - geared towards 'teamwork' in EU CMO, including mission-induction training. And finally;
- Exercises which provide the opportunity to practice the most complex procedures and provide training opportunities for management staff and other high-level bodies and officials.

EU training in ESDP aims to complement that training being undertaken by Member States and, by adopting a holistic and coordinated approach on training matters, to enhance the efficiency of Crisis Management Operations conducted by the EU. The EU's training regimen will contribute to a European security culture under ESDP by:

- Strengthening synergies between various EU level training initiatives;
- Increasing the interoperability between all involved actors;
- Focussing on the civil/military as well as civil/civil co-ordination within ESDP.

**As such, EU training objectives are designed:**

**@ The strategic level to:**

- a) develop a common ESDP culture;
- b) provide personnel for EU instances who are able to work efficiently on all ESDP matters, and to
- c) provide MS personnel familiar with EU policies, institutions and procedures.

**@ The operational level to:**

- a) prepare personnel to take part in EU-led operations, and to
- b) facilitate interoperability.

**@ The tactical level the training objectives may apply to cover**

- a) generic,
- b) pre-mission and
- c) in-theatre training.

### **First EU Exercise Series**

As I alluded to earlier, Exercises provide the opportunity to test and validate the building blocks of training. The EU's first exercise series, started in 2002, is about to come to a conclusion with Military Exercise 2005. The first cycle aimed at exercising, slice by slice, the whole of the EU Crisis Management Process and its subordinate procedures. To this end, a generic scenario depicting a deteriorating situation between two Countries on a fictitious island, 'ATLANTIA', has been used as a basis for four exercises (**Crisis Management Exercises – CMEs**):

- **CME 02** was initially considering the issue of the Crisis Management Concept and the subsequent development of Military and Police Strategic Options.
- As the Berlin-plus issue found a political solution at the end of 2002, **CME/CMX 03** was dedicated at exercising the arrangements between the EU and

NATO when the EU is envisaging an EU-led operation with recourse to NATO capabilities and common assets. It ended-up with consideration on the tasking for Operational Planning for Civilian and Military Instruments.

- **CME 04** will exercise the interaction between Brussels and an EU OHQ set-up from a national parent HQ, the UK PJHQ. The major aim is twofold: exercising the Activation Process of an OHQ and developing a CONOPS with a multinationalized OHQ.
- **MILEX 05** is scheduled for later this year to exercise the interaction between an EU-OHQ, hosted by the French CPCO, and an EU FHQ from the 2nd German /US Corps.

As I speak, the next five-year exercise program (revised annually) which will articulate the second series of exercises is being discussed. It will naturally move on from the previous series aiming to develop the EU capabilities and validate more recent concepts and institutional developments.

### **Conclusion: ESDP Reality**

To sum up, regarding ESDP a lot has been achieved, but a lot remains to be done. The EU has acquired a strategic dimension. It has been recognized that the EU's profile will to a large extent remain that of a 'Civilian Power', as trade and development continue to play an essential role to promote security and stability. At the same time, the EU's capabilities both in the military and civilian domain

have been but need to be further improved, in particular in terms of rapid reaction. Regardless of the EU's efforts and achievements in this respect, its capacity to make an impact depends on its co-operation with its strategic partners.