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Transforming Violent Conflicts in Africa

Gerald Hainzl and Walter Feichtinger (Eds.)

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Foreword

For many years now, a key focus of the United Nation (UN) has been to end or contain armed conflicts in Africa. Two notable developments can be identified in this regard: firstly, the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture, under the slogan 'African solutions to African problems'. Secondly, since the beginning of the 21st century, a stronger and more direct EU security policy engagement in Africa has emerged.

Thus far, there have been 9 military operations – based on UN Security Council resolutions – and 11 civilian missions commissioned by the European Union (EU). The EU has also supported the African Union (AU) and regional security organizations in capacity building through various ways, in particular through the provision of financial resources.

Considerable progress has been made on the African continent in the area of international conflict and crisis management – and the path towards partnership-based cooperation seems to increasingly yield fruit. However, there are also divergent visions or thoughts, which ought to be subject to common agreement. In addition to these structural and substantive questions, the geopolitical dimension – namely, the growing interest and involvement of other major powers – is becoming increasingly important. Thus, from the perspective of the EU, it is important not only to evaluate how far its own approach and cooperation with the AU, African regional organizations – such as, ECOWAS – and individual states achieves the results it desires, but also the extent to which co-operation with other major players is beneficial and whether their activities can be a hindrance.

The Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management at the National Defence Academy has dealt, from the outset, with the two abovementioned developments from an analytical perspective, which has resulted in numerous publications. The insights therefrom have been incorporated into political consultations and teaching at university institutions and made accessible to the public. In this volume, experts address questions, such as: for what purposes EU funds provided within the framework of the African Peace Facility are actually being used, and

how liberation movements can be successfully transformed into political parties. This is no insignificant issue given that, in 2015, 24 armed conflicts were registered in Africa – almost of which were intrastate conflicts – and there are no guarantees that liberation movements will give up their military and authoritarian behavior, even though political pluralism is a key precondition for a successful transformation process

Director of the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management

Abstract

The transformation of violent conflicts has been intensely scrutinised over the past years. Particulary the failure in Somalia and the genocide in Rwanda marked a change towards an increased international awareness.

Some African governments are the result of the struggle of liberation movements, which overthrew authoritarian political systems. Some of these movements showed a degree resilience towards estabilishing a democratic multi-party system once they seized power. Not only because they are unwilling to do so, but often because they lack political experience and programmes as well as necessary organisational structures.

Although the BRICS countries at first sight look like an alternative to the Western system, they should not be viewed as a monolithic block. They have their joint ventures like the creation of the BRICS development bank, a reserve fund, and a business council, but each country is more or less following its own strategy, when it seems more useful to them to do so.

The African Peace Facility (APF) is a specific financial co-operation with the European Union with regard to security, stability and peace. Besides long-term capacity building approaches the APF consists of immediate crisis reponse mechanisms, which seem to be more important than long-term engagement.

African presidents often face the difficulty of serving the nation and serving their ethnic group, which could endanger the presidents‘ personal safety and security. Faced with this situation, presidents might be trapped in a dual discourse of security in regard to the discourse of a nation-wide security and the discourse of the presidents ethnic group.

Transforming Violent Conflicts in Africa – Challenges and Strategies

Michael Zinkanell, Gerald Hainzl

The transformation of violent conflicts on the African continent has been scrutinised intensely over the past years. Particularly the genocide in Rwanda marked a milestone for increased international awareness regarding African conflict transformation, as it dramatically outlined the gruesome consequences of insufficiently recognising an underlying violent development. In order to academically investigate in the triggers and the socio-political preconditions of African conflicts as well as the multilateral engagement in transforming violence the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management of the Austrian National Defence Academy organised an expert talk on "The Transformation of Violent African Conflicts", inviting five international experts.

This volume offers a detailed insight into the topics discussed, namely transforming liberation movements into political parties, the BRICS and their engagement in African security, an outline of the African Peace Facility and its cost and outcome, and lastly the Sub-Saharan presidential security dilemma. The most relevant results and findings will be presented in the conclusion chapter, including the recommendations, which were brought up on the last day of the expert talk.

When comparing modern Africa with the continent six decades ago, decolonisation was the most remarkable development. The strive for self-determination on a political, social, and economic level shaped today's 54 African countries, which are home to over one billion inhabitants. Compared to the other continents, Africa has the most rapid population growth rate as it may reach the 2.5 billion mark by 2050, which also makes it the youngest population worldwide. Besides the fact that the combination of demographic growth and harsh environmental circumstances will pose a challenge to peace and security on the African continent, the state-building process is still ongoing. The violent struggle

for power has been the predominant means of gaining political independence. When constructing democracies in African countries, particularly in war-affected societies, the political principles have to be based on traditional local and regional institutions. Therefore, elections mark the beginning, not the end, of national reconciliation. In addition, implementing reconciliation efforts on a national level is often not sufficient, as conflicts spread over a regional dimension due to an intertwined net of social injustice, insufficient provision of political goods, or the lack of economic opportunities. Conflict reconciliation has to include measures of post-conflict reconstruction and economic empowerment, which are recognised as an essential means to foster jus post bellum. So-called 'Western' theories or interests shall not impose solutions to African conflicts; only African civil societies, which are willing to establish a peaceful coexistence, can resolve violence and hostilities in an all-inclusive way.

Prior to the implementation of a democratic process, the struggle for political or economic power as a precondition for violence is often predominant. In particular during the time of African liberation movements, militia activities in Uganda (1986), Chad (1979), Rwanda (1994), or the DRC (1997) to mention only some, successfully enforced the assumption of power. The complicated path, from guerrilla-like liberation movements to political parties and parliamentary systems, is being elaborated in the first chapter. A significant number of today's African governments evolved from rebellious uprisings and the toppling of authoritarian regimes. This does not automatically lead to a fully integrated democratic development; rather do these newly formed political institutions still show signs of authoritarian rule. Further, rivalling movements are posing a threat to security, as it often comes down to the "survival of the fittest". The new order of former rebellion leaders, who became the new political elite may establish relative stability, creating strict policies while ruling with an iron fist for an extended period, which makes a political transition very challenging.

Transforming liberation movements into political parties is a long-term problem, an effort that cannot take place overnight. These movements lack diplomatic experience, and they focus on military instead of political

leadership, as political pluralism and multi-party systems are often not accepted. Since the leaders of many African countries (such as Uganda, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, or Angola) are holding their office for decades, political succession becomes yet another problem. Although there are positive examples of leadership succession like in South African or in Ethiopia, internal problems, civil uprising, or violent clashes could be the cause of a change of administration. An unexpected death of the former chief of state and disharmony between the new leader and the military are increasing the likelihood of security issues as a result of leadership succession.

As positive examples of political transformation have shown, there are two vital solutions to decrease unstable and unsustainable political systems, which resulted from liberation movements. First, ethnical federalism offers the possibility to strengthen community ownership and self-administration. Hardly any African nation is homogeneous, various tribes and local communities are causing ethnical and cultural diversity. If these communities are not integrated into the political system and are not offered some basic self-determination, a mutual feeling of abandonment and disempowerment could cause a disunited and scattered society. Even the primal "liberating admiration" of movements fighting an authoritarian regime will vanish once they have adopted a similar totalitarian character. Therefore, a meaningful bottom-up approach is necessary to increase the long-term sustainability, trustworthiness, and credibility of the newly established political elite. The second aspect is strongly linked to the first one. An economic plan, integrating all communities across the country accordingly, is needed. The mismanagement and maladministration of the former authoritarian rule have to come to an end, through implementing economic integration as well as offering the possibility to pursue personal wealth. An empowered, economically stable, independent, and politically involved society is far less likely to start civil unrest.

However, all these endeavours will come only to a successful end once recognising that the concept of politics in the so-called 'Western' world does not necessarily function in an African context. Influencing politics or inflicting destabilising aggressions to African nations during the process of

political transition or a time of stable governance with the intention to forcefully spread 'Western' democracy is not acceptable.

The issue of foreign engagement is being touched upon in the second chapter. The case study is mainly focusing on the BRICS countries' involvement in African security related fields, as it is recognised that the concept of the BRICS relationship is interpreted differently for each of the five nations. The BRICS can be seen as new power elite, countries, which believe they have been undermined and partly left out, and which share the desire of a power shift from the Global North to the Global South. To some degree, they can be seen as the counterpole to the 'Western' socio-political system. The BRICS countries have their own development bank, contingency reserve fund, academic forums, business councils and various other organisations and institutions.

Especially China and India show significant interest in the security situation on the African continent. About 80% of China's UN troops are located in African and India has also stationed troops in several African countries. The reason is economic interest; China has grown to the biggest economy and simultaneously to the largest consumer worldwide. Multiple African states, in particular, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are major suppliers to China. Hence, extensive cooperation is in place in an economical and political way, causing some kind of interdependency between African states and China. Over the years strategic partnerships were excessively built. One symbolic fact for inter-dependency is the Chinese funding of the new African Union Headquarter. Other than European or American funding, Chinese money is not linked to political preconditions. Hence, even African governments with Human Rights violations or undemocratic power structures can gain access to financial support from China. The primary emphasis does not lie on the human concern but rather on economic growth and business. One of the most negative examples is arms supply. Arms still pollute many African nations, and no improvement is in sight, as the Arms Trade Treaty of 2014 was not ratified nor signed by Russia, India, and China.

As the BRICS influence is likely to rise in the future since their economies are amongst the fastest growing, they assist in maintaining the national

security of African partners to preserve the economic relations, while the human security is being undermined. China's motive focuses solely on achieving economic growth; state-building mechanisms, social integration, or community empowerment are not on its agenda. For both China and India, energy and land are the two most vital interests. An all-inclusive approach is required, emphasising on the mutual support of justice, security, peace, politics, military and economy. Since win-win solutions are admired, awareness has to be raised that today's intertwined globalised economy would harm all partners if a new underlying war is erupting. One essential question of the future is if China will also make efforts to export its political system.

Contrasting the involvement of the BRICS countries, the European Union has established a particular mechanism for its cooperation with African nations – the African Peace Facility (APF). Chapter three is analysing the costs and outcomes of the APF. The APF consists of a long-term EU assistance to counteract African conflicts more efficiently and an early response mechanism, to enable rapid actions by making funds available without complicated bureaucratic procedures. Three pillars are central to the APF: first, the provision of financial support for African lead peace support operations, ensuring self-management and independent decision-making, second the provision of solely non-lethal support, the salaries of African soldiers, and third the early warning mechanism, enabling the approval of funding within two weeks only.

Some controversy arises because all of the APF funding comes from the European Development Fund (EDF). Would that not imply that military operations are partially financed by money from the Development Fund? The answer is yes. This fact indicates that the European Union is recognising the strong link between security and development: preventing violence through early warning systems, training, the establishment of functioning and loyal security forces, as well as capacity building are enhancing the development of the region.The APF had a direct impact on millions of people in Africa. Its method of combining development with security while contributing to African ownership and self-determination is a game changer concerning improving conflict management on the African continent. The downsides are the dependency on donor money from EU

member states, the ill-equipped administration, corruption, which is hampering the process, and the lack of experience. A long-term capacity building is therefore needed in addition to the rapid response that would maintain a peaceful and sustainable development while improving the African-European relations at the same time.

Lastly, chapter four explains the Sub-Saharan presidential security dilemma. This issue is arising out of a dual security discourse: presidential security with the focus on the national security and tribal-ethnic security, which emphasises the ethnical interests of the tribe. As long as these two components are in line with each other, without conflicting interests, the overall stability is kept. If, however, the national presidential interests clash with the interests of the ethnical clan, the president faces the dilemma of acting in the on behalf of the tribe or based on what is best for the entire nation. A realist ethnographic point of view ("Ethno-Realism") is created. Under this constructed reality, ethnical identity plays an increased role in the interaction between tribes. Hence, this concept is portraying a potential conflict, which occurs once realism is mixed with ethnic-tribal identities.

Due to this difficulty, the president's freedom of action is limited, while personal security is endangered if the tribal interests are being undermined at the same time. Military support from tribe could be withdrawn, leading to a coupe d'état in the worst case. The president will eventually either lose public support or tribal recognition. Such cases show, that security is not necessarily a national problem but that the personal safety of the president could also post a security threat since the tribe has the power to manipulate political decision-making. A lack of institutions and insufficient inclusiveness is the underlying problem.

A political system blind to ethnicity and tribalism, local independent security forces, fully integrated military troops from different backgrounds, as well as a responsible president, are possible solutions for the dilemma. The international community can also play an essential role. It should only communicate and collaborate with states that provide presidential security and legitimate institutions. Pushing for changes is seen as a possible but controversial step towards sustaining a nation's presidential security. However, since the most recent examples show that intrastate wars are

more likely than interstate wars, the international community should actively focus on preventing disintegration and disunity within a state. Additionally, states should be given the change to develop political chance naturally; pushing for a 'democratic panacea' is not a sustainable way to tackle issues related to state building.

Overall three main findings can be highlighted, which flow like a common theme throughout the volume. Firstly, institution building is essential for a positive development towards inclusiveness and democracy. The establishment of state institutions provides a basis structure and a fundament on which democratic elements can be built upon. Further, the existence of institutions enhances the possibility for inclusive participation in the political and socio-economic landscape and automatically strengthens the core democratic value of the separation of powers. Without institutions, political parties may not arise out of liberation movements, the presidential security remains tribal, and newly established governance is more likely to crumble and turn into a failed state.

Secondly, security and development are two interlinked and interdependent prerequisites for sustainable peace. One cannot exist without the other; providing security without establishing long-term development opportunities will create socio-economic unrest resulting in insecurity. The same counts for setting up development projects without implementing security simultaneously; looting, killings, and violence will disable any lasting development. The extensive funding of the African Peace Facility by the European Development Fund is not only a very accurate example of this interdependency but also a very positive and successful one.

Lastly, African problems require African solutions. The following chapters stress multiple aspects of negative international involvement, which can be recognised on a regional, national, and local level in various forms and manifestations. Therefore collaboration and cooperation must be based on mutual benefits, trust and the abolishment of financial and social exploitation, while international engagement has to go hand in hand with evaluating the needs of the civil society. Enhanced ownership to the African civil society slowly dissolves oppressive power structures as it paves the way towards community empowerment.

The BRICS Engagement in Security Related Fields in Africa

Pádraig Carmody

> "Security the chief pretense of civilisation cannot exist when the worst of dangers, the danger of poverty, hangs over everyone's head"
>
> George Bernard Shaw

Introduction

What kind of actor(s) is the BRICS in international affairs and how do they affect the human and state security of the countries they engage with in Africa? The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) grouping or coordination mechanism has been existence since 2009, when they began their annual meetings, starting in Yekaterinburg in Russia. The BRICS are a new phenomenon in international relations. The so-called "developing world" has older co-ordination mechanisms, particularly the Non-Aligned Movement or the Group of 77, however the BRICS are a collection of some of the world's biggest so-called emerging economies or powers. Their emergence then reflects a shift in the centre of gravity in the global political economy and perhaps also a desire to maximize influence by reducing coordination problems between a grouping with initially four, now five, members.

Security and the BRICS

> "Altruism is in short supply in international relations" – Indian diplomat, interview, Johannesburg, South Africa, August 2014.

The BRICS grouping initially was not explicitly concerned with security. However in May 2015, the Russian President Vladimir Putin said that security was now also an important part of their agenda at a meeting of BRICS national security advisors in Moscow. According to the Russian national security advisor at that meeting– "With our countries enormous

resources and development prospects in mind, we have every reason to believe that BRICS member-states are in a special risk zone. The developments of the past few years indicate that misinformation, artificial exacerbation of ethnic, religious and cultural differences, rather than military means, will be used to check our progress" (quoted in BRICS Post, 2015). This statement reveals a "conflict mentality" or posture amongst some of the policy makers and elites of the BRICS towards the West. It also, however, demonstrates that security and defence are being conceived of not just in military, but in broader economic, social and political terms. Consequently some of the key objectives of (some) BRICS security policies are regime maintenance and/through their countries political and economic advancement.

In relation to Africa, the BRICS do not have coordinated security policies towards the continent, but there are nonetheless important engagements in this space. Before discussing these security engagements it is necessary to interrogate the BRICS more closely in order to better understand them. While China now has the world's largest economy, when measured at purchasing power parity, according to the International Monetary Fund, it accounts for only 12% of global military expenditure as compared to 34% for the United States (Perlo-Freeman *et al.* 2015). This means that China's security engagements, and also those of the other BRICS, are primarily non-military in Africa. Before discussing these in more detail it is necessary to interrogate the nature of the BRICS.

Conceptualising BRICS

What are the BRICS? Firstly, as noted above they are a new phenomenon in international relations. Whereas regional economic groupings such as the European Union or the North American Free Trade Agreement share their sovereignty to greater or lesser degrees, the BRICS have members on four continents, so the nature and extent of cooperation will necessarily be different. Furthermore the objective of the BRICS grouping varies from that of the European Union, for example, as discussed below.

When Jim O'Neill, the Goldman Sachs analyst who coined the term BRIC in 2001, came up with the idea he had it in mind to capture what he saw

would be the biggest fastest growing emerging economies in the new millennium. However the decision to convene the BRIC(S) as a grouping was a geopolitical one. The BRICS are representatives of a "South Space" (Carmody, 2013) which is attempting to escape actual or perceived Western domination through an economic, political and security rebalancing of the global order. As such their geopolitical cooperation is underlain or girded by the desire to assert individual and, to a much less extent collective sovereignty, rather than share it as in the case of the European Union, for example. The BRICS as a concept then, as far as its members are concerned, is about reworking international relations to be more favourable to their own development and thereby and through this to serve as a counter-pole to Western power. However, the different members of the grouping have somewhat different perception of what this "balancing" or perhaps "over-taking" strategy entails.

Whereas Russia currently seeks to engage in "hard balancing" through proxy confrontation with the West through the conflict in Ukraine for example, China has sought to avoid direct confrontation – preferring instead to primarily develop its economic power capabilities. Whereas Mao's dictum was once "power grow out the barrel of a gun" a more apt paraphrased aphorism for China's current geopolitical stategy might be the "power flows from money". On the other hand Brazil and India continue to cultivate close economic and political relations with Western powers, as Brazil in particular seeks to achieve "autonomy through engagement" (Carmody 2013). Thus while sharing a broad understanding, each of the different BRICS powers has somewhat different conceptions of what the grouping is and what its nature and purposes are.

The BRICS are also an evolving process, as has been demonstrated in recent years through a deepening institutionalisation through the commissioning of the "New Development Bank" and "Contingency Currency Reserve". These reflect attempts to reduce dependence on Western dominated financial institutions – the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. However in reality they are additive rather than being a challenge to them, as for example once South Africa has drawn down US $3 billion (30% of its borrowing quota) from the Contingency Currency Reserve it must look, under the articles of

agreement, to the IMF. This has led some to argue that this actually represents a strengthening rather than a diminution of IMF or Western power.

In addition to being a process then, the concept of the BRICS can also be used as a lens to reflect on broader changes in the global political economy, such as the so-called "Rise of the South" (UNDP 2013). The BRICS impact is also a reality. For example it is well known that Chinese demand was largely responsible for the recent commodity super-cycle. China by itself accounts for approximately 60% of the BRICS total economic output, whereas South Africa's economy is only approximately the same size as Bejing's in US dollars terms. These impact disparities affect the nature of engagement with African states.

BRICS security engagements in Africa

The BRICS demonstrate commitment to selective and to selective universal multilateralism. The BRICS coordination mechanism is itself an example of selective multilateralism, but all of the members are also members of the United Nations, with Russia and China holding seats as permanent, veto members of the UN Security Council. The permanent five or P5 were the victors in World War II and have long range nuclear capabilities, thereby casting doubt as to whether the rise of the individual BRICS is an *entirely* new or novel phenomenon as it is sometimes thought.

China has several thousand troops serving as UN peacekeepers in South Sudan and elsewhere on the continent and 80% of Chinese UN peacekeeping troops are serving in African missions. This geography in part reflects the desire of China to be seen as a "responsible power" internationally but may also confer "soft power" advantages on China as it engages with the African Union and individual African states. India and South Africa also have troops seconded to the UN in Congo, and elsewhere on the continent. However, rather than these necessarily just being acts of good will or motivated by a feeling of shared collective responsibility there may be underlying material and wider geopolitical motivations. For example, South Africa's desire to become a permanent

member of Security Council is well known and contributing to UN peace keeping operations might help it work toward this goal.

While the BRICS do not have coordinated security policies towards Africa, South Africa has been very active in a variety of both African Union and United Nations sponsored peace keeping missions. Again however there is a question about whether or not there are underlying material motivations in these engagements. For example after more than a dozen South African soldiers were killed in the Central African Republic a South African National Defence Force soldier was quoted as saying:

> "Our men were deployed to various parts of the city, *protecting belongings of South Africans*. They were the first to be attacked. Everyone thought it was those who were ambushed, but it was the guys outside *the different buildings – the ones which belong to businesses in Jo'burg*... We were lied to straight out... We were not supposed to be here. We did not come here to do this. We were told we were here to serve and protect, to ensure peace" (quoted in Bond 2014).

Furthermore Patrick Bond has argued that South African involvement in United Nations operations against M23 rebels in the Eastern DRC in 2013 may have been related to the fact that the South African President's nephew, Khulubuse Zuma, is involved in multi-billion dollar oil deals there. As noted earlier in the quote from the Russian National Security Advisor the BRICS powers see security as multi-dimensional and inter-connected. This is partly because of the experience of more than a "century of humiliation" (as it is referred to in China) at the hands of Western powers, but also means that domestic economic considerations may be included.

Oher security interventions include the Chinese naval escorts off the coast of Somalia, which is available to Chinese (including Taiwanese) flagged ships to protect against piracy. Security extends to economic and energy conceptualisations. For example in relation to China's engagement with the brutal Sudanese regimes "business is business". In the case of Sudan, the flip side of oil exports is arms imports from Africa in order to repress dissent and maintain the "looting machine" (Burgis, 2015). According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute arms exports are used to "strengthen… political influence in sub-Saharan Africa in order to gain access to natural resources and to further the security interest of the

supplier" (quoted in Mail and Guardian Africa, 2015). This is the case for China, but also for the United States which is the world's largest arms exporter and biggest exporter to Africa. The two largest arms importers in Sub-Saharan Africa are Sudan, which imports 15% of all SSA arms and Uganda, which imports 14% of the total. These are close Chinese and American allies respectively.

The "great" powers then pursue (in)security policies in their dealings with partner regimes in Africa, where energy security is achieved at the cost of insecurity for some in oil bearing regions, such as the Niger Delta or Abeyi in (South) Sudan. Arms exports also create arms pollution, with the Horn of Africa reportedly having the highest density of light weaponry anywhere in the world. This further creates opportunities for, and potentially, fuels conflict. However "excessive" conflict risks undermining resource exports. For example, at its height the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta cut Nigeria's daily oil production by 40% (Burgis 2015). The creation and perpetuation of conflict complexes then threatens resource access, generating incentives to engage in peace making. For example there is Chinese "special representative on Darfur", who has sought to mediate the conflict there, perhaps in contradiction to China's stated policy of "non-interference". However, arms supplies by themselves could be seen as an extreme form of interference, in-any-event, as they serve to reinforce the power of extant regimes. Thus energy, military and human security are interlinked in relations to the BRICS security engagements in Africa, as is economic security.

While some of the BRICS economies have struggled in recent years on foot on the end of the global commodity super-cycle, the rate of economic growth in India has picked up. According to the global rating agency Fitch "India takes over as the fastest growing BRIC this year with 7.5 per cent GDP growth, accelerating to 8 per cent in 2016 driven by structural reforms and higher investment" (International Business Times 2015). There are however, other reasons for this revived level of economic growth in India, particularly the decline in oil and other mineral import prices, as India is a substantial importer of these. This has also repressed inflation, allowing the Indian central bank to reduce interest rates, further stimulating economic growth.

Eighty nine per cent of India's oil arrives by sea, and in recent years a substantial proportion of this comes from Africa. According to the Indian external affairs minister – "We have a strong stake in the security and stability of these waters, which is linked to energy security, since a large proportion of Asian oil and gas is shipped through the Indian Ocean" (quoted in Vines and Oruitemeka 2008). The Indian navy has patrolling Mauritius's Exclusive Economic Zone since 2003 and also that of the Seychelles and the Indian government has set up a listening post in Madagascar. When the first shipment of oil produced by India's overseas oil and natural gas company arrived from Sudan a government minster declared that this was "India's oil", reflecting a projection of sovereignty outwards. However India has attracted far less scrutiny, attention and opprobrium arising from its relations with Sudan, than China has. This can be seen as an example of "globalisation slipstreaming" behind China (Carmody 2013), where its more powerful neighbour attracts greater attention allowing Indian foreign policy greater latitude for manoeuvre.

The other BRICS also have energy security interests in the region. For example South Africa undertook a military intervention in Lesotho in 1998. Some have argued that this was in part because it sought to protect the hydro-electric power it receives from the massive Katse dam in that country. Energy has become a particularly important issue in South Africa in recent years as the country has experienced frequent "load shedding" or electricity blackouts as production cannot meet demand, in part as per capita consumption is roughly four fifths of that in the United Kingdom.

Energy security is not part of the geopolitical code through which Brazil views Africa, as it is a net energy exporter, but there are substantial investment opportunities for the semi-public Petrobras company and also for biofuel companies. Likewise Russia is a major energy exporter, but does export substantial quantities of arms to Africa (Carmody 2013).

Implications for future relations

As noted earlier the BRICS are not a coherent actor, in the same way as the European Union for example as their objectives are different and their membership is spread across four continents. That is not to say that they

are not powerful, both individually and collectively in international affairs however. In particular China has very substantial power resources ranging from the world's largest economy, when measured at purchasing power parity, massive foreign exchange reserves, an innovative "flexigemonic" foreign strategy and a permanent seat at the United Nations' Security Council. In many senses it is the cornerstone of the BRICS as demonstrated by the fact that it accounts for 60% of the groupings total economic output.

As has been extensively detailed elsewhere the Communist Party of China prioritizes regime security through economic growth and relatedly energy (in)security. The energy security policies that the Chinese government, along with other "great" powers, pursues is sometimes associated with conflict, as in the case of Sudan, for example. However higher economic growth creates potential for win-win outcomes and China also attempts to restrain conflict to prevent it compromising resource supplies.

According to the founder of world systems theory Immanuel Wallerstein (2015, p. 273):

> "The world system's structural crisis is moving too fast, and in too many uncertain ways, to assume sufficient relative stability to allow the BRICS as such to continue to play a special role, either geopolitically or economically. Like globalisation itself as a concept, the BRICS may turn out to be a passing phenomenon."

However a number of objections may be raised to this. Firstly it would appear that globalisation, despite periodic crises and retrenchment is a secular phenomenon. Secondly the BRICS grouping is becoming more deeply institutionalised and consequently this channel of influence, through these new institutions, is likely to grow. Thirdly, despite the recent economic travails of some of the group, China and India's economies continue to grow quickly. That is not to say that there are no structural crises in the world system; there demonstrably are and some of these, such as climate change, have huge human, economic and political security implications.

As the former speaker of the House of Representatives in the United States, Nancy Pelosi (2015), recently noted: "The benefits of globalization have overwhelmingly flowed to the most affluent and powerful, while the costs have been shouldered by ordinary citizens in both developed and developing nations". She argues that there is a need for new model of global economic governance, perhaps regulated by UN.

Global inequality finds violent expression in the mutation of so-called global war on terror into a pattern of conflict between Western powers, and now also Russia, and Islamic fundamentalist groups that some are referring to as the Third World War. This dynamic is increasingly promoting and infusing conflicts in parts of Africa from Libya to Mali and Somalia.

As Zacarias (2003) notes "security become possible if its four pillars – order, justice, peace and economics – coexist in a condition of dynamic equilibrium". At the moment the BRICS powers relations with Africa can be largely characterised as extractive (Taylor 2014). While the global commodity super-cycle, largely powered by China, appears to have been associated with some shallow poverty reduction in Africa, its end may bode ill for future conflict dynamics on the continent. Given current power structures and relations, it would appear that the BRICS are unlikely to substantially change Africa's dependent and extraction relations with the global economy. This then will necessitate efforts to prevent and remediate violent conflict when it occurs. However, until the structural basis of the continent's economies are reworked to allow for greater domestic value creation, capture and distribution these problems are likely to be recurrent, if not intractable.

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African Peace Facility – Cost and Outcome

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Summerized by Nicole Gruber
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The Rise of the African Union

When analysing African conflicts, one has to consider the complex and changing nature of conflicts, as well as the great diversity and variation from one country to another. In the past, most of the serious conflicts in Africa evolved from internal disputes and, to some extent, this has caused interstate wars with manifold regional dynamics. Before the African Union was established in 2002, the internal nature of conflicts was creating great difficulties for African countries when trying to respond to regional insecurity and instability. Countries were unwilling to intervene, fearing that one day another country might also interfere with their own national affairs and agendas. Due to this reluctance, conflicts on the African Continent were often consequently mediated by the United Nations and former colonial powers such as France and the UK among others, who intervened and sought to support resolutions for these conflicts.

The transition from the OAU to the African Union in 2002 marked the beginning of an increased emphasis on security issues and a realization that African countries must address and effectively deal with the conflicts on their continent. The idea of African solutions for African problems was largely driven by this recognition. It represents part of the background for the emergence of the African Peace Facility (APF), and provides insight and a better understanding of how this mechanism was designed.

The APF is in essence the main financial mechanism for African-EU cooperation in the area of peace and security. It was established in 2004 in response to increasing demands from the AU for specific long-term assistance. The assistance requested was particularly of a financial and technical nature, in order to support the development of effective

responses to conflict. As already mentioned, the APF was created in context of the emerging idea of *African solutions for African problems* and was also the result of the European countries' and the USA's reluctance to send their own peacekeepers on African missions. Consequently, it was believed that African countries needed to devote more resources and attention to solve their own problems and to count less on solutions coming from the outside. This implied a need for a more strategic continent-wide crisis-response capacity.

When the AU was first created, it lacked the legitimacy to act on behalf of the continent and its institutions and mechanisms for dealing with peace and with conflict prevention were weak. It had a very small Peace and Security Department and few funds dedicated to activities that were related to this area. So by conception, the APF had a dual strategic focus. On the one hand, it sought to facilitate immediate crisis response due to a recognition that something had to be done to address the diverse conflicts emerging on the continent. On the other hand, it had a longer-term agenda to build capacity of the regional and continental crisis-response mechanisms.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

In 2002 the era of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) commenced. The APSA system provides the backdrop for continental and regional conflict-response efforts. It is a series of structures and organizations on both a regional and a continental level in Africa that is intended to facilitate African responses to crisis and conflict. Thus, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), a standing organ of the AU was established, consisting of 15 periodically alternating AU member states, that are in charge of conflict prevention, management and resolution. The PSC activities range from proactive actions like early warning, diplomacy and promotion of peace and security to reactive actions and operations during and after conflict as well as humanitarian action and disaster management.

The basic pillars of APSA are regional organizations, including both the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Regional Mechanisms

(RMs), which have a peace and security mandate. This includes the East Africa Standby Force coordinating mechanism, and the North African Regional Capability based in Tripoli as well as ECOWAS Standby Force, SADC Standby Brigade and The FOMAC Standby Force. These are specific mechanisms that are set up as African Standby Forces (ASF) - a technical facility of deployment to support the African peacekeeping forces. There are five ASFs across the continent in southern, eastern, central, western and northern Africa. Each one is intended to provide Africa with forces that can be deployed on short notice in response to crisis, and if necessary before a UN mission can be developed. Furthermore, there is a so-called Panel of the Wise which consists of high level ex-heads of state and other experts who can intervene and serve as special envoys when addressing conflicts. Additionally, there is the African Peace Fund which is intended to provide resources for peace-building and a continental-wide early warning system, building on mechanisms located in regional organizations and at the national level.

This is the basic APSA concept which was developed in 2002. However, this peace and security architecture has been beset by many weaknesses. For instance it requires a large commitment on the part of the African nations to operationalise a continental-wide peace and security organ. African countries have been reluctant to give the AU the authority to intervene in their backyards. Furthermore, there have been different views among international, regional and continental actors regarding how conflicts should be addressed. Hence, there is no real shared continental vision - certainly not back when the APSA was established - on how to respond to peace and security problems. There have always been tensions between regional organizations and the AU and general reluctance on the part of the former to engage with these peace and security mechanisms. Not all regional organisations welcome AU authority as a lead in terms of continental-wide responses to peace and security issues. For instance, with regard to the African-led response to the crisis in Mali, there were tensions between the AU and ECOWAS about who should lead. Similar tensions existed between SADC and the AU over how to deal with the political crisis in Madagascar. This is not surprising on a continent where most nations have traditionally been protective of their foreign policy and are wary of interference by outside actors in their backyards.

The APF consists of three broad components

From the outset, the main focus of the APF was to provide financial support for African-led peace support operations. So the whole idea was that the African Peace and Security Council required access to resources to independently mount operations where they felt these were required. With this initial financing, a range of operations were supported. AMIS in Sudan, AMISOM in Somalia, which is still ongoing, MICOPAX in the Central African Republic and AFISMA, more recently, in Mali. Some of these operations where eventually transformed into UN operations, but at their outset all were AU-authorized operations and fully staffed by African troops.

The APF provides non-lethal support, essentially covering the allowances of all soldiers participating in peacekeeping operations. Other forms of international support including military equipment has been provided by the UN, the US or individual EU member states.

The second component of the APF has focused on APSA capacity-building. This involves a wide range of capacity-building support that is intended to reinforce the various structures and organizations linked to APSA, largely at a regional level but also within the AU itself. This includes the peace and security departments of all of these actors, peace-keeping training institutions, early-warning mechanisms, etc. In practice, a large proportion of support provided has gone into providing staff for the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD) which had virtually no personnel in 2003/04**.** Gradually, the number of staff in AU PSD increased to several hundred, financed in part through the APF but also through other donors such as GIZ, the German agency for international cooperation.

The main emphasis, in terms of capacity-building through APSA, has been on strengthening financial management. There has been a real concern, particularly in Europe, about the huge amounts of money dispensed to African organizations and ensuring its appropriate use. In the early days of peace support operations on the continent there were many instances of informal procedures being used to transport cash, in response to an urgent need on the ground and due to a lack of alternative and more effective

mechanisms to manage financial issues. So there has been a huge learning curve in the last few years for the APF, with particular emphasis on financial management. Although this area of capacity building was considered successful, other required and necessary aspects of capacity building fell through the cracks and did not receive the equivalent attention as a result.

More recently, the third important component of the APF, the Early Response Mechanism, was developed. This mechanism was set up in 2009 and emerged from the recognition that no existing mechanism enables the AU and its partners to respond rapidly to a crisis in Africa. The problem is the speed in which the EU approves requests for financing. Typically, to provide funding for peace support operations like AMISOM, it takes approximately six months for the funding to be approved in Brussels. Previous experiences where crises emerge at short notice have shown that this can be a problem. Because no regional mechanism exists to approve funding immediately, the Early Response Mechanism was set up to approve funding within two weeks. This enables the AU to authorize the immediate release of funds to send peace envoys, help set up a peace support operation, or for other activities intended to facilitate a rapid response to the crisis. These activities typically have a six-month time frame and are supposed to enable early actions until other sources of funding can be acquired.

APF Funding

From 2004 till the end of 2015, approximately 1.7 billion Euros have been contracted for the APF. Of that amount, approximately 80 percent has gone to support AMISOM, 285.5 million just in 2015, followed by MISCA (now MINUSCA) in the Central African Republic and AFISMA in Mali. This highlights where the priorities were set. Money was utilized to support rapid response to conflicts on the ground, peace support operations and particularly AMISOM, which has been by far the largest operation and is currently still running as an AU-led operation.

All of this funding from the EU has come from the European Development Fund (EDF). The APF's ability to use development funds to

support peace and security activities has been a great achievement. While certain EU members got very nervous regarding the use of European Development Funds to support military and security issues, most donors recognize that there is a clear linkage between security and development and that it is necessary to re-evaluate how to deal with these issues in a more integrated matter. Due to these reasons, the question of APF funding has been a very sensitive issue in Brussels. For instance, all decision-making regarding the funding for AMISOM has to be discussed and approved in Brussels among member states. It takes up to six months to approve a tranche of funding, and following this period the funding has to be reviewed again. Thus, for the last six to eight years, AMISOM´s funding has been reviewed every six months. Due to this long bureaucratic process in Brussels, money often arrives months late and either the troop-contributing countries or the AU are forced to pre-finance peace support operations.

90 percent of the EU funding to the APF has gone to support peace support operations. The main concern from the EU's perspective and in general has been about the sustainability of this funding. From the outset, the APF was built on the idea of an EU exit strategy, with a plan to provide funds for a limited number of years. The intention was to establish a parallel contribution mechanism that could be used by African states as well as other concerned international parties that might be interested in contributing. In practice, those parallel contributions have never been forthcoming and a clear exit strategy for the EU has never materialised. While some EU member states have cited concerns about the amounts of money going to support the APF, this needs to be kept in perspective. At the height of the US intervention in Afghanistan, the US was spending one billion dollars every seven to ten days to support their military efforts there. This is a huge amount of money compared to the 1.4 billion Euros European countries have spent on peace and security issues in Africa, through the APF, over the last ten years. But clearly there are a range of competing priorities within the EU in terms of how to respond to development and security issues on the continent.

Impact and Outcomes of APF

There is no doubt that the APF has been a game changer in terms of facilitating and improving African responses to conflicts on the continent. The EU has supported missions in a whole range of countries, including Somalia, Central African Republic, Mali, Burundi and Sudan, as well as smaller investments to other African countries. This enables collective African security action, something that has never been possible before. The APF has empowered a Peace and Security Council and has had a direct impact on hundreds of thousands of lives in the countries and regions effected by conflicts. Furthermore, despite underlying tensions, insufficiencies and competition, the APF has promoted collaboration between the AU and regional organizations in terms of addressing a whole range of conflicts. In many ways that is a great achievement as it has allowed the development and encouragement of African ownership in crisis response. This is a huge departure from past European interventions on the African continent over the past few centuries which have been driven by the strategic interests of European countries and have often been at odds with the interests of African nations.

In many ways, the APF can be seen as an innovative instrument. As previously mentioned development funds can be used to promote peace and security issues in Africa. Moreover, the APF has become more flexible and has evolved in many ways over the past ten years. This positive development was in response to the early limitations which gave rise the establishment of Early Response Mechanism. Thus, the APF moved away from a formerly narrow focus on peace support operations to a broader emphasis on conflict prevention and mediation. Despite the relatively small amount of money spent on conflict prevention there is a growing recognition that more has to be done to prevent political tensions turning into violent conflict. The broader focus of the APF has, however, created unrealistic expectations with regards to the APF's role. As a result, we have seen a the APF being increasingly stretched in terms of the activities it conducts. The APF has been pushed to take on security sector reform, post-conflict reconstruction activities, tackle terrorism and enforce maritime security. In many cases, these are the priorities of donor countries and not necessarily those of African countries.

The APF is essentially a financial instrument, which is meant to deliver a security objective. However, over the last few years there have been challenges to achieving this objective, as the APF is dependent on special conditions to work effectively, including African capacity that in many cases is still weak. In addition, the APF is dependent on the financial contributions of both African and EU member states. In terms of human resources the APF unit in Brussels consists only of four or five people which is a small team bearing a large responsibility. It has a whole range of duties, such as managing decision-making processes, handling contract impasses, overseeing Brussel's various activities and providing or at least channelling appropriate levels of technical assistance. Hence, there are huge constraints on the APF's ability to function as it should.

There have also been some specific challenges at the regional level. The Regional Economic Communities were not originally set up to work on peace and security issues, and most of them have only turned their attention to these issues in the last ten years. ECOWAS has been one of the first organizations to develop capacity in regards to peace and security issues due to the crisis in Liberia in the 1990s. Supporting the development of regional and continental organizations remains a key priority for the APF.

A third issue is the complementarity between what the APF is doing and other EU funding instruments. The EU has a wide range of funding instruments in Africa, including regional programmes, and the CSDP/ISP. Also the complementarity between the EU and other non-EU funding instruments from the UN, the US or other financial donors, is a point of concern. While the APF cannot do it all and should not attempt to do it all, attempts to secure complementary financial contributions from other partners have largely been unsuccessful.

These are all issues which constrain APF support for long-term capacity building which will be necessary for African-led conflict prevention efforts to be effective and sustainable. As already highlighted, there is a need to complement these rapid responses more effectively with activities that can help to build long-term capacity within the APSA. For all of these reasons, and given that African financial contributions have been relatively limited,

it is difficult for Africa to fulfil its role as a fully-fledged partner in the so-called African-EU partnership. This has the consequence of undermining African ownership of the APF and of EU activities in the area of security and peace. Despite all these challenges, the APF has been a necessary and vital game changer with regards to the strengthening of African collective responses to conflicts on the continent. *African solutions for African problems* is still very much a work-in-progress, but the APF has been an important step forward.

Presidential Security Dilemma, Ethnorealism and the Greed Hypothesis

Abdelkérim Ousman

The notion of "security dilemma" figures eminently in all variants of realism. Therefore, before specifying what I describe as "presidential security dilemma", the cause of instability, I will discuss whether it is possible to use realism for the study of ethnic conflicts in general and the sub-Saharan presidential security problems in particular.

For ethno-realists, those who thought of applying realism in ethnic conflicts, the security dilemma (and other core realist issues such as survival and the maximization of its perceived conditions) remains unchanged whether at the inter-ethnic or international levels. The intellectual authority for such conceptualization still remains Hans Morgenthau[1] who, in 1948, proposed that in essence, humans desire three things: "to live, to propagate and to dominate". Ethno-realists apply these assumptions to their analysis of power and security relations among ethnic groups, in a way similar to what realists have done for conflict relations among states. Their conclusions could be summarized as follows: ethnic identities are natural phenomena that play a primordial structuring role in the relations among humans and, the resulting divisions are not political construct but natural occurrences producing tensions and rivalries which are, in some occasions, not dissimilar from those occurring among states.[2]

In this sense, the newly found phrase, "ethno-realism", adds nothing substantial to the realist theory of International Relations, since the dilemma remains the same and so is the behavior of the actors. Whether

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[1] Hans Morgentau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Knopf: New York 1948, p. 17.

[2] Ted Robert Gurr, "Minorities, Nationalists and Ethnopolitical Conflicts", In InChester Crocker, Fen Olser Hampson and Pamella Aall (eds), *Managing Global Chaos. Sources and Responses To International Conflict*, Washington: US Instituteof Peace Pres 1996, pp.53-78, Anthony Smith "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism" *Survival*, Spring 1993, pp. 48-62 and Chaim Kauffman, "Possible and Impossible Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars", *International Security*, No.23, Fall 1996, pp.120-156.

they are individuals (presidents), groups (ethnic groups, tribes and clans) or nation-states, they all seek to maximize one utility: the security interest. What ethno-realism does not explain, however, is the fluidity and varied intensities of tensions and rivalries among ethnic groups. Etho-realists simply acknowledge that tensions, rivalries and armed conflicts become acute when they occur in an environment dominated by a hyper-nationalist project based on the desire of one ethnic group at the expense of others.[3]

In Chad, Sudan, and the Central African Republic and elsewhere in Africa, massacres, ethnic cleansing and genocide were conducted by those who claim to be the fighting arms of governments and in complicity with governments, which provide them with political support, arms, ammunitions and air covers. This government role makes the anarchy thesis, underpinning (ethno) realism, difficult to maintain, difficulty that invites for the modification of security dilemma facing African states. Their security dilemma stems from their very mode of functioning, which leads the head of state to an impasse: when faced with issues of crimes and punishment (involving his officials), he may have to choose between two equally unappealing alternatives, reflecting what a dilemma is by definition: bringing those who committed crimes before the law and risking the possibility that a leading member of the clan in power organizes a military coup or, covering and comforting those criminals members of his clan and face the rebellion of the victims' survivors. This is partly why these states are in constant state of fragility and political crisis.

The presidential security dilemma presented in this fashion poses the question whether the pervasive phenomenon of warlordism in the African continent could be explained by greed alone. Since the end of the Cold War, in countries like Angola, Sierra Leone and Congo, non-state groups no longer enjoyed foreign sponsorship and began self-financing by exploiting their countries' natural resources, which made them to lose moral dignity in the eyes of some academic circles and international institutions such as The Hague Court and the World Bank. Some

[3] David Welsh "Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict" in *Ethic Conflict and International Security,* in Michael E. Brown (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993, pp.56-57 and Stephen Van Evera "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War", *International Securities* 18 (4):3-39.

academics and international institutions' officials formulated the greed hypothesis to account for what they term as "Warlordism", leading to the analysis of political instability from the point of view of leaders of rebel groups. Such an analysis takes as level of analysis these leaders' desire to gain money from illegal sources such as drug trafficking and unlawful exploitation of natural resources. The desire of money as a level of analysis is not explained by the rarefication of foreign support to rebel groups; it is, rather, assumed that "the point of some wars is not for one side or the other to win them, but to engage in profitable crime under the cover of warfare."[4] The greed hypothesis, thus, operates through two reductions that deprive current intrastate conflicts from their political and security nature. First, it reduces a rebel leader to a warlord, who on his turn is reduced to an economic interest maximizing entity or homoeconomicus. The resulting ideal type profile of a warlord is: a being whose desire is limited to the accumulation of wealth through wars and illegal means. Such characterization has led many analyses to shift emphasis "…from considerations about deprivation and scarcity towards an overall attention for the conflict-promoting aspects of economic factors in armed conflict."[5] The greed hypothesis, however, shares the same epistemological roots with ethno-realism; in both analyses it is assumed that actors make rational choice to maximize their utility. However, for the purpose of denying moral and political dignity to rebel leaders, it is implied that in each group one individual leads because other individuals consider that their economic utility could be maximized by following the leader, who is often self-proclaimed. This assumption belittles the fact that in often cases in Africa, individuals become rebels not to gain money but because their security is threatened and dignity not respected at the individual and/or community levels.

Indeed, the conceptualization of conflicts in Africa in terms of warlordism overlooks the complexity arising from the fact that, in several cases rebels groups are constituted of volunteers representing different victimized ethnic groups and clans, who operate collegially through factional representation in their decision-making process. They simply lack strong

[4] KEEN, D., *The Economic Functions of Civil Wars*, Adelphi Papers, n° 320.
[5] BALLENTINE, K. and SHERMAN, J., *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict. Beyond Greed and Grievance*, Boulder&London (Lynne Rienner Publishers), 2003, p. 5.

leadership rules, which institute one person as a decision-maker. Because of the ethnic differences among rebel groups, cooperation is not without great difficulties even though rebel groups consider themselves the enemies and victims of the regime in place. Nevertheless, they are obliged to cooperate; otherwise, the regime would have found easier to eliminate them one after another. Even though unity, among rebels groups, is often proclaimed, a unified leadership, if it exists, is fragile. In cases of Chad, Darfur and South Sudan cooperation is rarely beyond particular circumstances of military operations and tactics: when they are attacked by government troupes or when they decide to attack the regime.

In spite of this complexity, for Paul Collier of the World Bank, for instance, greed is the prime driving force of those engaged in intrastate conflicts [6], and predation determines the motivation behind the formation of armed groups. Such an analysis is flawed because, it is not economics that fuels the war but the necessity of independent financing (in the absence of a foreign sponsor) that prompts some groups to unlawfully exploit the resources of their countries or neighboring countries or simply engage in racketeering of already victimized communities in the name of their struggle. There is simply no factual legitimacy that allows for labelling all regroups as economically greedy. There is no doubt that in some parts of the world (others than Chad and Darfur), some groups are criminal organizations, others are political extremist groups with no definable and attainable goals, but the majority of rebel groups in Africa are just "home-grown response to insecurity"[7] created by political authorities' own security dilemma. Such is the case of organizations like the Justice and Equality Movement in Darfur and various other Darfuri rebels groups and the Chadian Union des Forces de la Résistance (UFR) and other Chadian rebel organizations that have been involved in the proxy wars between Chad and Sudan during the first decade of this century.

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[6] Paul Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,* World Policy Research Paper, Washington: World Bank, 2000, p.3.

[7] C. Eros, "Vigilantes, civil defence forces, and militia groups: the other side of privatizations of security in Africa"*, Conflicts Trends* vol.1 (2000)*,* pp25-29. For groups of insurgents like the Somali, Eritrean, Ethiopian, Ugandan, Rwandan, Congelese Liberian and Sierra Leonean, please C. Clapham (ed) *African Guerillas*, Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 2000.

If presidential security dilemma as a concept cannot be accommodated within ethno-realism or the greed hypothesis, is the concept of tribalism more suitable? Before critically analyzing the concept of tribalism for the cases of Chad, Darfur and South Sudan, one has to face the fluid loyalties and shifting allegiances that characterize rebel movements in Chad and Darfur. As recently observed by Marielle Debos:

The cross-border activities of armed combatants with fluid loyalties are a particularly important factor that is often overlooked. Before these conflicts gained international attention, many combatants involved in the Chad, Darfur, and Central African crises had already fought in several wars in the region, either as rebels or soldiers. The repeated re-conversion of armed combatants, who easily shift allegiances, is indeed a structural pattern of the current conflicts which has major implications both at the local and transnational levels.[8]

When applied in this context, the concept of "tribalism" loses its explanatory power. While the configuration of power is fluid, because there is no enduring loyalty, the word tribalism signifies a strong feeling of identity with loyalty to one's tribe or group. It does not explain, for instance, why in Chad, for example, the head of the armed opposition is the president's nephew. This phenomenon is part of the presidential security dilemma underlined above: where one member of the ruling clan considers that the sitting president would be incapable of maintaining cordial relations among the factions that constitute the regime and/or with foreign sponsors. Without its factional support and foreign sponsorship, the clan in power runs the risk of being victimized by other groups. This was what prompts in Chad a nephew to rebel against his uncle the president.

It is undeniable that most often a tribe or clan takes up weapons against the sitting government spontaneously and individually, as a reaction to violence exercised by government authorities, who are often, the president's siblings. This fact does not make the whole dynamics necessarily tribal, because in the absence of functioning government institutions that uphold the rules of

[8] Marielle Debos "Fluid Loyalties in a Regional Crisis: Chadian 'Ex-liberators' in the Central African Republic", *African Affairs*, n° 427, 2008, pp. 225-241.

law, it is legitimate that a community takes up weapons to defend itself and joins a rebel grouping.

The multi-tribal character of governments also should be emphasized. However, in the absence of functioning and impartial state institutions some tribes are regarded by the head of state as more reliable than others in protecting the physical security of the president. This is why, sometimes, violence starts inside the group in power because one clan feels wronged, in the name of the president, by another, which further endangers the physical security of the president. In another typical case, a closer relative of the president threatens to take over power because he feels the president was incapable of managing the inter-tribal alliance upon which rests the government. In other often cases the president sees an individual as potential challenger to his power and authority and consequently arrests or kills him and important members of his family. It is this multidimensional dynamics of violence, mirroring the lack of impartial institution monopolizing the exercise of violence, which explains both the fluidity and the shifting allegiances within the government and on which depends the strength or weakness of the president's security dilemma. In effect, the less violence is needed to protect the president, the weaker is the security dilemma. The more the president uses violence to protect himself, the more his security dilemma becomes stronger and the less multiethnic is his regime, which in the long run would be marked not only by ethnic desertions, but also by individuals fleeing the ranks of government armed forces. Indeed, there are a lot of people who join the fight on the side of rebel forces on an individual basis, sometimes by patriotism and other times by opportunism. Last but not least are the many individuals who join the rebel forces because they are fugitive accused of stealing public money, while not benefiting from the impunity that characterizes the unlawful activities of the president's siblings.

Sometimes all the above could be found combined in a one single situation of political violence and unrest mistakenly described as tribalism. Clearly, there is a need for a better term to explain the multiple sources of political

violence. For Réné Lemarchand[9], who wrote in 1980s, when political violence breaks out in Africa, it is often a combination of two sorts of crises: the first is the one associated with the lack of democracy and political participation which is often combined to another crisis generated by the attempt of post-colonial institutions to establish their hegemony. In Chad, as in elsewhere in Africa, this hegemonic crisis is caused by the structuration of the state power around some members of the civil service, the military and a single party system, that are composed from members of a single tribe or clan as opposed to the majority of the country's citizens. Lemarchand captures the resulting strife as "factionalism", term also used by George Nzongola Ntalaja and others to describe "…unstructured forms of behavior that cannot be incorporated easily into the more popular paradigms of class and ethnicity without at the same time reducing their explanatory force and because of the multiplicity of the terms faction and factionalism."[10] In this definition, factions describe "…non corporate groupings involved in conflict and recruited by leaders on the basis of diverse principles. Ideology is largely irrelevant as a source of cohesion between a leader and followers. What holds them together is the existence of transactional relationship between them and this in turn is affected by the character of the political field in which it is born, nurtured, or served."[11] Factionalism does not operate in a vacuum; it is also described as a "…dialectical process between informal groups and the institutions of the state, while at the same time giving proper weight to the often improper part played by international actors in shaping the outcome of these interactions."[12] For the proponents of this thesis, "Factionalism is typically associated with the breakdown of state institutions, when communities are experiencing a severe disruption of their normative and institutional underpinnings […] Factional competition may occur at many different levels and coexist with other forms of social differentiation, including those based on class and ethnic solidarity."[13] In the context of this paper,

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[9] Rene Lemarchand "La violence politique", in Christian Coulon and Denis-Constant Martin, *Les Afriques politiques*, La Découverte 1991. p.206. Cited by Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, *Violence politique et conflits en Afrique*, Paris, L'Harmattan 2006, p.135.

[10] Georges Nzongola-Ntlaja, *The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities*, Africa World Press, 1986, 327 pages, p. 51.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] *Ibid.*

however, factionalism does not express the breakdown of state institutions because in the case of Chad and Sudan. It does not emerge in replacement of other institutional forms. As far as power and authority are concerned since independence, factionalism has been and still is the only foundation for political authority and revolves around the security dilemma faced by the president. Next section, which is about the cases of Chad and Sudan, shows how factionalism revolves around presidential security dilemma.

Chad and Sudan: Factions and Presidential Security Dilemma

It should be noted that in countries like Chad and Sudan governments are locked into mortal combat with their armed opponents. For this reason, they describe their armed foes as terrorists and/or mercenaries and dismiss their social and political grievances, which are often caused by government violence. In the absence of a legal political process that allows for peaceful dissidence, government members who disagree with the head of state are killed, exiled or become armed opponents. In fact, it goes without saying that Chadian and Sudanese political authorities are both based on threat of death towards the governed and not on a promise for better life. Such a type of authority tolerates the corrupt and abusive behaviors of its officials and often faces, in return, damaging and costly uprisings and armed insurgencies. As a result, the political process is reduced to an enduring cycle of violence that is always ethnically and tribally based.

Beyond these important similarities there are enormous differences between the two countries in terms of statecraft. In Sudan, up until recently, there is a hegemonic idea of being Sudanese despite the ethnic differences and racial discrimination exercised by government officials against non-Arabs. In comparison Chad lacks such hegemony. In Sudan there are political parties aligned along the lines of ideological and religious differences, which are all about the relationship between religion and the state. Furthermore, Sudan has multiethnic political and military elites who consciously exploit factional alliances and tribal allegiances to strengthen the state's authority. In Chad, politics is rarely about anything else than tribal and factional bickering. While in Sudan armed opponents never won a war against the government and change of government often occurred through a military coup led by one faction of the governing élites, in Chad,

since independence, tribally based armed opponents defeated three times the government in place. Thus, in spite of the Darfur and other Sudanese conflicts, the Sudan, even after the independence of South Sudan, is more of a nation than Chad. However, currently because of the conflict in Darfur and other Northern Sudanese, Sudan is as unstable as Chad is, even though the latter is among the most unstable countries in Africa: Yet what is clear are the basic factors behind the instability - elements that are central to many conflicts across Africa: growing oil wealth, complex ethnic ties that transcend borders (in this case, with Sudan), and ambitious presidents aiming to stay in power longer than their constitutions originally allowed. Indeed, experts say, Chad is a kind of microcosm of the reasons for conflict on the continent. "Chad signifies the worst of Africa," says Peter Kagwanja of the International Crisis Group in Pretoria, South Africa. Despite some significant economic and peace-making progress in Africa in recent years, Chad is "the best example," he says, "of how long the road is to peace" for Africa."[14]

Both Chad and Sudan rely on foreign military assistance. However, Chad is more dependent on foreign military aid than Sudan, because the latter has recently built a significant military industrial base. In fact, since 1994, the Sudanese armaments production is organized in the form of "Military Industry Corporation", which allows Sudan to produce small arms as well as heavy weaponry with Chinese and Iranian technical assistance. "The country is the second largest producer of arms in sub-Saharan Africa, after South Africa."[15] Chad, for its part, compensates for its lack of an armament industry, as many former French colonies do, by signing military cooperation and secret defense agreements with France. It is the ability or inability of the Chadian head of state to maintain cordial relations with his French counterpart that determines whether or not a Chadian regime survives its armed foes. This is exemplified by instances where one government member or a group decides to take over power as they estimate that the current governing faction is militarily weak and lack French military support. As we shall see in the next section, Chadian

[14] Abraham McLaughlin and Claire Soares, "Oil wealth and corruption at play in Chad's rebellion" *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 26, 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0421/p06s01-woaf.html, Downloaded May 19, 2009.
[15] http://mic.sd/english/mainen.html.

authorities, since independence, have always made the economy of nation-building when they have an assured French military support.

Foreign Military Aid as Impediment to State-Building

French military support to Chadian regimes is the main factor impeding the formation of professional Chadian defense forces and encouraged the domination of the country by one ethnic group, which is the cause of all episodes of Chadian civil wars.

The involvement of Sudan in Chadian civil and factional wars created a backlash endangering Sudanese national unity in the west of Sudan by creating the phenomenon of Zaghawa political awakening, in both Chad and Sudan, furthering the de-institutionalization of the Chadian state and contaminating Sudan. As a result both countries are on the verge of becoming "failing states", like Somalia. To reverse this trend, among the many institutional functions that these two countries lack and must have are: professional military forces that protect governing elites from themselves (in deterring them as much as possible from corrupt behaviors) and shield them from those who would attempt to seize power by violent means.

In countries like Sudan and Chad there are many people in uniform but they are few military institutions from the viewpoint of the rules of law. Most people in uniform are armed tribes and clans disguised as soldiers, who often unlawfully serve themselves (by unlawfully confiscating, for their benefits, civilian people's goods) or serve at the pleasure of the dictator head of the state who is member of their tribe or clan.[16]

As it happened in many occasions in Sudan and Chad a president is rarely overthrown by a victimized community but by his own, which is already benefiting from all privileges of power. When a community or group of individuals decides to overthrow a president, who is a sibling, it is because the latter has decided to open the governance system to other communities

[16] International Crisis Group "Chad: Powder Keg in the East" Crisis Group Africa Report N°149, 15 April 2009, p.4.

in order to make it more inclusive, share power with armed rebel groups or civil opponents or simply reform the armed forces in order to make them law obeying state institutions. Recent history of Chad had shown that the president's ethnic group or clan had always resisted openness until the total collapse of the state or in a rare occasion until the tribe or clan in power is overthrown and becomes on its turn a victimized community.

Clearly, the presidential security dilemma is the cause of emergence of rebel groups, as well as of civil strife. This dilemma, which is largely explained by the ineffectiveness of formal institutions, has its roots deep the colonial history of both countries. For the insecurity that is prevailing in Eastern Chad and Darfour, the colonial domination of that region could be blamed for one thing: the destruction of traditional institutions and the lack of their replacement by modern ones. This has been done by both France and England through the brutal marginalization of the sultanates of Ouaddaï (Eastern Chad) and Darfur (Sudan). When Chad became independent in 1960 (four years after Sudan), power was given by France to leaders who came from the South of the country. In 1964, when the people of the North rebelled against domination by the Southerners, "Sudan became the main rear base of these northern dissidents, who formed the first armed movement in 1966 in Nyala (South Darfur) the Front de libération nationale du Tchad (Frolinat). Frolinat used Islamic rhetoric to mobilize people in the north against the 'pagans' and Christians of the south, who remained closely bound to the former colonial power."[17]

Between the popular uprising and the creation of the armed movement there was a three-year gap, which explains the fact the rebellion in its beginning was not religious nor based on a modern ideology; it was home grown reaction to insecurity caused by government authorities. Later the armed rebellion was transformed into an armed movement, which recruited members "…among all the northern populations (Ouaddaïans and Arabs from the Sahel, Tubu and Gorane from the Sahara), but ultimately broke

[17] Jérôme Tubiana, *The Chad and Sudan Proxy Wars: The Darfurization of Chad Myths and Reality,* p.24.

up along ethnic lines into different movements that fought each other as much as they fought the regime".[18]

The factional nature of the rebellion was only mirroring the factional nature of the state dominated by one clan. The Sara government was formed by an alliance among several tribes (Gambaye, Mbaye, Goulay, Madingaye, Kaba, Sara-Kaba, Niellim, Nar, Dai et Ngana) dominated by the Madingaye. The dominance of Chad by the Madingaye and their allies could be seen in the military and paramilitary organizations and the entire civil service. The source of cohesion in this faction is not an ideology but an explicit social contract (although unwritten) that commits the followers to militarily defend the president and his clan against his enemies and in return the followers are, implicitly or explicitly, allowed to loot the rest of the populations from their little wealth. It should be noted that the first popular uprising by the Moubi tribe[19] that later became Frolinat was caused by excessive taxations.

In the 1960s political context of Chad, it was impossible to create truly national military and paramilitary organizations that protect the entire population. One part of the population (the Southerners) constituted the military base of the regime and tortured, killed, humiliated and overtaxed the rest (the Northerners). Those among the Northerners who joined the Chadian armed forces rarely reached the rank of corporal. It was in this context that the governments of Chad and France signed secret defense agreements to protect the government just in case the faction in power fails to protect itself. However, France had its own interests: maintaining Chad in French neocolonial dominance and it trusted the Southerners for that role.

This was why French Africanists and security analysts have been accustomed to the description of Chad as important strategic place for French military presence in Africa: if Chad fails to forces hostile to French interests, then, it will adversely affect France's military projection in the entire region. This is certainly, a mechanical vision, but it has always

[18] *Ibid.*„ p.24.
[19] Moukhtar Bachar, *Mangalmé, préfecture du Guerra et ses habitants (les Moubi)*, Fort Lamy, École nationale d'administration, 1970 (mémoire de 1re année).

inspired the heads of French armies to exercise certain form of military control over sub-Saharan Francophone states through explicit and secret military agreements. Chad is part of the first signatories of defence agreements ratified by France during the independence. According P. Hugot, Chad is totally unstructured, anarchic and empty of any political legitimacy. For Hugot it was the colonial military administration, its dismantling of pre-colonial political formations, that has left the country in such a state. However, this author fails to see how French military assistance was part of the problem. Strong of the French military support, Chadian political authority is based on nothing else, than the number and quality of weapons, the discipline of Chadian national army, which is national only by name, and the volume of their supply in ammunitions.[20] As a result, in spite of more than 50 years of political independence from France, the country was unable to generate a truly national government with public institutions reflecting its multiethnic character. In 1975 when the first Chadian president (Ngarta Tombalbaye) was assassinated by the members of his own tribe, the public institutions left by France were simply stations where the ethnic brethrens of the former president are placed in dominant positions.

The assassination of the first Chadian president by his own siblings did not end the rebellion nor was it aimed for that purpose. It was the resultant of conflict among the governing factions. The rebellion, (although was at war among its own factions and against the government, because of the weapons provided by Libya) gained strength, seriously threatening the government. From the 1970s up 1980s, a major conflict developed within Frolinat between two rebel groups that are ethnically very close: the Tubu, led by Goukouni Weddeye, and the Gorane, led by Hissein Habré, who was also supported by the Zaghawa. Traditionally hostile to the Gorane, Arabs tended to support Weddeye. Later they founded their own movements: first, in 1970, the Volcan Army, which was both pro-Arab and Islamist in persuasion, and in 1978, the Conseil démocratique revolutionnaire (CDR) of Acyl Ahmat Akhabash.

Amid civil war and burgeoning rebel organizations, in 1976, under the government of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, then president of France, Chad

[20] P. Hugo, «Un mahdi pour le Tchad», *L'Afrique et l'Asie modernes*, No.125, 1980 (2), p.53.

and France replaced the defense agreement by a technical military cooperation agreement. The main difference of this agreement with the previous is the content of article 4, which sets the framework for intervention of the French forces: French military personnel serve within Chadian forces with their rank. They ware the Chadian uniform or civilian clothes according to the instructions of the Chadian military authority. They may not be directly involved in war, policing, nor in peacekeeping operations. However, as it has been recently revealed, beside this formal cooperation, there was a secret policing agreement. The policing agreement is not trivial, because in several African States, a secret policing agreement has been signed, in the 1960s, to secure the life of "friendly" dictators, a sort of insurance to keep power. These secret texts provide for intervention, at the discretion of the French President, on the request of African presidents. The secret agreement often stipulates three main points:

First point: France may intervene but has no obligation to do so. It is at the discretion of the President of the French Republic, single decision maker on this subject. The request goes through the Ambassador of France.

Second point: It is the head of African State which makes the request "in a particularly serious situation."

Third point: the command of the local troops and the use of firepower are immediately transferred to the French officer sent on-site.

These texts are still in force, if one believes the explanations given in March 2006 by General Henri Bentégat in the French Senate, which came after his address of 2002 at the National Assembly, where he stated: "nobody does today imagine an implementation of defense agreements outside of situations not satisfying the conditions of external aggression, even though some defense agreements signed by France have secret clauses providing for broader intervention cases" (The translation is mine)

Chad history proves that the new agreements of the 1970s have not changed the Gaullist design of Africa. Immediately after their signature, the new cooperation agreements were accompanied by an ad hoc instrument called DAMI (for detachment of military assistance and intelligence).

Officially, it is promoting a lighter, more efficient and more professional cooperation. In fact, DAMI forces, composed from French Special Forces, will become the units of intelligence and protection of the power in place. Placed from the summit to the base of the Chadian military hierarchy, DAMI advisors will form a chain of command parallel to the official Chadian military hierarchy. This allows France to maintain or change the leaders in place, with the secret intervention of the DGSE (Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure).

No faction can violently conquer power and maintain it without the approval of France. Given the fact that it is France that provides Chadian military with arms, ammunition and intelligence, it could affect power in Chad by intervening or by not intervening in a situation of conflict. In the absence of truly Chadian national military forces, the lack of French support to president Tombalbaye led to the latter death. Later the French government refused to assist militarily President Felix Malloum, a Southern Christian who belongs to the governing faction that was previously installed by France, in favor of the Northerner Hissène Habré.

One would wonder how the French government changed from supporting the Southerners to help a Northern Chadian Muslim (Hissène Habré) to take over power. The answer could be found in the history of the relationship between Chad and France. Since the conquest of Chad, the French external security community was divided into two groups: those who romanticize arid lands and deserts, their camels and slender women against those who preferred greenery and exotic civilizations of mysterious Africa. The latter group romanticizes Southern Chadians (former victims of Northern Chadian slave traders) whose hearts beat to the sound of the drum pacing the dances of animist initiation rituals. These old colonial sentimental attitudes are being reinforced by Parisian politics sometimes supporting "civilized" Northerner Chadian Muslims against "superstitious and savage" Southerners. In other times, the French defended the negro-Africans victim of contempt by plunderers of the North. While Northern Chadians in their majority have always distrusted France, the Southerners' devotion to France had led many to lose their lives on the battlefields of Europe during World War I and II.

Thus, in 1979, while France was supporting at the same time Habré (Muslim Northerner) and Kamougué (Southerner Christian), the followers of these two men massacred each other in N'Djamena, the capital city of Chad. The French who supported the Southerners found themselves behind the French Ambassador in Chad, while those who supported the "Northerners were solidly behind the commander of the French base, known for its support to the Armed Forces of the North of Hissène Habré".[21] The commander of the French military base in Chad won the day and habré became the president of Chad in 1982.

However, before Hissène Habré came to power in 1982, briefly between 1979 and 1982, France lost total control of Chad. With the support of Libya, Goukouni Weddeye took power in N'Djamena in 1979. In 1980, Habré sought refuge in Darfur, where he received support from the Zaghawa tribes. In 1982, Habré took power with the support of Sudan, the United States, and France that were united to contain the Libyan influence not only in Chad but in the entire sub-Saharan Africa. Gadhafi, for his part, supported the Chadian Arabs of the Conseil démocratique révolutionaire (CDR), who had been led by Acheikh Ibn Oumar Saïd from Awlad Rashid Arab tribe.

The French armed forces were instrumental in the installation of Hissène Habré in power in 1982. Hissène Habré achieved an appearance of national unity by expelling Libyan and pro-Libyan forces from the north of Chad in 1987, and began to diversify his military dependency by a method of playing off the United States against France. However, his attempt to further national unity by building a truly national institution was thwarted by the resistance by his own tribe brethrens and his factional allies the Zaghawa. He was faced by rebellions in the South and Center of the country. His own tribe was unhappy because he opened the governance system, especially his party, the UNIR, to representatives of other tribes than the Gorane and Zaghawa.

Moreover, since Chad was on the verge of financial bankruptcy, the regime was unable to compensate its soldiers and the latter began looting the other

[21] Jean-François Ménard *States of Black Africa*, Karthala, 1991, p. 187.

tribes not only in Chad but also in the neighboring Darfur, which put the government of Chad in a diplomatic conflict with the government of Sudan. Not only Habré has antagonized his own tribe and allies (the Zaghawa) by opening his governance system to other Chadians, his need to diversify his foreign military assistance in order to decrease his military dependency on France was perceived by the French authorities as a leaning towards the Anglo-Saxon dominance undermining the historical French influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. In other words, the situation was ripe for another leader who could build an internal factional alliance to establish a governing coalition that could accommodate French and Sudanese concerns.

In 1989, the main challenge to his power became his defecting allies the Zaghawa, whom he suspected of attempting a coup. As it could be expected, the Zaghawa sought refuge in Darfur. There, they enjoyed not only the support of Sudanese Zaghawa but also of the Islamist junta of Omar al-Bashir, who had just taken over power in Khartoum. The Sudanese's support of the Chadian Zaghawa was an error (due to their misreading of the Chadian factionalism), which they will regret later. Chad was poor and financially bankrupted. Habré's allies, especially the Bedeyat (a Zaghawa clan) had perceived no other choice than to resort to their ancestral practice: looting the members of other communities to survive, which led them to victimize Chadian and Sudanese Arabs, Ouaddai, Hajeray and Southern Chadians.

Without French military assistance, Habré could not secure his regime nor insure his own security and the Americans were not interested in supporting him. His lack of foreign military assistance has led members of his tribe the Gorane to desert him. In 1990, the Zaghawa led by Idriss Déby (the current president, who was also member of Habré's regime) with support from France, Sudan and Libya took over power in N'Djamena. The French's role was particularly important, because they made the new government of Chad a new ally and sought to extend their influence to Sudan, which was also in a dire economic situation and in need of a potent western ally.

France's New Relations with the Islamic Sudanese Junta

For a variety of reasons, including comments against the regime abuses, both England and the United States lost influence in Sudan in 1993. At the time, Sudan was in full economic and financial crisis and, the Sudanese regime was desperately looking for a way out of its isolation, which became a golden opportunity for France to become Sudan's privileged ally to initiate large geo-political, military, oil and commercial maneuver in the region. In 1992, Jean-Claude Mantion and Paul Fontbonne of the Délégation Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure had already old and close contact with Sudanese intelligence officials. Jean-Christophe Mitterrand was on very good terms with General el Bechir; his friend Paul Dijoud, Director Africa in Quai d'Orsay had made many trips to Khartoum, organized by a Franco-Tunisian businessman.[22]

Early in 1993, Khartoum undertook a great effort to please the French Government. French scientists and journalists received invitations to visit the country. Many Sudanese provinces introduced French as optional course in secondary education. Khartoum allowed Paris to intervene as a mediator to its endless civil wars and tried to forge closer links with the French political parties.[23] In April 1993, Hassan el Turabi welcomed the success of the French right to the parliamentary elections "declaring that he is convinced that the Gaullists had a better understanding of the Arab world and things would go better with them".[24] Indeed, Jean-Claude Mantion, associated with Jean-Charles Marchiani to Pasqua network, was mandated to work for the improvement of the relationship between France and Sudan, together with his long time-friend, el Fatih Irwa, high Security Advisor of the Sudanese regime.

Late 1993, General Philippe Rondot of the DST (under authority of the Minister of the Interior) engaged Khartoum for tracking Carlos, an

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[22] Dossier noir no. 2, 09/01/95, Chapitre 5, "Les pot pourri franco-soudanais", Cited in Dossiers Noirs, "Les séductions d'el Tourabi et la revanche de Fachoda », http://www.voltairenet.org/article5909.html.

[23] Pax Christi, *The French Connection, Rapport sur la collaboration politique, économique et militaire entre Khartoum et Paris.* 10/94, p.8.

[24] Mouna Naim "Non-dits franco-soudanais", *Le Monde* 18/08/1994.

international terrorist. In December of that year, Jean-Claude Mantion and el Fatih Irwa organized a meeting between Sudanese and French military delegations. In that meeting, the Sudanese reaffirmed their charges against Uganda, involved, according to them, in delivering arms to the Sudanese People Liberation Movement, a violent non-state organization fighting against the Government of Sudan. By this accusation, the Sudanese government was inciting the French resentment towards the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni - for its support for the Rwandan FPR, the latter was accused of being "the Anglo-Saxons pawn", suspected of wanting to "destabilizing" Mobutu's Zaire.

The Ugandan common enemy became the cornerstone of the Franco-Sudanese military cooperation, especially the exchange between both countries' secret services.[25] However, the military aspect of this alliance could not fully unfold because it would have taken a global dimension.

Since the French soldiers have installed their man Idriss Déby in power in Ndjamena, Sudan has accepted the agreement that Darfur no longer serves as a base for Chadian rebels. The proof is that when Abbas Kotty, former collaborator of Idriss Déby (turned a rebel against him and again reconciled with him), was assassinated in N'Djamena, his men were driven out of Darfur by the Sudanese armed forces. In exchange, France allowed Sudanese government troops to pass through the Central African Republic (CAR) and especially Zaire to attack the SPLA of John Garang from the South of Southern Sudan. Since 1992, relations between the secret services of the two countries have steadily increased.[26]

The French secret service also provided satellite photos identifying the rebels' positions. In Paris, officials admitted that: "It is true that we gave these photos to the Sudanese. However, we believe that they were not able to use them, which requires fairly advanced technical knowledge. But in fact, the Sudanese had help from their Iraqi friends"[27] Regarding the delivery of weapons to Sudan, Jean-Charles Marchiani is the man for the

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[25] Pax Christi, *op.cit.*, p.7.
[26] La lettre du Continent, «Washington, Paris et Khartoum » No.204, 3/2/1994.
[27] Stephen Smith, « Quand Pasqua prend la voie soudanaise », in *Libération* du 16/08/94. This paragraph was cited in *Dossier noir n° 2.*

job. Former official of the armament division of Thomson, a leading French armaments manufacturer, Marchiani had carte blanche from the French authority to meet the needs of Sudanese.[28] It would also reinforce a probable routine support for the campaigns of the Islamic army, with the delivery, at very favorable terms, ammunition and spare parts for French weapons of the Sudanese army: AML 90, 155 Canon, Puma Helicopters, etc.[29]

Throughout the 1990, French, Chinese and Iranian military assistance have made the government of Sudan believe that it could win militarily over its internal armed foes and, therefore, has no need to be involved in serious negotiations that would result in changing the system of governance. More than a decade of killings by Sudanese government or government-sponsored agents like the Janjaweed, the net result is the radicalization of armed oppositions that have the potential of breaking their country to pieces along the ethnic and tribal lines. In Darfur, the Sudanese government has contributed to this by reactivating the Arab Janjaweed militia who fought on the same side with many other Darfuri tribes, including the Zaghawa, against Southern Sudanese. After the ceasefire with Southern Sudanese the Arab Janjaweed were called to protect their brethrens from Zagahawa looting, which contributed in the splitting of the Zaghawa tribes from the Sudanese government forces to become a force of their own opposing the government.

The Zaghawa draw their political awakening from two paradoxical sources. First, from their feeling of being victimized like the Southerners, their former enemies who (unlike them), are on the verge of creating their own country. To have something similar to what the Southern Sudanese got, the Zaghawa decided to turn their guns against the government of Sudan, which is fighting their brethrens in Darfur who formed the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) supported by the government of Chad. This government had no choice but to support the JEM financially and

[28] Patrice Piquard, « Les hommes de Monsieur Charles », in *L'Evénement du Jeudi* du 25/08/94.
[29] Jacques Julliard, « Soudan : le marché de la honte », in *Le Nouvel Observateur* du 01/09/94.

militarily. In return, without the JEM the regime of Idriss Deby, in Chad, would have not survived a day towards the end of the 1990s.

The more they cause damages among the other communities, the more their brother the Chadian President needs them to protect himself and his government against other victimized tribes. Because of Zaghawa excesses in Darfur and rebellion against the government of Sudan, the latter has decided that to get rid of the Zaghawa problem in Sudan, it would be necessary to get rid of the Zaghawa hold on the government in Chad. This was the origin of the proxy war between the Chadian and Sudanese regimes. In 2006, 2008 and 2009 Sudan supported Chadian rebel groups that attacked the capital city of Chad with the objective of removing Idriss Deby from power. The Chadian rebels failed to overthrow president Deby because they lacked unified leadership and France provided strong military support to Deby. In 2008, Chad supported a military incursion of the JEM to Omdurman, a city connected to Khartoum, the Sudanese capital.

Idriss Deby—in office since 1990—has had to fight military insurgencies throughout his tenure due to the Zaghawa abuses of other communities, particularly the people of Ouaddai, the Arabs, Gorane and Tama, who constituted the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), which oversaw several anti-government ethnically based rebel organizations, with the objective to remove the Chadian president from power.[30] Due to their members' divided loyalty, rebel groups within the UFDD were unable to create a unified leadership, which resulted in the separation of the people of Ouaddai within UFDD to create their own organization: the Union des Forces pour le Changement et la Démocratie (UFCD). The two organizations together with the Rassemblement des Forces du Changement (RFC), led by the nephew of the current Chadian president, formed the Union des Forces de la Resistance (UFR). Like the

[30] Amin George Forji "Chad Battles Determined Rebel Group UFDD", *Ohmynews*, http://english.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/article_view.asp?no=331330&rel_no=1, 2006-11-27, Downloaded May 16, 2009.

other organizations that preceded it, the UFR was also incapable of creating a unified leadership. [31]

With the loss of oil to South Sudan, the regime of Beshir in Sudan survives from handout from oil rich Arab countries and by providing troops to Saudi Arabia in its war in Yemen. With the decease of oil prices the Chadian government continues by transforming its tribal armies into mercenaries supporting French military interventions in the Republic of Central Africa, Mali, and Cameroon and by helping Nigeria in its fight against Boko Haram.

Conclusion

Throughout this paper, I have maintained the concept of presidential security dilemma provides a powerful explanation of security problems in Sub-Saharan Africa. I used the cases of Sudan and Chad to illustrate this dilemma. The case of Chad demonstrates that French military support to different Chadian regimes since independence was the main factor impeding the formation of professional Chadian defense forces and encouraged the domination of the country by one ethnic group or the other, which is the cause of all episodes of Chadian civil wars. The involvement of Sudan in Chadian civil and factional wars created a backlash endangering Sudanese national unity in the west of Sudan by creating the phenomenon of Zaghawa political awakening, in both Chad and Sudan. The Zaghawa phenomenon is furthering the de-institutionalization of the Chadian state and thus contaminating Sudan. In this sense, contrary to the Chadian regime and its supporters, what we have witnessed in the first decade of this century was not a darfurization of Chad but the Chadianization of western Sudanese conflicts that are increasingly ethnical and tribal rather than ideological and religious. Both countries are on the verge of becoming "failing states", like Somalia, because of their expediency of dealing with presidential security dilemma.

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[31] "Rebels Groups Unite In Chad" Downloaded May 16, 2009, http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=68&art_id=nw20090119141208954C282122.

To reverse this trend, among the many institutional functions that these two countries lack and must have are: professional military and paramilitary forces that protect governing elites from themselves (in deterring them as much as possible from corrupt behaviors) and shield them from those who would attempt to seize power by violent means.

International donors like Austria, France, the European Union and the United States could use the leverage they have in the continent to encourage African countries to build military establishments, which missions should be extended from the presidential security to human security. This could be accomplished by measures that incrementally "de-tribalize" the security force that protects the president and delink the police forces from the military. A concomitant step that aims to integrate presidential security to military establishment should be followed.

The creation of national military establishments is not an easy task; it can only be considered in the long term. However, a clear roadmap defining the steps to be taken should be put in place, while presidents should be held accountable for the lack of progress towards these steps. In addition, Human Rights should not only be part of the democracy norm, but also the standards of all steps of creating military establishments. Consequently, Human Rights performance should also determine the amount of military aid that the country and the military receive from international donors.

In terms of international political ethics, the prevailing principle, since the end of the Cold War, is that democracy could provide the solution to internal conflicts and that political systems should be blind to ethnicity and religion. While there is nothing wrong with these principles, it is all clear now that democracy does not seem to be a solution to the problem of many dysfunctional African states. A democratic process can only take place when there is a functioning state. Other institutional state-building initiatives should come first and among these initiatives priority should be given to building defence establishments that obey the constitutions of their countries.

The Transformation of Liberation Movements into Political Parties

Christopher Clapham

Introduction

'Liberation movements' are formed to compete for power by armed struggle, which in many cases is violent and prolonged, rather than through the relatively peaceful processes of electoral competition between rival political parties, or through military coups d'état or other seizures of power such as urban uprisings. In cases where these movements are ultimately victorious, and take over the government of the state against which they have been fighting, they provide a very distinctive form of the transformation of violent conflicts with which this workshop is concerned, and are well worth consideration as a category with its own particular strengths and weaknesses, even though there are also some significant differences between individual cases.

Victorious liberation movements have imposed their control over states in most parts of the developing world, with China and Vietnam in eastern Asia and Cuba in the Caribbean as perhaps the best known examples, but they have been especially common in sub-Saharan Africa. In the part of the continent with which I am most familiar, the area of northeast Africa known as the Horn, virtually every government has come to power in this way, the microstate of Djibouti being the sole exception. The present regimes in Eritrea and Ethiopia derive from the movements, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that overthrew the Marxist military regime of the Derg in Ethiopia in 1991. In Somalia and Somaliland, the key moment was the collapse of the Siyad Barre dictatorship in the same year, though in Somalia no new regime was able to establish itself, whereas in Somaliland the liberation movement voluntarily disbanded itself, leading to an exceptional case of post-liberation democratic transition – though one which remains formally unrecognised by any other state in the world. In neighbouring South Sudan, the now

fragmented Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) derives from the long struggle against successive governments in Khartoum, which ended with independence in 2011.

In central Africa, such regimes include the National Resistance Movement (NRM) which gained power in Uganda in 1986, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) which took over in the wake of the genocide in 1994, and the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) which overthrew the Mobutu regime in what was then called Zaïre and is now the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997. In Chad, rebel groups from the north of the country ousted the existing regime from the capital in 1979, and eventually succeeded in establishing a successor regime under Hissène Habre. In southern Africa, we can include the MPLA in Angola and Frelimo in Mozambique, which fought against Portuguese colonialism and gained power in 1975, as well as the movements directed against white minority rule, ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe (1980) and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa (1994).[32] In west Africa, the phenomenon has been much less common, though in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, rebels overthrew the previous governments but were unable to establish effective alternative regimes.

One striking feature of this survey is that the overthrow of African governments by liberation movements has virtually ceased since the 1990s, with the SPLM as the only subsequent example, and this in turn indicates a marked decline in the prevalence of conflict in Africa over the last two decades. At a time when the world has become increasingly concerned about the rise of Islamist resistance movements such as Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia, none of which has yet succeeded in taking over the government of a state, this is readily overlooked and is worth emphasising. In examining the record of liberation movements in power, we are therefore looking at regimes that have for the most part been in government for twenty years or more.

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[32] I exclude SWAPO in Namibia, since this was never able to establish an effective presence in what was then South African-ruled Southwest Africa – a fact that may actually have eased its peaceful accession to power.

The Strengths and Weaknesses of Post-Liberation Regimes

Given the almost universal tendency to concentrate on the *problems* of conflict transformation in Africa, it is worth starting with an emphasis on the strengths that liberation movements bring to this issue, by far the most important of which is that in most cases, governments that have come to power through armed struggle have proved to be strong and durable. After the traumatic and extremely damaging experience of civil war, the first priority has to be the re-establishment of peace, and there is ample evidence that this is best achieved when there is a single clear winner, the liberation movement itself, which has gained unchallenged dominance, and which brings with it the military effectvieness, the organisational capacity, the popular support, and the confidence in its own mission and right to rule that derive from victorious struggle.

Outsiders, and especially well-meaning Western governments, are apt to respond to civil wars in Africa by seeking a peaceful and negotiated compromise settlement, in which each of the warring parties gains some role in government, but the harsh lesson is that in the great majority of cases, such compromises do not work. They merely postpone the reckoning, until the compromise breaks down, the war resumes, and each combatant seeks to gain on the battlefield the power that it was denied by the settlement.[33] In practice, outside states are generally far better off working out which side is likely to win in domestic terms, and then backing it, rather than trying to find a place for everyone. The key requirement is to establish effective rule, which all of the parties to the conflict are obliged to acknowledge, and which then provides the essential basis for stability. Ensuring, so far as one can, that such rule is then as fair and democratic as possible, and seeking to resolve the issues that led to conflict in the first place, are then important but necessarily secondary tasks. In cases when, even after the dominant liberation movement has taken power, its domestic rivals – such UNITA in Angola, Renamo in Mozambique, and ZAPU in Zimbabwe – continue to contest the settlement, these are effectively

[33] See Monica Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*, Princeton University Press, 2009, for an excellent analysis of this problem.

doomed, and often after much useless bloodshed, they are defeated and forced to accept the established power structure.

There are two very different exceptions to this general rule, the first of which is what have been called 'pacted transitions', in minority rule states like Zimbabwe and South Africa. In such cases the two parties in conflict, the liberation movement and the supporters of the minority regime currently in power, each recognise that they need one another, and can put together the basis for a deal that meets their minimum requirements. The existing regime realises that it cannot survive in the long term, and that prolonging the war will only lead to further social breakdown and destruction, which may irreparably damage the interests of those whom it represents. The liberation movement, on the other hand, acknowledges that it does not possess the technical skills and organisation needed to manage the state that it is seeking to take over, and that it therefore needs the existing state apparatus and economy that are controlled by the incumbent regime. The deal on offer is then that the liberation movement takes over political leadership of the state, but is still constrained by the bureaucratic and economic structures within which it has to work, and which are still effectively managed by the incumbent elites. Over time, this deal inevitably comes under pressure, and in Zimbabwe it has now totally collapsed, but the critical priority is to provide a consensual mechanism through which the transfer of power to the representatives of the majority can be achieved.

The second and much more problematic situation in which some negotiated settlement is needed arises in states like Somalia and South Sudan, which lacked any effective government structure at the time when the liberation movement succeeded in displacing the incumbent regime, and in which the liberation movement was itself deeply divided, and was unable to impose any effective source of power or structure of governance. Attempts in such cases to stitch up compromise deals, like the numerous peace plans for South Sudan since the breakdown of the independence settlement in 2013, or the even more numerous attempts to re-establish the collapsed state in Somalia, are doomed to failure, and there is nothing for it but to go back to the grass roots and try to create a settlement from the base, rather than through a futile attempt at elite compromise. The most

effective example of such a settlement has been in Somaliland, the former British colony in the northern part of the former Somali Republic, which seceded after the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991. The liberation movement, the Somali National Movement (SNM) then – quite exceptionally in such cases – dissolved itself, and a national convention (known in Somali as a *guurti*) was established to discuss the country's future. This could draw on a longstanding cultural tradition of negotiated settlement to conflicts, and the elders of the different clans who formed the principal negotiators commanded enough respect among their peoples to be able to reach an authoritative settlement, which confirmed the separation from Somalia and established a democratic structure of government in which three competing political parties would be permitted, set up in such a way as to discourage party-formation on clan lines. Despite the divisions endemic in Somali politics, this system has now survived for twenty-four years, including a peaceful handover of power when one of the opposition parties won the election, and provides a dramatic contrast to the continued violence in former Italian Somalia to the south. Somaliland certainly had features that facilitated such a settlement, which is by no means necessarily replicable elsewhere, but provides at least an example that other troubled states like South Sudan may be able to emulate.

A further major source of strength for liberation movements turned governments is that these have the self-confidence and sense of 'ownership' needed to rule effectively. They are deeply conscious that they have power because they have fought for it, earned it, and won it, and their own sense of their right to rule pervades their approach to government. This characteristically makes them awkward partners for external states that have their own ideas about how their countries should be governed, but outside partners need at this point to recognise that their own position is a subordinate one, that their own influence is extremely limited, and that if they cannot support the policies of the government, their only course is to retire from the country concerned. Any state is better off with its own government, rooted in its own population, rather than one that is highly dependent on external aid and policy advice, and former liberation movements generally have a capacity to devise and implement policies in a way that more conventional governments do not. This capacity, for sure,

has in some cases been used wisely, and in others disastrously, but this is something over which outsiders have little if any leverage.

These strengths carry with them corresponding weaknesses, which in turn relate to the peculiar difficulties involved in turning a movement geared to armed struggle into one concerned with running an ordinary peacetime government.[34] Central to this process is the transformation of the liberation movement itself, which almost invariably turns itself, in form at least, into a political party. Usually, the movement even keeps its original name, though it sometimes makes a cosmetic change: the EPLF in Eritrea, for instance, became the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) – in a country that has experienced tragically little of either. But these, obviously enough, are not 'political parties' in any normal sense of the term, but carry with them the attitudes and organisation derived from their previous existence as military-political organisations. Most basically of all, they are not organisations concerned to compete for political power, since they already *have* power, and have not the slightest intention of giving it away. It is virtually unknown for any liberation movement to transform itself into a party that views itself simply as one party among others, within a genuinely competitive system.

'Liberation', therefore, very seldom results in the 'freedom' or 'democracy' for which the movement has ostensibly been fighting, but leads instead to the displacement of one authoritarian regime by another. The main advantage that the new regime is then likely to enjoy over its predecessor is that it normally draws its support from a significantly larger part of the population, and has achieved a legitimacy in the eyes of its people that the previous government lacked. It may well also have built up an organisational base among its supporters, as an essential element in conducting the liberation war, and – although one certainly cannot take this for granted – have learned something of the arts of government in the

[34] This is a problem that I have examined in greater detail in Christopher Clapham, 'From Liberation Movement to Government: past legacies and the challenge of transition in Africa', Johannesburg: Brenthurst Foundation Discussion Paper 8, 2012, which is available online at http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/files/Brenthurst_Commisioned_Reports/Brenthurst-paper-201208-From-Liberation-Movement-to-Government.pdf.

process. How the movement will actually behave in government is indicated to a substantial extent by the way in which it behaved during the liberation war: disciplined movements can be expected to carry that discipline through into government, while movements that were subject to splits and infighting invariably show a far lower level of government capacity. How the leadership will respond to specific policy challenges, as for example in the area of economic policy, nonetheless remains in large part unknown, and critical decisions have to be made at the moment of liberation that have a major impact on the direction taken by the new government.

One almost invariable feature of movements-turned-parties is that the leadership of the party is restricted to those with 'struggle credentials', often for long into the future. This is evident well beyond Africa, as for instance in China, where even the grandchildren of heroes of the 'long march' in the 1930s still have privileged access to positions of power, or in Cuba, where the Castro brothers have monopolised the leadership for over half a century. Given that liberation movement leaders often gain power when they are still young, they can stay around for a very long time: Jose Dos Santos in Angola has been president since 1979, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe since 1980, Yoweri Museveni in Uganda since 1986, Isayas Afwerki in Eritrea since 1991, and Paul Kagame in Rwanda since 1994 – all of them for over twenty years – with the dangers of sclerosis that this brings with it. The only case of which I am aware in which a leader without struggle credentials has taken over is in Ethiopia, with the succession of Hailemariam Desalegn as prime minister after the death of Meles Zenawi in 2012. Meles was a quite exceptional leader, and this was a deliberate decision on his part to broaden the governing EPRDF beyond the inner core derived from the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which had conducted the struggle but provided a very restricted base from which to exercise power. Hailemariam is a thoroughly competent and intelligent technocrat from a historically marginalised area of Ethiopia, whose elevation to the top leadership position (Ethiopia, exceptionally in Africa, has a titular president with very limited powers) is quite unprecedented. The price that has to be paid is that he lacks a political base in the core of the movement, so that the military and security sector remains in TPLF hands. In South Africa, exceptionally, there is still an

element of internal democracy within the ANC, which was critical in ousting Thabo Mbeki in favour of Jacob Zuma in 2007. Elsewhere, authoritarian leadership is the norm.

Even when a governing post-liberation party seeks to recruit new members to broaden its appeal, this is effectively a matter of extending patronage, by using the attractions of power in a state in which this is essentially monopolised by the party. It is actually quite normal for the movement to permit the existence of opposition parties, not least as a result of pressure from aid donors since the end of the Cold War, but these parties have enjoyed no more than marginal status, and have had no plausible prospect of actually gaining power. There have been two cases, in Ethiopia in 2005 and in Zimbabwe in 2008, in which (on any realistic assessment) an opposition party won the elections, but was then prevented from taking over the government. In Ethiopia, the government seized control over the electoral process and announced results in its own favour, while in Zimbabwe the opposition was forced into a 'power-sharing' deal, after which it was marginalised through massive fraud and intimidation. The only case of a democratic handover to a winning opposition party in a post-liberation state has been in Somaliland, where – as already noted – the liberation movement dissolved itself, and none of the three parties established under the constitution could claim the mantle of liberators.

This is a situation over which Western actors such as the European Union and its member states have no control, and the only practical option open to them has been to work with whoever is in power, and to do what they can through contacts with the regime to attempt to influence it in the direction that they favour, but even this influence has been very limited: the very strong sense of ownership associated with post-liberation regimes has characteristically given them a strong aversion to what they regard as illegitimate interference. African governments have proved extremely adept at taking what foreigners have to offer, while evading the 'conditionalities' that they try to impose, while the emergence of China as a major player on the condition has restored the leverage that was greatly reduced in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War. In cases where Western states have attempted to impose sanctions on states with particularly poor human rights records, these have generally had to give

way to accommodate more pressing concerns over competing political and economic interests, one of which has often been the security concerns aroused by Islamist terrorism.

Sources of Variance between Post-Liberation Regimes

Although post-liberation regimes have distinctive features in common, they also differ in ways that depend especially on two key variables, the first and most important of which is the underlying structure and governability of the state concerned. African states differ dramatically in their size, environment, complexity and historical legacies, and these factors affect post-liberation regimes every bit as much as other governments. Not least, they have a profound impact on the structure and capacity of the movement itself, which continues to affect it even after it has taken power. Southern Somalia and South Sudan are classic cases of states with very weak systems of governance, even during the colonial era, and in which even the governmental capability that they possessed was deeply eroded by the conflicts that eventually led to the collapse or withdrawal of the pre-liberation regimes. Any incoming government in these cases faces enormous difficulties in creating a state with any effective administrative capacity, and the 'liberation movements' themselves were divided by the very factors – notably the clan structure in Somalia, and ethnic divisions especially between Dinka and Nuer in South Sudan – that impeded governance in the first place. In each case there was effectively no 'government' for the incoming regime to take over, while the insurgents themselves were so divided that they were in no position to provide one. The external mediators and interveners who found themselves trying to negotiate settlements between the rival domestic groups discovered that the most basic underlying problem was that these countries lacked the governmental infrastructure that was needed to make any compromise work.

This in turn reflected the difficulties of governing highly dispersed and especially pastoralist peoples, which were equally evident in pre-colonial as well as colonial Africa. Indeed, while there were some parts of the continent in which colonial regimes were able to establish effective structures of rule in formerly ungoverned spaces, probably the best

indicator of governability is whether there was an existing structure of authority at the time that the colonialists took over. In South Sudan, to take an extreme example, not only was there no such structure, but the British colonial regime made very little attempt to create one, and whatever they left behind them was destroyed by the wars that followed. The French divided their colony of Chad into 'Chad utile' (useful Chad) – the southern part of the country in which the exploitable resources (and therefore government) were concentrated – and 'Chad inutile' (useless Chad), and it is not surprising that the security problems from which the country has suffered arose in the latter. Though many of the least governable areas of Africa lie in the Islamic zone, and have attracted recent attention as the homes of Islamist movements such as al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, it is important to emphasise that this is not a consequence of Islam itself: Islam has been the religion of some of the world's great cities, such as Damascus and Baghdad, and in Africa the jihad of Osman dan Fodio in the early nineteenth century established the basis for stable Moslem rule in much of what is now northern Nigeria. The best general indicator of governability in Africa is probably population density.

At the other extreme, states like South Africa and Zimbabwe had highly effective structures of government which could be taken over by the liberation movement after the establishment of majority rule, while Rwanda and Ethiopia were long-established states with hierarchical societies, and a very strong tradition of deference to the established order. In Rwanda in 1994, the regime in place at the time of the genocide fled before the advancing RPF, taking with them virtually all of the administration and as much of its equipment as they could carry with them, but the RPF was nonetheless able to re-establish an extremely effective administration within a very limited time, drawing on the organisational capacity of the movement itself, and on the obedience of the population. In Eritrea, likewise, an exceptionally powerful and well-organised movement, the EPLF, quite simply *became* the state in 1991, since the previous Ethiopian administration was expelled from the newly independent territory. It has succeeded in maintaining a highly authoritarian regime, indicated for example by its capacity to impose military conscription for both men and women.

Movements that have proved disciplined and effective during the liberation struggle itself correspondingly possessed hierarchical internal structures that gave a high level of initiative to their leaders, and even in cases where the leadership structure during the war was to some extent collegiate, the top leader characteristically benefited from the additional power derived from heading the government of a state. The second key variable in explaining the trajectory taken by post-liberation governments is therefore the personality and skills of their leaders, and there is much in the varying record of such states in Africa that can plausibly be ascribed only to leadership choice. Some leaders have proved to be highly effective and intelligent, whereas others have been completely disastrous.

In the exceptional case of South Africa, Nelson Mandela was not even in any practical sense the leader of the ANC during the struggle, since he was in prison throughout it, and therefore lacked the intense mark that involvement in liberation war left on the mentalities of those who experienced it. In any event, his ability to establish himself as leader after his release, undertake the critical task of negotiating the terms for the achievement of majority rule with the incumbent National Party regime, manage the government effectively during his single term as president, and then hand over to his successor, mark him by any standards as a quite extraordinary human being. Among those who *were* engaged in the liberation war, the two names that stand out are those of Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, and Paul Kagame in Rwanda. Meles in particular was a quite exceptional leader in any company, who came to power with both a political plan, for turning Ethiopia into a federation based on the different 'nationalities' or ethnic groups of which the country was composed, and an economic plan, based on a Chinese model of state-directed capitalism that sought to create a 'developmental state' geared to raising the living standards of Ethiopians through engagement with the global economy. He was not a 'democrat' in the Western sense, and his Marxist-Leninist ideological orientation remained with him throughout his life, but Ethiopia under his leadership has proved one of the most successful models of post-liberation government.

Among the failures, one of the most striking cases is Zimbabwe, where Mugabe has effectively destroyed what was a functioning and fairly

developed economy, by abandoning the 'pact' on which the country's transition to majority rule had been based, and by treating it instead as a source of patronage for leading members of his regime, who lacked the skills and interest to manage the assets that they were given. Still more tragic, however, is the case of Eritrea, with probably the most heroic and best organised liberation movement on the continent, but whose leader, Isayas Afwerki, proved quite incapable of adapting an organisation and mindset created by liberation war into one that could manage the very different demands of running a peaceful state. In the process, he has turned Eritrea into a kind of African North Korea, waging wars against three of his neighbours, the most damaging of which was the catastrophic war against Ethiopia in 1998-2000 over trivial issues of boundary demarcation, and subjecting the population to effectively unlimited military conscription. Eritrea has as a result been responsible for a massively disproportionate number of the people now besieging the frontiers of Europe, and the big question now facing the country is what will happen when Isayas dies or is overthrown, and whether a new leadership can set Eritrea on a new and more positive course.

Conclusion

Post-liberation regimes correspondingly pose particular issues for would-be partners such as the European Union and its member states, who on the one hand seek to promote development and stability in Africa, while on the other seeking to establish the values that have been central to the peace and prosperity of their own continent, but which are shared only very partially, if at all, by the governments of the countries with which they are dealing. One generally positive factor is that – with the exception of countries such as Somalia and South Sudan, which actually account for very few of the cases with which we are concerned – they are generally dealing with established and self-confident regimes, and can correspondingly seek to build long-term relationships with their African partners, drawing on those goals and values that the two sides have in common. In cases – of which Eritrea and Zimbabwe may provide examples – where such commonalities are slight or non-existent, outsiders can only acknowledge their own inability to make any significant difference, and are generally wisest to withdraw. In other cases, there are often some policy areas – in poverty

reduction, for example – in which the two sides can find common ground, even though in others – characteristically those of democracy and human rights – in which they are far apart, and European states have to make delicate judgements about the extent to which they can promote positive developments without compromising their own values in other ways. Ethiopia is a classic case where donors have been prepared to make very substantial commitments, on the ground that the government generally shares their concerns over human welfare, and implements development projects honestly and efficiently, even though it falls quite some way short of their expected standards in terms of democracy and human rights. There is no alternative to a case-by-case approach, in which external partners have to reach hard-headed assessments about the regimes with which they are dealing, and their own ability to contribute positively to the welfare of countries and peoples where their own influence is necessarily very limited.

Key findings and recommendations

Gerald Hainzl

The following text summarises the key findings and recommendations already mentioned in the introductory chapter.

Transformation of Liberation Movements into Political Parties

- A significant number of African governments are a result of liberation movements, which overthrew previous authoritarian systems. This, however, does not make these liberation movements non-authoritarian; to some extent, the success of such movements is even dependent on imposing authority.
- The phenomenon of liberation movements is not only an African one but has also occurred elsewhere, for example in China, Cuba, and North Korea. The new leaders are often young and therefore stay in power for decades; accepting succession is a very urgent and complicated issue, which compromises national security.
- Another main problem is the transformation of liberation movements into political parties. Once they have seized power, liberation movements show reluctance towards establishing a democratic multi-party system in order to undermine political competition over power. Furthermore, they lack political experience, organisation, and programmes.
- Ethnic federalism – a federal bottom-up development and therefore self-organised civil society – is an alternative to the Western concept of centralised political parties. The concepts of self-determination and inclusive economic planning are suggested keys towards these ambitions. In this context, a concentrated and centralised population is easier to control than a decentralised or nomadic one.

The BRICS and their Engagement in Security-Related Fields

- At first it has to be mentioned that the BRICS concept is understood as a new power and economic elite, which is presenting itself as an alternative to the Western system. Although there are joint ventures,

such as, the creation of a BRICS development bank, reserve fund, and business council, the BRICS countries follow their own goals, especially when it comes to engagements in Africa; they should not be seen as a monolithic bloc.

- Economic factors play a distinct role for all BRICS countries. China and India are motivated by energy and food/land security interests/needs, importing resources from Africa, whilst energy is exported by Russia and Brazil. Economic concerns are the primary motivations of the BRICS countries; humanitarian matters are not regarded as important. One example in this regard is the export of arms in order to gain access to natural resources.
- Thus, the BRICS strive economic security, empower African supporters, and undermine human security.
- The BRICS' influence on African countries is likely to grow in the future. Political influence follows economic cooperation; hence the question arises if China in particular is not only aiming to export its economic "Win-Win" philosophy but also its political system.
- The competition between the BRICS and the West (in general and over Africa) will not provoke a 'New Cold War' because the economies of the BRICS countries and the West are very intertwined and interdependent. There are serveral joint economic programmes from which both entities benefit.
- In order to sustainably contribute to security, mutual support in the military, economic, political, peace, and justice domains has to be established.

African Peace Facility – Cost and Outcome

- The African Peace Facility (APF) is a specific financial cooperation between the EU and Africa with regards to security, stability and peace. The APF consists of long-term capacity building approaches and immediate crisis response mechanisms.
- Regional African organisations and their military structures are particularly targeted with non-lethal support as well as payment-programmes for soldiers, both of which are subject of critique. Thus, questions, such as, how strongly security and development are

interlinked and if development funds should be used to fund military actions are controversial.

- It is known that the EU is spreading its influence on African institution building through the APF. This, however, is accepted by the benefit-receiving nations.
- However, the implementation problems lie in the lack of experience, as well as poor human resource management of receiving countries. Additionally, corruption – such as, the case of 'ghost soldiers' or alleged soldiers – causes issues.
- The APF is not focusing sufficiently on long-term capacity building approaches, but is rather highlighting and working on short-term rapid response. Such problems are making a fully-fledged partnership between African states and the EU more difficult.

Sub-Saharan Presidential Security Dilemma

- The presidential security dilemma arises out of a dual discourse of security: the presidential discourse with regards to nation-wide security and the ethnic discourse regarding the security of the ethnic group. Therefore, African presidents often face the difficulty of serving the nation and serving their own ethnic group, which could endanger the president's personal safety and security.
- What evolves is a realist ethnographic point of view, called "Ethno-Realism". A constructed ethnic identity is playing a major role in the interaction between humans/ethnic groups. Furthermore, this concept is at the core of conflicts, which are driven by the idea of realism.
- Faced with this situation, the president risks losing the backing or public support of his own ethnic group. The core of the problem lies in the creation of institutions.
- These cases show that the security problem is often not an issue of border or national security but the security of the president, which enables an ethnic struggle for power that is easy to manipulate.
- The international community can and should only collaborate with states, which have established presidential security and international legitimacy. International partners and donors should push for changes towards presidential security, and cannot interact with an ethnic military power.

- The main concern of the international community should be internal aggressions. Disintegration inside a state is more likely to lead to intra-state conflicts than external aggression. Further, the democratic process can only be started once defence establishments and institutions have been built. Democracy is not a panacea.
- The following points offer solutions to the presidential dilemma:
    - A political system which is blind to ethnicity and tribalism
    - Local police forces, which are delinked from the military forces
    - 'Detribalise' forces and create long-term military establishments
    - Push for presidential accountability

Transformation from an African Perspective

- A shift from inter-state to intra-state conflicts has been occurring in Africa over the last decades. The fight for power was identified as a main indicator for this development, which diminishes the social-political and economic progress of African countries. However, these intra-state conflicts are interlinked and therefore they have to be addressed locally as well as regionally.
- Ethnic/religious/political identities are justifying the use of violence and are therefore instrumentalised as means to intra-state conflicts. Strong clashing identities, weak democracy, and restricted access to limited resources are jeopardising peace and sustainability.
- The complexity of combatants – not only soldiers but also civilians are defined as fighting parties in such conflicts – is complicating the identification and classification of conflicts.
- The private sector is increasingly playing an essential role in intra-state conflicts, since economic interests go often hand in hand with violent attempts to take over political/military power.
- Seizing political and economic power is always a major aim in armed uprisings between/amongst armed groups and states.
- Elections can peacefully transform conflicts but do not solve conflicts. Therefore elections should not be at the beginning of the reconciliation process but at the end. The construction of a democratic transition must be based on traditional institutions,

economic empowerment of the state, post-conflict investments, fair distribution of resources, as well as an all-inclusive reconciliation process.

- Imported Western mechanisms of ruling in the past and present may have caused more conflicts. The solution to resolving current conflicts and preventing new ones lies within the willingness of the African civil society to live together peacefully.

The questions below were raised to all participants and discussed in detail in order to reflect on the lectures and produce outcomes and findings, by way of conclusion.

1. *Which factors contribute to stabilisation and destabilisation during the transitional phase? In order to prevent long lasting problems, from an external actors point of view, what are the key factors and the key obstacles during this period?*

   By looking at factors for instability one can identify stabilisation factors. Presidents would act differently. Often the privileging of the own ethnic group is done because of necessity in order to protect the stability of the country and prevent local leaders from starting rebellions against the president. Harmony between the role of the military and the role of the civil society has to be established. The military has to understand that it is serving the civil society and it has to be built according to the situation and the capabilities of the state. Young rebel soldiers and bush-fighters can transform from a bush-fighter to a politician/soldier more easily than those who fought for many years. Compensation for soldiers and (re)integration programmes are essential for success. A former rebel without professional training and experience would never be a good soldier. Therefore, psychological harm, as a result of fighting, has to be resolved, people have to be reconciled and practical discipline and training is needed for a sucessful transformation.

2. *What future utilities of APF can be identified?*

   The APF has to enhance capacity building mechanisms in the future. Further, assistance and a better assessment of needs has to

be provided and organisational challenges have to be overcome. Other EU and non-EU actors who can also provide a contribution have to be identified. The main focus should lie on long-term improvements. Five to ten years of constructive relationships are needed to make an impact. The lessons learned have to be considered when planning the long-term future.

Additional remarks discussed:

- External actors could offer training to African soldiers and boost their deployment. In order to select the best people to get access to these opportunities tests could be held. External forces could contribute to presidential security.
- The international community should rather recognise countries who have succeeded in transforming conflicts peacefully and established institutions and security – such as, Somaliland – than support countries who are acting against human rights. It is urged to apply international political pressure.
- Federalism could be a solution in terms of letting people govern and organise themselves and empower people from political as well as a social perspective. Self-organisation is seen as better way than forced democracy.
- The international community has to acknowledge that oppression can go as far as leaving individuals with no other options than to pick up arms and fight against the oppressor. A persons loses fear when he/she has nothing else to lose anymore. The question to ask is how far can oppression go until the one being oppressed resists with violence?

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The transformation of violent conflicts has been intensely scrutinised over the past years. Particulary the failure in Somalia and the genocide in Rwanda marked a change towards an increased international awareness. This book seeks to examine some of the challenges in Africa from different perspectives: an international focus on the BRICS-countries and a structural one when it comes to cost and outcome of the African Peace Facility. Not less important in order to understand these issues are the security dilemmas of presidents in some countries as well as the tricky transformation of liberation movements into political parties.

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