

**Koordiniert, komplementär und
kohärent agieren in fragilen
Situationen –
Die Wiener 3C-Konferenz**

**Coordinated, Complementary and
Coherent Action in Fragile
Situations –
The Vienna 3C Conference**



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Walter Feichtinger
Ursula Werther-Pietsch
Günther Barnet (Hrsg./Eds.)

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Stiftgasse 2a, 1070 Wien
Bgdr Dr. Walter Feichtinger
lvak.ifk@bmlvs.gv.at

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“We acknowledge that peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and well-being, and that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing“.

2010 MDG Summit Outcome, MDG-Gipfel Schlussdokument,
UN-Doc. A/65/L.1 as of 17 September 2010, para 11



Erfolgreiche Friedensarbeit erfordert koordiniertes Vorgehen

Dr. Michael Spindelegger

Die Sicherheitskonzepte haben sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten grundlegend verändert. Internationales Friedensengagement in fragilen Situationen erfordert heute verstärkte Koordination, Komplementarität und Kohärenz zwischen internationalen Akteuren, nationalen Regierungen und der Zivilgesellschaft. Es braucht umfassende und ganzheitliche Konzepte, die außen-, sicherheits- und entwicklungspolitische sowie wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen miteinander verbinden.

Konfliktprävention, Friedenssicherung und Friedenskonsolidierung sowie der Aufbau staatlicher Strukturen sind eng miteinander verknüpft. Die verschiedenen Akteure, die diese Aufgaben wahrnehmen und unterstützen, sind daher zu einer engen Kooperation und Koordination verpflichtet. Ein einzelner Akteur allein kann nicht erfolgreich sein; nur eine gemeinsame Anstrengung kann gewährleisten, dass Sicherheit und Entwicklung vorangetrieben und schwache staatliche Strukturen gestärkt werden.

Die Wiener 3C-Konferenz hat sich zum Ziel gesetzt, die Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft zu beleuchten und so einen konkreten Beitrag zu mehr Effizienz in der Bewältigung von fragilen Situationen zu leisten. Nur mit einer verbesserten Zusammenarbeit aller Akteure kann den globalen Bedrohungen für Frieden und Sicherheit vor Ort wirksam begegnet werden.

Ich stimme mit UNO-Generalsekretär Ban Ki-moon überein, dass die internationale Staatengemeinschaft die kritische Phase unmittelbar nach Beendigung eines Konfliktes zu einer raschen und entschlossenen Antwort nutzen muss. Gleichzeitig ist es notwendig, langfristig engagiert zu bleiben und alle Bemühungen für Sicherheit und Entwicklung in einer koordinierten, komplementären und kohärenten Weise durchzuführen.

Österreich und Wien als internationale Drehscheibe für Frieden und Dialog sowie als Amtssitz der Vereinten Nationen sind bereit, einen aktiven Beitrag zu diesem Prozess zu leisten: durch die Fortsetzung unseres Engagements in internationalen Friedensmissionen – mit Soldatinnen und Soldaten, Polizeikräften und zivilen Experten – sowie im Rahmen unserer Entwicklungszusammenarbeit.

Dr. Michael Spindelegger
Bundesminister für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten

Successful peace work depends on coordination

Dr. Michael Spindelegger

Security concepts have changed significantly over the past several decades. Modern international peace engagement in fragile situations calls for increased coordination, complementarity and coherence of international actors, national governments and civil society. We need comprehensive and holistic concepts that combine foreign, security, development and economic policy measures.

Conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and state-building are closely intertwined. The various actors working in these fields are therefore obliged to cooperate and coordinate closely. No single actor can be successful on its own; only a joint effort can ensure promotion of security and development while strengthening weak state structures.

The objective of the Vienna 3C Conference was to shed light on the role of civil society, thus making a concrete contribution to better efficiency in overcoming fragile situations. Only through better cooperation among all actors in the field can global threats for peace and security be dealt with effectively.

I agree with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon that the international community must make best use of the critical phase of the immediate aftermath of a given conflict in order to provide a swift and decisive response. At the same time, it is necessary to remain engaged with a long term perspective, striving to implement all efforts toward security and development in a coordinated, complementary and coherent way.

Austria and Vienna, as an international hub for peace and dialogue and as a headquarters of the United Nations, are prepared to make a significant contribution to this process: by continuing our engagement in international peace missions – with male and female soldiers, police personnel and civilian experts – as well as in the framework of our development cooperation work.

Dr. Michael Spindelegger
Federal Minister for European and International Affairs



Das neue Gesicht internationaler Friedenseinsätze

Mag. Norbert Darabos

Internationales Friedensengagement erfordert heute verstärkte Koordination, Komplementarität und Kohärenz (3C) zwischen internationalen Akteuren, nationalen Regierungen und der Zivilgesellschaft.

Frieden und Entwicklung bedingen einander, unabhängig davon, wo – denn: wir leben in einer vernetzten Welt. Konflikte in anderen Teilen der Welt bedrohen unsere Sicherheit daheim. Und: Sicherheit kann nur erreicht werden, wenn auch Entwicklung stattfindet.

Die Wiener 3C-Konferenz richtet den Blick auf die Zivilgesellschaft und ihren konkreten Beitrag zu mehr Effizienz im Friedensmanagement. Mit dieser Konferenz verfolgen wir einen innovativen Ansatz: Erstmals werden Nichtregierungsorganisationen in die Beratungen zentral miteinbezogen und somit die bedeutende Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft in der Friedensarbeit entsprechend berücksichtigt.

Ziel ist, die Zusammenarbeit zwischen internationalen Akteuren, nationalen Regierungen und der Zivilgesellschaft vor Ort zu verbessern, um den globalen Bedrohungen für Frieden und Sicherheit wirksam zu begegnen.

Internationale Friedensmissionen sind ein zeitgemäßer und unerlässlicher Beitrag zur Erhaltung von Friede, Sicherheit und Entwicklung. Nur gemeinsam können wir fragile Situationen erfolgreich und nachhaltig überwinden!

Mag. Norbert Darabos
Bundesminister für Landesverteidigung und Sport

The new face of international peace operations

Mag. Norbert Darabos

International peace engagement requires coordinated, complementary and coherent (3C) action of international actors, national governments and civil society.

Peace and development are mutually interlinked, regardless where on our globe: We live in an interconnected world. Conflicts in other parts of the world have an impact on our security. And: Security can only be achieved if there is development under way.

The 3C Conference focussed on civil society and its concrete contribution to achieving more efficiency in peace management. By highlighting this topic we pursue an innovative approach: For the first time non-governmental organisations are parts and parcel of planning taking into account the crucial role of the civil society in international Peacebuilding efforts.

We aim at improving the collaboration between international actors, national governments and civil society on the ground in order to efficiently address global threats to peace and security.

International peace operations are a topical and essential contribution of international actors to peace, security and development. Only with a common approach we can successfully and sustainably overcome fragile situations!

Mag. Norbert Darabos
Federal Minister of Defence and Sports

Zum Thema

Vorwort der Herausgeber

Fragile Situationen können nur gemeinsam erfolgreich bewältigt werden, wie Irene Freudenthuss-Reichl, Leiterin der Sektion Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im BMeiA betont. Oder, wie Generalmajor Johann Pucher, Leiter der Direktion für Sicherheitspolitik im BMLVS festhält, ein kohärentes, koordiniertes und komplementäres Vorgehen (3C) im Engagement für Frieden, Sicherheit und Entwicklung ist unverzichtbar.

Die lokale Zivilgesellschaft ist ein einzigartiger Spiegel der Bedürfnisse der lokalen Bevölkerung in fragilen Situationen. Nichtregierungsorganisationen, die in fragilen Situationen tätig sind, tragen durch ihren besonderen Zugang zur lokalen Zivilgesellschaft zum Prozess der Verbindung von Staat und Zivilgesellschaft bei. Die Strategien der internationalen Gemeinschaft für Konfliktprävention, Friedenssicherung, Friedenskonsolidierung und Aufbau staatlicher Strukturen erfordern daher eine Vorgangsweise, die dieses Wissen miteinbezieht. Das neue Element, auf das sich die Wiener 3C-Konferenz im Frühjahr 2010 konzentriert hat, liegt in der erfolgreichen Suche nach einer fruchtbaren Zusammenarbeit staatlicher Akteure mit der engagierten zivilen Gesellschaft, über die Grenzen verschiedener Herangehensweisen, Zielsetzungen und Arbeitskulturen hinweg.

Sicherheit und Entwicklung als künftige Herausforderungen im Kontext von 3C

Fragile und komplexe Situationen beherrschen die aktuelle Diskussion um die künftigen sicherheits- und entwicklungspolitischen Herausforderungen. Auch wenn die Erfahrungen der letzten beiden Jahrzehnte mit ihren wenig befriedigenden Ergebnissen von Somalia über Afghanistan, von Haiti bis Nepal oder auf dem West-Balkan sowie die geschmälernten Ressourcen infolge der globalen Ernährungs-, Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrisen den Willen und die Bereitschaft zur Übernahme lang anhaltender Stabilisierungseinsätze, sonstige Maßnahmen des Konfliktmanagements und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zumindest für die nächste Dekade deutlich reduzieren könnten, werden diese dennoch auf der Tagesordnung bleiben. Einerseits liegt die Zahl der fragilen Staaten bei über 60 mit derzeit ungefähr 1,2 Mrd. Menschen, die von Konflikt und Fragilität betroffen sind. Andererseits werden die unmittelbaren wirtschaftlichen Effekte in den Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern, die Konflikte um deren Rohstoffe, der Mangel an Ressourcen vor Ort (Wasser, Weide- und Ackerland, Lebensmittel etc.) sowie die einhergehenden nachhaltigen ökologischen Veränderungen (Versteppung, Ausfischen etc.) durch Konflikte nochmals verstärkt.

Resultierende Sekundäreffekte auf stabile Staaten – von Migration bis Terrorismus – werden in einem solchen Szenario nicht geringer. Dies erfordert – im Gegensatz zu den sich abzeichnenden Rückzugstendenzen – ein neuerliches und verstärktes Engagement in fragilen oder prekären Situationen. Konzeptionelle Überlegungen für die Art und Weise künftigen Handelns in fragilen Lagen können und müssen daher trotz des vorläufigen Herunterschraubens der Ambitionen erfolgen. Der 3C-Ansatz (coordinated, coherent and complementary, engl. 3C), der Gegenstand der internationalen Konferenz zu „The 3C approach in fragile situations – the role of civil society“ am 5. bis 7. Mai 2010 in Wien war, ist dazu besonders prädestiniert und wichtig.

Eine Fülle von wissenschaftlicher Literatur und Konzepten unterschiedlichster Organisationen sowie Institutionen beschäftigt sich intensiv mit der Frage, wie die komplexen Sicherheits- und Entwicklungs Herausforderungen in Gegenwart und naher Zukunft effizient und effektiv

bewältigt werden können. Dabei tauchen einige Schlüsselbegriffe auf, die nahezu dogmatisch in die Debatte über die Interaktion von Akteuren unterschiedlichster Art – zivil und militärisch, staatlich und nicht – staatlich, aber auch national und international – Eingang gefunden haben. Dennoch gibt es für diese Ansätze, Denkschulen oder „Philosophien“ bis heute keine einheitlichen Konzepte und Definitionen. Manchmal werden dieselben Überlegungen, wesentlich oder unwesentlich, mit mehreren Begriffen – wie etwa *Comprehensive Approach*, *Coordinated Approach*, *Integrated Approach* oder *Whole of System Approach/WoSA* – umschrieben. Oft besteht auch kein gemeinsames Verständnis darüber, welcher Umfang und welche Konsequenzen aus diesen erwachsen. Der 3C-Ansatz versucht dies ganz pragmatisch aufzulösen und ist insofern ein wesentlicher Fortschritt.

Koordiniert, komplementär und kohärent agieren in fragilen Situationen

Abgesehen von terminologischen Fragen ist die Notwendigkeit der Herstellung eines gemeinsamen Interaktionsrahmens zwischen den Instrumenten und Akteuren von Außen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik zu einem „doktrinären Mantra“ geworden. Eine Vielzahl von Foren und Strategien beschäftigen sich mit dem Thema, Erfahrungen weltweit von über zehn Jahren liegen dazu vor. Das Spektrum der involvierten Internationalen Organisationen (IOs) ist breit und umfasst jedenfalls UNO, NATO und EU, aber auch die Weltbank (WB), die OECD und andere Internationale Finanzinstitutionen (IFIs).

Aus institutioneller Sicht sind neben den mittlerweile relativ unbestrittenen Hauptachsen aus den Bereichen – Außenpolitik, Entwicklungspolitik und Verteidigung, oft als kanadische „3D-Formel“ (diplomacy, development and defence) bezeichnet – eine Fülle von anderen Politikfeldern und deren Mittel als notwendiger Beitrag für „nachhaltige Stabilisierung und Wiederaufbau“ (S&R) in und nach bewaffneten Konflikten, aber auch zu deren Prävention erkannt worden. Etwa dem DIMES-Ansatz (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic/Financial, and Societal/Cultural) folgend, bedarf es neben militärischem Einsatz ziviler Expertise von Polizei und Justiz, aus der Finanzverwaltung, dem Bildungs- und Informationsbereich, den Sozial-, Gesundheits- und Infrastruktursektoren, sowie sozio-ökonomisches und ökologisches Fachwissen. Dies sowohl in der Planung für kohärente gesamtstaatliche oder multinationale Politikformulierungen als auch bei der Umsetzung vor Ort. Damit die Einsatz leistenden Staaten in Form ihrer verschiedenen Ministerien und nachgeordneten Agenturen diese Aufgabe in ihren unterschiedlichen Bezugsrahmen meistern können, hat es sich als notwendig herausgestellt, dafür Mechanismen und Prinzipien zu entwickeln, die überwiegend als *Whole of Government Approach (WoGA)* bezeichnet werden. Dass die Expertise und Ressourcen dafür jedoch nicht nur von staatlicher Seite kommen können, sondern vielfach durch NRO und andere nicht-staatliche Akteure ergänzt werden, liegt dabei auf der Hand.

Diese grundsätzlichen Erkenntnisse haben dazu geführt, nicht nur die verschiedenen Akteure im Sinne eines erweiterten 3D-Ansatzes in Pflicht zu nehmen, sondern auch die Abstimmung von spezifischen Mitteln und Methoden voranzutreiben. Das Ergebnis ist der angesprochene 3C-Ansatz, der im Rahmen einer gemeinsamen Konferenz von der Schweiz, der UNO, der NATO, der OECD und der Weltbank in Genf im März 2009 vorgestellt und diskutiert und durch die gegenständliche Wiener 3C-Konferenz und Initiative um den Aspekt der Zusammenarbeit zwischen staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteuren erweitert wurde.

Der vorliegende Band versteht sich als Beitrag zu einem neuen internationalen Konsensus zu Konfliktprevention, Friedenssicherung, Friedenskonsolidierung und dem Aufbau staatlicher Strukturen. In dessen Zentrum steht heute dem Internationalen Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, der einen der bedeutendsten Paradigmenwechsel in der Interventionspraxis der

internationalen Gemeinschaft verdeutlicht und mitgestaltet. Michael Schmunk, stellvertretender Leiter der deutschen OSZE-Mission in Wien, spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von einer Neuaufstellung der Aufgaben und einer neuen „Bescheidenheit“ in der Wahrnehmung, was mit externem Statebuilding zu erreichen ist.

Viele Elemente, wie die Unterschiedlichkeit der befassten Akteure mit ihren *inter- und intra-Agency Dimensionen*, aber auch den Spezifika ihrer Handlungsmuster, Werte und Kulturen machen die Komplexität der Überlegungen aus. Einerseits sollte innerhalb der Organisationen und Institutionen konsistent vorgegangen, andererseits Institutionen übergreifend Politikkohärenz erreicht werden. So etwa zwischen allen Teilorganisationen der UNO und einem operativen UN-Kontingent bei deren umfassenden Engagement in einer Krisenregion und den gleichzeitig wirkenden Instrumenten von NATO oder EU sowie den Staaten, die in allen drei Organisationen Mitglied sein können. Schließlich ist eine Vielzahl an nicht-staatlichen Akteuren von humanitären NRO und EZA-Organisationen bis hin zu privaten Wirtschaftsinitiativen mit ihren spezifischen internationalen Beziehungsgeflechten relevant.

Interaktion zwischen externen staatlichen Akteuren und der Zivilgesellschaft ist erfahrungsgemäß nicht nur vor Ort, sondern strategisch auch in den Zentralen erforderlich. Die Einbindung in Planungs- und Führungsprozesse ist zwar von beiden Seiten umstritten und schwierig. Jene Verwaltungen, die dies schon auf nationaler Ebene versuchen, können auf höheres gegenseitiges Vertrauen und Verständnis verweisen, die sich positiv auf die Arbeit „im Feld“ niederschlagen. Für eine strukturelle Einbindung von NRO und anderen nicht-staatlichen Akteuren bei der nationalen Politikformulierung und Umsetzung hat sich der noch nicht weit verbreitete Begriff des *Whole of Nation Approach (WoNA)* herausgebildet. Die österreichische 3C-Initiative im Rahmen der Konferenz, zu der dieser Sammelband erscheint, versucht genau diese Aspekte einzubeziehen und hält den Stand der Diskussion in einem gemeinsam ausverhandelten „Prinzipienkatalog“ der Zusammenarbeit („Wiener 3C-Appell“) fest. Damit lieferte die Konferenz auch wichtige Impulse für die Vorarbeiten zu einer österreichischen Positionierung auf dem Gebiet Sicherheit und Entwicklung.

Kontext-abhängige Zusammenarbeitsprinzipien als Schlüssel zum Erfolg

Durch die Einbeziehung aller engagierten Kräfte ist die Aufteilung der Aufgaben, die zur Bewältigung fragiler Situationen notwendig sind, auf verschiedene Akteure möglich. Niemand kann alles leisten. Der gezielte Einsatz im Sinne „strategischer Vernetzung“ und die vorausschauende Sicherstellung der Kapazitäten (durch wen auch immer) im Wege gesamtstaatlicher und multinational abgestimmter Prozesse ist der Schlüssel zu *Kohärenz* auf der Ebene der Politikformulierung, Planung und Bereitstellung. Der 3C-Ansatz ist damit auch ein Initialschritt für bessere Wirksamkeit von Hilfe und mehr Politikkohärenz.

Oft wird eine solche Vorgangsweise aber nur als operatives und situatives Konzept verstanden, mit dem die unterschiedlichen Mittel im Anlassfall (vor Ort) koordiniert, effizient und effektiv eingesetzt werden bzw. indem die Strategien in einem bestimmten geographischen Kontext auf Hauptstadt- und Hauptquartiersebene entwickelt und abgestimmt werden. Dies ist aus den Erfordernissen der Einsätze in Afghanistan und im Irak verständlich, dennoch muss ein richtungsweisender strategischer Ansatz auch die Entwicklung einer langfristigen Sichtweise für Institutionen übergreifende Mechanismen zur gemeinsamen Fähigkeitsentwicklung einschließlich gemeinsamer Lessons Learned Prozesse im Sinne von *Transformation* zu *vernetzter (Sicherheits-)Politik* berücksichtigen.

Ebenso wichtig ist es bei laufenden Engagements und Einsätzen, die Beziehungen zwischen den Ebenen nicht außer Acht zu lassen. Ausgangspunkt sollte aus einer strategischen Analyse der Situation auf Basis eines *Comprehensive Assessment* durch alle Beteiligten gemeinsame Ziele für das Engagement abgeleitet und definiert werden sowie eine Festlegung erfolgen, mit welchen Mitteln und in welcher realistischen Zeitleiste diese Ziele erreicht werden sollen. Erst mit einer solchen rationalen Strategie, die Dimensionen der Menschenrechte, Kinder in bewaffneten Konflikten, Frauen in Friedensprozessen und den Schutz von Zivilbevölkerung als Aspekte von menschlicher Sicherheit, die auf die Bedürfnisse und Chancen des Menschen eingeht¹, haben Missionen und Operationen im Kontext fragiler Situationen überhaupt eine Chance auf Erfolg. Die Erfahrungen der letzten Missionen und Operationen zeigen, dass die operativen Kommandanten und deren zivile Pendanten, ausgestattet mit nicht realistischen, oft nicht integrierten Mandaten sowie unzureichenden Ressourcen, beginnen mussten, vor Ort gemeinsame Ziele zu definieren und ad hoc Koordinierungsinstrumente zu schaffen. Aus der Sicht von 3C sollten multidimensionale Operationspläne von gemeinsamen strategischen Zielen geleitet und tatsächlich erreichbar sein.

Unterschiedliche Herangehensweisen, gemeinsame Ziele: Friedensoperationen und das Konzept menschlicher Sicherheit

Den theoretischen Hintergrund für das moderne zivil-militärische Krisenmanagement bildet ein breites Sicherheitsverständnis. *Umfassende Sicherheit (Comprehensive Security)* – entwickelt in Bezug auf sicherheitspolitische Herausforderungen nach Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts – entstammt Überlegungen der *Kopenhagener Gruppe* um Barry Buzan und bedeutete im Wesentlichen, dass Sicherheit nur durch das Zusammenwirken von militärischen, politischen, ökonomischen und gesellschaftlichen Faktoren zu erreichen sei. In logischer Auslegung dieser These wurde neben der *horizontalen Beziehung* zwischen den Akteuren auch eine *vertikale Ausrichtung* angedacht, die sich vom Staat, über Gruppen bis zu den Individuen ausdehnt – eine Dimension, die im *Human Security* Diskurs eine wesentliche Rolle spielt.

Das „Vernetzungsparadigma“ als Notwendigkeit für organisationsübergreifende Lösungsansätze bisher nationaler (Sicherheits-)Sektoren in vielfältiger Hinsicht – zivil-zivil, zivil-militärisch, militärisch-militärisch, national/international/multilateral, politisch-strategisch, taktisch-operativ etc. – erfordert idealerweise die Definition von zivil-militärischen Zusammenarbeitskonzepten für alle Akteure in jeder dieser Ebenen und für nahezu alle Aufgaben. Der Übergang von *segmentierter Sicherheitspolitik* zu einer Sicherheitspolitik, die umfassende *menschlicher Sicherheit* zum Ziel hat und die einzelnen Akteure stärker vernetzt, ist somit sowohl Beschreibung des Zustands als auch Postulat geworden. Der 3C-Ansatz übernimmt diese Sichtweise und übersetzt ihn in eine *policy*-Dimension: Der Umgang mit fragilen Situationen erfordert die gleichzeitige Beachtung von Rahmenbedingungen für Sicherheit *und* Entwicklung. Erst der Zusammenklang von Armutsbekämpfung – die Umsetzung der Millenniumsziele (MDGs) – *und* der Aufbau von „resilient societies“ und staatlichen Strukturen mit gewaltfreien Konfliktlösungsmechanismen kann das Potential des Konzepts menschliche Sicherheit, das am Beginn der Diskussion stand, ausfüllen und Antworten auf Fragilität im 21. Jahrhundert geben.

Die Gründe für die Notwendigkeit der Zusammenarbeit sind vielfältig und reichen von den *neuen Bedrohungsformen* über die *Interdependenz der Akteure* bis hin zu technologischen und organisationstheoretischen Überlegungen. Insbesondere moderne *Stabilisierungsoperationen* oder *Integrated, scenario-based Missions* als qualitativ und quantitativ anspruchsvollste

¹ Siehe insbesondere VN-Sicherheitsratsresolutionen 1325 und Folgeresolutionen, 1612, 1894.

Herausforderung der zivil-militärischen Zusammenarbeit im 3C-Kontext erfordert besondere Planungs- und Führungskonzepte zur erfolgreichen, also effekt- und wirkungsorientierten sowie kosten- und zeiteffizienten Umsetzung. Diese Überlegungen beschränken sich aber nicht auf Mechanismen der Operationsführung, sondern setzen bereits bei der mittel- und langfristigen Fähigkeits- und Kapazitätsentwicklung an und binden daher neben der Verwaltung die Zivilgesellschaft und insbesondere den Wirtschaftssektor sowie den Wissenschaftsbereich gleichermaßen mit ein. Daraus entsteht aus den Überlegungen zur *vernetzten Operationsführung* die Ableitung hin zu gesamtstaatlichem Einsatz unter Einbeziehung der Zivilgesellschaft auf nationaler wie internationaler Ebene.

Gegner und Skeptiker dieses Konzepts verweisen auf die institutionellen und ideologischen Hindernisse, die deren Umsetzung erschweren bzw. unmöglich machen können. So wird argumentiert, die Prinzipien der *Unabhängigkeit, Unparteilichkeit und Gleichbehandlung, der klaren Priorisierung der Bedürfnisse der lokalen Bevölkerung und dem Wohlergehen der Menschen* der humanitären Hilfe und vieler NRO stünden der Notwendigkeit zur *Mandatserfüllung* staatlicher und internationaler Akteure widersprüchlich gegenüber. Ebenso gelte dies für die Ziele und Herangehensweisen im Kontext *menschlicher Sicherheit*, entwicklungspolitischer und wirtschaftlicher *Nachhaltigkeit* gegenüber *stabilitäts- oder machterhaltungsorientierten* Ansätzen. Dass diese aber in einem 3C-Verständnis kein Widerspruch sein müssen, sondern sich sogar effektorientiert ergänzen können, wurde in letzter Zeit vermehrt durch verschiedene Initiativen und Untersuchungen belegt, wie etwa das Beispiel der Konflikte in der Region Horn von Afrika zeigt.

In dieser Region stoßen verschiedene lokale, regionale und globale Einflüsse aufeinander. Kann die rein militärische Bekämpfung oder Eindämmung von Konflikttreibern eine nachhaltige Lösung herbeiführen? Vermutlich nicht, wie andere S&R-Einsätzen in Afrika und Asien derzeit zeigen. Ist Entwicklungspolitik oder humanitäre Hilfe ohne „sicheres Umfeld“ in der Lage, gewaltfreie Konfliktlösung in diesen Gesellschaften zu festigen? Vermutlich ebenfalls nicht. Und könnten selbst beide zusammen nachhaltig wirken, wenn existentielle Lebensgrundlagen, wie etwa der Fischfang, Wasser- und Weiderechte oder die Nutzung von Bodenschätzen aufgrund globaler Verflechtungen und klimatischer Veränderungen weitgehend gestört sind bzw. einseitig genutzt werden? Oder bräuchte es zu deren positiver Gestaltung nicht auch wirtschafts- und umweltpolitischer Zielsetzungen im regionalen und globalen Kontext? Das internationale Credo lautet: ja.

Unter diesen Annahmen erfordern Lösungen im Sinne des 3C-Ansatzes den gesamthaften Blick auf Ebenen, Akteure und Handlungsmuster, der diese unterschiedlichen Elemente erst zum Zusammenwirken (Interaktion) bringt. Nachdem deren typische Vorgangsweisen unterschiedlich sind und diese im Hinblick auf ihre ganz spezifischen und notwendigen Fähigkeiten nicht nivelliert werden dürfen, ist es erforderlich, eine Art „directed coordination“ zu führen bzw. ein „coherent web of actors“ zu betreiben. Damit dies gelingt, ist in jeder Situation zu fragen, wer welche Rolle in der Steuerung des Prozesses und der Behebung der Konfliktursachen einnehmen kann, und zwar so, dass der Umgang miteinander nicht jeweils ungewollte und/oder (überproportional) negative Effekte auf die Bemühungen der anderen herbeiführt (eine Anwendung des „Do no harm“-Prinzips).

Eine solche Sichtweise anerkennt die Unterschiedlichkeit von Akteuren und deren Herangehensweisen und versucht, ihren Einsatz für die gemeinsam gesetzten Ziele zu optimieren. Daher ist gute Koordination die Grundlage einer *kohärenten Vorgehensweise* und leistet mehr Sicherheit und Entwicklung vor Ort als jeder einzelne Akteur allein bewerkstelligen könnte. Dennoch wird *Koordination* oft als *Unter- und Überordnung* empfunden und drückt in unter-

schiedlichen Sprachkontexten auch *verschiedene Regelungsdichten* aus. Dieser Punkt ist in der Praxis daher oft besonders umstritten.

Daher soll (und kann) *nicht einem* Interaktionsmuster gefolgt werden, die „Dichte“ der Interaktion an Handlungsmustern, dh die Intensität der Zusammenarbeit, kann variieren und von der Konsultation bis zur Integration reichen. Österreich hat diesen Gedanken der Flexibilität in der Zusammenarbeit bereits erfolgreich im Rahmen des EU-Militärstabs eingebracht. Der vorliegende „Wiener 3C-Appell“ hat diese Idee näher ausgeführt und mittels der 16 Prinzipien den Weg zu derart flexiblen Handlungsmustern eingeschlagen. Dies zeigt das kreative Potential eines kleinen europäischen Staats, Beiträge zum internationalen Krisenmanagement, zur Friedenskonsolidierung sowie zu einer konflikt sensitiven Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu leisten und damit scheinbare und gedankliche Grenzen zu überwinden.

In diesem Buch kommen die Impulse der verschiedenen „policy communities“ aus den Bereichen Diplomatie, Entwicklungspolitik, Militär, Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik, Polizei und Justiz sowie von nicht-staatlichen Organisationen aus den Bereichen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, humanitäre Hilfe, Menschenrechtsschutz und –förderung sowie Friedensförderung zu Wort. Für die mutigen Beiträge und die Verhandlungsbereitschaft zum „Wiener 3C-Appell“ möchten wir uns herzlich bei allen Beteiligten bedanken.

An dieser Stelle möchten wir neben den Autorinnen und Autoren auch unseren Teams – allen voran Mag. Dr. Anna-Katharina Roithner, Mag. Ursula Heinrich, Mag. Walter Matyas, Mag. Ernst M. Felberbauer, Frau Monalisa Sarmiento und Herrn Christian M. Huber – für die Mithilfe bei der Erstellung dieses Buches danken.

Friedliche Gesellschaften, demokratische Staaten sowie eine leistungsfähige und verantwortungsbewusste Wirtschaft sind am besten geeignet, die Idee menschlicher Sicherheit zu verwirklichen. Wir hoffen, dass Initiativen wie die 3C-Konferenz und das Einbringen der daraus gewonnenen Erkenntnisse dazu beitragen.

Viel Inspiration beim Lesen!

Walter Feichtinger
Ursula Werther-Pietsch
Günther Barnet

On the issue at hand

Preface by the editors

Successful management of fragile situations can only take place cooperatively, as Irene Freudenschuss-Reichl, General Director of the Austrian Development Cooperation within the Ministry of European and International Affairs, stresses. Or as Major General Johann Pucher, Defence Policy Director of the Directorate General for Security Policy at the Ministry of Defense and Sports puts it, efforts toward peace, security and development cannot do without an approach that is coherent, coordinated and complimentary (3C).

In any fragile situation, local civil society embodies a unique reflection of the needs of local population. Non-governmental organisations working in fragile situations contribute to the process of connecting the state and civil society via their special access to the latter. Therefore, the international community's strategies for conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace consolidation and the establishment of state structures require a mode of operation which integrates such knowledge. The new element upon which the Vienna 3C Conference in early 2010 concentrated lies in the successful quest for fruitful cooperation of state actors with involved, dedicated elements of civil society-cooperation that transcends differing approaches, objectives and working cultures.

Security and development as challenges for the future in a 3C-context

Fragile and complex situations are a major theme of the ongoing discussions concerning future challenges for security and development policies. Even though the experience of unsatisfactory results over the past two decades from Somalia to Afghanistan, from Haiti to Nepal and on to the Western Balkans, coupled with the problem of diminished resources due to the global food, economic and financial crises, has weakened the willingness and resolve to take on lengthy stabilization missions and other conflict management and development cooperation measures at least for the next decade, such measures will remain part of the agenda. This is the case because the current number of fragile states totals more than 60, with 1.2 billion inhabitants who are subject to conflict and fragility. It is also the case because, in developing and emerging countries, such conflict tends to amplify the economic impact of preexisting conflicts over raw materials, of scarce local resource availability (water, pastures and arable land, food, etc.), and of ecological changes (desertification, overfishing, etc).

In such a scenario, this fragility's secondary effects on stable states – ranging from migration to terrorism – cannot be expected to diminish. Therefore, renewed and strengthened engagement in fragile and precarious situations is required. Despite the temporary downscaling of our ambitions, there exists a need for conceptual deliberation regarding ways and means of future engagement in fragile situations. The 3C approach (coordinated, coherent and complementary), the theme of the international conference on “The 3C approach in fragile situations – the role of civil society” that took place in Vienna from 5 to 7 May 2010, is especially relevant and important in this context.

An abundance of academic literature, along with concepts by the most various organizations and institutions, deals intensively with the question of how to efficiently and effectively tackle the complex security and development challenges of the present and the near future.

In this context, certain key concepts have been elevated to an almost dogmatic status within the debate on the interaction of actors from the most divergent (civilian and military, state and non-state, as well as domestic and international) backgrounds.

So far, there exist no common concepts or definitions for these approaches, schools of thought or “philosophies.” Sometimes, consciously or unconsciously, identical considerations are described by different concepts such as *Comprehensive Approach*, *Coordinated Approach*, *Integrated Approach* or *Whole of System Approach/WoSA*. There is often no common understanding as to the extent and the consequences of these. The 3C approach attempts to break down such concepts pragmatically and thus represents considerable progress.

Coordinated, complementary and coherent (inter)action in fragile situations

Apart from terminological questions, the need to create a common framework for the interaction among instruments and actors of foreign, security and development policy has become something of a “doctrinal mantra.” A multiplicity of forums and doctrines deal with the matter, drawing on over ten years of worldwide experience. The spectrum of involved international organizations (IOs) is broad and includes the UN, NATO and the EU at its core, as well as the World Bank (WB), the OECD and the international financial institutions (IFIs).

From an institutional point of view, beyond the relatively undisputed principal axes of the diplomacy, development and defense-related policy fields, often called “the Canadian 3D formula,” a variety of other policy fields along with their respective tools have been recognized as necessary contributions to sustainable stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) efforts during and following armed conflict. According to the DIMES-approach (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic/Financial and Societal/Cultural), for example, there is a need for additional civilian expertise pertaining to policing and justice, fiscal administration, education and information, and the social, health and infrastructure sectors, as well as socio-economic and ecological issues, in the interest of planning coherent overall state or multinational policies v as well as implementing policies on the ground. In order to enable contributing states, their ministries and subordinated agencies to meet this challenge, it has proven necessary to develop mechanisms and principles that can be described as a *Whole of Government Approach (WoGA)*. In doing so, it is obvious that knowledge and resources for achieving this goal cannot derive only from the state and, in many cases, can in fact come only be complemented by NGOs and other non-state actors.

These fundamental realizations have led to policies that oblige the various actors not only to apply a broadened 3D approach, but also to coordinate the specific means and methods employed. The result is the 3C approach mentioned above, which was presented and discussed in the framework of a joint conference of Switzerland, the UN, NATO, the OECD and the World Bank in Geneva in March 2009, and expanded by the aspect of cooperation between state and non-state actors in the Vienna 3C conference and initiative concerned here.

The present volume is meant as a contribution to a new international consensus on conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace consolidation and the establishment of state structures. Currently at its center is the international dialog on peacebuilding and statebuilding; this dialog articulates and codetermines one of the most significant paradigm shifts in the international community’s interventional practice. In this regard, Michael Schmunk, Deputy Chief of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the OSCE in Vienna, speaks of a new definition of tasks and a new sort of “modesty” in the perception of what can be achieved by external statebuilding.

The complexity of the considerations at hand is due to the divergence of actors involved, with their *inter- and intra-agency dimensions* and their specific patterns of action, values and cultures. On the one hand, procedures within organizations and institutions should be consistent, while on the other hand, policy coherence must transcend institutions – e.g. between agencies of the UN and operative UN forces through comprehensive engagement in a given crisis region and the simultaneously acting instruments of NATO and the EU (as well as of states who may simultaneously be members of those organizations). Finally a variety of non state actors ranging from humanitarian NGOs and aid agencies to private economic initiatives with their specific networks of international relations will be relevant.

Interaction between external state actors and civil society must be effected not only on the ground; strategic coordination also has to take place at the various headquarters. Each side views inclusion in the planning and management processes as being questionable and difficult. Those administrations which are already making such an effort at the national level report better mutual trust and comprehension, leading to positive effects “in the field.” Regarding the structural involvement of local NGOs and international non-state actors in the formulation of national policies and their realization, the not-very-widespread concept of the *Whole of Nation Approach (WoNA)* has been used. The Austrian 3C initiative represented at the conference documented by this volume attempts to include precisely these aspects, and it distills the present state of the discussion into a jointly negotiated “catalogue of principles” of cooperation (the “Vienna 3C Appeal”). Thus, this conference has also provided important impulses for the positioning of Austria in the policy field of security and development.

Contextualized principles of interaction are key to success

By including all engaged actors in a given situation, it is possible to distribute among various actors the tasks which are essential to overcoming fragility. Nobody can do everything. Targeted commitment in the sense of “strategic networking” and the anticipatory allocation of capacities (regardless of by whom) via a whole-of-government and multi-nation coordinated processes is the key for coherence at the level of policy formulation, planning and allocation of resources. Thus, the 3C approach is also an initial step towards more effective assistance and more policy coherence for development.

Such a procedure is often viewed simply as an operative and situative concept by which the various means are being used (at field level) in a coordinated, efficient and effective way and/or by developing and coordinating strategies for a specific geographic context at the capital and headquarters levels. This is understandable in the light of the specific needs of missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, a future-oriented strategic approach, however, has to consider the development of a long-term strategy for mechanisms of joint training that transcend institutions and include joint processes of “lessons learned” in the sense of *transformation to networked (security) policy*.

For ongoing engagements and missions, it is just as important not to disregard the relations between the various stages of engagement and (hierarchical) levels. The starting point should be a strategic analysis of the situation based upon a *Comprehensive Assessment* by all stakeholders, which should in turn lead to the definition of common objectives for the engagement and to agreement on the means to be employed and a realistic time limit within which said objectives should be achieved. Missions and operations in fragile situations can be successful only if they are based upon such a rational strategy encompassing dimensions of human rights, children affected by armed conflict, women in peace processes and the protection of civilians, all aspects of human security which focuses on the needs and

capacities of the human being¹. Experience from recent missions and operations has shown that operative commanders and their civilian counterparts, provided with unrealistic, frequently non-integrated mandates and insufficient resources, were forced to begin defining common goals and ad hoc coordination mechanisms on the spot. From the perspective of the 3C approach, multidimensional operation plans should be guided by common strategic goals which are actually attainable.

Different approaches, common goals: peace operations and the concept of human security

The theoretical basis of modern civilian-military crisis management is a broad understanding of security. The term *Comprehensive Security* – developed in the context of security-policy challenges following the end of the East-West-conflict – was coined by the *Copenhagen group* associated with Barry Buzan and basically means that security can only be promoted from outside via the interaction of military, political, economic and societal factors. As a logical interpretation of this thesis, the *horizontal relationship* between actors was joined by the acknowledgement of an existing genuine *vertical alignment* extending from the state to groups and individuals – a dimension which plays a considerable role in the discourse on *human security*.

Ideally, the “networking paradigm,” as a necessity of trans-organizational solutions applying to formerly national (security) sectors in manifold respects (civilian-civilian, civilian-military, military-military, national/international/multilateral, political-strategic, tactical-operative, etc.), calls for the definition of civilian-military cooperation concepts for all actors at each of these levels and for almost all tasks. The transition from *compartmentalized security policy* to a security policy that aims at comprehensive *human security* and interlinks the different actors has thus become both a description of this state of affairs and a postulate. The 3C approach works based on this assumption and translates it into a *policy-dimension*: dealing with fragile situations demands that simultaneous attention be paid to the conditions affecting security *and* development. It is only the achievement of harmony between combating poverty – the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – *and* building resilient societies and state structures with non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms that the potential of the human security concept from the beginning of the discussion can be fulfilled, and responses to fragility updated, for the 21st century.

The reasons for the need for cooperation are manifold and range from *new security threats* and *interdependency* to technological and organizational considerations. Particularly, modern *stabilization operations* or *integrated, scenario-based missions* – as the most qualitatively and quantitatively ambitious challenges for civil-military cooperation in the 3C spirit – need special planning and leadership concepts in order to guarantee successful effect- and result-oriented, as well as cost- and time-efficient, implementation. These considerations are not limited to the mechanisms for the management of operations, but already start with medium- and long-term skill and capacity development while including the economic and the scientific sectors in equal measure. Considerations pertaining to *interconnected operational management* thus lead to a whole of government approach, including civil society at the national and international levels.

These concepts’ opponents and skeptics refer to the institutional and ideological hurdles that can make their implementation difficult or impossible. One such argument holds that the

¹ See especially UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and related resolutions, 1612, 1894.

principles of humanitarian aid and many NGOs – *independence, impartiality and neutrality, as well as the clear prioritizing of the needs of local society and the wellbeing of human beings* – are perceived to contradict the need of state and international actors to *comply with their mandates*. The same is said to be true of the goals and approaches in the context of *human security* and developmental and economic *sustainability*, as opposed to *stability and/or power oriented approaches*. In the 3C logic these approaches are not necessarily contradictory, but can even unfold effect-oriented and complementary added-value, as shown by several recent initiatives and studies – e.g. the conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

The Horn of Africa is a region in which various local, regional and global spheres of influence collide. Can combating or containing the actors of conflict by mere military means bring about sustainable solutions? Probably not, as other S&R campaigns in Africa and Asia are currently showing us. Can development policy or humanitarian aid without a “secure environment” consolidate violence-free conflict resolution in these societies? Once again, probably not. And can even both together lead to sustainability if peoples’ existential means of subsistence, such as fishing, access to water and pastures or the use of natural resources, are disturbed or exploited unilaterally due to global interdependence and climate change? Or is there indeed a need to also have socio-economic and environmental goals in a regional and global context in order to achieve positive results? The international credo says: yes.

On the basis of these assumptions, solutions in keeping with the 3C approach require a comprehensive view of levels, actors and action patterns in order to facilitate these diverse elements’ *interaction*. Since their typical patterns of behavior diverge and – taking into account their specific and essential capacities – must not be reduced to a lowest common denominator, it is necessary to arrive at a sort of “directed coordination”, a “coherent web” of actors. In the interest of making this possible, every situation requires us to ask just who can play which role in guiding the process and eliminating the root causes of conflict, doing so in such a way that the resulting mutual interaction does not unintentionally result in negative effects on the involved actors’ respective efforts (an application of the “do no harm”-principle).

Such a view recognizes the differences between actors and their approaches while trying to optimize their commitment to the set of agreed goals. Therefore, good coordination is the basis for *coherent action* and provides better security and development-potential on the ground than each actor would be able to effect alone. Even so, *coordination* is often viewed as a function of *subordination* or *dominance*, and from one linguistic context to another the *densities of formal arrangements* implied by the term can vary. In actual practice, this point is often a particularly contentious one.

Therefore, we should not (and cannot) follow *one single* interaction pattern; the “density” of behavioral patterns’ interaction – i.e. the intensity of cooperation in a given case – can vary, ranging from consultation to integration. Austria has already successfully included this notion of cooperative flexibility in the framework of EU Military Staff. The present “Vienna 3C Appeal” has developed this idea further, and its 16 principles pave the way toward such forms of flexible interaction. This illustrates the creative potential of a small European state to contribute to international crisis management, peacekeeping, peace building and conflict-sensitive development cooperation and to overcome apparent and notional barriers.

This book lends expression to the impulses from the various policy communities (diplomatic, development policy, military, financial and economic, police and justice), as well as from NGOs working in the areas of development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, human

rights protection and promotion and peace promotion. We would like to extend our wholehearted thanks to all participants for their bold contributions and their willingness to negotiate in the interest of creating the “Vienna 3C Appeal.”

Here, in addition to the authors, we would also like to thank our team – above all Anna-Katharina Roithner, Ursula Heinrich, Walter Matyas, Ernst M. Felberbauer, Monalisa Sarmiento and Christian M. Huber – for their help in producing this book.

Peaceful, resilient societies, democratic states and efficient, responsible economies are best positioned to realize the notion of human security. Initiatives like the Vienna 3C Conference, we hope, represent an important impulse in this regard.

We wish you an inspiring read!

Walter Feichtinger
Ursula Werther-Pietsch
Günther Barnet

Teil I./Part I. 3C-Ansatz in fragilen Situationen/ 3C Approach in fragile situations

Der 3C-Ansatz in fragilen Situationen

Cristina Hoyos

Kohärenz, Koordination und Komplementarität sind für integrierte Ansätze in fragilen Situationen essentiell und die internationale Gemeinschaft kann mit Einbezug der Zivilgesellschaft diesbezüglich bessere Resultate erreichen.

1.) Ausgangslage

Weltweit leben rund 1,2 Milliarden Menschen in Staaten, die von Fragilität und Konflikten betroffen sind. Es handelt sich hierbei um 43 Länder, die im Jahr 2008 insgesamt 33,2 Milliarden US-Dollar an offizieller Entwicklungshilfe erhalten haben. Dies entspricht ungefähr einem Drittel der gesamten offiziellen Entwicklungshilfe.

Auf der einen Seite haben im Jahr 2009 mehrere bilaterale Geber – darunter europäische Staaten – Kürzungen ihrer Hilfe angekündigt; die Hilfe wird zudem nicht immer als genügend effektiv wahrgenommen. Auf der anderen Seite engagieren sich verstärkt Länder wie China, Indien, Brasilien und Südafrika in diesen Staaten, die von Fragilität und Konflikten betroffen sind. Für 2010 hat sich China bereits mit rund 15 Milliarden US-Dollar in Afrika verpflichtet.¹ Diese neuen Geber sind bisher noch am wenigsten in Koordinationsbemühungen eingebunden.

2.) Mit welchen Herausforderungen sind wir konfrontiert?

Um in fragilen Kontexten und nach bewaffneten Konflikten den Wiederaufbau zu gestalten, werden verschiedene Kapazitäten benötigt:

- Die verschiedenen beteiligten Akteure, wie Entwicklungshelfer und -helferinnen, Soldaten und Soldatinnen, Diplomaten und Diplomatinen und die Zivilgesellschaft arbeiten mit unterschiedlichen Rahmenbedingungen. Für eine effektive Umsetzung brauchen deren Programme allerdings eine gemeinsame strategische Ausrichtung.
- Jeder Akteur bringt einen Mehrwert und hat spezielle Kapazitäten, Erfahrungen und Interessen. Die entsprechenden Aufgaben werden aber nicht immer effizient untereinander aufgeteilt und aufeinander abgestimmt.
- Unterschiedliche Ansätze der Geberländer und der Zivilgesellschaft können zu Überlappungen, Duplikation und zu lückenhaften Programmen führen.
- Die internationale Gemeinschaft, einzelne Institutionen oder selbst internationale Nichtregierungsorganisationen konkurrenzieren sich gegenseitig häufig, da sie verschiedene Ansätze, Interessen und Prioritäten vertreten.
- Unterschiedliche institutionelle und bürokratische Kulturen und Vorgehensweisen der verschiedenen „*Policy Communities*“ erschweren die Koordination.

¹ United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (2008), „Trends in South-South and triangular development cooperation“, background study for the Development Co-operation Forum.

- Zeit ist immer ein wichtiger Faktor, da die internationale Gemeinschaft konkrete Ergebnisse und eine Veränderung schnellstmöglich erreichen möchte. Dies ist in fragilen Kontexten meistens eine unrealistische Erwartung.

Hier geht es somit nicht um die Quantität der Hilfe, die von der internationalen Gemeinschaft geleistet wird, sondern um die Qualität dieses Engagements, um sein Potential, die Armut zu reduzieren und eine nachhaltige Entwicklung der von Konflikten und Fragilität betroffenen Länder erreichen zu können. Um diese Herausforderung anzugehen, braucht es eine enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Akteuren im Bereich der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, der Sicherheit, der Diplomatie und der Wirtschaft. Es muss ein gemeinsames Verständnis zwischen den verschiedenen „*Policy Communities*“ entwickelt werden, um abgestimmte Ziele festzusetzen: Es müssen systematisch kontextspezifische Analysen zu Staatsbildung und Friedensförderung erarbeitet werden, um die Effektivität der Hilfe zu verbessern.

3.) Vorschläge einer besseren Zusammenarbeit

Um eine bessere Zusammenarbeit der verschiedenen Akteure zu erreichen, hat die Schweiz gemeinsam mit der UNO, der Weltbank, der OECD und der NATO einen Ansatz entwickelt, der die Kohärenz, Koordination und Komplementarität zwischen den verschiedenen „*Policy Communities*“ in fragilen Staaten und Situationen verbessern soll. Dieser sogenannte „3C-Ansatz“ ist als Verstärkung der gemeinsamen und sich gegenseitig ergänzenden Ansätze der internationalen Akteure einschließlich der Zivilgesellschaft zu verstehen, die auf eine effizientere und wirksamere Unterstützung von Frieden, Sicherheit und Entwicklung in fragilen Staaten und Situationen abzielen. Das heißt, dass sich die Geberstaaten inklusive der Zivilgesellschaft im Rahmen eines „*Whole of Government Approach*“ und eines „*Whole of System Approach*“ über die Resultate, die in fragilen und von Konflikten betroffenen Ländern erreicht werden sollen, einig werden müssen. Das Ziel ist somit, nach einer gemeinsamen Kontextanalyse im Partnerland auf die Bedürfnisse und Prioritäten des betroffenen Landes einzugehen und gemeinsame Strategien zu entwickeln.

Die Zivilgesellschaft spielt in fragilen Staaten eine besondere Rolle, sollte aber den Staat nicht ersetzen, sondern eher die Beziehung zwischen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern und den staatlichen Institutionen mit helfen aufzubauen. Es muss ein gutes und klares Verständnis geben, welche Rolle die Zivilgesellschaft in der Friedensförderung kurz-, mittel- und langfristig haben soll. Die Zivilgesellschaft kann in ihrer unabhängigen Rolle die Einhaltung der Rechenschaftspflicht in fragilen Staaten fördern und die staatliche Friedensförderung ergänzen und unterstützen.

In der *3C Roadmap* geht es um die folgenden sechs Prinzipien, welche die Zivilgesellschaft mit einbezieht:

1. Stärkung von Eigenverantwortung und Kapazitäten in betroffenen Staaten;
2. Möglichst rasche und angemessene Reaktion auf Veränderungen im Partnerland;
3. Verbesserung der gegenseitigen Rechenschaftspflicht von Partnerländern und internationalen Akteuren;
4. Verringerung der Belastung des Partnerlandes durch Koordination der externen Unterstützung;
5. Effizienter Einsatz der beschränkten Mittel unter Vermeidung von Doppelspurigkeiten und Finanzierungslücken; sowie
6. Verbesserung und Vertiefung der gemeinsamen Lernprozesse und Erhöhung der Reaktionsfähigkeit.

1. Stärkung von Eigenverantwortung und Kapazitäten in betroffenen Staaten:

Die Behörden von Partnerländern und relevante Akteure auf allen Ebenen, einschließlich der Zivilgesellschaft, sollen systematisch einbezogen werden. Das gilt sowohl für die Ermittlung der bestehenden Bedürfnisse, die Analyse von Konfliktursachen und Fragilität als auch für die Festlegung von Prioritäten bei der Stärkung der Eigenverantwortung auf nationaler und lokaler Ebene, sowie die Unterstützung von Vertrauensbildung und Versöhnung.

Der Stärkung von Institutionen und Kapazitäten der Partnerländer sollte auf allen Ebenen, auch auf lokaler Ebene, Priorität eingeräumt werden, damit der Staat seine grundlegenden Aufgaben erfüllen kann. Die grundlegenden Aufgaben umfassen: die Sicherstellung von Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Sicherheit, die Bereitstellung, Planung und Verwaltung der öffentlichen Finanzen, die Schaffung eines günstigen Umfelds für die Bereitstellung grundlegender Dienstleistungen, für eine starke Wirtschaftsleistung und für die Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen. Unterstützung in diesen Bereichen stärkt wiederum das Vertrauen der Bürgerinnen und Bürger in die staatlichen Institutionen und damit ihre Bereitschaft, sich zu engagieren. Der Zivilgesellschaft kommt sowohl bei der Forderung nach guter Regierungsführung als auch bei der Bereitstellung von Dienstleistungen eine zentrale Rolle zu.

2. Möglichst rasche und angemessene Reaktion auf Veränderungen im Partnerland:

Maßgebliche Veränderungen, Herausforderungen und Trends, einschließlich der Krisen- und Risikodynamik, sollten regelmäßig gemeinsam evaluiert und analysiert werden. Diese gemeinsamen Evaluationen sollten zunächst – nach Möglichkeit unter Einbezug der Partnerländer – anfangs einfach und schnell erarbeitet und erst später schrittweise vertieft werden. Sie sollten Entscheidungsträger aus den Bereichen Sicherheit, Diplomatie, Wirtschaft sowie Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und humanitäre Hilfe umfassen und allenfalls auch weitere Bereiche miteinbeziehen. Auf der Basis dieser Evaluationen sollten Partnerländer und internationale Akteure je nach Kontext gemeinsam realistische Ziele in den Bereichen Friedenskonsolidierung, Staatsbildung und Wiederaufbau festlegen, die an das sich verändernde Umfeld angepasst werden können. Sie sollten außerdem Strategien entwickeln, mit denen die Ursachen von Konflikt und Fragilität angegangen und der Schutz und die Partizipation der Bevölkerung sichergestellt werden können.

Dabei sollten die komparativen Vorteile der verschiedenen Akteure genutzt werden, damit sie komplementär zueinander arbeiten können. Gleichzeitig sollte aber auch die Unabhängigkeit, Neutralität und Unparteilichkeit der humanitären Hilfe gewahrt werden. Die Verwendung gemeinsamer Instrumente und Methoden für Kontextanalyse, Planung, Überwachung und Evaluation, die den Bedürfnissen aller Akteure entsprechen, sollte gefördert werden, um die Kohärenz, Koordination und Komplementarität zu erhöhen.

3. Verbesserung der gegenseitigen Rechenschaftspflicht von Partnerländern und internationaler Gemeinschaft:

Zwischen dem Partnerland und der internationalen Gemeinschaft sollte ein kontinuierlicher Dialog geführt werden um sicherzustellen, dass sich die gemeinsamen Ziele in geeigneten Mechanismen zur gegenseitigen Rechenschaftslegung niederschlagen, wie z.B. umfassenden Leistungsvereinbarungen. In diesen Leistungsvereinbarungen würden die erforderlichen Aktivitäten und Ressourcen sowie die vereinbarten Zielwerte detailliert festgelegt. Die Mechanismen müssten regelmäßig gegenseitig überprüft werden.

Bei Regierungen, bei denen der politische Wille da ist, Frieden, Sicherheit, Menschenrechte und Entwicklung zu fördern, die aber dazu nicht in der Lage sind, sollte die internationale Gemeinschaft inklusive der Zivilgesellschaft ihre Hilfe, wenn möglich an den Strategien dieser Länder ausrichten. Wo dies wegen einer besonders schwachen Regierung oder einem gewaltsamen Konflikt nicht möglich ist, sollten sie nach Möglichkeiten suchen, um die Koordination mit Plänen sicherzustellen, die auf sektorieller oder regionaler Ebene unter Mitwirkung aller wichtigen Akteure entwickelt wurden.

4. Verringerung der Belastung des Partnerlandes durch Koordination der externen Hilfe:

Die externe Hilfe sollte so weit wie möglich vereinfacht und vereinheitlicht werden, indem die Zahl der Koordinationsmechanismen und der Hilfskanäle reduziert wird und gemeinsame Arbeitsmethoden vereinbart werden. Sämtliche Geber sollten versuchen, die Funktionsweise ihrer Vertretungen im Feld den Bedürfnissen der Partnerländer anzupassen und die verschiedenen Aktivitäten in klare Strukturen und Abläufe einzubinden. Praktisch könnte dies über folgende Maßnahmen stattfinden: gemeinsame Büros, Vereinbarungen über die Arbeitsteilung, Vereinbarungen über die Delegation der Zusammenarbeit, Treuhandfonds mit mehreren Gebern, sowie gemeinsame Anforderungen an Berichterstattung und Rechnungslegung.

Angesichts der entscheidenden Rolle der Vereinten Nationen in bewaffneten Konflikten und fragilen Situationen sollte die Aufteilung von Aufgaben und Verantwortlichkeiten innerhalb der UNO und zwischen der UNO und den internationalen Finanzorganisationen sowie anderen Gebern im Rahmen der laufenden Reformprozesse geklärt werden. Damit könnte ein kohärentes und koordiniertes Vorgehen sichergestellt werden.

5. Effizienter Einsatz der beschränkten Mittel unter Vermeidung von Doppelspurigkeiten und Finanzierungslücken:

Es sollte eine flexible, rasche und zuverlässige, langfristige Finanzierung sichergestellt werden, einschließlich einer Korbfinanzierung, wo dies sinnvoll ist. Die Finanzierung sollte angemessen sein, den versprochenen Beträgen entsprechen und möglichst rasch verfügbar gemacht werden, um eine Stabilisierung des Landes zu unterstützen und im Wiederaufbau und der Friedenskonsolidierung rasche Fortschritte zu erzielen.

Auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene sollte ein klarer Überblick über alle eingegangenen Verpflichtungen und Investitionen, sowie alle Kapazitäten geschaffen und regelmäßig aktualisiert werden. Das Ziel ist, die Umsetzung der Verpflichtungen zu optimieren: die Prioritäten müssen klar sein, auch wenn sie sich manchmal ändern; komparative Vorteile sollten genutzt werden. Doppelspurigkeiten und kritische Finanzierungslücken müssen vermieden werden.

6. Verbesserung und Vertiefung der gemeinsamen Lernprozesse und Erhöhung der Reaktionsfähigkeit:

Innerhalb der Geberregierungen, aber auch für die verschiedenen internationalen Organisationen, die in fragilen Staaten und Situationen tätig sind, sollten gemeinsame Veranstaltungen zur Förderung der Aus- und Weiterbildung sowie der Kapazitätsentwicklung durchgeführt werden. In diesem Zusammenhang sollten Erkenntnisse und *Best Practices* der einschlägigen internationalen, regionalen und subregionalen Organisationen und Gremien verbreitet werden. Zudem sollte das Know-how der internationalen, nationalen und lokalen Zivilgesellschaft vollumfänglich genutzt werden.

Die Aktivitäten sollten so weit wie möglich systematischer gemeinsam überwacht und evaluiert werden. An diesen gemeinsamen Bemühungen sollten alle betroffenen Departemente/Ministerien/Behörden der internationalen Gemeinschaft – einschließlich bilateraler Geber und internationaler Organisationen – sowie des Partnerlands und seiner Zivilgesellschaft beteiligt werden, soweit dies sinnvoll ist. Dabei sollte sichergestellt werden, dass die verschiedenen Perspektiven aller Akteure sowie die Prioritäten und Strategien des Partnerlandes gebührend berücksichtigt werden.

4.) Schlussfolgerungen

Eine nachhaltige Befreiung der fragilen Staaten von Armut und Unsicherheit muss von diesen selbst ausgehen und in deren Eigenverantwortung geschehen. Die Geberländer, wie auch die lokale Zivilgesellschaft können diese Entwicklung in fragilen Staaten positiv wie negativ beeinflussen. Sie sollten aber die mehrdimensionalen Herausforderungen und das Zusammenspiel von Sicherheit, Diplomatie, Wirtschaft und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aufnehmen, und wo immer möglich gemeinsame Strategien erarbeiten. Hier ist wichtig, die Erfahrungen der internationalen, nationalen und lokalen Nichtregierungsorganisationen mit einzubeziehen, da diese für viele Entwicklungsagenturen in fragilen Kontexten operationell vor Ort tätig sind und sich oft durch ein vertieftes, lokales Wissen auszeichnen und die Interessen verschiedener Bevölkerungsgruppen einbringen können. Große Herausforderungen ergeben sich bei den Schnittstellen von Regierungsführung, Wirtschaft und Sicherheit. Wir müssen hier ein vielfältiges Instrumentarium der Sektoren Sicherheit, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Diplomatie, Finanzen, Recht, Zivilgesellschaft, wie auch dem Privatsektor integrieren, wenn die internationale Gemeinschaft effizient in fragilen Kontexten arbeiten möchte. Die internationale Gemeinschaft sollte ihre Erwartungen im Bereich der Stärkung von Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Sicherheit und Wohlfahrt in fragilen Kontexten realistisch ansetzen, da das Engagement in fragilen Kontexten Jahrzehnte lang dauern kann und mittelfristig Misserfolge in Kauf genommen werden müssen, bis staatsbildende Reformen schließlich ihre langfristige Wirkung entfalten können. Es sollte eine grundsätzliche Bereitschaft geben, die unterschiedlichen Kulturen, Kenntnisse und Erfahrungen als Mehrwert zu verstehen und zur Problemlösung einzusetzen.

Internationales Engagement wird staatliche Fragilität auf absehbare Zeit nicht beseitigen können. Die internationale Gemeinschaft kann aber ihre Arbeit in fragilen Kontexten wirkungsvoller und effizienter gestalten: durch die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den verschiedenen „*Policy Communities*“, den Einbezug der Zivilgesellschaft und durch die Etablierung von gemeinsamen Analysen und Strategien, durch die Klärung der Mandate, Rollen und spezifischen Aufgaben im Rahmen einer kohärenten, koordinierten und komplementären Vorgehensweise.

Abstract

The Government of Switzerland in association with OECD, United Nations, World Bank and NATO organised the 3C Conference in Geneva on 19/20 March 2009 with a view to promoting a coordinated, complementary and coherent approach of different actors in fragile situations. The 3C Roadmap adopted at the Conference reinforces existing international policy commitments with the ownership and endorsement of other policy communities, thus creating Whole of System / Whole of Government commitments and generating new impetus for their implementation.

The Conference agreed that the following principles for engagement in fragile situations should be given particular attention:

1. Strengthening national ownership and national capacities;
2. Responding in a timely and appropriate manner to the evolving situation in the partner country;
3. Strengthening mutual accountability of partner countries and international actors;
4. Reducing the burden of aid management on partner country capacity;
5. Making efficient use of limited resources and avoiding duplication and funding gaps;
6. Improving and deepening joint learning, and increasing response capacities.

The Roadmap also contains a series of specific operational recommendations and joint and individual commitments. The Vienna 3C Conference is a follow-up to this work focusing on civil society interaction in fragile situations.

3C aus außen- und entwicklungspolitischer Sicht

Irene Freudenschuss-Reichl

1.) Die Wiener 3C-Konferenz – das Konzept

Das österreichische Bundesministerium für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten (BMeiA) veranstaltete gemeinsam mit dem Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport (BMLVS) und österreichischen zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen von 5. bis 7. Mai 2010 eine internationale Konferenz zum Thema „Koordiniert, komplementär und kohärent agieren in fragilen Situationen – Die Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft“.

Ziel der Konsultationen war die Erweiterung des Blickwinkels der Genfer 3C-Konferenz auf die Rolle der Nichtregierungsorganisationen in fragilen Situationen. Besonderer Wert wurde auf die Zusammenarbeit zwischen verschiedenen involvierten Akteuren vor Ort, inklusive lokaler und internationaler zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen gelegt.

Die Tagung entwickelte einen Konsensus in der Zusammenarbeit zwischen verschiedenen Akteuren vor Ort und rund um Konfliktsituationen auf der Grundlage neuer Konzepte zu Peacebuilding und Statebuilding. Internationale Geberorganisationen sollen ihr Vorgehen eng mit der jeweiligen betroffenen Regierung und der lokalen Zivilgesellschaft abstimmen.

2.) Ziele der Wiener 3C-Konferenz

In den letzten eineinhalb Jahren ist das Thema Sicherheit und Entwicklung unter dem Stern der „3C“ gestanden – englisch „coordinated, complementary and coherent“ – „koordiniert, komplementär und kohärent handeln“ in Situationen, in denen Menschen aufgrund von Konflikten Not leiden, wo menschliche Sicherheit durch bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen bedroht ist, oder der Übergang aus einer Nachkriegssituation in stabile und nachhaltige Entwicklung gelingen soll. Die Sicherheitskonzepte, mit denen wir diese Situationen meistern wollen, haben sich dadurch verändert. Es geht heute nicht mehr nur um Verteidigung im engeren Sinn, sondern gleichzeitig um Frieden und Entwicklung, unabhängig davon, wo. Wir leben in einer vernetzten Welt, in der Konflikte in anderen Teilen der Welt unsere Sicherheit daheim berühren.

Tatsächlich ist heute anerkannt, dass Entwicklung und Sicherheit einander bedingen – eine Einsicht, die von der Entwicklungspolitik seit 2005 intensiv bearbeitet wird. Sicherheit ist entwicklungsrelevant geworden, und Entwicklung sicherheitsrelevant: Keine internationale Mission kann ein Land verlassen, das im Chaos versinkt. Der Aufbau von staatlichen Strukturen in einem unsicheren Umfeld ist illusorisch. Das heißt, die Aufgaben hängen eng miteinander zusammen, mehr noch, die verschiedenen Akteure, die diese Aufgaben übernehmen, hängen existentiell voneinander ab. Kein einzelner Akteur kann allein erfolgreich sein; es ist eine gemeinsame Anstrengung notwendig, um Entwicklung und Sicherheit in fragilen Situationen voranzutreiben. Seit Genf hat sich dafür der Begriff „Whole-of-Government Approach“ oder auch „Whole-of-Nation (System) Approach“ durchgesetzt – letzteres meint auch den Einsatz der Nichtregierungsorganisationen vor Ort.

3.) Fokus auf nicht-staatliche Akteure

Dieses Zusammenwirken zwischen staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteuren ist bisher noch zu wenig beleuchtet worden. Deshalb haben wir letztes Jahr in Nachfolge der Genfer Konferenz, insbesondere die Vertreterinnen und Vertreter der Zivilgesellschaft eingeladen, mitzudiskutieren. Denn die Nichtregierungsorganisationen leisten einen ganz spezifischen Beitrag zur Überwindung fragiler Situationen.

Wir biegen damit auf einen Weg ein, der operativ, konkret und ergebnisorientiert ist. In den konzeptuellen Arbeiten zum „Strategischen Leitfaden für Sicherheit und Entwicklung“, die das Bundesministerium für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten gemeinsam mit dem Ministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport geleitet hat, ist klar geworden: Besonders in den schwierigen Transitionsphasen hängt der Erfolg von einem koordinierten Vorgehen aller Akteure der internationalen, aber auch der lokalen Gesellschaft und der Nichtregierungsorganisationen ab.

Wir tragen mit unserem Dialog zwischen staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteuren in fragilen Situationen einen Baustein zu den aktuellen Reformbestrebungen auf multilateraler Ebene bei:

- Richtungsweisend hat die OECD mit der Pariser Erklärung zur Wirksamkeit von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit 2005 und dem 2008 ausgearbeiteten Accra Aktionsplan die Weichen für ein besseres Miteinander in fragilen Situationen gesetzt. Die Realität ist oft weit davon entfernt.
- In der Europäischen Union laufen etwa mit dem Aktionsplan in fragilen Situationen oder dem „Comprehensive Approach“ derzeit Reformprozesse, die diese Schnittstelle im Visier haben. Dabei haben wir gelernt, dass die Probleme nicht von einander getrennt auftauchen, sondern gleichzeitig auftreten und zu bewältigen sind.
- Auch die Vereinten Nationen beschäftigen sich mit dem Thema. Sie untersuchen, wie die Phase unmittelbar nach Beendigung von Konflikten von der internationalen Gemeinschaft am besten unterstützt werden kann und wie die Chancen dieser Phase genutzt werden können, sei es durch Mediation oder einen frühen Einstieg für die Privatwirtschaft. Dies ist auch das zentrale Anliegen der österreichischen Initiative zur Verbesserung von sozio-ökonomischen Auswirkungen von internationalen Friedensoperationen auf die lokale Situation, die wir im Herbst 2009 gemeinsam mit EU-Partnern lanciert haben und am 1. Oktober 2010 in New York vorstellen.

Österreich kann besonders als Mitglied des Weltsicherheitsrats zu einem verbesserten Zusammenwirken von Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik beitragen. Ein wichtiges Anliegen ist uns dabei der Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung, der mit der unter österreichischem Vorsitz angenommenen SR-Resolution 1894 wesentlich verbessert wurde.

Wir sind bereit, mit unserem Engagement in fragilen Situationen einen zeitgemäßen und unerlässlichen Beitrag zur Erhaltung von Friede, Sicherheit und Entwicklung zu leisten. Dazu braucht es auch einen „Konsens“ zwischen denen, die helfen wollen – staatlicher wie nicht-staatlicher Organisationen.

Abstract

Development and security are mutually interlinked. No international mission can claim that its mission was successful if it leaves behind weak institutions and latent violence, and vice versa, institution and legitimacy cannot be built in an unsafe context.

Thus, there is a critical need for linking security and development communities. In real terms that means that mandates, roles and tasks of different actors cannot be exercised in an isolated manner. We need a joint effort to propel development and security in a given context. In elaborating joint strategies combining the various dimensions of engagement inclusion of international and national NGOs as well as local civil society is crucial since they dispose of knowledge regarding local priorities and needs.

Koordination, Komplementarität und Kohärenz als Regulative der österreichischen Sicherheitspolitik

Johann Pucher

Das internationale Engagement Österreichs muss als finale Zielsetzung anstreben und dazu einen Beitrag leisten, dass in Einsatzregionen nachhaltige sozioökonomische Rahmenbedingungen geschaffen werden. Das österreichische Mitwirken an Maßnahmen im Nexus „Sicherheit und Entwicklung“ will ein rechtsstaatlich fundiertes Funktionsgefüge zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft errichtet sehen, in dem es demokratische Partizipation und eine „gute Regierungsführung“ gibt. Das wird nicht immer gleich und leicht zu erreichen sein. Aber es gilt, dies anzustreben und mit Nachdruck zu verfolgen. Es geht um mehr als um reine militärische Stabilität oder die Beendigung von Feindseligkeiten.

Durch die Dynamik der Konflikte unserer Zeit werden die internationalen Friedensbemühungen ebenso herausgefordert wie die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union und die österreichische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Die Folgen der großen Finanzkrise von 2008 verschärfen die Konfliktlagen und fragilen Situationen noch zusätzlich: Einerseits verstärken sich die Verteilungauseinandersetzungen, andererseits reduziert die entwickelte Welt in ernüchterndem Maß ihre Beiträge zur Stabilisierung und Entwicklung. Es ist zu befürchten, dass es in Zukunft noch mehr Krisen und Konflikte bei abnehmenden Ressourcen für deren Stabilisierung geben wird. In der Konsequenz wird man auch in Österreich bei der Konfliktbearbeitung stärker als bisher in Planung und Engagement die vorhandenen Potenziale zielgerichtet bündeln müssen. Dies ganz im Sinne eines „Whole of Government Approach“, besser noch, auch unter Einbeziehung von anderen, nichtstaatlichen Akteuren, als „Whole of Nation Approach“.

1.) Weiterentwickeltes Sicherheitsverständnis

Es ist ein Gebot der Zeit und der Humanität, über die Staaten als solche hinausgehend die Menschen zu Subjekten von Sicherheit zu machen. Fragen der äußeren Sicherheit können nicht mehr nur als Fragen der Sicherheit von und zwischen Staaten formuliert werden. Eine Sicherheitspolitik, die bei aller notwendiger politischer Abstraktion die Sicherheit der Menschen nicht aus den Augen verlieren will, muss sich auch mit Fragen von Armut, sozialer Disparität, Migration, Umwelt- und Ressourcensicherheit, organisiertem Verbrechen und ökonomischer Stabilität auseinandersetzen. Dieses Anliegen kann und muss alle engagierten Akteure in Österreich einigen.

Das Militär neigt traditionell dazu, sich auf die heiße Phase eines Konflikts und deren Bewältigung zu konzentrieren. Die Erfolge militärischer Interventionen oder der Versuche, von außen gesellschaftliche Veränderungen nach westlichem Modell zu oktroyieren, sind mehr als bescheiden. Ein Umdenken scheint eingeleitet zu werden. Wir sollten uns daher mehr als bisher der Konfliktprävention, dem Peace Building und der Post-Konflikt-Stabilisierung widmen. Das erfordert langfristiges politisches und gesellschaftliches Engagement für globale Klima- bzw. Umweltschutzpolitik, Migrationspolitik oder den Kampf gegen Armut und Marginalisierung. Wir alle müssen noch besser als bisher versuchen, die Wurzeln von Konflikten zu verstehen und sie bekämpfen. Dies berührt ganz besonders das Zusammenspiel von Sicherheit und Entwicklung bzw. von Sicherheitspolitik und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit.

2.) Ganzheitliche Lösungsstrategien

Die komplexen und vielfältigen Herausforderungen des internationalen Krisenmanagements in sogenannten „fragilen Situationen“, erfordern ein langfristig angesetztes, intelligent koordiniertes, also ein komplementäres und kohärentes Vorgehen aller Akteure. Dies beginnt bei der Analyse, setzt sich über die Planung fort und materialisiert sich dann vor Ort. Alle Akteure bedeutet, dass über einen gesamtstaatlichen Ansatz hinaus auch die internationalen Organisationen und NRO eingebunden werden.

Im Spannungsfeld der neuen Herausforderungen und eines erweiterten Sicherheitsbegriffes hat unter dem Schirm des Begriffs „Comprehensive Approach“ eine breite Diskussion über geeignete gesamtsystematische und im Speziellen gesamtstaatliche Antworten und Strategien eingesetzt.

In der Kritik dieses Zugangs verweist man unter anderem auf die institutionellen und mentalen Hindernisse, die der Umsetzung eines solchen ganzheitlichen Ansatzes entgegenstehen. Unterschiedliche Einsatzziele und Unternehmenskulturen prallen in der Einsatzrealität aufeinander. Es gilt, diese Spannung in einem ganzheitlichen Prozedere kreativ zu nützen. Ein Vorschlag dazu ist der in diesem Band zur Diskussion gestellte „3C-Ansatz“, der im Rahmen einer gemeinsamen Konferenz von der Schweiz, der UNO, der NATO, der OECD und der Weltbank in Genf an 19. und 20. März 2009 vorgestellt wurde.¹

3.) Profilierte Akteure

Auffassungsunterschiede zwischen den Akteuren, tradierte Barrieren im Denken und Handeln müssen überwunden werden. Nicht nur zwischen den unterschiedlichen Internationalen Organisationen mit ihren jeweils spezifischen Zugangsweisen, sondern auch zwischen den verschiedenen Ressorts in Österreich, und auch zwischen den staatlichen Stellen und den Nichtregierungsorganisationen.

Die verschiedenen Akteure gehen an fragile Situationen mit den ihnen jeweils eigenen Sichtweisen und Methoden heran. Sie bringen ihre Wertvorstellungen und Organisationskulturen ein, jeder mit seinen spezifischen Stärken und Schwächen. Aber jeder für sich alleine ist nicht ausreichend, um Konflikte und deren Ursachen dauerhaft zu lösen zu können.

Bei der systematischen Koordination dieser Akteure stellen sich zahlreiche praxisrelevante Fragen:

- Das Bemühen, die Menschen zu Subjekten von Sicherheit zu machen, kann in bestimmten Phasen von Konflikten auch den Einsatz von militärischen, polizeilichen und justiziellen Mitteln erfordern. Wie sollen diese in fragilen Situationen handeln, ohne nach ihrem Einsatz langfristige Entwicklung zu behindern?
- Sollen der Sicherheitssektor und insbesondere das Militär sich nur auf die Schaffung eines sicheren Umfeldes konzentrieren, oder sollen sie auch zivile Funktionen übernehmen?
- Schränkt die Präsenz von Militär den nötigen humanitären Freiraum ein, den NRO üblicherweise für ihren neutralen und unabhängigen Zugang benötigen, der sich vor allem am Bedarf der betroffenen Bevölkerung orientiert?

¹ Vgl. 3C Roadmap. Improving results in conflict and fragile situations. Genf, März 2009. Elektronisch verfügbar unter <<http://www.3CConference2009.ch/en/Home/media/3C%20Roadmap.pdf>>.

- Inwieweit werden NRO, wenn sie mit Polizei oder Militär zusammenarbeiten, allenfalls als Teil einer feindlichen Gruppierung wahrgenommen?

4.) Die Rolle des Militärs

Dass Konflikte sehr oft nicht mehr zwischen Staaten, sondern sub- und transstaatlich ausgetragen werden, häufig zwischen nicht eindeutig zuordenbaren bewaffneten Gruppen mit verschiedenen Motiven und verschiedenen Konfliktaustragungsstrategien, hat auch zur Folge, dass viele zivile Opfer zu beklagen sind. Die von Österreich 2009 wesentlich mitinitiierte Sicherheitsratsresolution 1894 „Protection of Civilians“ verlangt, dass in Zukunft multinationale Streitkräfte die Zivilbevölkerung, insbesondere die Verwundbarsten, die Frauen und Kinder verstärkt schützen. Es soll der betroffenen Zivilbevölkerung jene Unterstützung zukommen, die angesichts fehlender Infrastruktur oder anderer Mängel nötig und dringlich ist. Es gilt, die „humanitäre Lücke“ zu füllen, wo immer sie besteht und wer immer dazu in der Lage ist.

Situationen mit hohem Gewaltpotenzial erfordern ohnehin die besonderen Fähigkeiten des Militärs, weil dieses Schutz und erste Führungsfähigkeit sichern kann. Aber selbst in Situationen mit relativ geringer Eskalationsdynamik sind Streitkräfte gefragt, weil nur sie etwa über die notwendigen verlegbaren Fähigkeiten verfügen, um fehlende staatliche Infrastruktur – wie etwa ein Flughafenmanagement oder „schwimmende“ Spitäler – rasch und effektiv bereitzustellen.

Eine friktionsfreie Arbeitsteilung zwischen zivilen und militärischen Akteuren sollte selbstverständlich werden. Es geht nicht um „Mission Hunting“ für das Militär. Neben zivilen Ressourcen für Prävention und Konfliktnachsorge kann immer wieder ein Bedarf an zivilmilitärischer Interaktion bestehen. Natürlich auf der Basis von dafür eigens entwickelten Regeln und Mechanismen, wie sie in den sogenannten „3C“-Prinzipien Koordination, Komplementarität und Kohärenz formuliert werden.

5.) Gemeinsam helfen

Hilfe und Unterstützung im Notfall gewährt man am besten im Verbund aller geeigneten Instrumente. So ist es ziemlich sinnlos, im Fall der Stagnation eines militärischen Einsatzes einfach nur mehr Soldatinnen und Soldaten in eine Krisenregion zu schicken, um den sprichwörtlichen „Deckel darauf zu stülpen“, ohne die Konfliktsachen zu bekämpfen. Es macht auch wenig Sinn, Friedensabkommen zu schließen, dann aber über Jahre Truppen in der Region stationieren zu müssen, da Entwicklung und Konflikt bearbeitende politische Prozesse nachhinken oder fehlen. Es ist eine gefährliche Tendenz zu beobachten, dass multinationale Streitkräfte in Postkonfliktsituationen abziehen müssen, bevor die grundlegenden Konflikttransformationsprozesse erfolgreich und stabilisierend abgeschlossen werden konnten.

Denn erst das erlaubt eine friedliche Entwicklung und eine geordnete Problembewältigung. Ohne eine strukturierte Einbeziehung der Zivilgesellschaft mit ihren ganz spezifischen Fähigkeiten und Positionen wird man nicht weiterkommen.

Eine den „3C“-Prinzipien entsprechende Weiterentwicklung und Verbesserung von Koordination, Komplementarität und Kohärenz wird auch dem österreichischen Solidaritätshandeln helfen, die Aktivitäten der staatlichen und der nichtstaatlichen Akteure mit ihren jeweiligen Stärken und Schwächen in einem ganzheitlichen Vorgehen zu bündeln. Das wird uns in Ös-

terreich erlauben, Vorbereitungsmaßnahmen und Abstimmung zu verbessern. Und es wird uns erlauben, mehr Verständnis füreinander zu gewinnen.

6.) Ableitungen für die österreichische Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik sowie die Streitkräfte im Allgemeinen

In der Konsequenz wird es eine zentrale Aufgabe sein, Schnittstellen und Gemeinsamkeiten einerseits zwischen der österreichischen Sicherheitspolitik und der österreichischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sowie andererseits zwischen staatlichen und nichtstaatlichen Akteuren zu definieren. Aufgaben wie humanitäre und Katastrophenhilfe sowie Stabilisierungsoperationen und -missionen finden vielfach in Fällen und Räumen statt, die bereits vorher Ziel von nationalen bzw. multinationalen Aktivitäten der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sind oder es danach werden können. Der internationalen Debatte folgend hat auch in Österreich eine zunehmend strukturierte Diskussion darüber eingesetzt, welcher Zusammenhang zwischen stabilisierenden Maßnahmen des Sicherheitssektors und der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit besteht und was das für gesamtstaatliche Fragestellungen bedeutet.

Es ist zu begrüßen, dass entsprechende Überlegungen angestellt werden: sowohl im Kontext der Aktualisierung des Dreijahresprogramms der Österreichischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und des Strategischen Leitfadens Sicherheit und Entwicklung als auch im Prozess zur Erstellung eines gesamtstaatlichen Auslandseinsatzkonzeptes. Ziel ist die konzeptionelle Darstellung und Definition von gemeinsamen Aufgabenstellungen, Schnittstellen und Zusammenarbeitskriterien in komplexen und fragilen Situationen, wie sie vor allem OECD, UNO und Weltbank, aber auch die NATO und die EU anstreben. Durch diese Handlungsstränge soll Politikkohärenz in Österreich ermöglicht werden.

Dabei ist zumindest theoretisch unbestritten, dass das Militär neben der unmittelbaren Lösungskompetenz in Situationen mit hohem Gewaltpotenzial auch in Phasen der Prävention und Konfliktnachsorge zum Einsatz kommen soll. Welche konkreten Aufgaben dies umfasst, bleibt dabei zurzeit offen.

Ob aber in anderen Aufgabenbereichen – etwa bei der Bereitstellung von Gütern des täglichen Bedarfs oder bei der Aufrechterhaltung von Infrastruktursystemen einschließlich der Gesundheitsvorsorge – militärische Kräfte als Ersatz für nicht vorhandene zivile Akteure tätig werden sollen, ist in der Humanitarian Community, aber auch in einigen Verteidigungsministerien umstritten. Dabei sprechen mehrere Momente überzeugend dafür: sowohl die in Umfang, Geschwindigkeit oder Durchhaltefähigkeit mangelnde Projektionsfähigkeit ziviler Organisationen als auch die Tatsache, dass in Stabilisierungsoperationen oft Räume über längere Zeit für zivile Einsatzkräfte nicht zugänglich und lokale Behörden nicht ausreichend vorhanden sind. Daher werden diese Aufgaben wohl auch vom Militär übernommen werden müssen. Auch kann es notwendig sein, Aufgaben des nichtmilitärischen Sicherheitssektors bei der Herstellung von Rechtsstaatlichkeit und öffentlicher Sicherheit in frühen Stabilisierungsphasen subsidiär durch Streitkräfte wahrzunehmen.

In Österreich wie in der internationalen Debatte fürchten Teile der entwicklungspolitischen Gemeinschaft um die Einhaltung der Grundsätze von Humanität, Neutralität und Unparteilichkeit bei einer zivil-militärischen Zusammenarbeit mit all den sich daraus ergebenden Sicherheitsrisiken für die zivilen Akteure.

Umso wichtiger erscheint es, für bestimmte Funktionskomplexe bei der Unterstützung von Prozessen des State- oder Nation Building zu definieren, welche konkreten Aufgaben wel-

chem Akteur zukommen und wie sich diese in einer Zeitleiste eines Konfliktverlaufes entwickeln können. Das betrifft etwa die

- Entwicklung von Rechtsstaatlichkeit,
- Schaffung eines sicheren Umfelds,
- Etablierung eines demokratischen Regierungs- und Gemeinwesens,
- Entwicklung nachhaltiger Wirtschaftsstrukturen oder
- Sicherstellung von Bedürfnissen des täglichen Lebens

Dabei sind insbesondere Transitionszeitpunkte² und Transformationsaspekte³ von Bedeutung.

Es gilt daher, die jeweiligen Befürchtungen von zivilen Organisationen und Streitkräften ernst zu nehmen. Sie sind auflösbar. Im Kern berührt doch alle die Frage, wie sich Österreich im internationalen Friedensengagement zukünftig aufstellen will. Dabei sollte alle Beteiligten der Anspruch einen, internationale solidarische Hilfe effektiv dort leisten zu können, wo sie benötigt wird. Das erwartet sich die österreichische Bevölkerung, das erwartet sich auch zu Recht die internationale Staatengemeinschaft von einem der bestsituierten Staaten Europas.

Abstract

The complex and diverse challenges of today's international crisis management require a new comprehensive approach, granting better coordination, complementarity and coherence between civil and military stakeholders. This text discusses the development of the perception of security, the need for new comprehensive strategies, the coordination between civil and military actors and the consequences for Austria's security- and development policies. A focus is put on better coordination between Austria's security policy and development cooperation, and the need for a "whole of nation" approach. Finally, the text discusses the concerns of civil organisations and armed forces with regards to their respective roles and tasks in international crisis management.

² Übergabe der Verantwortung an einen anderen Aufgabenträger: von militärisch auf zivil, von internationalen bzw. multinationalen Akteuren auf lokale Behörden etc.

³ Z.B. von präventiven Konflikteindämmungsmaßnahmen über Konfliktparteientrennungsaufgaben bis hin zu Stabilisierungsaufgaben und von diesen zu echter Friedenskonsolidierung oder Konflikttransformation auf normale politische Diskurse.

Non-governmental organisations and the 3C

Ruth Picker

We welcome the process of the 3C consultation with our co-negotiators, a process of trying to mutually understand each others' perspectives, possibilities and limitations in fragile situations. We welcome the efforts undertaken by the Ministry of European and International Affairs and the Ministry of Defence and Sports to facilitate this process – it was a model process with regard to participation and true discourse about the issues at stake.

How about the expectations of NGOs with regard to the 3Cs? First of all we expect an improvement with regard to the quality of activities in fragile situations. This applies particularly to coordination at the national and international level. All state and non-state actors that are involved in national level coordination efforts know all too well that there is a lot of room for improvement, especially when it comes to coordination structures.

Second, we expect that state actors recognize NGOs as actors in their own right; as actors who operate based on a different perspective, varying goals, a different set of values, with specific qualifications, experiences and possibilities in fragile situations. For example, a lot of development NGOs work in the field of what one may summarize under the term “prevention” of violent conflict through strengthening democracy and in particular local civil society as one of the pillars of democracy. NGOs may also fulfil vital functions: they provide basic social services where states fail to fulfil their responsibilities; they promote human rights and foster the empowerment of local civil society; NGOs deliver humanitarian aid and they support peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts, to name just a few examples of the wide range of what NGOs contribute in fragile states. In short: NGOs do much more than “complement” state activities.

Third, we expect state actors to fully acknowledge and respect the humanitarian space needed by humanitarian NGOs to do their work according to their guiding principles: and this mission is to alleviate human suffering regardless of who it is who suffers. Guiding principles of humanitarian NGOs include neutrality, impartiality, non-discrimination and independence, based on human rights or what some call an understanding of shared “humanity”.

Fourth, we hope that – as a result of the 3C consultation – state actors develop an understanding that if NGOs refuse to cooperate, this may happen out of concern for the basic principles outlined before. These principles safeguard that humanitarian NGOs can fulfil their mission. They warrant acceptance by all parties of a conflict as well as access to people in need and contribute to the safety of aid workers.

Fifth, when it comes to coordination, we ask state actors to consider that for NGOs, the need to coordinate with international actors (non-state or otherwise) may be more decisive than the need to pursue a nation-state approach – depending on which approach delivers the best result for the population in need.

“Coordination, coherence and complementarity” need more than good and sincere intentions by all negotiating partners: The 3C need also the political will necessary to provide a sufficient, stable and predictable financial basis to make a serious contribution to global peace, development and security.

Zusammenfassung

Nichtregierungsorganisationen erwarten sich vom 3C-Ansatz in erster Linie eine Qualitätssteigerung im Engagement in fragilen Situationen und eine Anerkennung als eigenständige Akteure mit selbständigen Aufgaben vor Ort. Wichtig für die Durchführung humanitärer Hilfe ist der so genannte "humanitarian space", für den die Prinzipien der Neutralität, Unparteilichkeit, Nicht-Diskriminierung und Unabhängigkeit auf der Grundlage der Menschenrechte/Humanität gelten. Gegenseitiges Verständnis ist Voraussetzung für ein gemeinsames Tätigwerden von staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteuren in Situationen extremer Unsicherheit, Koordination ist aber kein Selbstzweck. Wesentlich für das Gelingen eines 3C-Ansatzes aus Sicht der Nichtregierungsorganisationen ist der politische Wille dazu.

Teil II./Part II. Wiener 3C-Appell/Vienna 3C Appeal

Die Zusammenarbeit staatlicher und nicht-staatlicher Akteure in fragilen Situationen – Thesen und Prinzipien der Wiener 3C-Konferenz

Ursula Werther-Pietsch/Anna Katharina Roithner

1.) Einleitung

a.) Konzeptueller Zugang

Die Erreichung der Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) erscheint gerade in fragilen und von bewaffneten Konflikten betroffenen Staaten ohne einen kohärenten Ansatz der internationalen Gemeinschaft für Sicherheit und Entwicklung nicht realisierbar. Aktuelle Initiativen wie der Internationale Dialog der OECD zu Peacebuilding und Statebuilding und die beiden 3C-Konferenzen in Genf sowie in Wien versuchen, diese konzeptionelle Lücke auszufüllen. Dabei bewegt sich die Suche nach neuen Konzepten im Spannungsfeld zwischen Peacebuilding und Statebuilding.

„Wir müssen hier ein vielfältiges Instrumentarium der Sektoren Sicherheit, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Diplomatie, Finanzen, Recht, Zivilgesellschaft wie auch den Privatsektor integrieren, wenn die internationale Gemeinschaft effizient in fragilen Kontexten arbeiten möchte“ (Hoyos). Neue Visionen einer besseren Zusammenarbeit von Akteuren in fragilen Situationen sollen entwickelt werden, um nachhaltige Entwicklung in fragilen Umgebungen zu ermöglichen.

In Zusammenhang mit der Forderung nach nachhaltigem, kohärentem Peacebuilding und Statebuilding „from-the-bottom-up“ nehmen lokale Nichtregierungsorganisationen dank ihres Wissens über lokale Besonderheiten und Prioritäten eine besondere Rolle ein. Die Wiener 3C-Konferenz widmete sich speziell der Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft in fragilen, konfliktbehafteten Regionen und deren Zusammenspiel mit anderen Akteuren.

b.) Die Wiener 3C-Konferenz als follow-up zur Genfer 3C-Konferenz

Die Genfer 3C-Konferenz 2009 stellt einen Meilenstein in der Verwirklichung koordinierter, komplementärer und kohärenter Vorgangsweisen in fragilen Situationen dar. Indem das Schlussdokument eine integrierte Sicht der verschiedenen Zielsetzungen entwirft, insbesondere auch die einander gegenseitig stärkenden Säulen des VN-Systems, „Entwicklung, Friede und Sicherheit, und Menschenrechte“ (VN-Reformgipfel 2005, Schlussdokument, para 9; VN-MDG-Gipfel 2010, Schlussdokument, para 11) aufgreift, kann es als gemeinsame Vision aller beteiligten Akteure gelten.

In der Genfer Roadmap wird der 3C-Ansatz definiert: „A coherent, coordinated and complementary (3C) approach is needed to improve the effectiveness of support to countries and communities affected by conflict and fragility. Coherence, coordination and complementarity require both “Whole of Government” and “Whole of System approaches”. 3C is understood as collaborative and mutually reinforcing approaches by international actors and partner countries, including civil society, to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their support to peace, security, and development in situations of conflict and fragility. The 3C Roadmap is

intended to reinforce related ongoing international processes, such as those led by the 3C conference co-convenors, the UN, the WB, the OECD and NATO, and to promote synergy amongst them“.

Trotz der Erwähnung der Zivilgesellschaft war im Konferenzgeschehen keine der Rollen der NRO in fragilen Situationen entsprechende Präsenz vorgesehen. Zu wichtig erschien erst einmal die Zusammenführung der verschiedenen Komponenten der Regierungsstellen im „Whole-of-Government“-Ansatz, der insbesondere durch die Vorlaufkonferenzen in Den Haag, Oslo und Paris 2008 präzisiert und verstärkt in die internationale Debatte eingebracht worden war.

Österreich nahm dieses Momentum auf, und verpflichtete sich im Annex zur 3C-Roadmap, der bilateralen und multilateralen Zusagen im Follow-up zur Konferenz gewidmet waren, im Folgejahr in Wien Konsultationen mit NRO abzuhalten.

2.) Thesen und Prinzipien – Versuch einer Konferenzsynthese

a.) Herausforderungen: Ausgangslage und Problemstellung

Sicherheit kann nur erreicht werden, wenn auch Entwicklung stattfindet und umgekehrt, Entwicklung kann nur stattfinden, wo Sicherheit gewährleistet wird.

Internationale Einsätze umfassen daher zunehmend zivile Komponenten. In den letzten Jahren sind verstärkt Veränderungen in den Bedrohungslagen eingetreten, denen nicht mehr nur militärisch begegnet werden kann (Pucher). Flüchtlingsbewegungen, intern Vertriebene, „ewige“ Auffanglager, irreguläre Kampfaktik und Terrorismus, (Klein-)Waffenhandel und Minenfelder, die Rekrutierung von KindersoldatInnen und deren Wiedereingliederung in die Gesellschaft, organisierte Kriminalität, Drogen- und Menschenhandel, Korruption etc., aber etwa auch der Einfluss von Klimaveränderungen auf Lebensbedingungen rufen Sicherheitsbedrohungen hervor, die gemeinsam bearbeitet werden müssen.

Die parallele Präsenz staatlicher und nicht-staatlicher Akteure vor Ort wirft naturgemäß spezifische Probleme auf (Barnet). In der Diskussion um zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit geht es um die Frage einer Über- oder Unterordnung, Gleichzeitigkeit oder eines antagonistischen Entgegenwirkens verschiedener Politikbereiche. Zudem bestehen Bedenken der humanitären Akteure, v.a. in Bezug auf Sicherheitsgefährdungen ziviler Akteure (Greiner).

Die internationale Gemeinschaft verfügt über keine akkordierte Strategie, wie mit fragilen Situationen umzugehen ist – Uneinigkeit herrscht zu Ursachen, Wirkungen und politischen Reaktionen. Ein Konsens, der modellhaft wirken könnte, kann nur von Geberseite und betroffenen Staaten/Regionen gemeinsam erarbeitet werden. Ein wichtiger Schritt ist die Reformdebatte um die MDGs. Anknüpfend an die fünf Säulen der 1992 Agenda for Peace und die zitierte Anerkennung ziviler Komponenten in der Aufgabendefinition durch den VN-Generalsekretär 2009 – gestützt auf die „2008 UN Peacekeeping Operations - Principles and Guidelines“ (Capstone Doctrine), das „2003 Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations“ sowie eine Reihe anderer Berichte des VN-Generalsekretärs zu „Armed Violence Reduction“, „mediation“, „civil protection“ oder „responsibility to protect“, die 2009 und 2010 veröffentlicht wurden – lässt sich ein starker Impuls auf die Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen Methodik des Peacebuilding und Statebuilding (PBSB) ableiten, die eine gegenseitige Befruchtung der Konzepte aufzeigt.

b.) Neues zivilgesellschaftliches Empowerment

Eine „Stimme“ für fragile Staaten in internationalen Fora ist die „g7+“-Gruppe, die sich derzeit aus VertreterInnen von 19 fragilen Staaten zusammensetzt und im Internationalen Dialog der OECD zu Peacebuilding und Statebuilding aktiv ist (Petritsch). Im Schlussdokument des First Global Meeting dieses Dialogs, der Dili-Deklaration vom 10. April 2010, werden gemeinsame prioritäre Peacebuilding und Statebuilding-Ziele der Geber- und Partnerländer identifiziert. Diese bilden den aktuellen Ausgangspunkt bzw. konzeptionellen Hintergrund der 3C-Diskussion in Wien.

“A new vision for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding:

In order to translate the vision into reality and to guide our collective engagement, we identify the following Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals as stepping stones to achieve progress and development:

- Foster inclusive political settlements and processes, and inclusive political dialogue.
- Establish and strengthen basic safety and security.
- Achieve peaceful resolution of conflicts and access to justice.
- Develop effective and accountable government institutions to facilitate service delivery.
- Create the foundations for inclusive economic development, including sustainable livelihoods, employment and effective management of natural resources.
- Develop social capacities for reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.
- Foster regional stability and co-operation”

Dili Declaration, International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,
10. April 2010

Dieser Katalog richtet sich an staatliche wie nicht-staatliche Akteure. Es ist unbestritten, dass die Berücksichtigung von „political settlements“ jenen Punkt in der Debatte anspricht, der beim Aufbau staatlicher Strukturen bisher am wenigsten beachtet wurde. Die Legitimität staatlicher Institutionen trägt wesentlich zur Überwindung von fragilen Situationen und damit „Resilience“ von Gesellschaften bei. Hier trifft die Gebergemeinschaft jedoch auf eine hochpolitisierte, heterogene Landschaft.

Erschwerend auf die Zusammenarbeit mit den NRO und der lokalen Zivilgesellschaft wirkt die Fragmentierung der Zivilgesellschaft in unterschiedliche Gruppen, der Mangel an Weiterbildungsmöglichkeiten und finanziellen, sowie personellen Ressourcen und fehlendes Vertrauen zwischen staatlichen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen (Diallo). Dabei muss zwischen lokalen und internationalen NRO und deren Zielsetzungen unterschieden werden. Lokale NRO verfügen über ein subjektives, aber dafür kontextualisiertes Verständnis der lokalen Sicherheitssituation vor Ort und können in sensibler, eigenbestimmter Zusammenarbeit mit zivilen, aber auch militärischen Akteuren tätig werden. Aufgrund dessen erweist sich die Unterstützung sicherheitspolitisch und menschenrechtlich engagierter NRO und Forschungsinstitutionen vor Ort und das Empowerment der zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteure in von bewaffneten Konflikten und/oder Fragilität betroffenen Staaten durch die internationale Gebergemeinschaft als besonders bedeutend (Birikorang). Im 3C-Ansatz geht es nicht um kommerzielle Aufteilung von „Zulieferaufträgen“ und anderen Dienstleistungen durch privilegierte NRO, das Faktum des Engagements in einer konkreten Situation ist ausschlaggebend (Pospisil, Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik).

c.) Mehrwert des NRO-Engagements in fragilen Situationen

Statebuilding-Programme, die lokale zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen als strategische Partner heranziehen, können von vorhandenem Wissen über lokale Strukturen und grass roots-Bedürfnisse sowie bestehenden nicht-staatlichen lokalen Kapazitäten zur Bereitstellung von Sicherheit oder sozialer Dienstleistungen profitieren (Smits 2010).

Die besondere Stärke lokaler Nichtregierungsorganisationen liegt im Aufbau von langfristig friedenssichernden Strukturen und in der Stärkung der Beziehungen zwischen den BürgerInnen und den staatlichen Institutionen sowie der Förderung des Vertrauens in staatliche Strukturen. Lokale, zivilgesellschaftliche Initiativen können die Einhaltung der Rechenschaftspflicht des Staates in fragilen Umgebungen stärken sowie Engagement im Bereich der Krisenprävention und -resolution zeigen. Einen Schwerpunkt im Peacebuilding, das von NRO geleistet wird, bildet gerade auch die Zusammenarbeit mit Lokalregierungen, um am Aufbau demokratischer, staatlicher Strukturen zu arbeiten (Kramer). Auch die „Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States“ der OECD betonen die Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft in der Einforderung von Dienstleistungen und Good Governance (OECD 2007).

Diese Aufgaben sind im Annex des Wiener 3C-Appells festgehalten.

d.) Konzeptuelle Weiterentwicklung - von 3D zu 3C

Der 3C-Ansatz geht insofern über das 3D Konzept von diplomacy, defence and development hinaus, als er in fragilen Situationen eine koordinierte, komplementäre und kohärente Vorgangsweise aller Akteure und Akteurinnen vor Ort fordert. Er richtet sich an die internationale Gemeinschaft, bilaterale Geber und die Partnerländer. Im 3C-Ansatz geht es um ein abgestimmtes Vorgehen von diplomatischem, entwicklungspolitischem, finanz- und wirtschaftspolitischem, humanitärem, militärischem sowie polizeilichem und justiziellem Engagement, wo es die Zielsetzungen jeweils erfordern und zulassen. Ein Beispiel ist die Hereinnahme der Träger internationaler Friedensoperationen vor Ort als relevante Akteure mit Abstimmungsbedarf (Wiener 3C-Appell, Prinzip 14).

Dabei kommen spezifische Qualitäten, Herangehensweisen, Arbeitsprinzipien und Zugänge der einzelnen Akteure auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen zum Tragen, die nur in einem 3C-Ansatz bearbeitet werden können. In der konzeptuellen Aufbereitung ihrer Verteidigungsstrategie (Entwurf) 2010 beschreibt die NATO auf Basis der Erfahrungen in Afghanistan und Kosovo, „that today’s challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community, involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions“.

Diese Formel ist zentral in Kapitel I. „Ausgangspunkt“ des Wiener 3C-Appells verankert.

3.) Thesen

Als wichtigste Ergebnisse der Diskussion können folgende Aussagen, die in den einzelnen Beiträgen näher ausgeführt werden, festgehalten werden:

„Stimmen der Wiener 3C-Konferenz“:

- „Internationales Friedensengagement erfordert heute verstärkte Koordination, Komplementarität und Kohärenz (3C) zwischen internationalen Akteuren, nationalen Regierungen und der Zivilgesellschaft.“ (Michael Spindelegger, österreichischer Bundesminister für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten)
- „Es muss ein gemeinsames Verständnis zwischen den verschiedenen „Policy Communities“ entwickelt werden, um abgestimmte Ziele festzusetzen: Es müssen systematisch kontextspezifische Analysen zu Staatsbildung und Friedensförderung erarbeitet werden, um die Effektivität der Hilfe zu verbessern.“ (Cristina Hoyos, Sonderbeauftragte für Entwicklung, Fragilität und Sicherheit, Direktion für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Schweiz, Initiatorin der Genfer 3C-Konferenz)
- „Das Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport misst dem Whole-of-Government (Nation)-Ansatz einen hohen Stellenwert bei. Dies bildet Teil einer neuen Sicherheitskultur in Österreich.“ (Generalmajor Johann Pucher, Leiter des Büros für Sicherheitspolitik, österreichisches Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport)
- „Konfliktprävention, Friedenskonsolidierung und der Aufbau staatlicher Strukturen hängen eng miteinander zusammen. Mehr noch, die verschiedenen Akteure, die diese Aufgaben wahrnehmen, hängen voneinander ab. Nur gemeinsam können fragile Situationen erfolgreich bewältigt werden.“ (Irene Freudenschuss-Reichl, Leiterin der Sektion Entwicklungs- und Ostzusammenarbeit, Bundesministerium für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten)
- „Militärische Aktionen allein werden staatliche Fragilität nicht lösen.“ (Stefani Weiss, Bertelsmann Stiftung; Christina Hoyos)
- „Es geht um die Abstimmung des Engagements militärischer wie ziviler AkteurInnen vor, in und nach Konflikten.“ (Gudrun Kramer, Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding)
- „Die Zivilgesellschaft und besonders die NRO spielen eine bedeutende Rolle in der Friedensarbeit. Eine Abstimmung aller Akteure ist ein wichtiger Schritt hin zu mehr Effizienz im Friedensmanagement.“ (Sabine Kurtenbach, German Institute of Global and Area Studies GIGA Hamburg, Emma Birikorang, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre KAIPTC/Accra, Wolfgang Petritsch, Mitglied des OECD Expertenpanels für Peacebuilding and Statebuilding)
- „Peacebuilding ist mehr als statebuilding und ändert damit die alten Konzepte: Das Aufbauen staatlicher Strukturen muss die lokalen Vorgaben, die großteils von den Bedürfnissen und Erwartungen der lokalen Bevölkerung abhängen, im Auge haben. Peacebuilding arbeitet auf die Etablierung nachhaltiger, friedlicher Beziehungen und effektiver Governance-Strukturen hin und verschmilzt so in der Konzeptualisierung zunehmend mit Statebuilding (Alina Rocha Menocal, Overseas Development Institute ODI).
- „Im Konzept des Institutionenaufbaus wird der zentrale Begriff der Legitimität zum verbindenden Schlüsselement zu Peacebuilding. Diese neue Sicht findet sich in der Dili Declaration des Internationalen Dialogs zu Peacebuilding und Statebuilding vom 10. April 2010“ (Juana de Catheu, OECD/INCAF).
- „Dabei ist die lokale Zivilgesellschaft, zu der die NRO besonderen Zugang haben, kein einheitlicher Block oder Partner. Es gibt vielfache Abhängigkeiten, Wettbewerb, Fragmentierung und Misstrauen, die überwunden werden müssen.“ (Boubacar Diallo, Partenariat Stratégique pour la Paix en Afrique PASPA/Universität Niamey)
- „Eine gender-sensitive Perspektive optimiert Statebuilding Programme“ (Rosan Smits, Clingendael Institute – Conflict Resolution Unit)
- „Zu den 3C gehört, das Mandat des anderen zu verstehen. Die humanitären Organisationen benötigen für die Erfüllung ihres Mandats Neutralität gegenüber allen Gruppen der Bevölkerung sowie den Konfliktparteien“ (Max Santner, Österreichisches Rotes Kreuz).

- „3C bedeutet Brücken bilden ...“ (Vedran Dzihic, Universität Wien)
- „... und braucht soziale Netzwerke“ (Cristina Hoyos)
- „Ziel ist die Erreichung von menschlicher Sicherheit“ (Arno Truger, Österreichisches Studienzentrum für Frieden und Konfliktlösung)
- „Der Prozess der 3C Konsultationen war ein Modell-Prozess bezüglich Partizipation und Diskussion über die anstehenden Fragen“ (Ruth Picker, AG Globale Verantwortung)

4.) Die Verhandlungen zum Wiener 3C-Appell, ein Brückenschlag zur Zivilgesellschaft

Begleitend zur Wiener 3C-Konferenz konnten Empfehlungen für den Umgang zwischen staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteuren ausverhandelt werden („Wiener 3C-Appell“). Das Schlussdokument behandelt die Art der Kooperation militärischer und zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure in fragilen Situationen, insbesondere im Fall der Durchführung einer internationalen Mission in der Post-Konfliktphase. So wurde ein Schritt in Richtung einer Verankerung eines „Whole-of-Nation“ Ansatzes (gesamtstaatlicher Ansatz, „Comprehensive Approach“, Starlinger) in der österreichischen Sicherheits-, Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik erzielt. Der erreichte Konsensus zwischen den Verhandlungspartnern hat international Vorreiterfunktion.

Verhandlungspartner waren das österreichische Bundesministerium für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten, das Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport, die Dachverbände der österreichischen Nichtregierungsorganisationen, AG Globale Verantwortung und KOO, das Österreichische Rote Kreuz, Horizont 3000, das Österreichische Studienzentrum für Frieden und Konfliktlösung (ÖSFK) als Vertreter des Konsortiums der Zivilen Friedensdienste, sowie die Austrian Development Agency (ADA). Die Verhandlungen zum Wiener 3C-Appell wurden am 3. März aufgenommen und am 11. Juni 2010 abgeschlossen. Im Gefolge der Wiener 3C-Konferenz assoziierten sich das Institut für Integrative Konflikttransformation und Peacebuilding (IICP), der Internationaler Versöhnungsbund und das Institut für Friedenssicherung und Konfliktmanagement (IFK) als unterzeichnende Organisationen. Der Appell steht für weitere Beitritte offen.

Die Struktur des Wiener 3C-Appells weist auf die zentrale Botschaft des Dokuments hin: Gemeinsame Beweggründe, eine Definition der Akteure, wichtige Handlungsprinzipien, sowie eine grundlegende Aussage zum Umgang miteinander werden einleitend vorangestellt, gefolgt von den „Grundsätzen gemeinsamen Handelns“, dem Kernstück des Dokuments. Im Anhang werden die Leistungen der NRO und der staatlichen Institutionen aufgezählt, um deren spezifische Beiträge herauszustreichen.

Einigkeit bestand in der Annahme, dass ein 3C-Ansatz mehr zum generellen Fortschritt im Land beiträgt als ein isoliertes Vorgehen. Er geht von einer gemeinsamen kontextbezogenen Analyse fragiler Situationen aus und fordert eine neue Abstimmung zwischen allen vor Ort engagierten Partnern. In para 14 der Grundsätze wurde festgehalten, dass auch internationale Friedensoperationen durch Berücksichtigung ihrer sozio-ökonomischen Auswirkungen einen bedeutenden Beitrag zur Bewältigung der „Übergänge“ leisten können.

Beim Aufbau staatlicher Strukturen stellt der Appell auf eine partizipatorische Vorgangsweise, dh die Einbeziehung der lokalen Zivilbevölkerung, aller Akteure ab. Dieser Prozess erfordert die Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen Perspektive, die immer wieder angepasst werden muss. Die Verhandlungsparteien gingen von der Notwendigkeit einer gemeinsamen kontextbezogenen Analyse in fragilen Situationen aus. In der Zusammenarbeit darf es keine erzwungenen „Allianzen“ geben, aber auch keine „ideologischen“ Barrieren.

Der 3C-Appell basiert auf dem Grundsatz, dass die einzelnen Akteure den jeweils anderen in Hinblick auf seine/ihre Eigenständigkeit, Expertise, Aufgabenstellungen und den spezifischen Beitrag, den sie zur Erreichung des Ziels von mehr Frieden, Sicherheit und Entwicklung leisten, anerkennen und die Akteure voneinander lernen können.

„Knackpunkte“ in den Verhandlungen waren die Frage der Bereitschaft zu gemeinsamer Analyse, die Neutralität humanitärer Akteure bei sich ausweitenden internationalen Mandaten und die Frage, wieweit militärische Kräfte zivile Aufgaben übernehmen sollen/können. Unter der gemeinsamen Vision von mehr Sicherheit und Entwicklung vor Ort ergab sich daraus intensiver Gesprächsbedarf für ein effizientes Miteinander.

Im Follow-up Prozess von Wien ist es wichtig, dass der Dialog zu den Wiener 3C-Prinzipien fortgesetzt wird, auch lessons learnt sollen in diesem Prozess berücksichtigt werden. Das 3C-Momentum wird sowohl bei der Umsetzung im Feld aufgegriffen als auch auf Ebene der Arbeitsgruppe, die den Appell ausverhandelt hat, weitergeführt. Die Ergebnisse der Wiener 3C-Konferenz sollen auf EU- und VN-Ebene, aber auch auf Ebene der NATO und der Weltbank eingebracht werden und im Rahmen des International Network on Conflict and Fragility INCAF der OECD weiterentwickelt werden.

Der Wiener 3C-Appell ist somit eine gemeinsam von staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteuren in fragilen Situationen erarbeitete Antwort auf:

- Änderung der Bedrohungslagen („transversal/global“)
- Änderung in der Arbeitsweise („multidimensional/militärisch-zivil“)
- Änderung im Konzept („menschenrechtsorientiert und übergangssensitiv“)

5.) Der Impuls zur Weiterführung des 3C-Ansatzes

Die lokale Zivilgesellschaft ist ein einzigartiger Spiegel der Artikulation von Grundbedürfnissen der lokalen Bevölkerung in fragilen Situationen. Internationale NRO, die in fragilen Situationen tätig sind, tragen durch ihren besonderen Zugang zur lokalen Zivilgesellschaft und deren Prioritäten zum politischen Prozess der Verbindung von Staat und Zivilgesellschaft bei. Die Strategien der internationalen Gemeinschaft für Peacebuilding und Statebuilding erfordern daher eine koordinierte, komplementäre und kohärente (engl. „3C“) Vorgangsweise *aller* Akteure vor Ort (erweiterter 3C-Ansatz). Der um das Engagement von NRO erweiterte 3C-Ansatz, ist ein Initialschritt in Richtung besserer Wirksamkeit von Hilfe und Politikkohärenz.

Aus der Verbindung von Sicherheit und Entwicklung in fragilen Situationen, speziell auf den Gebieten Peacebuilding und Statebuilding ergibt sich das Konzept einer „politischen EZA“. Sie geht anders als die klassische EZA in fragile Situationen und ist mit entstehenden Zivilgesellschaften konfrontiert. Das Ziel ist „resilience“ der dortigen Gesellschaften und staatlichen Strukturen, um das Ausbrechen oder Wiederaufflammen von bewaffneten Konflikten zu vermeiden. Dazu müssen alle Akteure ihre Rolle und die möglichen Synergien mit anderen kennen. Den beiden 3C-Konferenzen in Genf und Wien ist ein Initialschritt in Richtung Verankerung dieser Prärogative für Wirksamkeit von Hilfe und ein effizientes Miteinander gelungen. Von dort ist ein Impuls für die weitere Umsetzung der MDGs zu erwarten.

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The interaction of state and non-state actors in fragile situations – findings and principles of the Vienna 3C Conference

Ursula Werther-Pietsch/Anna Katharina Roithner

1.) Introduction

a.) Conceptual approach

Without a coherent approach of the international community the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) seem not to be attainable, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states. Current initiatives as the OECD International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and both 3C Conferences in Geneva as well as in Vienna try to fill this conceptual gap. The research of new concepts is situated in the area of conflict between peacebuilding and statebuilding.

“If the international community wishes to work efficiently in fragile contexts, we need to integrate the instruments of multiple domains such as security, development cooperation, diplomacy, finance, law, civil society and the private sector. This is not an easy task” (Hoyos). New visions with regard to a better cooperation of actors in fragile situations shall be developed in order to enable sustainable development in fragile environments.

With regard to the demand of sustainable, coherent peacebuilding and statebuilding “from-the-bottom-up” local non-governmental organizations assume a special role due to their unique knowledge on local priorities and needs. The Vienna 3C Conference was dedicated specifically to the role of civil society in fragile, conflict-affected regions and its interplay with other actors.

b.) The Vienna 3C Conference as follow-up to the Geneva 3C Conference

The Geneva 3C Conference 2009 represents a milestone in the realization of a coordinated, complementary and coherent approach in fragile situations. The outcome document can be described as a common vision of all the actors involved as it designs an integrated vision of different goals, especially the mutually reinforcing pillars of the UN-system, “development, peace and security, and human rights (UN reform summit 2005, outcome document, para 9; UN MDG summit 2010, para 11).

In the Geneva Roadmap the 3C approach is defined as following: „A coherent, coordinated and complementary (3C) approach is needed to improve the effectiveness of support to countries and communities affected by conflict and fragility. Coherence, coordination and complementarity require both Whole of Government and Whole of System approaches. 3C is understood as collaborative and mutually reinforcing approaches by international actors and partner countries, including civil society, to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their support to peace, security, and development in situations of conflict and fragility. The 3C Roadmap is intended to reinforce related ongoing international processes, such as those led by the 3C Conference co-convenors, the UN, the WB, the OECD and NATO, and to promote synergy amongst them“.

Although civil society was mentioned in the roadmap, it was not sufficiently represented at the conference. It seemed more important to initially connect the different government com-

ponents of the “Whole-of-Government”-approach which was defined at the pre-conferences in The Hague, Oslo and Paris in 2008 and then increasingly launched into the international debate.

Austria picked up this momentum and pledged to organize consultations with NGOs in Vienna the following year in the annex to the 3C Roadmap which was dedicated to bi- and multilateral pledges in the follow-up of the conference.

2.) Findings and principles – attempt of a conference synthesis

a.) Challenges: Initial position and problem statement

Security can only be attained when development takes place and vice-versa development can only take place where security can be guaranteed.

Consequently, international missions increasingly encompass civil components. During the last years, threat scenarios have changed and therefore cannot be addressed solely with a military approach anymore (Pucher). Refugee movements, internally displaced persons, “eternal” reception camps, irregular combat techniques and terrorism, (small) arms trade and mining fields, the recruitment of child soldiers and their reintegration into society, organized crime, smuggling of drugs and human beings, corruption... but also the influence of climate change on living conditions create security threats which need to be commonly addressed.

The parallel presence of state and non-state actors on the ground creates specific problems (Barnet). The debate about civil-military cooperation deals with questions of domination or subordination, parallelity or an antagonistic behaviour of different policy fields. Furthermore, humanitarian actors bear concerns, for example with regard to security threats to civil actors (Greiner).

The international community does not dispose of a common strategic approach to fragile situations – discord reigns regarding causes, effects and political reactions. A consensus which could work as a role model can only be elaborated commonly by donors and respective states/regions. An important step represents the reform debate of the MDGs.

Following up the five pillars of the 1992 Agenda for Peace and the quoted recognition of civil components in the task definition of the UN General Secretary 2009 – based on the “2008 UN Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines” (Capstone Doctrine), the “2003 Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations” as well as a variety of other reports of UN-Secretary Generals on Armed Violence Reduction, mediation, civil protection or responsibility to protect which were published in 2009 and 2009 – a strong impulse for the development of a common methodology of peacebuilding and statebuilding (PBSB) can be identified which shows the mutual enrichment of these concepts.

b.) New civil society empowerment

The „g7+”-group which is composed of representatives of fragile states and is actively engaged in the OECD International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (Petritsch) represents a “voice” for fragile states in international fora. In the outcome document of the First Global Meeting of the Dialogue, the Dili Declaration as of 10 April 2010, common peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities of donor and partner countries were identified. These form the starting point or conceptual background of the 3C deliberations in Vienna.

“A new vision for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding:

In order to translate the vision into reality and to guide our collective engagement, we identify the following Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals as stepping stones to achieve progress and development:

- Foster inclusive political settlements and processes, and inclusive political dialogue.
- Establish and strengthen basic safety and security.
- Achieve peaceful resolution of conflicts and access to justice.
- Develop effective and accountable government institutions to facilitate service delivery.
- Create the foundations for inclusive economic development, including sustainable livelihoods, employment and effective management of natural resources.
- Develop social capacities for reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.
- Foster regional stability and co-operation”

Dili Declaration, International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, April 10 2010

This catalogue addresses state as well as non-state actors. It is uncontested that the consideration of “political settlements” addresses the respective item in the debate that until now has been less considered in state-institution-building. The legitimacy of state institutions plays a considerable role in overcoming state fragility and establishing resilient societies. In this context, the donor community encounters a highly political, heterogenous environment.

The fragmentation of civil society in different groups, the lack of further training possibilities and financial and human resources and lacking trust between state and civil-society organizations (Diallo) further exacerbates the cooperation with NGOs and local civil society. In this relation we need to distinguish local from international NGOs and their respective aims. Local NGOs dispose of a subjective but contextualized idea of the security situation on the ground and are able to act in cooperation with civil but also with military actors. This is why the support of NGOs active in the field of security policy and human rights, of research institutes in the field and the empowerment of civil society actors in conflict affected and/or fragile states reveals to be of utmost importance to the international community (Birikorang). The 3C approach does not advocate the commercial distribution of “supply orders” and other services on behalf of privileged NGOs – the actual engagement in a concrete situation is decisive (Pospisil, OIIP).

c.) Added value of NGO engagement in fragile situations

State-building programs which rely on local civil society organizations as strategic partners can benefit from knowledge on local structures and grass-roots needs as well as non-state local capacities in delivery of security of social services (Smits 2010).

The specific strength of local non-government organizations lies in the construction of long-lasting peace-securing structures and in the reinforcement of relations between the citizens and state-institutions as well as the confidence in state institutions. Local civil society initiatives can strengthen the accountability of the state in fragile environments and show engagement in the field of conflict prevention and resolution. One main focus of peacebuilding which is taken over by NGOs is the cooperation with local governments in sustainment of democratic institution-building (Kramer). The OECD “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States” stress the role of civil society in the request of social services and good governance (OECD 2007).

These tasks are mentioned in the Annex to the Vienna 3C Appeal.

d.) A conceptual advancement – from 3D to 3C

The 3C approach which requests a coordinated, complementary and coherent approach of all actors in the field in fragile situations, extends the original 3D concept. It addresses the international community, bilateral donors and partner countries. The 3C approach advocates common action of actors in the fields of diplomacy, development cooperation, finance, political economy, humanitarian aid, military, policy and justice in case the agreed objectives allow for it. The consideration of international peace-operations on the ground can be given as an example (Vienna 3C Appeal, Principle 14).

The specific qualities, approaches and principles of every single actor on different levels that play an important role can only be drawn together by a 3C approach. In the conceptual elaboration of its defence strategy (draft) 2010 NATO describes the situation on the basis of its experiences in Afghanistan and Kosovo as following: “that today’s challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community, involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions”.

This formula is anchored in chapter I. of the Vienna 3C Appeal.

3.) Findings

As most important results of the deliberations that will be elaborated in the single articles we can sum up:

„Voices of the Vienna 3C Conference“:

- International peace engagement today requires increased coordination, complementarity and coherence (3C) between international actors, national governments *and civil society*. (Michael Spindelegger, Minister for European and International Affairs)
- A common understanding of mandates and roles between the various “policy communities” has to be established in order to set aligned goals: Context-specific analyses of peacebuilding and statebuilding have to be systematically developed with a view to improve aid effectiveness. (Cristina Hoyos, Special Advisor for Development, Fragility and Security in the Agency for Development, initiator of the Geneva 3C Conference)
- The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports also attaches great significance to a whole-of-government (nation) approach. This is part of a new security culture in Austria. (MG Johann Pucher, Director General for Security Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports)
- Conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and statebuilding are intimately interconnected, the various actors involved depend on each other. Fragile situations have to be tackled jointly. (Irene Freudenschuss-Reichl, Director-General for Development Cooperation, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs)
- Military action alone will not solve state fragility. (Stefani Weiss, Bertelsmann Foundation; Christina Hoyos)
- This is about the coordination between military and civil actors before, after and during conflict. (Gudrun Kramer, Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding, IICP)
- Civil society and in particular NGOs play a crucial role in working for peace. Coordination between all actors is an important step towards increased efficiency in peace man-

agement. (Sabine Kurtenbach, German Institute of Global and Area Studies GIGA Hamburg; Emma Birikorang, KAITPC Accra; Wolfgang Petritsch, Member of the OECD Expert Panel for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding)

- Peacebuilding goes beyond state building and calls for a rethink on established concepts when building state structures, local parameters largely defined by the needs and expectations of local society have to be accounted for. Peacebuilding aims at establishing sustainable peaceful relations and effective governance structures reconciling peacebuilding and statebuilding concepts. (Alina Rocha Menocal, Overseas Development Institute ODI)
- The central concept of legitimacy becomes the key link between peacebuilding and statebuilding. This new vision is reflected in the Dili Declaration of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding of 10 April 2010. (Juana de Catheu, OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility)
- Local civil society, where NGOs can play a particular role, is not a single block or partner. There is a lot to be overcome – multiple dependencies, competition, fragmentation and distrust. (Rosan Smits, Clingendael Foundation; Boubacar Diallo, Partenariat Stratégique pour la Paix en Afrique PASPA/University of Niamey – West Africa)
- A gender-sensitive perspective optimises statebuilding programmes. (Rosan Smits, Clingendael Institute – Conflict Resolution Unit)
- 3C is about understanding each other’s mandate. Humanitarian organisations need to be perceived as neutral and independent actors in order to be able to fulfil their mandates. (Max Santner, Austrian Red Cross)
- 3C is about bridging ... (Vedran Dzihic, Kosovo case study, University of Vienna)
- ... and needs social hearings. (Cristina Hoyos)
- The goal is to achieve human security. (Arno Truger, Austrian Study Center for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, ASPR)
- The process of 3C consultations was a model process with regard to participation and true discourse about the issues at stake. (Ruth Picker, Global Responsibility - Austrian Platform for Development and Humanitarian Aid)

4.) The negotiations of the Vienna 3C Appeal, bridging with civil society

As an accompanying part to the Vienna 3C Conference the “Vienna 3C Appeal” could be negotiated as a catalogue of recommendations regarding the cooperation of military and civil society actors in fragile situations, particularly in case of the presence of an international mission in the post-conflict phase. In this way a further step to a “Whole-of-Nation” approach (“comprehensive approach”, Starlinger) of the Austrian security, foreign and development cooperation policy was taken. The consensus between the negotiation partners can act as an international role model.

The Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, the Federal Ministry for Defence and Sports, the umbrella organizations of the Austrian non-governmental organizations, AG Global Responsibility and KOO, the Austrian Red Cross, Horizont3000, the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) as representative of the consortium Civil Peace Services as well as the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) acted as negotiation partners. The negotiations for the Vienna 3C Appeal started on March 3 and were concluded on June 11 2010. In the follow up of the Vienna 3C Conference the Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding (IICP), the Internationaler Versöhnungsbund and the Institut für Friedensicherung und Konfliktmanagement (IFK) were added as signatory organizations. The Appeal is open to further accession.

The structure of the Vienna 3C Appeal stresses the key message of the document: Common motivations, a definition of the actors in play, important principles of action as well as a basic assumption with regard to common principles of conduct appear in the first part which are followed by the “Principles and Aims of Acting Together”, the main part of the document. In the annex the achievements of NGOs and state institutions are specified in order to stress their specific contributions.

Consensus could be reached on the assumption that a 3C approach can much better contribute to general progress in a country than isolated action. Along with the Geneva 3C Roadmap, the OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile Situations and UNSC resolution 1894 the Appeal calls for enhanced cooperation of various actors in fragile and conflict-affected environments. Consequently, the development of shared tools and methodologies for assessment, planning, monitoring and evaluations plays a crucial role.

The 3C Appeal assumes a joint, context-based analysis of fragile situations and claims a reconciliation between all respective actors in the field. Para 14 is dedicated to the consideration of international peace operations and their socio-economic effects.

With regard to state institution-building the Appeal revendicates a participatory course of action by involving local civil society. This process presupposes the development of a common perspective which needs to be adapted to the changing context. The negotiating parties assumed that a common, context-based analysis in fragile situations was indispensable. With regard to the cooperation of actors there shall be no “forced alliances” or “ideological barriers”.

The 3C Appeal is based on the key principles that the actors shall acknowledge each others independence, expertise, task assignment and specific contribution to the aim of more peace, security and development and learn from each other.

Controversial negotiation items represented the actor’s disposition to common analysis, the neutrality of humanitarian actors under expanding international mandates and the question if military actors shall/can take over civilian tasks. Under the common vision of more security and development on the ground the intensive necessity of common dialogue for an effective cooperation was detected.

During the follow-up process to Vienna it is important to continue the dialogue regarding the Vienna 3C principles and to consider lessons learnt. The 3C momentum shall be taken up in the field as well as in the working group set up to negotiate the 3C appeal. The results of the Vienna 3C Conference shall be brought to the EU, UN, NATO and World Bank level and be further developed in the framework of the OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility INCAF.

The Vienna 3C Appeal is a joint answer of state and non-state actors in fragile situations to:

- new threat scenarios (“transversal/global”)
- a multitude of tasks (“multidimensional/military-civilian”)
- a revision of concepts (“human-rights-orientated / transition-sensitive”)

5.) Keeping up the momentum of the 3C approach

Local civil society is an extraordinary mirror of articulation of basic needs of local societies in fragile situations. International NGOs which act in fragile situations and dispose of a special

access to local civil society can positively contribute to the political linkage process of state and civil society. The international community's strategy for peacebuilding and statebuilding demands for a coordinated, complementary and coherent (3C) approach of *all* actors on the ground (extended 3C approach). The 3C approach, supplemented by NGO engagement, represents a first step to more aid effectiveness and political coherence.

The linkage of security and development in fragile situations, especially in the fields of peacebuilding and statebuilding results in the concept of a "political development cooperation". On the contrary to classic development cooperation new cooperation forms in fragile situations engage with emerging civil societies. The aim of this new development cooperation is the establishment of resilient societies and structures in order to prevent the relapse into violent conflict. In order to achieve this goal all actors need to know their respective roles and possible synergies with others. Both 3C Conferences in Geneva and Vienna were able to take a first step to anchor this concept of effective development cooperation and efficient interaction in fragile situations setting an innovative impetus for MDG implementation.

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Wiener 3C-Appell

Koordiniert, komplementär und kohärent agieren in fragilen Situationen

Grundsätze und Ziele der Abstimmung von staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteurinnen und Akteuren
Empfehlungen

Österreichische
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit



Globale
Verantwortung
Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Entwicklung und Humanitäre Hilfe



IICP
Institute for Integrative
Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding

I. Ausgangspunkt

Fragile Situationen¹ erfordern eine koordinierte, komplementäre und kohärente Vorgangsweise aller Akteurinnen und Akteure vor Ort. Wir, die Unterzeichnenden, bauen auf den wichtigen Impulsen der 3C Roadmap vom 20. März 2009² auf.

Was ist unser Ziel?

Sicherheit und Entwicklung bedingen einander. Unser Engagement soll zu Frieden, Sicherheit und Entwicklung eines Landes/einer Region beitragen. Wir begrüßen daher den 3C-Ansatz, in fragilen Situationen kohärent, koordiniert und komplementär vorzugehen, in Abstimmung mit der betroffenen Regierung und der lokalen Zivilgesellschaft. Ziel des Wiener 3C-Appells ist es, für dieses Zusammenwirken Grundsätze und Ziele festzulegen.

Wer sind die Akteurinnen und Akteure?

Im 3C-Ansatz geht es um ein abgestimmtes Vorgehen von staatlichen Institutionen aus den Bereichen Diplomatie, Entwicklungspolitik, Militär, Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik, Polizei und Justiz sowie von nicht-staatlichen Organisationen aus den Bereichen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, humanitäre Hilfe, Menschenrechtsschutz und -förderung sowie Friedensförderung. Dabei kommen spezifische Qualitäten, Herangehensweisen, Arbeitsprinzipien und Zugänge auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen zum Tragen.

Spezifische Leistungen dieser Akteurinnen und Akteure in fragilen Situationen werden im Anhang beschrieben.

Was ist uns dabei wichtig?

- Wir erkennen an, dass Entwicklung, Frieden und Sicherheit sowie die Menschenrechte miteinander verflochten sind und einander gegenseitig verstärken.³
- Konfliktprävention, Friedenserhaltung und Friedenskonsolidierung hängen eng mit dem Aufbau staatlicher Strukturen und der Förderung der Zivilgesellschaft zusammen.
- Ein wichtiger Beitrag zur Schaffung von Frieden setzt beim *Empowerment* (Ermächtigung) der lokalen Bevölkerung und der Stärkung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten an.
- Der Schutz und die Stärkung der Zivilbevölkerung sowie die Förderung von verletzlichen Gruppen, von Frauen und Kindern, Minderheiten und von Menschen mit Behinderung/en

¹ Fragile Situationen können dadurch charakterisiert werden, dass sie im Extremfall in einen bewaffneten Konflikt münden. Fragilität kann als nachhaltige Störung der Beziehungen und Erwartungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft aufgefasst werden und ist eine Konsequenz von staatlichem Versagen auf den Ebenen von Autorität, Legitimität, Rechtsschutz und Leistungsbereitstellung, sei es durch mangelnde Kapazitäten oder fehlenden politischen Willen (OECD/DAC: Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, 2008: 16ff). Der Wiener 3C-Appell bezieht sich daher auf den Zeitraum vor, in und nach Konflikten sowie auf fragile Situationen, in denen eine latente Eskalationsgefahr gegeben ist.

² Sechs Prinzipien der 3C Roadmap (Stärkung von Eigenverantwortung und Kapazitäten in betroffenen Staaten; möglichst rasche und angemessene Reaktion auf Veränderungen im Partnerland; Verbesserung der gegenseitigen Rechenschaftspflicht von Partnerländern und internationalen Akteuren; Verringerung der Belastung des Partnerlandes durch Koordination der externen Unterstützung; effizienter Einsatz der beschränkten Mittel unter Vermeidung von Doppelspurigkeiten und Finanzierungslücken; sowie Verbesserung und Vertiefung der gemeinsamen Lernprozesse und Erhöhung der Reaktionsfähigkeit), http://www.3C-Conference2009.ch/en/Home/Conference_Outcomes

³ Absatz 9 des Ergebnisdokuments des VN-Weltgipfels 2005

tragen zur Bewältigung fragiler Situationen bei und werden von uns besonders berücksichtigt.⁴

- Der 3C-Ansatz trägt mehr zum generellen Fortschritt im Land bei als ein isoliertes Vorgehen. Dieser Prozess ermöglicht die Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen Perspektive, die immer wieder angepasst werden muss. In der Zusammenarbeit darf es keine erzwungenen „Allianzen“ geben.
- Die Leistungen von NRO dürfen nicht automatisch als Teil zentral gesamtstaatlicher Aktivität begriffen werden. Auf der Basis von gemeinsamen Zielen sind staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteurinnen und Akteure für komplementäres, kohärentes und koordiniertes Vorgehen offen.

Wie wollen wir miteinander umgehen?

Es ist unser Grundsatz, dass alle Akteurinnen und Akteure einander im Hinblick auf ihre Eigenständigkeit, Expertise, Aufgabenstellungen und den spezifischen Beitrag, den sie zur Erreichung des Ziels von mehr Frieden, Sicherheit und Entwicklung leisten, gegenseitig anerkennen und voneinander lernen.

Die Koordinierung zwischen staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteurinnen und Akteuren darf deren Kooperationserfordernissen innerhalb ihrer internationalen Partnerschaften und Netzwerke nicht entgegenstehen, sondern soll diese unterstützen und ergänzen.

II. Grundsätze und Ziele unseres Handelns

Die Wiener 3C-Prinzipien

1. Friedensprozesse sind nur dann nachhaltig, wenn diese auch von der Zivilgesellschaft unterstützt und mitgestaltet werden.
2. Wir, die Unterzeichnenden, anerkennen ‚Local Ownership‘ als zentrales Prinzip. Das bedeutet, dass für eine nachhaltige Konfliktlösung und Friedenssicherung eine breite lokale Partizipation und Mitbestimmung in Entscheidungsprozessen erforderlich ist. Durch die Unterstützung lokaler personaler, materieller und struktureller Kapazitäten soll eine graduelle Beendigung des internationalen Engagements in fragilen Situationen erleichtert werden.
3. Wir sehen die Möglichkeit gemeinsamer Visionen für das Engagement in fragilen Situationen, wenn diese Visionen auf der Basis des Bedarfs der Betroffenen, sowie des gegenseitigen Vertrauens in die Fähigkeiten der internationalen Akteurinnen und Akteure und deren Willen, diese auch nutzbringend einzusetzen, beruhen. Daraus können in der Folge abgestimmte Vorgehensweisen oder gemeinsame Strategien dort entwickelt werden, wo es die Zielsetzungen jeweils erfordern und zulassen. In konkreten Situationen können jedoch auch unterschiedliche Zugänge sinnvoller für die betroffene Bevölkerung sein.
4. Wir legen einen Schwerpunkt auf den Bereich Konfliktprävention, um zu verhindern, dass bewaffnete Konflikte ausbrechen oder wieder aufflammen.
5. Wir halten eine gemeinsame Analyse und Beurteilung sowie eine koordinierte Planung für einen entscheidenden Ausgangspunkt unseres Handelns.
6. Wir befürworten regelmäßige Briefings und Informationsaustausch im Anlassfall, um die konkreten Aufgaben und Handlungsweisen der verschiedenen Akteurinnen und Akteure besser zu verstehen.

⁴ auf Grundlage der VN-Sicherheitsratsresolutionen 1325/2000, 1820/2008 und 1889/2009, 1612/2005 und 1882/2009, 1674/2006 und 1894/2009.

7. Wir setzen uns dafür ein, negative Auswirkungen unseres Handelns auf die betroffene Bevölkerung und die natürlichen Ressourcen zu vermeiden (“Do no harm”). Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen ist es u.a. wichtig, Wirksamkeitsanalysen durchzuführen und die Ergebnisse anderen Akteurinnen und Akteuren zu kommunizieren.
8. Wir befürworten eine systematische Ausbildung und Fähigkeitsentwicklung im Vorfeld.
9. Die Perspektive unseres Handelns ist langfristig und kultursensitiv, d.h. wir arbeiten auf eine nachhaltige und dauerhafte Deeskalation und Lösung von Konflikten hin.
10. Der Schutz verletzlicher Gruppen im Sinne der Resolutionen des VN-Sicherheitsrates 1894 (2009) bildet einen Schwerpunkt unseres Handelns.
11. Frauen spielen eine zentrale Rolle in Friedensprozessen und bei der Konfliktprevention. Wir unterstützen besonders die Ziele der Resolution des VN-Sicherheitsrates 1325 (2000) und der Folgeresolutionen.
12. Uns ist der ungehinderte humanitäre Zugang zu Menschen in Not wichtig. Wir anerkennen Menschlichkeit, Unabhängigkeit, Unparteilichkeit und Neutralität als oberstes Prinzip der humanitären Hilfe. Gleichzeitig respektieren wir Einsätze und Engagements von Staaten und internationalen Organisationen mit anderen Mandaten. Für Missionen zur Friedensdurchsetzung und bewaffnete Friedenserhaltung ist jedoch ein Mandat der Vereinten Nationen oder einer ihrer Regionalorganisationen bzw. die gemeinsame Einladung aller Konfliktparteien auf der Basis eines internationalen Abkommens erforderlich.
13. Wo multilaterale Mandate von komplexen internationalen Friedensoperationen die militärische Unterstützung ziviler Aufgaben notwendig machen, ist es uns wichtig, dass dieselben Prinzipien der Entwicklungssensitivität sowie des respektvollen Umgangs mit der betroffenen Bevölkerung und den zivilen Akteurinnen und Akteuren angewendet werden. Die Übernahme von zivilen Aufgaben durch Streitkräfte sollte nur dann ersatzweise erfolgen, wenn diese nicht durch zivile Fachkräfte wahrgenommen werden können.
14. Wir treten dafür ein, dass sich die Zusammenarbeit zwischen internationalen Friedensoperationen und NRO – darunter auch solchen, die explizit Frauen, Minderheiten und andere gesellschaftlich diskriminierte Gruppen vertreten – verbessert und Synergien genützt werden. Insbesondere sollen internationale Friedensoperationen, die nachweislich einen bedeutenden Beitrag zur Stabilisierung nach Konflikten leisten, entwicklungsensitiver gestaltet werden und stärker auf die sozioökonomischen Bedürfnisse und Verhältnisse vor Ort eingehen. Dazu gehört die
- Erfüllung der Sicherheitskomponente in Abstimmung mit anderen Zielen (Keine Sicherheit ohne Entwicklung – und keine Entwicklung ohne Sicherheit“);
 - situationsbedingte Unterstützung anderer Akteurinnen und Akteure in ihren Zielen, wenn es die jeweils eigene Arbeitsweise und Aufgabenstellung erlaubt;
 - die frühzeitige Schaffung sichtbarer und nachhaltiger Verbesserungen der ökonomischen Lebensumstände, dabei gilt insbesondere:
 - Förderung lokaler Beschaffung durch die internationale Präsenz;
 - Anpassung der Bezahlung von lokalem Personal an lokale Gehälter sowie
 - Ankurbelung relevanter Sektoren der Privatwirtschaft, insbesondere von Frauen geführte Unternehmen⁵
15. Da NRO ein spezifischer Mehrwert in fragilen Situationen zukommt, treten wir auch dafür ein, dass ihre Expertise und einschlägige Erfahrung in fragilen Situationen in multilaterale Prozesse – nach dem Vorbild des „Internationalen Dialogs zu Peacebuilding und Statebuilding“ der OECD⁶ – einfließen.

⁵ Akkordierte Änderung vom 26.10.2010

⁶ Interpeace, Background Paper: Voices of civil society organizations (CSOs) on peacebuilding and statebuilding, prepared as an input into the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, Dili, Timor-Leste,

16. Der Grad der Kooperation (z.B. Koordination, Informationsaustausch) von staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteurinnen und Akteuren in fragilen Situationen ist kontextabhängig und muss jeweils individuell definiert werden.

Wir, die Unterzeichnenden, kommen überein, den Dialog zu den Wiener 3C-Prinzipien fortzusetzen und lessons learned und good/best practices zu berücksichtigen.

Dieser Appeal stellt work in progress dar und soll gemeinsam weiterentwickelt werden.

Wien, im Juni 2010

Anhang

Leistungen staatlicher und nicht-staatlicher Akteurinnen und Akteure in fragilen Situationen

Leistungen staatlicher Institutionen

Staatliche Institutionen tragen Verantwortung in der Planung und Durchführung ihrer politischen Strategien und Mandate. Sie stellen die Kohärenz zwischen allen dafür notwendigen nationalen und internationalen Politiken sicher. Daraus leitet sich die Notwendigkeit zur Koordinierung nationaler und internationaler staatlicher Institutionen in fragilen Situationen unter möglichst einheitlicher ziviler Führung ab.

In diesem Rahmen legen österreichische staatliche Institutionen in fragilen Situationen Schwerpunkte in den Bereichen

- Konfliktprävention und Krisenmanagement;
- Peacebuilding - Statebuilding; sowie
- Umgang mit transversalen Herausforderungen.

Damit sollen u.a. folgende Ziele erreicht werden:

- Herstellung eines *sicheren Umfeldes* damit andere Maßnahmen Platz greifen können (*Human Security*);
- Umfassende Maßnahmen zum Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung:
 - insbesondere Frauen und Kindern;
 - Förderung der Einhaltung des humanitären Völkerrechts und der internationalen Menschenrechtsnormen und des Flüchtlingsvölkerrechts durch alle Konfliktparteien;
 - Sicherstellung des freien Zugangs für humanitäre Organisationen und Hilfslieferungen, sowie Schutz von humanitären Helfern vor Übergriffen;
 - Schaffung der Voraussetzungen für eine sichere, freiwillige und würdevolle Rückkehr und Wiedereingliederung von Flüchtlingen und Binnenvertriebenen;
- Gewährleistung individueller Sicherheit und Durchsetzung des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols;
- Aufbau bzw. Wiederherstellung rechtsstaatlicher Strukturen (*Rule of Law*) durch:
 - Reform von Sicherheits- und Justizinstitutionen (Security Sector Reform/SSR)

- Unterstützung in der Bekämpfung von Straflosigkeit bei schweren Verstößen gegen das humanitäre Völkerrecht und die Menschenrechte
- Förderung von Mechanismen der Vergangenheitsbewältigung (z.B. strafrechtliche Verfolgung, Wahrheitskommissionen, Reparationszahlungen für Opfer von Menschenrechtsverletzungen, Reform von Institutionen);
- Herausbildung demokratischer und politischer Institutionen und Konzepte sowie
- einer funktionierenden öffentlichen Verwaltung (*Good Governance*);
- Unterstützung bei der Durchführung demokratischer Wahlen und Abstimmungen;
- Förderung freier Medien und kultureller Einrichtungen;
- Stärkung der Menschenrechte durch Stärkung der Zivilgesellschaft und Schaffung von unabhängigen Menschenrechtsinstitutionen und Mechanismen;
- Maßnahmen zur Entwaffnung, Demobilisierung und Wiedereingliederung (*Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration/DDR*) insbesondere durch;
 - Unterstützung von ehemaligen Kindersoldaten;
 - Verhütung des unerlaubten Handels mit und Verbreitung von Kleinwaffen;
 - Unterstützung bei Minenräumungstätigkeiten; Programme zur Unterstützung von Minen und Streumunitionsoffern
- Sicherung individueller Lebensbedürfnisse in den Bereichen Versorgung mit Gütern des täglichen Bedarfs, Gesundheit und Soziales, Bildung, Infrastruktur etc.:
 - Entwicklung von nachhaltiger Wirtschaft einschließlich der Stärkung des privaten Sektors (unter besonderer Beachtung der Optimierung von sozioökonomischen Auswirkungen internationaler Missionen);
 - Unterstützung beim Zugang zu regionalen und internationalen Märkten;
 - Erhalt nachhaltiger Ökosysteme;
 - Zurverfügungstellung von Basisgesundheits- und -sozialprogrammen und Unterstützung bei der Entwicklung nationaler Kapazitäten;
 - Zurverfügungstellung von Basisbildungsprogrammen und Unterstützung bei der Entwicklung nationaler Bildungssysteme;
- Entwicklung und Förderung der Zivilgesellschaft in den Partnerregionen
- Stärkung der „Widerstandsfähigkeit“ (resilience) von Gesellschaft und Staat gegen Versuche, Konflikte gewaltsam auszutragen;
- Vertrauensbildung und Konfliktaufarbeitung zur Friedenskonsolidierung und Versöhnung (insbesondere Kapazitätenbildung für Mediation).

Beiträge dazu werden einerseits durch Entsendung von zivilen Experten, Polizei, Justiz und Militär geleistet, andererseits durch Mittel der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Bereich Konfliktprävention und Friedenssicherung. Hinzu kommen Mittel relevanter Politikfelder sowie Finanzinstrumente, die an den Bedarf in fragilen Situationen angepasst werden müssen (zB pooled funding).

Leistungen von Nichtregierungsorganisationen

Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NRO) haben einen komplementären Mehrwert in fragilen Situationen. Dieser leitet sich aus ihrer Wertebasis (Einsatz für ein Leben aller Menschen in Würde, für globale soziale Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit), ihrer Unparteilichkeit und ihrer Verankerung in der zivilgesellschaftlichen Basis ab.

Prämisse

NRO handeln nach der Prämisse der Bedarfsbefriedigung der notleidenden Bevölkerung, auf Basis ihrer bürgerlichen, politischen, wirtschaftlichen, sozialen, kulturellen Menschenrechte und internationaler Entwicklungs-Übereinkommen, wie sie in den Millenniumszielen zum Ausdruck kommen. Alle anderen Ziele sind diesen Zielen nachgeordnet.

Prinzipien

Unabdingbare Prinzipien von entwicklungs- und friedenspolitischen NRO umfassen Nachhaltigkeit, *Empowerment* (Ermächtigung), Rechenschaftspflicht und Partizipation. Humanitäre Hilfe erfolgt nach den Prinzipien der Neutralität, Unabhängigkeit, Unparteilichkeit und Menschlichkeit und muss frei sein von politischen, wirtschaftlichen, militärischen oder anderen Zielsetzungen.

Handlungsfelder

NRO verfügen in vielen relevanten Handlungsfeldern fragiler Situationen über ausgewiesene Expertise. Sie sind nicht an die Wahrung staatlicher Interessen gebunden und verfügen daher im Regelfall über flexiblen Handlungsspielraum und große Glaubwürdigkeit. Ihre Verankerung vor Ort erleichtert schnelle, an lokale Bedürfnisse angepasste und adäquate Hilfsleistungen.

Die Stärkung lokaler zivilgesellschaftlicher Strukturen ist ein Schlüsselfaktor für den Aufbau von Frieden, Sicherheit und Demokratie:

- Humanitäre Hilfe (z.B. Hilfe für Flüchtlinge und Binnenvertriebene; medizinische Versorgung; Besuche von Kriegsgefangenen und Kontrolle der Haftbedingungen; Verteilung von Nahrungsmitteln, Zelten, etc.) nach den oben genannten Prinzipien;
- Umsetzung von Programmen auf der Ebene der zivilen Gesellschaft (z.B. Bereitstellung sozialer Dienste/ basic social services)
- Stärkung lokaler zivilgesellschaftlicher Strukturen, Akteurinnen und Akteure insbesondere von Frauen – durch Kapazitätsaufbau und *Empowerment* von Organisationen (Planung, Budgetierung, Partizipation, Monitoring von politischen Prozessen) und Individuen (Qualifizierung);
- Unterstützung der Zivilgesellschaft bei der gewaltfreien Bearbeitung und Lösung von Konflikten in allen Phasen;
- Demokratisierung durch Förderung von Vernetzungsprozessen und sozialen Bewegungen;
- Schulungen und Anwaltschaft bez. Grund- und Menschenrechte und Humanitärem Völkerrecht;
- Monitoring von Übergriffen auf Zivilistinnen und Zivilisten (einschließlich sexuelle Gewalt);
- Anwaltschaftliche Arbeit und Unterstützung bez. Maßnahmen zu Mediation, Versöhnungsarbeit und Beendigung von Straflosigkeit (transitional justice) sowie zum Aufbau demokratischer staatlicher Strukturen in Zusammenarbeit mit lokalen Institutionen;
- Sensibilisierung und Anwaltschaft im Norden sowie Watchdog Funktion gegenüber Regierungen & staatlichen Interventionen.

Beiträge dazu werden durch die Entsendung von Fachkräften unterschiedlicher Disziplinen und den Einsatz von Finanzmitteln aus öffentlichen und privaten Quellen geleistet, die an den spezifischen Bedarf in fragilen Situationen angepasst sind.

Vienna 3C Appeal

**Coordinated, Complementary and Coherent measures
in fragile situations**

Principles and Aims of Interaction between Government
and Non-governmental Actors
Recommendations

Österreichische
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit



Globale
Verantwortung
Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Entwicklung und Humanitäre Hilfe



IICP
Institute for Integrative
Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding

I. Context

Fragile situations¹ call for a coordinated, complementary and coherent approach by all actors on the ground. We, the undersigned, are committed to the recommendations of the 3C Roadmap of 20 March 2009.²

What is our purpose?

Security and development are interdependent. Our engagements should contribute to peace, security and development in a given country/specific region. We therefore welcome the 3C approach of proceeding in a coherent, coordinated and complementary way in fragile situations, in consultation with the government and local civil society concerned. The purpose of the Vienna 3C Appeal is to set out principles and aims of this collaborative approach.

Who are the actors?

The 3C approach is concerned with concerted procedure by state institutions in the diplomatic, development, defence, financial, economic, humanitarian, justice and police communities, as well as non-governmental organisations in the fields of development cooperation, humanitarian aid, human rights protection/promotion, and peacebuilding. This entails specific issues of quality, approach, working principles and access at different levels.

The specific contributions of these actors in fragile situations are described in the Annex.

What matters to us?

- We acknowledge that development, peace, and security, as well as human rights, are interconnected and mutually reinforcing.³
- Conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding are closely related to capacity building in state institutions and the promotion of civil society.
- Peace begins with the empowerment of the local population and the strengthening of democracy and human rights.
- The protection and strengthening of the civilian population, as well as the promotion of vulnerable groups, women and children, minorities, and persons with disabilities contributes to the capacity for coping with fragile situations; these groups should be taken into special account.⁴

¹ The characteristic feature of fragile situations is the threat of armed conflict in the worst case. Fragility can be understood as persistent dysfunctional relations and disparate expectations between government and society and is a consequence of state failure with respect to authority, legitimacy, legal protection and service delivery, whether for lack of capacity or political will (OECD/DAC: Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, 2008: 16ff). The Vienna 3C Appeal therefore pertains to the period before, during and after conflicts and fragile situations where there is a latent threat of escalation.

² The six principles of the 3C Roadmap are: Strengthening national ownership and national capacities in the states concerned; responding in a timely and appropriate manner to the evolving situation in the partner country; strengthening mutual accountability of partner countries and international actors; reducing the burden of aid management on partner country capacity; making efficient use of limited resources and avoiding duplication and funding gaps; improving and deepening joint learning and increasing response capacities, http://www.3CConference2009.ch/en/Home/Conference_Outcomes

³ Paragraph 9 of the outcome document of the UN World Summit in 2005

⁴ Based on UN Security Council Resolutions 1325/2000, 1820/2008 and 1889/2009, 1612/2005 and 1882/2009, 1674/2006 and 1894/2009.

- The 3C approach contributes more to general progress in a country than an isolated initiative. This process enables the creation of a joint perspective that needs ongoing amendment. There should be no enforced ‘alliances’ in cooperation.
- The contributions of NGOs should not be seen automatically as part of central, whole-of-government activity. On the basis of joint aims, government and non-governmental actors are open to a complementary, coherent and coordinated approach.

How do we want to treat each other?

As a matter of principle, we believe that all actors must respect, and learn from, each other, as each brings their own independence, expertise, tasks and their specific contribution to achieving the aims of greater peace, security and development.

Coordination between government and non-governmental actors must not run counter to the cooperation requirements of their international partnerships and networks; rather, it should support and complement these.

II. Principles and aims of acting together

Vienna 3C principles

1. Peace processes are only sustainable when they are also supported and shaped by civil society.
2. We, the undersigned, acknowledge local ownership as a central principle. That means the need for broad local participation and co-determination for sustainable conflict resolution and peacekeeping in decision-making processes. Support of local personal, material and institutional capacities should facilitate the phasing-out of international engagement in fragile situations.
3. We recognise the opportunity for shared visions for engagement in fragile situations, provided that these are based on the needs of those affected, as well as mutual confidence in the capabilities of the international actors and their determination to put these to beneficial use. We can therefore develop coordinated procedures or joint strategies where the respective objectives call for and allow this. In specific situations, however, different approaches can be more appropriate for the target population.
4. We accord priority to conflict prevention to avoid the outbreak or relapse of armed conflicts.
5. We consider joint analysis and assessment and coordinated planning as the decisive starting point for our activities.
6. We support regular briefings and information exchange when required to gain a better grasp of the specific tasks and modes of operation of the various actors.
7. We are committed to avoiding any adverse effects of our measures on the population concerned and natural resources (do-no-harm). To achieve this, it is also important to conduct impact assessments and communicate the findings to other actors.
8. We advocate systematic training and capacity building beforehand.
9. Our actions are conceived for the long term and are responsive to the cultural setting, i.e. we aim for the sustainable, long-term de-escalation and settlement of conflicts.
10. We attach priority to protecting vulnerable groups, as cited in UN Security Council Resolution 1894 (2009).

11. Women play a central role in peace processes and in conflict prevention. We support in particular the aims of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and the follow-up resolutions.

12. The unhindered humanitarian access to people in need is of importance to us. We acknowledge humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality as foremost principles of humanitarian aid. At the same time, we respect the missions and engagement of states and international organisations with other mandates. For peace enforcement and armed peacekeeping missions, however, either a mandate of the United Nations or one of its regional organisations, or a joint request by all parties to the conflict under an international treaty is required.

13. Where multilateral mandates of complex international peace operations necessitate military support for civilian tasks, we attach importance to applying the same principles of developmental sensitivity as well as the respectful treatment of the population and the civilian actors concerned. The performance of civilian tasks by the armed forces shall only take place in those cases in which it is not possible for civilian experts to do so.

14. We advocate improving cooperation between international peace operations and NGOs - including those that explicitly represent women, minorities and other socially discriminated groups - and exploring synergies. In particular, international peace operations that clearly make an important contribution to stabilisation after conflicts should be designed to be more responsive to development goals and care more for local socio-economic needs and conditions. This includes the following:

- Carrying out the security component in concert with other aims ('no security without development and no development without security')
- Providing situational support for the aims of other actors where the own mode of operation and tasks permit
- Effecting visible and sustainable economic improvements at an early stage, especially
 - Promoting local procurement by the international mission
 - Remunerating local staff in keeping with local pay scales
 - Stimulating relevant local private sector activities, especially women-led enterprises.⁵

15. As NGOs add specific value in fragile situations, we also advocate channelling their expertise and relevant experience into multilateral processes modelled on the OECD's⁶ International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

16. The scope of cooperation (e.g. coordination, information exchange) between government and non-governmental actors in fragile situations depends on the setting and must be defined in each individual case.

We, the undersigned, agree to continue our dialogue on the Vienna 3C principles and account for lessons learnt and good/best practices.

This appeal represents work in progress and will be developed further jointly.

Vienna, June 2010

⁵ Agreed amendment as of 26 October 2010.

⁶ Interpeace, Background Paper: Voices of civil society organisations (CSOs) on peacebuilding and statebuilding, prepared as an input to the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, Dili, Timor-Leste, 9-10 April, 2010, http://www.interpeace.org/images/pdf/interpeace_background_paper_international_dialogue_conf_dili_cso_input_final_23042010.pdf

Annex

Contributions of Government and Non-governmental Actors in Fragile Situations

Contributions of government institutions

Government institutions bear responsibility in planning and implementing their policy strategies and mandates. They ensure coherence among all the necessary national and international policies. This calls for coordination of national and international government institutions in fragile situations, preferably under civic leadership.

In this framework, Austrian government institutions in fragile situations attach priorities to the following:

- Conflict prevention and crisis management
- Peacebuilding and statebuilding
- Dealing with transversal challenges

This includes pursuing the following goals:

- Creating a secure environment to enable other measures to take effect (human security)
- Comprehensive measures for protecting the civilian population: Especially women and children
 - Promoting compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law as well as international law on refugees by all parties to the conflict
 - Guaranteeing free access for humanitarian organisations and relief supplies as well as protecting humanitarian helpers from attack
 - Meeting conditions for the safe, voluntary and dignified return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons
- Guaranteeing individual security and enforcing state monopoly on the use of force
- Building or restoring state institutions under the rule of law through:
 - Justice and security sector reform (SSR)
Support for fighting against impunity for grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights
 - Promotion of mechanisms for coming to terms with the past (e.g. criminal prosecution, truth commissions, reparation payments for victims of violations of human rights, institutional reform)
- Developing democratic and political institutions and concepts as well as a functioning public administration (good governance)
- Assistance in holding democratic elections and reaching consensus
- Promoting independent media and cultural facilities
- Enhancing human rights by strengthening civil society and setting up independent human rights institutions and mechanisms
- Taking measures for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), particularly through:
 - Support for former child soldiers
 - Prevention of illicit trafficking and distribution of small arms
 - Support for demining activities; programmes to support mine and cluster munition victims

- Securing individual basic needs in supplying goods for everyday needs, health and social services, education, infrastructure, etc:
 - Development of a sustainable economy, including strengthening the private sector (taking special account of maximising the socio-economic impacts of international missions)
 - Supporting access to regional and international markets
 - Preservation of sustainable ecosystems
 - Provision of basic health and social programmes and support in developing national capacities
 - Provision of basic education programmes and support in developing national education programmes
- Developing and promoting civil society in partner regions
- Strengthening the resilience of societies and states against settling conflicts through violence
- Building confidence and transforming conflict for peacebuilding and reconciliation (particularly capacity development for mediation)

Contributions are made to this on the one hand by assigning civilian experts, police officers, judicial and military personnel and on the other through development cooperation in conflict prevention and peacekeeping. Added to this are the resources of relevant policy fields and financial instruments, which must be tailored to needs in fragile situations (e.g. pooled funding).

Contributions by non-governmental organisations

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can add complementary value in fragile situations by virtue of their basic values (commitment to a life with dignity for all people, for global social equity and sustainability), their neutrality and their foundation in civil society.

Premise

NGOs act on the premise of satisfying the needs of the deprived population, based on their civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights and international development agreements, as set out in the Millennium Goals. All other aims are subordinate to these goals.

Principles

Essential principles of development and peacebuilding NGOs include sustainability, empowerment, accountability and participation.

Humanitarian aid through NGOs is provided according to the principles of neutrality, independence, impartiality and humanity, and must be free of any political, economic, military or other agenda.

Fields of activity

In many relevant fields of activity, NGOs can draw on proven expertise in fragile situations. They are not bound to uphold government interests and therefore usually have a broader scope of action and are accorded greater credibility. Their local situation facilitates rapid, adequate assistance geared to local needs. Strengthening local civilian capacity is a key factor for establishing peace, security and democracy:

- Humanitarian aid (e.g. aid for refugees and internally displaced persons; medical care; visits to prisoners of war and inspection of conditions of detention; distribution of food, tents etc.) in keeping with the above principles
- Implementation of programmes at a civil society level (e.g. provision of basic social services)
- Strengthening local civic capacity and actors – particularly women – through capacity building and empowerment of organisations (planning, budgeting, participation, monitoring of political processes) and individuals (training)
- Supporting civil society in the non-violent management and resolution of conflicts in all phases
- Advancing democracy by promoting networking processes and social movements
- Conducting training and advocacy measures in basic and human rights and international humanitarian law
- Monitoring attacks on civilians (including sexual violence)
- Carrying out advocacy work and supporting measures for mediation, reconciliation and eliminating impunity (transitional justice) and for building democratic state institutions in cooperation with local institutions
- Raising awareness and conducting advocacy work in the North as well as performing a watchdog function towards governments & government interventions

Contributions to this are made by assigning experts from different disciplines and allocating financial funds from public and private sources that are tailored to specific needs in fragile situations.

Teil III./Part III. 3C und Zivilgesellschaft, eine neue Perspektive/3C and civil society, a new perspective

A. Einbindung der Zivilgesellschaft – konzeptuelle Herausforderungen/How to include civil society - conceptual challenges

Statebuilding for peace – a new paradigm for international engagement in post-conflict fragile states?¹

Alina Rocha Menocal

1.) Introduction²

Fragile states have emerged as a leading priority in current international development thinking and practice. While there is no firm consensus within the international community on exactly what constitutes a “fragile” state or situation (see Box 1 for a variety of donor definitions), there is general agreement on some key characteristics. These include the presence of weak institutions and governance systems, and a fundamental lack of leadership, state capacity and/or political will to fulfil essential state functions, especially in terms of providing basic services to the poor. A significant number of developing countries are characterised by some degree of fragility along different dimensions – institutional, economic, political, social, and global. In some of these states fragility is entrenched and systemic, while in others it is more local and temporary (Rocha Menocal *et al.*, 2008).

Box 1: Donor definitions of “fragility”

A leading trait that international development actors use to define fragile states is their (in)ability to provide basic services to the poor, either as a result of a lack of political will, weak capacity, or both. Such is the core of DFID’s and the OECD’s definition, for example. Other definitions of state fragility, including those used by the European Commission, CIDA, the UNDP, and USAID, go beyond this narrow focus on performing basic functions for poverty reduction and development to encompass other dimensions, including territorial authority and (political) legitimacy, as intrinsic components of fragility. The World Bank, for its part, defines fragile situations as those characterised by a debilitating combination of weak governance, weak policies and weak institutions indicated by a ranking below ‘3’ on the Bank’s Country Policies and Institutional Performance Assessment (CPIA) index.

Source: Rocha Menocal *et al.* (2008)

At its core, fragility is a deeply political phenomenon. A fragile situation is one characterised by a fundamental lack of effective political processes that can bring state capacities and social expectations into equilibrium (Jones *et al.*, 2008). In a fragile setting, the quality of the politi-

¹ Author contacts: Alina Rocha Menocal Overseas Development Institute 111 Westminster Bridge Road London SE1 7JD United Kingdom Email: A.rochamenocal@odi.org.uk

² This paper was produced as a European University Institute Working Paper (RSCAS 2010/34) to feed into the elaboration of the 2009 *European Report on Development (ERD)* on “Overcoming Fragility in Africa”. A draft was presented at the Workshop on “Transforming Political Structures: Security, Institutions, and Regional Integration Mechanisms” organised by the ERD in Florence, Italy, 16-17 April 2009. Subsequent revisions are based on further research building on a Briefing Paper that the author wrote for the Overseas Development Institute titled “Statebuilding for peace: navigating an arena of contradictions” (August 2009).

cal settlement establishing the rules of the game is deeply flawed (especially in terms of its exclusionary nature), is not resilient, and/or has become significantly undermined or contested. A “social contract” binding state and society together in mutually reinforcing ways is largely missing.

All these characteristics of fragility are severely exacerbated through conflict. Clearly, countries that are not necessarily characterised by endemic violence may also be considered fragile. On the other hand, conflict, especially civil war, is a major trap for fragility. According to Paul Collier (2007), for instance, 73 percent of the people living in fragile settings have recently been through a civil war or are still in one, and having experienced a civil war doubles the risk of another conflict. Thus, while post-conflict transitions offer an important window of opportunity for (re-) construction and regeneration, they also entail high risks of crisis that can rapidly degenerate into renewed warfare.

In these particular, conflict-afflicted settings, the international community faces the dual task of promoting peace while helping to build more effective, inclusive, and responsive states³. This has led to a growing realisation among donors (including, for example, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank that their peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions ought to be brought closer together – ‘statebuilding for peace’, as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has put it.⁴ But how are peace- and statebuilding processes linked, and what are some of the most significant complementarities and tensions between them? This paper considers these questions. It begins by providing an overview of the evolution of these two concepts (Section II). The paper then analyses key complementarities between peacebuilding and statebuilding (Section III), as well as the challenges that arise for both on the basis of these complementarities (Section IV). The paper goes on to explore some of the most significant tensions that arise between the two approaches, and what these tensions may imply for the international assistance community (Section V). Finally, by way of a conclusion, the paper highlights a few key lessons that emerge from the foregoing analysis for improved donor policy and practice in statebuilding for peace efforts (Section VI).

2.) Understanding key concepts and their evolution

a.) Peacebuilding

From a considerable hands-off approach to international “peace keeping” during the Cold War, mainly as a result of geo-political considerations and concerns about state sovereignty, “peacebuilding” emerged as a key focus of international attention beginning in the 1990s, with the United Nations playing a leading role. Since then, the concept of peacebuilding and its agenda have evolved significantly. Building on UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, peacebuilding was originally associated with the (post-) conflict phase in countries that had experienced internal warfare, and was defined as “actions undertaken by national or international actors to identify and support structures which will

³ While it is essential to acknowledge that these two processes are mainly driven from within, the focus of this paper is primarily on the role of donors in supporting them.

⁴ The UNDP is currently undertaking a project titled “Statebuilding for Peace in Countries Emerging from Conflict: Lessons Learned for Capacity Development” that is being led by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”⁵ (Call and Cousins 2007). These early interventions in war-torn societies tended to focus on the establishment of a “negative peace” (*i.e.*, absence of, or prevention of a relapse into, armed conflict) and operated under very short-term timeframes. The emphasis of this “liberal peacebuilding” model (Paris 2004) was on holding a successful post-conflict election as fast as possible (usually within a year or two of the signing of a peace agreement) and on laying the foundations of a market-oriented economy, with the assumption/expectation that these provisions would prove sufficient in themselves to enable host societies to embark on a road towards lasting peace almost automatically (see Paris 2004 and Paris and Sisk 2008).

However, the mixed results of these “first-generation” missions – with the relative success of the mission in El Salvador sharply contrasting with the renewal of violence in Liberia and Rwanda in the early 1990s, for example – led to a substantial rethinking about the complexity of post-conflict transitions, and of the challenges embedded in bridging the gap between relief and development (Wyeth and Sisk 2009). Perhaps the most crucial insight or lesson to emerge from these experiences was that promoting political and/or economic liberalisation without ensuring that a sufficiently strong and effective formal institutional framework was in place to channel new rights, freedoms, demands and expectations peacefully, could lead to considerable instability and even fuel further conflict⁶. This led to a growing recognition that (re-)building or establishing at least a minimally functioning state was essential to undertake political and economic reforms and maintain the peace, especially in the long term (Call and Cousins 2007, Paris and Sisk 2008). As a result, from the late 1990s onward, the concept of peacebuilding has become more expansive and more consciously focused on the importance of state institutions, while it continues to emphasise the centrality of non-state actors (mainly civil society) and bottom-up processes as key to building sustainable peace.

At its most ambitious, peacebuilding has shifted from the relatively minimalist focus of the “negative peace” towards the maximalist goal of transforming society by strengthening human security and addressing fundamental grievances, horizontal inequalities, and other root causes of conflict. Thus interpreted, peacebuilding is a multifaceted endeavour that includes building democratic governance, protecting human rights, strengthening the rule of law, and promoting sustainable development, equitable access to resources, and environmental security (Barnett and Zürcher 2008). On the other hand, as Charles Call and Elizabeth Cousins (2007) have suggested, it may be wiser to steer away from either a minimalist or a maximalist conceptualisation of the term, and to opt for a middle ground. As such, peacebuilding can be defined as:

“those actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalise peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict (‘negative peace’) and a modicum of participatory politics (as a component of ‘positive peace’) that can be sustained in the absence of an international peace operation” (Call and Cousins 2007).

⁵ The concept itself predates *An Agenda for Peace*, however, and stems from decades of work in peace studies by leading pioneers such as Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach (Paris and Sisk 2008).

⁶ In Rwanda, political liberalisation before institutionalisation led to the strengthening of an “independent” but also highly irresponsible and polarised media that did much to deepen social divisions and incite the genocidal violence that ensued (Paris 2004). Snyder (2000) also argues that, where political competition is not properly institutionalised, it can lead to renewed conflict in the form of ethnic nationalism. In such cases, elections are “less an exercise of democracy than a census of loyalties commanded by previously warring groups” (Putzel 2007).

b.) Statebuilding

The (re-) discovery of the state in international policy-making circles as one of the keys to development is a relatively recent phenomenon (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007), as insights emerging from a rich body of multi-disciplinary academic literature on the need “to bring the state back in”⁷ took some time to be absorbed. The renaissance of the state is remarkable in the light of the anti-statist stance of the development paradigm under the *aegis* of the Washington Consensus. This was followed in the 1990s by the rise of the “good” governance agenda, which, in its initial incarnation, tended to be dominated by a de-politicised, technocratic approach, and was also relatively anti-statist. By the turn of the new millennium, however, statebuilding had become a leading priority for the international development community. Today, almost every major donor identifies statebuilding as one of its key objectives, particularly in fragile states (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007b). The Principles on Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations elaborated by the OECD DAC (2007), for example, stress that statebuilding should be the central objective of engagement in such settings.

This shift in emphasis, and the renewed international concern about the need to build capable, effective and responsive states, surfaced from the confluence of several factors. Firstly, as has been noted above, there has been a growing recognition of the institutional gap implicit in peacebuilding efforts and the challenges associated with such neglect of the state. The end of the Cold War saw the proliferation of new states (the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, East Timor, and, most recently, an independent Kosovo), some of which have remained weak and unstable. In addition, severe and sustained (and mainly internal) conflict and humanitarian crises have affected multiple fragile settings. Many of these places are struggling to lay the foundations for peace and (re-) construction, and there is an emerging international consensus that this cannot be done without strengthening the institutional structures of the state. As Vanessa Wyeth and Timothy Sisk (2009) have put it, in a sense:

“the concept of statebuilding initially emerged almost as an exit strategy for peace builders – an alternative way of thinking about war to peace transitions in response to the perceived pathologies of ‘liberal peacebuilding’.”

Secondly, there is a concern with poor development performance and how it is linked to state effectiveness. As the Commission for Africa emphasised in its 2005 report, the way states function is increasingly seen as one of the most important factors affecting development: institutions are crucial to promote development, and states are a critical hinge in achieving the transformations necessary to achieve and sustain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Fragile states are home to approximately one third of the world's poor population (or what Paul Collier refers to as “the bottom billion”), and it has become clear that the MDGs cannot be reached without progress in such settings.

Finally, since the attacks of 9-11, there has been a growing emphasis on the linkages between under-development and insecurity (both individual and international). Fragile states are perceived as generating undesirable dynamics and problems not only at the domestic level, but also in terms of the spill-over effects associated with conflict, instability, terrorism, trafficking, and organised violence, among others. Thus, capable and effective states have come to be seen as essential both to promote development and prosperity and to counter terrorism and other security challenges (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007b).

⁷ See, for example, B. Moore (1966); Evans et al. (1985); Migdal 1988; and Evans (1995).

In its simplest formulation, statebuilding refers to the set of actions undertaken by national and/or international actors to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions where these have been seriously eroded or are missing (Caplan 2005). Yet, as with peacebuilding, the concept of statebuilding has also evolved considerably over time. From a narrow preoccupation with building/strengthening formal institutions and state capacity, there has been an important shift within the international development community towards recognising that the state cannot be treated in isolation and that state-society relations are central to statebuilding processes. As such, the core of statebuilding, especially “responsive” statebuilding (Whaites 2008), has come to be understood in terms of an effective political process through which citizens and the state can negotiate mutual demands, obligations, and expectations (Jones *et al.* 2007). A fragile situation is one in which no such effective process is in place. This shift has rightfully placed the concept of legitimacy – both as a means to building state capacity and as an end in itself – at the centre of the statebuilding agenda (Wyeth and Sisk 2009).

The OECD DAC Principles express the current degree of international consensus on statebuilding as grounded in state-society relations and the need for legitimacy. As spelled out in Principle 3 (OECD DAC 2007):

“International engagement [in fragile states] will need to be concerted, sustained, and focused on building the relationship between state and society, through engagement in two main areas. Firstly, supporting the legitimacy and accountability of states by addressing issues of democratic governance, human rights, civil society engagement and peacebuilding. Secondly, strengthening the capability of states to fulfil their core functions is essential in order to reduce poverty ... Civil society has a key role both in demanding good governance and in service delivery.”

Thus, statebuilding is not simply about “top-down” approaches of institution strengthening (*i.e.*, those focusing on state actors and/or national élites), but also about “bottom-up” approaches linking state and society (*i.e.*, working through civil society). The adoption of top-down strategies is a common criticism of statebuilding (Chandler 2006), and it leads to the creation of a straw man.

3.) Complementarities between statebuilding and peacebuilding

c.) Contributions of a statebuilding approach to peacebuilding

As can be seen from the discussion above, over the past several years, there has been a growing overlap between the peacebuilding and the statebuilding agendas. Lakhdar Brahimi, a (former) leading UN diplomat, captured this when he stated that:

“[t]he concept of statebuilding is becoming more and more accepted within the international community and is actually far more apt as a description of exactly what it is that we should be trying to do in post-conflict countries” (Brahimi 2007).

However, it is also essential to bear in mind that growing international support for statebuilding is not intended as a call to supplant peacebuilding (Paris and Sisk 2008). While the two concepts have become more closely related, they remain distinct, both analytically and in practice. As articulated by Wyeth and Sisk (2009):

“[P]eacebuilding is a transitional enterprise ... focused on processes of war termination (usually, but not always, coinciding with implementation of peace agreements) and efforts to prevent renewed violence through processes to address the immediate causes of the conflict. Strategically, a goal of peacebuilding is to provide incentives for protagonists to commit to peace agreements, and help steer a process of political, social, and

economic transition. Statebuilding reflects the need for a stable, legitimate, and effective state that is responsive to its citizens and capable of providing basic services, security, access to justice, and a foundation for economic development, and is connected to the political processes through which state-society relations and power relationships among élites are negotiated.”

As has been emphasised, a statebuilding focus has helped to provide an important and welcome corrective to the neglect of state institutions that long persisted within peacebuilding efforts. Other institutions, actors, and alternative sources of authority (such as tribal authorities, the private sector, civil society, and supranational institutions like the UN), may be essential in their own right, but they cannot adequately substitute for the state in a sustainable manner. Preliminary research findings from a research project on civil society involvement in peacebuilding activities from 13 different conflicts, for example, have suggested that, while civil society peacebuilding efforts are extremely valuable in their own right, they do not have a strong direct impact on conflict and peace- (building). Effective state institutions and involvement/buy-in of state and political élites are necessary to enable an atmosphere that is conducive to civil society activities.⁸ As is also dramatically illustrated by the violence that took over East Timor in 2006, just a year after the departure of the UN peace-keeping mission, what is needed is a state that is organically linked to the society that it is intended to govern. The growing attention to statebuilding also provides a longer-term perspective than that usually embedded within a peacebuilding approach. This, again, is very welcome in terms of addressing the developmental needs of fragile states within a more realistic time-frame.

b.) Building more inclusive polities and societies

International efforts to promote state- and peacebuilding share a fundamental concern in working with domestic actors towards establishing and/or strengthening both arrangements and institutions that are more inclusive, representative and responsive, and that incorporate stakeholders that have traditionally not had a voice (including women, ethnic minorities, *etc.*). The aim is to develop new rules of the game that

- are acceptable to a majority of actors that need to be brought on board in peacebuilding and statebuilding endeavours; and
- can create a legitimate political centre.

From a statebuilding perspective, issues related to the nature and quality of what analysts have come to define as the “political settlement” lie at the heart of this endeavour (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007b). The peacebuilding agenda, on the other hand, focuses more immediately on the peace process itself. While the term “political settlement” often lacks definitional clarity, even as it has acquired considerable currency in international development circles (Whaites 2008), there is broad agreement that it is the expression of a common understanding, usually forged among élites, about how political power is to be organised and exercised, and about how the nature of the relationship between state and society is to be articulated. Political settlements often incorporate, or are shaped by features that are central to peacebuilding, including peace agreements and constitution-making processes. However, they are much deeper and broader than these. Political settlements include not only formal institutions adapted or created to manage politics – such as electoral processes, parliaments, constitutions and truth commissions, many of which may be the direct result of peacebuilding efforts – but also, crucially, the often informal and unarticulated political arrangements and understandings

⁸ At the time of writing, this was an ongoing research project that Thania Paffenholz was leading on for the Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. For more information, see: http://ccdp.ch/projects_civil_society.pdf

that underpin a political system. Political settlements also tend to evolve over time in the measure that state and social actors continue to negotiate the nature of their relationship and re-adjust their respective expectations as different needs, demands, and tensions arise (witness the recent events in Kenya and Bolivia, for example). On the other hand, in the measure that the political settlement is widely accepted, it is likely to fluctuate less over time and to provide a greater measure of predictability and stability.

Whether the focus is on the political settlement or on particular peace processes, however, the ambition to support the construction of more inclusive political orders is a daunting challenge, an issue that is analysed in greater detail later in this paper.

c.) Fostering legitimacy

Another essential complementarity between peacebuilding and statebuilding, and closely linked to the one discussed above, is their concern for legitimacy. Peace-builders and state-builders share a fundamental preoccupation in ensuring that the peace process and the process to reconstitute the new polity enjoy broad-based legitimacy and support, so that they can prove resilient over time. One crucial implication of this, which the international community has not always followed, is that peacebuilding processes should not be rushed. Domestic ownership and support of the peace process and (ensuing) political settlement is critical for subsequent statebuilding efforts. If international actors move too quickly, stakeholders may not be able to garner effective local support, have local ownership and attain legitimacy of the process. In effect, the *quality* of agreements is more important than speed. Artificial timelines (*i.e.*, to hold an election/draft a constitution), often more to suit donor agendas than country needs, can be considerably counter-productive.

From a statebuilding perspective in particular, the issue of legitimacy also lies at the core of statesociety relations and the nature of the “social pact” between state and society. It refers to “the normative belief of a political community that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed”; and states are legitimate when “key political élites and the public accept the rules regulating the exercise of power and the distribution of wealth as proper and binding” (Papagianni 2008). Without a minimum degree of legitimacy, states have difficulty functioning (Brinkerhoff 2006). The need to build legitimacy is therefore at the core of statebuilding efforts and is a primary requirement for peace, stability, and resilience over the long term. As Seth Kaplan (2008) has put it, “[t]he key to fixing fragile states is ... to legitimise the state by deeply enmeshing it within society” (p. 49).

Thus, in fragile settings, especially those that have been affected by conflict, what is at stake is not only national reconciliation through a peace process that is as inclusive as possible to ensure it enjoys buy-in from broad sectors of the population, but also the construction of:

- A state that is perceived as legitimate against a backdrop of mistrust, resentment and/or antagonism by the population;
- State institutions that serve the public good rather than the narrow interests of those in power through patronage and clientelism; and
- Positive and mutually-reinforcing linkages between state and society to sustain an effective and resilient public sphere.

Again, as with the need to build more inclusive, representative and responsive political orders, how to support fragile states to become more legitimate in the eyes of their population is a very difficult and complex undertaking. This search for legitimacy is discussed in further detail in the following section.

4.) Common challenges and implications for donors

a.) Inclusive political settlements and peace agreements as statecraft in contemporary statebuilding efforts?

As noted above, peacebuilding and statebuilding share a fundamental concern towards fostering more inclusive, representative, and responsive arrangements and institutions. In fact, the current context in which fragile states are being transformed and (re-) built, especially in (post-) conflict settings, offers a window of opportunity for a “new beginning”, or for “rewriting the future of history”, as Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart (2007) have put it. In such situations, political settlements that are re-articulated through negotiated peace agreements have the potential to lay the foundations for inclusive and rights-based statecraft. As Ghani and Lockhart argue, such settlements, at their core, attempt to reconstitute state-society relations and create a new social contract based upon mutual rights and obligations. The majority of contemporary negotiated agreements also invoke human rights and a desire to end genocide, ethnocide, exclusion and the violation of fundamental human rights.

However, it is essential to bear in mind that this remains only a potential opportunity, and it is far from clear whether it can be fulfilled. History shows that political settlements can remain highly exclusionary affairs even after a peace agreement that is intended to be more inclusive has been negotiated (for example, Guatemala – see below). Many peace agreements may not be particularly participatory and representative of different sectors of society to begin with, such as those agreed in Angola and even Mozambique, which is often hailed as a post-conflict success story. In addition, while negotiated agreements and the political settlement thus re-articulated (including constitutions) may look good on paper, translating their often high rhetoric into reality is a completely different matter. In the context of fragile states, characterised, among other things, by weak formal institutions, reduced state capacity, and limited resources, this is a particularly acute problem. Informal institutions and practices based on exclusion and on the logic of concentrating power can prove remarkably resilient. Peace agreements are often infused with a rights-based approach to economic and social development, containing detailed lists of rights for individuals in general and marginalised groups like indigenous people, refugees, internally displaced people, former combatants, and women in particular. But living up to these standards in actual practice is extremely difficult. Part of the peace- and statebuilding efforts needs to be dedicated to the establishment of priorities and the sequencing of interventions both among and within such priorities (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007b).

Thus, contemporary international peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts face a fundamental challenge in working towards ensuring that both peace processes and the process to reconstitute the new polity can be expanded to become more broadly representative and inclusive. This is an extraordinarily ambitious task: what is at stake is nothing short of redrawing the formal and informal foundations of the state so as to help build states that are more legitimate and representative, and that serve the public good rather than the narrow interests of those in power. It is also an inherently long-term endeavour, with the signing of peace agreements in post-conflict settings as only an initial (albeit very important) step in a protracted process that is likely to be non-linear and experience considerable fluctuations and setbacks. Redrawing the sets of understandings and arrangements that underpin the polity and bind state and society requires getting to the heart of embedded power structures and fundamentally altering them. This is likely to be an extremely difficult and sensitive (as well as highly political) endeavour, especially given that, in a very real sense, the drive behind both peacebuilding and

statebuilding, especially in post-conflict settings, inevitably lies in negotiation and compromise, rather than on fundamental transformation.

The experience of Guatemala provides a powerful illustration of this challenge. At the end of a gruesome civil war that lasted four decades, Guatemala embarked on an ambitious project to develop a new political settlement to rearticulate the basis of the Guatemalan state along more democratic, inclusive, egalitarian, and representative lines. The Peace Agreements that culminated in 1996 were used as a basis for this. The Accords are exceptional in their scope, breadth, and vision. Grounded on the respect for the rights of all of the population, the identification of exclusion (social, economic, political, ethnic, *etc.*) as the root cause of the confrontation, and the recognition of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural character of the Guatemalan nation-state, the agreements contain an elaborate programme of national transformation which includes a number of policy actions and targets, covering areas such as economic and social reform, human development, public sector reform, justice and human rights, and security and reconciliation. The Accords also place considerable emphasis on active and sustained citizen participation. As such, they promote extensive participation in public policymaking processes, in order to keep the state representative and accountable, and they make provisions for the decentralisation of both authority and resources to local levels of government. All these processes – the modernisation of the political system, the creation of shared spaces of negotiation and decision-making processes between state and society, and the strengthening of power at the local level – are aimed at the construction of an inclusive and participatory democratic system which, except for a brief ten-year period in the 1940s and 1950s, is totally and radically new in Guatemala (Rocha Menocal 2008).

However, despite some undeniable progress (for example, increased awareness and respect of indigenous rights) the formal substance of this agreement has not managed to alter power structures that have been in place for decades (if not centuries) in any meaningful way. The fundamental (informal) understanding among élites – that their privileges and hold on power are not to be touched – still remains. This can be seen, for example, in the way the post-conflict Guatemalan state has dealt with acute problems related to the pattern of land ownership in the country – which is, essentially, by not doing very much. The country's deeply unequal social structure is both rooted and reflected in its high levels of land concentration. The Socio-Economic Accord that was signed as part of the peace negotiations recognises the centrality of the land question as a structural cause of poverty and a source of conflict. However, it does not articulate a broad, national and long-term vision of development, and it avoids any direct challenge to the *status quo*. In this respect, the peace accords made little impact on a highly skewed land distribution, and the interests of large landowners have prevailed. In all probability, simmering agrarian unrest is not likely to lead to a full-scale rekindling of the war. Yet, the failure of successive governments to address land reform and introduce a rural social development policy that engages all stakeholders and improves the lives and welfare of indigenous populations has catalysed an increasingly violent series of land occupations, land-based conflicts, civil mobilisations and protests, and clashes between smallholders and the armed agents of wealthy landowners (Rocha Menocal 2008).

b.) In search of legitimacy

As has been noted above, another leading preoccupation of both the peacebuilding and the statebuilding agendas centres around the need to build/enhance legitimacy so as to support stronger linkages between state and society and more resilient political orders. One of the fundamental questions that arises for both national and international actors is, therefore, how this challenge can best be addressed. An important step in beginning to tackle this question is

to understand legitimacy as a very complex concept which includes many different dimensions. As Margaret Levi has put it, “no one – including Weber himself – has successfully sorted out which of the various elements [of legitimacy] are necessary or how to measure indicators or their interaction” (Levi 2006). Historically, states have relied on a combination of different and multi-faceted methods to establish their legitimacy and authority over those they rule. Some the most common sources for establishing and sustaining legitimacy are summarised in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Different sources of legitimacy

Form of legitimacy	Key characteristics and/or examples
Legitimacy bestowed by international standards and external actors	International recognition of the state as a member of the United Nations and as signatory of international declarations and covenants, for example. This kind of legitimacy can converge with domestic legitimacy or be at odds with it.
Legitimacy based on performance	This kind of legitimacy can emanate from, among other things: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the provision of public goods and services, including social security (e.g., the modern welfare state), and/or - sustained economic growth (e.g., the so-called East Asian Tigers – South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong – as well as China and Vietnam) <p>In fragile states, a key dimension of such legitimacy hinges on the (in-) ability of the state to provide or otherwise ensure the provision of basic services, first and foremost security (London School of Economics and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 2008; Whaites 2008), but also health, education, etc.</p>
Legitimacy based on ideology and/or nationalism	Examples include Cuba and Iran (revolutionary ideology based on communism and religious fundamentalism respectively, and largely defined in opposition to the United States in particular).
Legitimacy based on populism	This legitimacy is derived from a mass model of politics in which charismatic leaders appeal to the people directly as the source of their right to rule. Examples include Juan Perón in Argentina and, more recently, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.
Legitimacy based on clientelism and neo-patrimonialism	This form of legitimacy rests on the rewards that accrue from exchange of material benefits for political support. Linkages between state and social actors are based on personalised relations rather than mediated through formal institutions. Examples include much of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Process-oriented legitimacy	The legitimacy of the state is here tied to agreed-upon formal rules and procedures through which the state both takes binding decisions and organises people’s participation (participatory processes, bureaucratic management, justice, etc.) (Bellina <i>et al.</i> , 2009). Examples of such procedural legitimacy include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the establishment of the rule of law; - liberal democratic representation (including not only elections but also respect for fundamental civil and political rights); and - accountable and transparent decision-making processes. <p>This form of legitimacy exists mainly in advanced/highly developed industrial countries, but can also be found in developing countries such as Costa Rica and India. Since the 1980s, with the advent of the “Third Wave” of democratisation, many countries (including fragile states) throughout Africa, Asia, Latin America and elsewhere in the developing world are attempting to strengthen this form of legitimacy, although this remains a challenge (Rocha Menocal and Fritz 2008).</p>
Traditional forms of legitimacy	This kind of legitimacy derives from non-state communal and customary institutions and authorities and is based on norms of trust and reciprocity rooted in social practices. As explained by Kevin Clements (2008), “[t]he core constitutive values that lie at the heart of traditional legitimacy are the values that enable kin groups, tribes and communities to exist, satisfy basic human needs and survive through time. Traditional legitimacy rests on complex patterns of power, responsibility and obligation which enable social groups to exist and co-exist”. This kind of legitimacy can be found across the developing world (Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Pacific, etc.), and is particularly dominant in rural communities at the sub-national level.

As can be appreciated from the table above, some of these methods have been more inclusive than others, and many of them can be considered to be imperfect and considerably problematic (for example, populism and neopatrimonialism) depending on who is included in and who is left out of the social compact thus established between state and society. Patronage net-

works, for example, make the provision of state services highly differential between groups, where some groups receive much more than others. This may reinforce state legitimacy with some groups, while undermining it with others (Bellina *et al.*, 2009).

Since the 1990s, the form of legitimacy that tends to be emphasised by the international assistance community is that based on democratic representation and accountability, as well as justice and the rule of law⁹. From a normative perspective, it seems imperative to link a fundamental respect for the rule of law (including justice and human rights) and democratic accountability to any contemporary notion of state legitimacy. In fragile states in particular, as Frances Stewart and Graham Brown (2006) have argued, establishing a legitimate government based on inclusive democratic governance “is arguably the most important precursor of corrective policies...., as groups experiencing historical social exclusion or deprivation of human rights are unlikely to respond favourably to corrective policies if they continue to regard the state as illegitimate”.

However, one of the main challenges encountered in fragile states is that this type of legitimacy can be particularly difficult to achieve, given these states’ weak governance structures and substantial lack of human and technical capacity. Against a backdrop of financial mismanagement, often impoverished economies, and widespread poverty and inequality, it is also difficult for fragile states to build their legitimacy on the basis of their performance, which is another dimension of legitimacy that donors seek to support. Moreover, various sources and forms of legitimacy co-exist in such settings, and these may not necessarily reinforce each other but rather compete with or undermine one another. Fragile states can be characterised as “hybrid political orders” in which informal institutions, rules and processes (for example customary practices of rule, religion, and clientelism) often enjoy more legitimacy and a greater degree of trust than formal ones – not only because these provide alternative venues for security and social services, but also because they have been able, over time, to establish a sense of allegiance, trust and loyalty (Bellina *et al.*, 2009; see, also, Clements 2008).

As noted by Wyeth and Sisk (2008), “despite widespread reference to political legitimacy, [the international assistance community has] inadequate understanding of the various sources of legitimacy, [and] the process by which states legitimate their authority”. Until now, donor approaches to enhance the legitimacy of fragile states have tended to over-privilege a focus on building/strengthening formal state institutions. In addition, as discussed earlier, while seeking to build support for peace from the bottom up¹⁰, the international community has also engaged in activities that have unwittingly undermined, rather than strengthened, the legitimacy of the state itself. Moreover, in general, international development actors have not adequately engaged with traditional and more grounded forms of legitimacy (Clements 2008) or “explore[d] pathways for strengthening state legitimacy in contexts where other actors and institutions (often informal, non-state) compete with the state for legitimacy (for example, Afghanistan and Lebanon)” (Wyeth and Sisk 2008). How to do so remains a key challenge for international peace-builders and state-builders alike. Among other things, it requires the development of deep local knowledge and trust among different interlocutors at the subnational level, as well as substantial time and commitment over the long term. So far, however, experience with international peace- and statebuilding efforts suggests that donors may not always be best placed to deliver these. But, at the very minimum, donors need to ensure that their interventions do not have a negative impact on domestic legitimacy processes, which

⁹ See Brinkerhoff 2007, among others

¹⁰ As will be discussed later, donor efforts to provide basic services have not necessarily been linked to strengthening the legitimacy of the state, a tendency that has been problematic.

unfortunately - as has been noted - has often not been the case (see Section V below for more on this)¹¹.

5.) Tensions between peacebuilding and statebuilding and further implications for donors

As has been highlighted above, a peacebuilding approach and statebuilding efforts share some fundamental characteristics and overall aspirations that point to very strong complementarities in terms of building more peaceful, inclusive, representative, effective, and legitimate states and societies. On the other hand, it is also important to bear in mind that the two remain distinct processes. Thus, the growing international instinct to move in the direction of combining a peacebuilding and statebuilding approach in their engagement with fragile states needs to be framed within an understanding that peacebuilding and statebuilding may not always go hand in hand in a mutually reinforcing manner and may, at times, pull in different directions. That is to say, all good things may not automatically go together. There is a growing body of literature that has begun to analyse some of the tensions between the two and the difficult trade-offs and dilemmas that are often involved (see, for example, Call 2008; Paris and Sisk 2008). Four of the most salient ones are highlighted below.

i) Statebuilding may not automatically lead to peace.

The current vision of the international donor community on statebuilding (as illustrated in the OECD DAC Principles, for example) seems to be based on the assumption that the process can be remarkably consensual, inclusive, bottom-up and democratic. However, historical experiences with state formation and statebuilding suggest otherwise. State formation and statebuilding have emerged as long-term, non-linear, tumultuous, inherently violent and conflict-ridden processes often associated with war (see Tilly 1992 in particular). Such efforts have frequently been top-down, heavily driven and controlled by national élites, and concern for human rights and justice has been minimal. In cases in which social mobilisation (often driven by élites as well) has played a formative role in statebuilding processes, the relationship between state and society has more often than not been contentious and conflict-ridden¹².

Clearly, as has been noted, contemporary statebuilding efforts are qualitatively and contextually different from earlier state formation processes. The current devastation within which many fragile states are attempting to become reconstituted, or rather transformed, offers a crucial window of opportunity for more inclusive and non-discriminatory statebuilding processes that may also be more peaceful. Given the weakness and/or lack of legitimacy of much of the state apparatus, there is a significant opportunity for civil society actors (NGOs, religious organisations, indigenous groups, women's organisations, social movements, *etc.*) to become key players or interlocutors in the rearticulation of a social pact that is more legitimate and inclusive. In addition, as leading actors in contemporary statebuilding attempts, international players (and for the purposes of this paper, donors in particular) have come to assume particular responsibilities, and they are committed, at least in principle, to fomenting peace and constructing a domestic basis of legitimacy for the interventions that they under-

¹¹ The OECD DAC commissioned the London School of Economics and PriceWaterhouse Coopers to carry out a study on "doing no harm" in situations of fragility that discusses state legitimacy among other things. Some of the outputs of this project are cited in the References section of this paper/chapter.

¹² For a good example of such processes, see K. Polanyi's (1957) analysis of the "Great Transformation" that entailed the collapse of 19th century civilisation in Europe and the emergence of the welfare state (in England for example) and fascism (in Germany). Another, more recent example of the confrontational/antagonistic relationship between state and society in statebuilding is provided by the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

take in different fragile settings. This notwithstanding, statebuilding remains deeply political in nature. This is something that donors have become less reluctant to acknowledge more openly over the past few years (see, for example, OECD DAC 2008), at least in principle. But the practical implications of this still need to be more fully internalised: in the measure that statebuilding in the 21st century continues to create winners and losers, it has the potential to spark further conflict rather than simply reinforce a consensual process through a virtuous circle linking state and society.

ii) Steps that may be necessary to consolidate peace and arrive at a “formal” political settlement (in the form of a peace agreement) may undermine the creation of a capable and effective state in the longer term.

This can manifest itself in a number of different ways. For instance, the need to appease spoilers in the interest of peace can strengthen the hand of repressive rulers and/or crystallise politics along the lines over which a conflict has been fought (for example, Bosnia). Both of these undermine the sustainability of the state – and the peace itself – in the long run. Especially in post-conflict settings where a peace settlement needs to be negotiated, a significant challenge lies precisely in the fact that there are no clear winners and losers, so that difficult compromises need to be made. Among other things, there may be a need to include unsavoury actors responsible for considerable human rights atrocities at the negotiating table. In a context of high insecurity, the international community often has the temptation to co-opt local militia commanders with a view to ensuring their support for the government. In Afghanistan, for example, short-term stability has been consistently prioritised over the need to build a long-term and sustainable security apparatus. Thus, warlords continue to be co-opted into key positions of power and tribal leaders bribed, while the army and police were sidelined for several years in the prioritisation of aid (London School of Economics and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 2008).

There is also a danger that different parties will refuse to enter into negotiations unless a general amnesty is granted.¹³ In some contexts, bringing individuals to account too early may compromise a political settlement. Conversely, failing to bring individuals to justice may undermine people’s trust in the political process. In addition, a culture of tolerance towards the actions of political actors may lead to further perpetration of violence or criminality in an unaccountable climate. Thus, it is not always clear that the goals of achieving peace and those of achieving justice can be easily reconciled – and a careful and context-sensitive balance between these twin needs is an essential component of (and challenge to) successful statecraft. Different societies have attempted to experiment with different methods and mechanisms in search of such a balance. South Africa’s use of so-called “restorative justice” (first through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and more recently through the justice system) offers one such creative, if not entirely unproblematic, example (Batley 2005).

In addition, confidence-building measures, including provisions such as power sharing arrangements and compromise, come with advantages and drawbacks that need to be taken into account. Such measures may be necessary to overcome the distrust of the state and to foster the legitimacy of the peace settlement and the post-conflict political order in the short run, but they can also have a negative impact on the capacity and effectiveness of state institutions in the medium and long term. One of the basic tensions in this respect is to over-privilege the pursuit of peace over state coherence and effectiveness. A drive towards inclusiveness and broad representation can lead to such a dispersion of power and authority that the political

¹³ By way of illustration, as one observer has put it, warring factions in Sudan may disagree about everything except calling for a general amnesty.

system becomes paralysed, unable to function, and unable to carry out critical governance reforms. In Afghanistan, for example, the central state remains weak and thoroughly ineffective, in large part as a result of the need to accommodate potential spoilers and preserve internal peace (Call 2008). In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a study on “Doing No Harm” led by the London School of Economics and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009) has found that:

“the internecine wars of the late 1990s made it a humanitarian imperative to reach a peace agreement ... Donor countries endorsed [an imperfect peace] process, despite its flaws, as they were determined to do what they could to see peace maintained... [As a result] peacebuilding objectives trumped statebuilding objectives in this context.”

iii) Peacebuilding undermines statebuilding when it bypasses state institutions, even though doing so may make a lot of sense in the short term.

Again, there are multiple manifestations of this. Michael Carnahan and Clare Lockhart (2008), for example, have been critical of donor practices that entail channelling funds outside the domestic system of public finance through the creation of parallel mechanisms, and they have argued that international assistance needs to run through state institutions and rely on the formal budget process. This is essential to build the capacity of these institutions to perform basic functions that were depleted or destroyed by war, as well as to strengthen legitimacy by enhancing the state’s ability to address citizen expectations and demands.

The provision of basic social services, such as health, water and electricity, provides another, powerful illustration of this issue of undermining statebuilding efforts in the long term to address short-term imperatives. In principle, the state itself should play a leading role in providing such services, or, at the very least, in ensuring their provision by other parties. The successful undertaking of such functions is not only an important source of legitimacy for the state, but is also an obligation under different international, regional, and national laws and a key characteristic of statehood.

In fragile settings, however, the state’s institutional capacity to deliver in this area is likely to be considerably limited. This entails certain dilemmas that need to be taken into consideration. In fragile settings, donors have often put service delivery in the hands of international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to generate quick and visible improvements in everyday conditions. The creation of such “peace dividends” not only constitutes a key objective of the peacebuilding agenda but is also an extremely valid concern, especially given the decrepitude, if not outright absence, of state institutions that can fulfil basic functions. And yet it has to be managed very carefully: the temptation to bypass the state because of the challenges faced in (re-) building public provision can have potentially negative consequences on longer-term statebuilding priorities (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007). In the DRC, for example, schools and clinics are being built without the authorisation of the local administration (which would normally oversee these processes), and such initiatives have contributed to the weakening of the state and its linkages to society (LSE and PwC 2009).

In many ways, as Francis Fukuyama (2004) has put it, “there is a conflict in donor goals between building institutional capacity and providing end-users with the services that the capacity is meant to produce”. As highlighted by a recent UNDP/USAID study (2007), international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are very good at service delivery. This may be extremely useful in the short term, but it can also reduce the incentives to build national systems and to invest in strengthening local capacity over the long term. Moreover, the contracting out of tasks such as service delivery detracts considerable legitimacy from the state. The

state comes to be perceived by the population as unreliable and unable to meet basic needs that then have to be provided by the international community.

Donors therefore need to maintain a mixture of different aid modalities, investing in central government capacity-building while also maintaining and expanding the delivery of basic services. Thus far, this has proved a difficult balancing act. Overall, donors need to be much more highly cognisant of the kinds of impact/consequences that their short-term activities and priorities are likely to have on the more long-term goal of helping to build strong, effective, and responsive states. It remains essential for them to ensure that, when they work with non-state counterparts to provide basic services in the first instance, such support is framed or understood as part of the statebuilding project, rather than as an alternative to it (Rocha Menocal *et al.*, 2008).

iv) Statebuilding efforts can remain too focused on the formal institutions of the state at the central level.

Despite the emphasis that has been placed on state-society relations as central to statebuilding efforts, another enduring risk of adopting a statebuilding approach in fragile states is that state builders continue to rely on the state at the national level as the main partner to engage with. In the process, as noted earlier, they may overlook important non-state forms of social authority and capacities for peace, including traditional actors as well as informal institutions. Very often, however, engaging with the state can prove challenging because it may lack basic capacity, will, and/or legitimacy to be a reliable partner for transformation. What can the international community do when it is confronted with a malign or “toxic” government, for instance? Engagement through government may shore up regimes with little national legitimacy, but international withdrawal may condemn the population to increasing poverty and/or abuse at the hands of the state. In such situations, it becomes instrumental to engage with non-governmental counterparts, including NGOs, the private sector, trade unions, religious associations, social movements, *etc.*, as a deliberate strategy aimed at improving governance and accountability. Even where the state is not necessarily “toxic” but simply weak and incapable, a comprehensive plan for statebuilding cannot occur without an understanding of the role, capacities and potentiality of non-state actors (Rocha Menocal *et al.*, 2008). In these cases, efforts to build the capacity of both the state and the non-state actors to work together in a constructive manner to the benefit of the community are essential (see Rocha Menocal and Sharma 2008; Kaltenborn-Stachau 2008). Statebuilding approaches need to be adapted to the local context so that traditionally ingrained values and dynamics are not upset to the point that the statebuilding process is undermined.

Another dimension of this challenge is the need to achieve a balance between interventions at the central and the decentralised level. In a statebuilding situation in fragile states, strengthening the centre first may be a more important consideration in order to allow an overall system to emerge (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007b). When decentralised governance is not well managed, for instance, it can lead to instability and conflict, rather than peace. However, excessive centralisation should be avoided. And an initial focus on building a relatively centralised state structure should not be confused with neglecting to develop capacity and legitimacy at the local level as well. As Sarah Lister and Andrew Wild (2007) have noted in the case of Afghanistan:

“[t]he precondition for strengthening subnational administration should have been an overarching political strategy to rebuild and strengthen the *de jure* [central] state ... The wresting of control from regional and local commanders ... would have weakened their ability to influence the structure of sub-national administration. It would also have pro-

vided revenues that could have been used to link the provinces and districts more strongly to the centre, and enable local government to carry out activities that would have increased the legitimacy of local government structures.”

Once again, however, donors may - as yet - not possess sufficient knowledge to engage with (often non-state and informal) processes and institutions at the local level. This is a very time-consuming and resource-intensive endeavour that requires long-term commitment in the field, which may prove particularly difficult for donors, given the frequent turnover of their field staff. Thus, although the discourse has evolved, in practice, donors continue to struggle with the challenges of coming to grips with the local political context. It has proven especially difficult for international development actors to identify suitable non-state counterparts to work with at the sub-national level (Rocha Menocal and Sharma 2008). As Wyeth and Sisk (2009) have put it, “not only do international actors lack the tools to identify and map such potential local partners, they also face normative dilemmas about how to support customary or traditional approaches that may violate international norms and treaties”.

6.) Towards a more effective model of statebuilding for peace? Emerging lessons for improved donor practice

Engaging in fragile situations with the objective of building peaceful, more capable and more accountable states has emerged as a critical strategic priority for the international aid community. The peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas share fundamental complementarities which may, in general, outweigh some of the tensions that have been outlined in this paper. This suggests that the intuition to develop a more holistic approach towards ‘statebuilding for peace’ is well placed. However, donors need to recognise more fully that this is an endeavour that remains full of contradictions, and not a linear sequence of cumulative or mutually reinforcing steps. Much as donors would like to assume that “all good things go together”, there will always be difficult dilemmas and trade-offs between different and equally compelling imperatives. In the end, it is unlikely that all of these tensions will be resolved, but if they are better understood they can, at least, be managed more adequately (Paris and Sisk, 2008).

Managing the challenges embedded in statebuilding for peace efforts also requires donors to internalise and act on lessons that have emerged from cumulative years of experience on peacebuilding and statebuilding, as well as from a growing body of scholarly literature on these subjects.

1. **Donors need to be more humble in their approach to fragile states and more realistic about what international actors can achieve from the outside:** As Paris and Sisk (2008) have noted, the entire peacebuilding and statebuilding enterprise has the quality of an enormous experiment, especially given the magnitude and scale of the transformations that are being sought within a rather compressed period of time, and how complex, uncertain, and ambiguous this transformational process is likely to be. Critically, states cannot be made to work from the outside, and donors should be especially careful not to place undue expectations about what the state can deliver, especially in the short term, while it may not have the capacity to do very much. This may lead to increased popular disappointment with poor state performance and further social alienation from the state. It is thus essential to bring expectations into closer alignment with what is possible to achieve in fragile states.

International actors certainly have an important role to play. But rather than imposing institutions and blueprints from the outside, they need to start by building on what is

already there, and focus their engagement in fragile states on accompanying and facilitating domestic processes, leveraging local capacities, and complementing, rather than crowding out, domestic initiatives and actions (Cliffe and Manning 2008). Donors can also prove influential in helping to shape or alter the incentives of domestic leaders and élites for the promotion of peace and more responsive and accountable state institutions (in Guatemala, for instance, the efforts of the international community proved instrumental in giving momentum to the peace process and in achieving an eventual peace agreement). But this requires in-depth and sophisticated knowledge, a point highlighted further below.

2. **Donors need to build or sharpen their political understanding and effective support for state building:** As mentioned earlier, the international assistance community has increasingly come to appreciate that both peace- and statebuilding processes are inherently political in nature. There is also growing awareness, at least at the conceptual level, that state-society relations lie at the core of statebuilding. However, in actual practice, much of the focus on statebuilding to date continues to be based on a technical and functionalist approach.

Understanding statebuilding not only in terms of building the technical capacities and effectiveness of state institutions, but also in terms of the dynamic political process of reconstituting the political and social contract between state and society so that it may become more resilient and sustainable over time has important implications for donors which have yet to be fully realised in practice. It suggests the need for wide-ranging engagement in fragile situations that not only focuses on supporting and strengthening the capacity to perform certain core functions (public financial management, security, justice, and basic services), but also on the political processes that can transform the state or place it at risk of serious conflict or collapse. Among other things, in their efforts to build state institutions, donors need to pay particular attention to the creation of entry points for public participation and to the capacity of civil society to express its voice, and to the creation of both central and local state structures which are responsive and accountable (Rocha Menocal *et al.* 2008).

The need to become more politically sensitive and aware in actual practice calls for donors to sharpen their “political intelligence” in order to engage in fragile situations more effectively (Rocha Menocal and Sharma 2008). As a first step, better analysis is needed to develop a greater understanding of the political economy of statebuilding. Deeper and more sophisticated knowledge is needed in several key areas. For instance, donors need to develop a good understanding of the evolution of the political settlement and the rules of the game, and of the fundamental challenges embedded in trying to make these more inclusive, representative, and responsive. This should help increase awareness about the kinds of power relations that are at play, and the kinds of incentives, challenges and opportunities that domestic actors face in their efforts to build better and more effective state institutions and more productive bonds linking state and society. Another area in which much greater knowledge is required, which has also been highlighted in this paper, is sub-national (formal and informal) institutions and state and non-state actors that donors can engage with at the local level. Part of this needs to entail developing a better understanding of alternative sources of legitimacy that can be harnessed to support statebuilding processes – while donors should be mindful not to romanticise informal institutions and traditional customs. In addition, it is also essential to build stronger partnerships with other organisations that are more capable of advancing the political dialogue.

The second step is to find more effective ways to incorporate such analysis into the operational work of donors, which has so far proven considerably challenging. Among other things, this calls for a re-examination of donor instruments to assess how compatible they are with a more political economy approach and how flexible they can be to respond to contrasting fragile situations.

Thirdly, given that a growing number of donors either undertake political economy analysis or are aware of the need to do so, it is also important to ensure that there is increased scope to coordinate such donor efforts. The Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) and the resulting Transitional Results Frameworks (TRFs), which the World Bank has coordinated jointly with the UN in collaboration with other donors and national stakeholders in a small number of (post-) conflict states, represent an important initiative in this area, which needs to become more widespread and extend to other fragile settings beyond those affected by conflict. While more coordinated joint analysis may be difficult to achieve in the short term, at a minimum, donors should make a concerted effort to exchange and share the lessons emerging from such work, so that they can carry out their activities from a shared basis of understanding. Moreover, this kind of political economy analysis should not be viewed as a “one-off”. Instead, contextual changes need to be updated continuously on the basis of shared monitoring in order to inform on-going donor programming (Rocha Menocal and Sharma 2008).

3. As the OECD DAC Principles and Situations (2007) stress, **donors need to start with the domestic context in order to make informed policy decisions among competing priorities.** Dilemmas and trade-offs should be addressed through inclusive dialogues at different levels of governance, in order to ensure (yet again) that realistic expectations of what can be accomplished are set and the population at large can buy into them.
4. **Donors need to be prepared to remain committed over the long term** This is, again, one of the key principles elaborated by the OECD DAC for engagement in fragile states, and it merits re-emphasising. Statebuilding processes are inherently long-term, and, as has been noted, the kinds of transformations that are being sought are very ambitious. This is ultimately about fundamentally reshaping values, principles, interests, and power relations, and not just about “bricks and mortar” (Engberg-Pedersen *et al.*, 2008). Thus, donor time horizons and incentives need to be reconsidered if external support to statebuilding efforts is to make a meaningful and lasting contribution. This might be more easily said than done, given that it requires substantially altering many of the ways in which external actors currently operate, but it is an issue that requires urgent attention (Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2008).

Five-to-ten year timeframes are not sufficient. What is needed may well be a commitment of at least 15 years. Clearly, such a prolonged commitment poses its own perils (which, once again, helps to highlight the fact that the statebuilding endeavour is riddled with dilemmas and difficult trade-offs) – including, among other things, growing dependency on outside assistance and the de-legitimisation of international actors in the eyes of the domestic population. But accompanying statebuilding efforts over a sufficiently long period of time in order to enable them to take root and remain sustainable once international actors have left seems essential as well, and this cannot be achieved within the timeframes in which donors currently operate.

Another important dimension of this issue is that donor staff need to commit themselves to remaining in the field for more prolonged time periods than currently seem to be the norm. As has been discussed throughout this paper, one of the key challenges that donors confront in fragile states is to develop in-depth knowledge and build trust and contacts in-country, especially at the sub-national level, and these learning processes take time and require continuity of personnel. A constant danger is that institutional memory is lost and that it has to be rebuilt every time new staff arrives in the field.

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Zusammenfassung

Es existiert keine allgemeingültige Definition, was unter einem "fragilem Staat" zu verstehen ist. Fragilität wird jedoch übereinstimmend als politisches Phänomen wahrgenommen. Für fragile Staaten ist ein effektiver politischer Prozess, der Forderungen, Verpflichtungen und Erwartungen zwischen Staat und Bürger ausgleicht, wesentlich. Daher spielt Legitimität in zwei Formen - einerseits durch politische Rechenschaftspflicht, andererseits in der Erfüllung von Kernstaatsfunktionen - eine bedeutende Rolle.

Geberengagement muss in diesem Prozess Komplementaritäten und Synergien zwischen Peacebuilding und Statebuilding beachten, insbesondere muss beachtet werden, dass:

- Staatenbildung nicht automatisch zu Frieden führt.
- die Notwendigkeit, zu einem formalen Friedensabschluss zu kommen, die Schaffung eines fähigen und effektiven Staats untergraben kann.
- die rasche Verteilung der Friedensdividende durch Geberstrukturen den Aufbau von Institutionen vor Ort stören kann.
- Staatenbildung zu sehr auf zentralisierte staatliche Strukturen ausgerichtet sein kann.

Eine Hilfestellung von außen kann nur mit großer Kenntnis der politischen Gegebenheiten, bleibendem Engagement (mindestens Fünfzehn-Jahre-Horizont), kontextualisierte Prioritätensetzung und dem notwendigen Maß an Bescheidenheit erfolgen.

Independent Actors – Common Visions. A Contribution to a Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Consensus

Wolfgang Petritsch

1.) Civil society – recent trends in fragile situations

Both the number and size of civil-society organizations (CSOs) – the independent actors as well as their functions in international politics - have increased substantially since the end of the Cold War some twenty years ago.

Against the backdrop of the globalizing world, the role of the state has changed from the sole dominant actor to a partner (albeit main) in a web of new actors reaching from international and regional organisations to civil-society organisations and other non-state actors like private foundations as the Gates Foundation and celebrity-driven activities, such as in the case of Princess Diana or Bono. While humanitarian NGOs (or CSOs) have experienced an early move towards diversity starting with the Red Cross Movement in mid-19th century, human rights- and state-/society-building NGOs are, historically speaking, relative newcomers.

NGOs/CSOs have also most recently entered the field of crisis management, peace mediation and peace building. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) Geneva, the Crisis Management Institute (CMI) led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari are making, among others, substantive contributions to comprehensive multi-track peace processes. In Austria, the Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding (IICP) is following a similar approach.

The creation of the UN System kick-started the spread of CSOs into areas in which states previously held a monopoly. The privatization of hitherto public tasks such as security, safety, health or education and the growing asymmetry of inter- and intra-national low-level conflicts further contributed to the proliferation of CSOs.

A rather recent approach, the *fragile state syndrome*, has opened up new areas of cooperation between the traditional actors – nation states and international organizations - and the new wave of CSOs - both local NGOs and INGOs including private foundations.

The end of the Cold War ushered in, on the one hand, the practice of international humanitarian intervention and the corollary concept called “The Responsibility to Protect”. On the other hand, international relations are confronted with a more universally informed and vocal public, fuelled by the so-called CNN effect. These developments set the stage for a sea change in the increasingly complex relationship – both domestically and internationally - between the traditional actors (states, IOs) and the growing CSO-sector. A reassessment of the relationship between public and private - made even more urgent by the current crisis - is in the making.

In fragile situations, the 3C approach seems to be the apt formula; its implementation is long overdue.

In order to underpin what has been mentioned above, here are some facts and figures on the growing role of CSOs (in particular INGOs):

- About forty INGOs were active in Thailand to aid Cambodian refugees in the 1980s;
- By 2004, some 2.000 INGOs were active in Afghanistan alone;

- The Kosovo example: at the height of the conflict in 1998/99 about 380 NGOs (mostly local with foreign financing) were active in the region. According to a recent estimation – and after the momentous political changes triggered by the conflict and the subsequent international intervention - there are presently approx. 5000 NGOs registered in Kosovo.
- UNDP estimates that the total number of INGOs worldwide now exceeds 37.000.

Along with the increasing complexity and diversity, one of the more relevant issues at stake is the independence of the many interacting and intervening actors. Undoubtedly, their effectiveness would be increased by a shared vision. But what could such a shared vision be?

After years of trial and error approaches in post-conflict situations (for example in former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan or in sub-Saharan Africa), a fresh approach to states at risk is warranted.

Clearly, there are different ways of comprehending the complex relationship between state-building and peacebuilding. There is the classical thinking which defines itself in categories like power, interest, and justice, rule of law or sovereignty. But there is also the new bottom-up perspective focusing on the role of the individual which is concerned with human rights or human security - and their importance for peace.

The political scientist, Oliver R. Richmond, differentiates four generations of visions related to peace- and statebuilding:

The **first** generation is characterized by a realistic vision of peace which favours a conflict management approach with the aim to end open violence and to (re)-construct state-order. The main actor in the first generation's point of view is the state as sovereign entity, which interacts with other states and maintains the power-balance by means of military and diplomacy. This approach focuses on the problem solving process to construct a limited version of peace (negative peace) as a power-balance between states. Managing the conflict by third party interventions can be reached through peacekeeping missions, ranging from ceasefire patrol to implementing a certain democratic order.

The **second** generation emphasizes a structural vision of positive peace, where the civil society is an active part in conflict resolution. The aim is the removal of the so called root causes of conflict like structural inequalities. Conflict should be solved by social engineering such as multi-track diplomacy, peacebuilding and non-state-actors orientated on the concept of human security and democratic peace.

The **third** generation advocates a liberal peace vision and agenda, achieved by multi-dimensional and multi-level peacebuilding missions as third party interventions. This third generation thinks about peace from a top-down level implemented by consensual and punitive strategies. The main focus lies on reform processes such as liberal-democratic free-market ideologies, governance, rule of law and development policies. These principles should be implemented by UN- peacekeeping and statebuilding missions and are mainly perceived as responses to conflicts in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Another contemporary vision is the emerging fourth school, of the postmodern or post-structural generation. This perspective marginalizes welfare and well-being of the civil society. It maintains that in many cases the majority of the population cannot play an active role in the free market system. In many peacebuilding operations human security has not improved, the rates of crime, violence, poverty and unemployment remain high.

Consequently, the project of the **fourth** generation intends to contribute to a broader discussion about peacebuilding and statebuilding by reflecting inter-subjectivity, with emphasis on emancipation and real self-determination in respect of opportunities with regard to emotion, culture and learning. Its version is constructed as a bottom-up process with local participation.

The **fifth** proposal is the one I envision: it should be a more integrative combination of the strengths of all four visions: realism, structuralism, liberalism and post-modernism: a complex vision of peacebuilding, in other words, a vision of complex peacebuilding.

Why do I arrive at this?

In my long-standing professional life I was confronted with all four *schools*. I have, however, felt that there is more than just a one-dimensional response possible – and even necessary: In Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where I was entrusted with top level functions, the overall focus was on *international state-society relations*. At the OECD, I am currently working under the assumption of a so-called *global society*, while as President of the CSO IICP my focus is on *civil society*.

2.) Changing strategies, towards a typology of a complementary 3C strategy

The upward trend in numbers, as documented above is also reflected in the changing strategies in international statebuilding:

Although the following typology is complementary in principle and dependent on such imponderabilia as preferred political culture and traditions of the donor community such as elections, parliamentary democracy, rule of law etc., it also reflects, to a considerable degree, the evolving “gout du jour” :

1. **Liberalization First:** This strategy is defined by the Western paradigms of liberal democracy and market economy as laid down in the Washington Consensus (WC). Although the global crisis since 2008 has strongly impacted on the rationale of the WC, it still remains the preferred approach in development policy circles (WB, IMF, OECD, EU). This strategy reflects the vision of peace growing from the top-down. The concepts of democratization, human rights and economic development are seen as tools to stabilize so-called failed states in multi-level missions including local, regional and state level actors.
2. **Security First:** The Security First approach, based on the realistic vision, embraces less ambitious goals than the Liberalization First strategy by following the realist school of diplomacy (e.g. Kissinger) emphasizing the state’s power monopoly and physical security (without security no development). It favours a conflict management approach aiming at stopping open violence and (re)-constructing the state-order. This paradigm is open to partition and ethnic population transfers in order to create a strong and viable state. The main actor in the first generation’s point of view is the state as sovereign entity which interacts with other states and maintains the power-balance by means of military and diplomacy (Westphalian Order).
3. **Institutionalization First:** The Institutionalization First strategy, based on the post-modern/post-structural vision, argues for establishing legitimate and efficient public institutions at both state and local levels as soon as possible. This paradigm is a reaction to the insufficient results of the Liberalization First approach. Institution-building

is a core requisite to overcome fragility with a view to assist local stakeholders to build a viable state. It seems less ambitious than outright statebuilding, its goals are, however, compatible. This concept is open for power-sharing models and ready to take on board non-Western notions of political participation (e.g. Jirgas in Afghanistan). It is guided by postmodern insights and is critical of the failure of addressing the welfare and well-being of the civil society.

4. **Civil Society First:** The Civil Society First paradigm, based on the structural vision, places civil society centre stage and builds – in contrast to the first three approaches – on bottom-up processes. The idea is to create a political culture based upon broadly accepted norms and regulations. Those prerequisites are, however, in most cases of fragility, virtually absent. Thus, the first order is to strengthen social cohesion to develop a public sphere, free and responsible media, local CSOs, human rights and social responsibility. The overall aim is empowerment. This school of statebuilding puts the long-term focus on strategies to overcome the underlying conflict, to address resultant traumas and initiate truth and reconciliation processes. Another pivotal point is to remedy the historical root causes of conflict like structural inequalities. Conflicts should be solved by social engineering as practised in multi-track diplomacy, complex peacebuilding operations and through the inclusion of non-state actors associated with the concept of human security and democratic peace.

3.) CSO input into the Dili Dialogue

The first global meeting of the Accra-generated *International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding* in Dili, Timor-Leste (9-10 April 2010) produced a well coordinated input by CSOs. It is meant to examine good practices and key challenges in international support mechanisms in order to generate growing consensus around fundamental priorities and objectives in these areas. Of the 49 CSOs which contributed, about two thirds are from the Global South; these are their Central Observations:

1. Peacebuilding and statebuilding are processes and processes matter. There is a need to focus on the “how” and not on the “what”.
2. Peacebuilding and statebuilding should be complementary and mutually reinforcing processes, but tensions are arising. These tensions, based on contradicting visions and strategies, should not be denied or avoided, but acknowledged and overcome/transcended in a dialectical or dialogical way. We still need more research about lessons learned, on the basis of empirical case studies, connecting complexity thinking, understanding of inter-subjective narratives and political pragmatism.
3. Peacebuilding and statebuilding both need to be internally-led and externally-supported processes.
4. In Dili a strong interest in continuing the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding was expressed.

In fact it was one of the Dialogue Co-Chairs who stated that *we* are finally moving from monologue to dialogue. This is, indeed, the precondition for a successful *3C approach* in development policy.

Zusammenfassung

Nicht-staatliche Akteure, zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen, NGOs und private Stiftungen etc. engagieren sich zunehmend im Krisenmanagement, in der Mediation von Konflikten und im erweiterten Peacebuilding. Ihre Zahl hat sich nach Schätzungen von UNDP sprunghaft auf heute 37.0000 weltweit erhöht. Zu dieser Bewegung haben das Konzept der Schutzverantwortung und die Möglichkeiten einer informierten Weltöffentlichkeit beigetragen.

Die Vision für Peacebuilding und Statebuilding-Strategien ist entsprechend zersplittert, vier Schulen lassen sich identifizieren: die realistische mit dem Ziel, (negativen) Frieden zu installieren, die strukturalistische, die positiven Frieden insb. an die Schaffung geeigneter Institutionen anknüpft, eine liberal-interventionistische Schule (internationale Gemeinschaft Ende der 1990er Jahre bis 2005) und eine post-strukturalistische/funktionelle Schule, die Selbstbestimmungsprozessen mehr Raum gibt.

Komplexes Peacebuilding als Kombination aus den verschiedenen Schulen, wie es ansatzweise in umfassenden multi-track Friedensprozessen verwirklicht wird, kann als wegweisend angesehen werden. CSO nehmen Peacebuilding/Statebuilding Prozesse als intern geführte, extern unterstützte Prozesse wahr. Inklusive Prozesse sind das essentielle Element, um über Widersprüche von Peacebuilding und Statebuilding hinweg zu Sicherheit und Entwicklung zu führen.

The different roles of indigenous CSOs and international NGOs – a clarification

Rosan Smits

Most strategic policy frameworks for engagement in fragile states take note of the necessity of involving civil society organizations (CSOs) into the statebuilding policy design in a given country, although it is often unclear whether these point at international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) or local civil society in the country at stake.

Exactly this lack of clarity may explain why results in implementing these commitments have as of yet been disappointing. Namely, it tends to conceal differences between indigenous CSOs and outside NGOs. In fact, however, there are much more commonalities between international NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), than between the international NGOs and local actors: the first two categories share similar codes and professional culture. Neglecting this has serious implications for the way in which operative mechanisms for CSO involvement are developed. Currently, INGOs tend to be regarded legitimate and effective channels for reaching the local playground.

As a consequence, ‘local actor involvement’ is downscaled to earmarked financial support, channelled through INGOs. This has an eroding effect on the resilience of the local potential to give content to statebuilding objectives. Not least because INGOs often encourage an explosion in the local NGO sector, supported by their funds targeting specific issues – thereby once again forcing international priorities on the local reality.

By outsourcing and subcontracting the local non-state potential, it may well be that statebuilding programs do not benefit from grass-roots analyses, local service delivery capacity and in-depth knowledge as regards local authority structures. As local CSOs are in practice not fully employed as strategic partners in implementing statebuilding agendas, there obviously is a gap between high-profile policy commitment and its operationalisation on field level. Obstacles to overcoming this gap vary from international donor concerns as to the accountability and absorption capacity of non-state actors to domestic pressure within donor countries to achieve quick and tangible results. The entry points for discussion should therefore be linked to the validity and appropriateness of our contemporary mechanisms for civil society involvement as regards the identified policy needs and to ways how to improve them.

Gender-Responsive Statebuilding

Rosan Smits/Steven Schoofs

1.) Introduction¹

By adopting a series of resolutions dealing with the importance of addressing gender dynamics during peacebuilding processes and in situations of fragility, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has established a political framework to integrate gender into the international peace and security agenda². However, despite the formal recognition that gender matters for international peace and security, the UNSC has recently voiced its concern over the inadequate attempts made so far to integrate gender into peacebuilding programmes.

When it comes to translating these high-level commitments into concrete gender-responsive policies and programmes with impact on the ground, other multilateral policy forums such as the OECD/DAC, the European Commission and its individual Member States constitute the centre of gravity. In their programmes in so-called fragile contexts, the area of statebuilding in particular presents them with considerable difficulties when they seek to transform their commitment to gender-equality into pragmatic gender-responsive strategies.

2.) Statebuilding in fragile contexts: gender falling through the net

Statebuilding and improving weak governance systems in fragile states have rapidly become a central element of international engagement in fragile states. However, due to the complexity and operational limitations posed by fragile contexts, a growing sense of realism about the likely achievements of externally driven statebuilding programmes has begun to temper international ambitions. As a result, the dominant tendency among international donors is to define a limited set of strategic priorities for their engagement in fragile contexts, such as the establishment of minimum conditions for security and delivery of basic services. On this list of priorities, 'gender' is generally seen as a luxury to be left aside until the supposedly gender-neutral objectives in the domains of security and governance have been achieved. Even when there is a commitment to integrate gender into statebuilding programmes, actual implementation often involves 'cherry-picking', manifested as a predisposition for interventions in gender-stereotyped programme areas such as health, education and sexual violence. The result is that problematic gender dynamics within the domains of security and governance are generally addressed in an ad-hoc and superficial manner (if at all). This has significant implications for the effectiveness of the current statebuilding agenda.

Current external statebuilding strategies encounter severe difficulties in implementing policy commitments to gender-responsive engagement with fragile states. Because certain areas for intervention are stereotyped as gender-relevant at the expense of others, gender considerations are too often sidelined to subordinate parallel tracks and thus isolated from priority areas for

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² UNSCR 1325 (2000) was the first and most high-profile resolution on women, peace and security. It was followed by e.g. UNSCR 1820 (June 2008), UNSCR 1888 (September 2009) and UNSCR 1889 (October 2009).

intervention. Cognisant of the many challenges involved in statebuilding, this article identifies and discusses four building-blocks for the implementation of a gender-responsive approach to statebuilding in fragile contexts.

Given this emphasis on pragmatic realism in fragile contexts, there is a considerable risk that gender considerations will fall through the net of international statebuilding efforts. Therefore, the fundamental challenge is to dovetail high-level commitments to gender-equality with the need for realistic strategies in situations of fragility. At the very least, this requires international stakeholders to identify and capitalise on opportunities to make their pragmatic approach to statebuilding more gender-responsive.

3.) Adopting a gender perspective can optimise statebuilding programmes

A critical first step in that endeavour is to avoid the trap of framing gender as an exclusively normative issue which merely complicates the already difficult task of building more effective and accountable states. Attention to gender during the design and implementation of statebuilding interventions can enhance the impact and effectiveness of international statebuilding interventions. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is illustrative in this regard. SSR support programmes tend to suffer from an excessive focus on strengthening formal state structures, notably in the areas of military infrastructure and operational capacities. This typically includes building barracks, prisons and courts, downsizing the army, demilitarising the police and restructuring lines of command. Yet in SSR programmes important issues such as building trust between security institutions and the population, and civilian oversight tend to be neglected – with the risk that the rather technical and institution-oriented SSR approach will fail because it does not address the underlying power dynamics that erode citizen security.

The corollary of such a technocratic approach is that gender-specific objectives for SSR are likely to be reduced to increasing the total number of women in the security sector, under the assumption that that sector will consequently become better equipped to respond to the specific security needs of women in society (e.g. protection against genderbased violence). However, increasing female participation in the security sector entails more than the creation of opportunities and incentives for women to enter the security forces: it should also involve an assessment of additional obstacles to female participation (see example of Burundi in box 1). In addition, building a truly gender-responsive security sector requires a sound analysis and comprehensive addressing of the gender-specific security needs of intended beneficiaries (see example DR Congo in box 2).

The implication of the foregoing is that adopting a gender perspective during policy analysis, programming and implementation can help to bring programmatic interventions in the security and governance domains more in line with local opportunities and with local perspectives and needs³. In addition, attention to the less tangible aspects of gender dynamics can provide a counterweight to an oftentimes overly strong focus on institution building in fragile environments. Interventions aiming to promote development and security will be more realistic and sustainable if they are adapted to local needs and concrete realities on the ground. Gender analysis is a critical tool for optimising statebuilding interventions in fragile contexts, as it helps to generate context-specific and evidence-based policies and programmes.

³ An ambition expressed in, for instance, *The OECD/DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States* (April 2007).

Box 1: Gender analysis as tool to optimise SSR in Burundi

Burundi: Gender is more than just numbers.

The case of Burundi demonstrates that ticking the gender box by encouraging women to join the police does not necessarily lead to a more gender-balanced and gender-responsive police force. A comprehensive gender analysis explains why. First of all, cultural prejudgements prevent women from applying to join the security forces. Secondly, female police officers encounter daily harassment and mistreatment from their male colleagues, as separate living quarters and sanitation are not provided. The security forces are therefore not a conducive environment for women to work in. Thirdly, as women in Burundi have an educational arrears compared with men, after they join the police force they find they are less qualified to participate in the supposedly gender-neutral police training programme and therefore remain in the lowest ranks. (Based on research conducted by a women's organisation in Burundi 'Dushirehamwe' in 2008 and by International Alert in 2009).

Box 2: Gender analysis as tool to optimise SSR in DR Congo

DR Congo: Women's security needs as a human rights issue instead of key concern for SSR. The key security concern for Congolese women in particular and Congolese communities in general is widespread sexual violence. However, this issue is still hardly addressed through SSR programmes to which a significant amount of donor money has been pledged; action is, however, being taken by smaller human rights programmes, many of which are non-governmental. Despite formal commitments to a comprehensive strategy on combating sexual violence from security forces, little progress is perceived on the ground. This does not make Congolese men and women confident that the security sector will actually be reformed in order to serve their needs.

4.) Finding the margins for gender-positive change: Looking beyond the state

As in other areas of peacebuilding and statebuilding, the challenge is to join up analysis to concrete interventions. Too often, gender issues are considered but not followed through in actual programmes. To move from gender analysis to actual implementation of a gender-responsive approach to statebuilding requires that international actors ground their interventions in a broader historical and socio-political understanding of fragile contexts. A shift in thinking is indeed underway, as one of the emerging insights is that to be effective, statebuilding must pay much more attention to state–society relations. This evolution in thinking about statebuilding is to be welcomed, as it provides an opportunity to make international statebuilding efforts more responsive to problematic gender dynamics in fragile contexts.

One important issue that needs to be considered further in the context of state–society relations is that focusing exclusively on the state as an entry point for gender-positive change but ignoring the gender dynamics of state–society relations is likely to yield very few results. This is first of all because in societies with deeply-rooted gender asymmetries, the institutional domains of governance (both formal and traditional) are not insulated from the women-unfriendly socio-cultural attitudes in society. As a consequence, women are likely to have less contact with and access to male-dominated state institutions, which means that they have little recourse to formal governance mechanisms for empowerment. Secondly, the reach of formal state institutions in fragile contexts is often shallow or may be contested by competing claims to power made by non-state actors. The result may be so-called ungoverned spaces, especially in peripheral areas, where the formal state is largely absent. In addition, formal governance institutions, even those at national level, may operate *de facto* according to informal and often neo-patrimonial rules. In the absence of a fully functioning formal state, traditional authority structures and informal power networks are most likely to mediate governance processes. It is

particularly in societies with a strong patriarchal culture that non-state structures are just as likely as formal state institutions to function as an impediment to women's participation in governance.

The foregoing suggests that there is a very real risk that attempts to make formal state institutions more responsive to women's concerns will not succeed as long as obstacles within society to women's empowerment remain unaddressed. Moreover, if international actors do not actively seek to understand the gender politics at work within the formal and informal domains of society, their efforts to enhance governance and development risk provoking the consolidation of existing gender inequalities. Thus, while building and reinforcing formal governance institutions are indispensable activities for long-term gender equality goals, there is a need to look beyond formal state institutions as well as traditional authority structures and consider the gendered dynamics of the interaction between the state and society at large. The adoption of a broader conception of statebuilding in fragile contexts, which involves addressing state-society relations in addition to building or rebuilding state institutions, provides a crucial starting point for gender-responsive statebuilding.

At the same time, this observation touches on the question of the extent to which social changes, including gender equality, can be engineered by the international community. Recent assessments of peacebuilding efforts undertaken in the last two decades point to the limitations of external 'social engineering' in fragile contexts. Instead, local drivers of change – whether social processes or actors – have proven to be a necessary precondition for lasting change. As such, external actors also need not to overestimate their own capacities to radically re-shape deeply-rooted patriarchal structures in fragile societies. Yet, providing external support and protection at the right time and place to local drivers of gender-positive change that are too weak in the face of strong vested interests can be a realistic and effective strategy. This, however, requires external actors to actively integrate a gender perspective into broader context analyses of state-society relations in order that they understand the margins for change and subsequently support local capacities and opportunities for gender-positive change in fragile contexts (see example Afghanistan in box 3).

Box 3: Understanding the gender dynamics of local governance in Afghanistan

Improving local governance in Afghanistan in a gender-responsive manner.

In order to secure some of the gains made in terms of governance reform in Afghanistan, both the Afghan government and international donor community have been investing in local governance. However, the complex reality of local governance in Afghanistan poses a significant challenge to the implementation of a gender-responsive approach to statebuilding. Because of the historically limited presence of the Afghan state in peripheral areas, the population in the provinces relies heavily on informal and traditional governance mechanisms such as the shura (an ad hoc gathering of the adult male members of a community) to resolve community problems. Given that shuras enjoy much more public confidence than formal government, a strategy of linking shuras to formal local governance structures could endow local government with the necessary legitimacy. This is therefore considered to be a pragmatic and context-specific approach to building a functional and legitimate state in Afghanistan. However, such a strategy would entail the risk of the gendered power dynamics of traditional authority structures being neglected. The predominance of male elders and customary law in shuras works to the disadvantage of Afghan women, as customary law throughout Afghanistan tends to grant women fewer rights. If national and international actors do not take this reality of local governance in Afghanistan into account, they run the risk that traditional gender divisions in the domain of local governance will be reinforced. The Government of Afghanistan, in consultation with international donors, have set up a nationwide programme of community development (the National Solidarity Program), in which villages have been given access to funds for small community projects. One of the conditions for villages to access funds is that they have to create a Community Development Council (CDC), a new community-level institution that resembles the traditional shura model. Communities have been actively encouraged to engage women directly or indirectly in these CDCs and in project formulation and implementation. CDCs effectively have more women's representation than the traditional shuras, and could thus potentially evolve into more gender-appropriate mechanisms of local governance. In this case, national and international actors effectively identified an opportunity to create more space for women in local governance (even if the results can only be modest so far). Combining 'traditional' elements with 'modern' elements could make newly established governance institutions at the local governance more legitimate, but more research is needed to better understand its impact on women's participation in local governance.

5.) Towards implementation: Balancing intervention strategies

Ultimately, the consistent application of a gender perspective to policy and programming should be a means to an end: a gender-responsive statebuilding process. One important precondition for its success is that international actors work towards a more balanced and integrated approach to statebuilding. Whilst the awareness of the need for a reappraisal of fundamentals of the international statebuilding agenda is increasing, it goes against ingrained routines and structures and is therefore difficult to establish.

In actual practice, four clusters of intervention strategies based on the type of support and terrain of intervention can be identified (*see illustration 1*). Looking at the two axes, international donor programmes still predominantly involve interventions that target formal state institutions and exhibit a bias towards technical assistance, whereas society as an important intervention terrain is often pushed out of sight. As argued in the previous section, merely integrating gender objectives into a state-oriented intervention strategy will not effectively contribute to rendering state institutions more responsive to women's concerns. An effective alternative is to complement state-oriented interventions with intervention strategies that seek to mobilise gender-transformative capacities at the broader level of society, reaching beyond

the state and traditional non-state governance structures. It is hugely important to pursue this approach, to allow gender-sensitive statebuilding to materialise.




Illustration 1: Intervention matrix

But balancing support to state and civil society actors is not sufficient, since both may have a woman-unfriendly bias. A look at the horizontal axis of the intervention matrix (technical versus political assistance) confirms that technical support to building gender-responsive governance institutions should be counterbalanced by a more political approach to gender. Improving the position of women in fragile societies is essentially a sociopolitical question and should therefore be addressed accordingly. It involves addressing issues of power imbalance between men and women, and inequality in access to political, economic and social resources. By taking an assertive stance in support of women activists and addressing gender within frameworks for political dialogue, international donors have an important political role to play in actively defending the room to manoeuvre for women and men who are striving to change societal power relations from within.

In short, a tremendous asset to the international statebuilding agenda would be a concrete shift towards a stronger political focus and deepened understanding of and engagement with the powers at play within the societal domain. To this end, a pragmatic and strategic entry point could be to support those who can actually bring about gender-responsive change within the realm of the state: women themselves and progressive men.

6.) Women’s Agency

Perhaps paradoxically, fragile contexts may represent a major window of opportunity to address structural gender inequities. In conflict-affected societies in particular, years of conflict and the struggle for survival may have blurred traditional concepts of gender relations, thereby enabling women to reorganise themselves, to acquire additional skills and to occupy typically male positions within households, communities (of refugees/internally displaced persons), the local economy and the armed forces. Having capitalised on opportunities to break out of traditional gender roles, women are often deeply committed to consolidating

these changes. Therefore, a crucial starting point for gender-responsive international engagement in fragile contexts is to put the views and priorities of intended beneficiaries as well as their skills and capacities more prominently at the centre of policy-making and programming (see example DR Congo in box 4).

Box 4: Women's Agency in DR Congo

DR Congo: L'Union des Femmes pour le Développement.

Since its inception in 1997 in Bunia, l'Union des Femmes pour le Développement (UFD) has been at the forefront of the women's emancipation movement in Ituri. This small group of women demanding equal public and political participation has been nicknamed 'l'Union des Femmes Difficiles' by male authorities and their own husbands. Though the initiators' families were disrupted and displaced during the civil war, none of the women gave up their feminist endeavours. In the refugee camps, women from different regions joined the cause, with the result that when they dispersed to their homes, UFD became a widespread women's network, working to improve the position of women and girls within society and to identify and support vulnerable women who fall outside the scope of international assistance. UFD representatives participated in the Ituri Peace Talks (2004) and the Goma Peace Talks (2008), defending the interests of women in Eastern Congo.

Unfortunately, one of the major shortcomings of the dominant institution-oriented approach to statebuilding is that it often renders the capacities of local women's organisations and groups invisible. The activities of women's groups and organisations generally take place at the local community level, which remains insufficiently explored as a vital entry point for gender-responsive statebuilding. By ignoring this, external actors may not only overlook an excellent opportunity for improving their engagement, but also risk contributing to narrowing down existing opportunities to further enhance women's capacity to address gender inequities. However tempting it may be to ignore these capacities for change of local women groups under the banner of 'strategic priorities' or 'cultural sensitivity', international donors should avoid that by so doing they contribute to a reversal of traditional gender patterns. Hence, the real issue at stake for the international community is how it can support rather than undermine the efforts of women and men to change gender inequities within their own societies.

7.) Towards a gender-responsive approach to statebuilding in fragile contexts

It is not easy to achieve international commitments to gender equality in the challenging settings of contexts marked by poorly functioning governance systems. Nevertheless, this policy brief identifies four fundamentals of a gender-responsive approach to statebuilding in fragile contexts:

- **Apply gender analysis consistently.** International efforts to build gender-responsive state institutions require gender-sensitive context analysis that is attuned to formal and informal societal processes and power dynamics in society. International actors must ground their statebuilding interventions in this broader socio-political understanding of the fragile context.
- **Balance intervention strategies.** Applying a gender perspective to statebuilding interventions points to the need for a thorough reappraisal of the dominant focus on building or rebuilding state institutions in fragile contexts. It is fundamental to balance support to existing governance institutions and structures (whether formal or non-state), stimulate transformation of the often woman unfriendly elements within these institutions and strengthen local drivers of gender-positive change.

- **Consider society as an intervention terrain and align with women’s organisations.** Another missing link to implementing high ambitions in the area of gender, peace and security is to be found at the level of society. The onus is on the international community to foreground the capacities of women’s groups and organisations and manoeuvre itself into a position where it can better capitalise on capacities for gender-positive change. Instead of framing women as passive victims and subsequently diminishing women’s roles in fragile contexts, international actors need to actively look for ways to deploy women’s agencies and capacities as a vital entry point for the building of inclusive and stable societies.
- **Politicise gender-responsive statebuilding.** Implementing an effective, i.e. gender-responsive, policy agenda within statebuilding strategies is not a technocratic undertaking. It is ultimately a political question, which requires the total commitment of a full-fledged diplomatic apparatus that is willing to devote its diplomatic skills and instruments for the benefit of gender-responsive statebuilding.

Zusammenfassung

Politische Zusagen für ein gender-sensitives Engagement in fragilen Situationen stützen sich auf Sicherheitsratsresolutionen der Vereinten Nationen. Dennoch gibt es in der Umsetzung massive Probleme. OECD, Europäische Kommission und EU-Partner bemühen sich, Gender-Gleichberechtigung und operative Ansätze im Statebuilding zu etablieren. “Gender-responsiveness” sollte dabei nicht als rein normatives Anliegen behandelt werden.

Gender-Sensitivität optimiert Statebuilding-Strategien. Als Beispiel dafür kann SSR herangezogen werden: Während technische und institutionelle Aufgaben wie die Errichtung von Gefängnissen und Gerichten oder die Demilitarisierung von Polizeikräften im Vordergrund stehen, werden Vertrauensbildung zwischen Sicherheitseinrichtungen und Bevölkerung, Ausübung von demokratischer Kontrolle, Arbeitsbedingungen für weibliche Polizeikräfte oder streitkräfte-interne Programme gegen sexuelle Gewalt vernachlässigt (Beispiel: SSR-Aktivitäten in DRK, Frauen im Polizeieinsatz in Burundi).

Nicht nur staatliche Einrichtungen, sondern gesellschaftliche Rollenbilder müssen adressiert werden (Beispiel: Teilnahme von Frauen an afghanischen Gemeindeversammlungen). Wichtig ist der Zugang zu Ressourcen und Plattformen für eine/die Entscheidungsfindung, ein der durch transformative Gender-Kapazitäten gestärkt werden kann (Beispiel Frauen-Netzwerk in DRK).

Eckpfeiler eines gender-sensitiven Engagements in fragilen Kontexten sind:

- konsistente gender-sensitive Analyse,
- die Unterstützung von gender-sensitiven Institutionen, staatlich und nicht-staatlich,
- Förderung von Frauen-Gruppen innerhalb der Gesellschaft und ein
- begleitender öffentlicher politischer Dialog.

The African Union and civil society organizations: defining an emerging relationship?

Kwesi Aning/Emma Birikorang

1.) Introduction

The emergence of the African Union (AU) and the development of its peace and security architecture create both opportunities and challenges for the panoply of organizations and institutions that have the responsibility to operationalise the different aspects of the AU's peace and security agenda. Against this background the paper focuses on two aspects of the emerging security architecture, namely the *Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP)* and the *Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council* of the African Union. The argument presented in this paper is that these two instruments offer new and radical opportunities for a novel and emerging relationship between the AU's peace and security architecture and non-governmental organizations by focusing on the processes through which the view of specialist NGOs can gain acceptance among key policy makers. The argument is that such specialist groups are '*crucial channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to intergovernmental organizations*' and other entities.¹ Although in both Declaration and Protocol CSOs and NGOs are used interchangeably, for simplicity and clarity, we combine them by characterizing them as epistemic communities. Thus, they are '*networks of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within their domain*'.²

To fully explore these opportunities, the paper begins with a background examination of the multiple processes that resulted in the promulgation of the CADSP. Secondly, we make reference to the multiple processes starting with the Cairo Declaration in 1993 until the promulgation of the CADSP and the Protocol in 2004. Subsequently, focus is given to examining relevant sections of the Declaration and the Protocol in which the AU expresses its expectations for the potential emerging relationship between the PSC and civil society organizations. Although both the Solemn Declaration and the Protocol mentions CSOs and NGOs several times, nowhere is there a discussion of how this relationship can or should be operationalised. To that end, the paper discusses and identifies *three* of the possible processes through which civil society organizations with respective expertise in security-related issues can contribute to the Commission's work. Finally, we discuss the way forward.

2.) A new peace and security architecture?

Recent efforts focused on putting in place a comprehensive architecture for peace and security, which could address the multifaceted challenges, including peacekeeping. Those efforts culminated in the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union.

The PSC, as provided in the Protocol, is to be supported by the African Standby Force (to deal with peace-support operations), the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and the Peace Fund (to garner the necessary resources for the promotion of

¹ Peter M. Haas, 1992. 'Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination', *International Organization*, 46, pp. 1-35.

² See among others *ibid*, pp. 3, 16 – 20.

peace and security). In addition to the PSC Protocol, the peace and security architecture includes the *African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact*, adopted by the 4th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Abuja, Nigeria, in January 2005, the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), adopted by the 2nd Extraordinary Session of the Union, held in Sirte, Libya, in February 2005 as well as other security instruments of the Union, such as the Treaty establishing the African Nuclear Weapons Free-zone (the Pelindaba Treaty), and the OAU Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. While previous efforts concentrated on conflict resolution, the new peace and security architecture provides for a holistic approach towards the promotion of peace and security in Africa.

The adoption of the PSC Protocol and its entrance into force in December 2003 equipped the continent with a more robust apparatus for preserving and enhancing peace and security. The central objectives of the PSC are, among others:

- „promote and implement peace-building;
- develop a common defence policy for the Union;
- coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism; and
- promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.“

With the promulgation of these declarations and protocols, certain new ‘principles’ started to permeate Africa’s international relations.

a.) An emerging agenda for civil society contributions?

What do the PSC and the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union say about CSOs? According to the Protocol, the PSC is the ‘standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict[s] in Africa’.³ To fulfill its objectives the Council, in the performance of its duties,

“... may hold informal consultations with parties concerned by or interested in a conflict or a situation under its consideration, as well as with Regional mechanisms, international organizations and civil society organizations as may be needed for the discharge of its responsibilities.”⁴

Specifically and in terms of the continental early warning system, the PSC Protocol makes provision for ‘[t]he Commission ... [to] collaborate with ... research centers, academic institutions and NGOs, to facilitate the effective functioning of the Early Warning System’.⁵

Furthermore, with respect to the establishment of the African Standby Force⁶ (ASF), there is a recognition that ‘[i]n undertaking [its] functions, the African Standby Force shall, where ap-

³ Chapter IV b, Article 16 of the CADSP.

⁴ Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 11.

⁵ *ibid.*, Article 12 (3).

⁶ Among some of the functions that the ASF shall perform are: (a) observation and monitoring missions; (b) other types of peace support operations; (c) intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Articles 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act; (d) preventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating; (ii) an on-going violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or States, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement; (e) peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; (f) humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of

appropriate, cooperate with ... regional organizations, as well as with national authorities and NGOs'.⁷ Under the section dealing with relations with civil society organizations, the PSC Protocol states in no uncertain terms that,

„[t]he Peace and Security Council shall encourage non-governmental organizations, community-based and other civil society organizations, particularly women's organizations, to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required, such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council.“⁸

All these entry points about CSO participation under the protocol establishing the PSC are critical since it is the organ that shall 'implement the Common Defence Policy of the Union',⁹ and is '... a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa'.¹⁰

b.) From 'political rhetoric to 'operational reality': the emerging AU-CSO relationship

The CADSP introduces a new concept into African defence and security thinking creating options and opening new space for contribution by CSOs. This perception follows the argument '... that each African country's defence is inextricably linked to that of other African countries, as well as that of other regions and, by the same token, that of the African continent as a whole'.¹¹ Thus a multi-dimensional notion of security has been adopted providing a more encompassing and holistic notion of the term and broadening approaches to identify and respond to security threats.

The identified common security threats span inter- and intra-state conflicts/tensions, unstable post-conflict situations and other factors that engender insecurity namely refugees and IDPs, use of landmines and unexploded ordinance, illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons, pandemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, environmental degradation, violent and other crimes, including organized and cross border crimes, human trafficking, drug trafficking, money laundering.¹² The expansive nature of the identified root causes of threats generates opportunities for different expert groups to offer their knowledge in both policy formulation and implementation processes of the AU.

In addition to these 'identified common threats' the Common African Defence and Security Policy deals with peace-building and peacekeeping as well as post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction including demobilization, disarmament and reintegration and the specific problem of child soldiers.¹³ According to the CADSP, this policy shift in terms of (a) the drive to develop a common defence policy and (b) to engage CSOs reflects a

civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters. All these duties are in Article 3 (a – g)

⁷ *ibid* Article 13 (4)

⁸ Article 20, See also Article 24 of the CADSP

⁹ See *ibid* Article 3 (e) and Introduction, CADSP, point 3

¹⁰ Chapter IV, Article 15 (b) of CADSP

¹¹ See Article 5 of the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy and Article 12 (i). This actually forms one of the new cardinal principles inherent in the CADSP.

¹² CADSP Article 8 (1-4). The document further defines what it perceives as 'common external threats. These 'refer to external challenges to Africa's continental security, which may engender or have the potential, either directly or indirectly, to constrain individual and collective efforts to achieve continental security goals'. These include among others, mercenarism, international terrorism and terrorist activities, weapons of mass destruction, cross border crimes such as drug and human trafficking et al. See Article 8, (a) – (h) of the CADSP.

¹³ Article 10 of CADSP.

“... feature of advanced co-operative framework, or of regions where integration is highly advanced, and taking into account the common history, political, economic and international experiences which bind AU member states together.”¹⁴

Under the broad mandate and the objectives of the CADSP is the recognition to ‘...provide a framework for delineating the legal parameters for African Civil Society to function with regard to conflict prevention, management and resolution’.¹⁵

3.) Identifying areas of potential collaboration and evaluating CSO capacity to engage and contribute

Although these delineations have been made, there is a need to assess the capacities that CSOs can bring to the table. It is important, however, that in evaluating what CSOs can contribute - issues of subsidiarity, comparative advantage and complementarity – are considered appropriately. To that end, we can identify several areas where CSOs can be of support to the AU in terms of conflict prevention, management and other actions. These are on two levels, namely on (a) conceptual and analytical work, and (b) practical peacebuilding activities.¹⁶ These are areas where the AU needs particular support and help from CSO.¹⁷ Some of the weaknesses of AU performance in fulfilling its mandate are due to the lack of:

- in-depth analyses of conflicts to provide a sound basis for taking decisions on interventions;
- adequate capacity to manage the conflicts on the continent;
- independent analytical briefing of the AU on the situations in conflict zones; and
- mechanisms for disseminating information about the decisions and operations of the AU.

These are essential and concrete entry points for CSOs to foster effective engagement of the AU in fragile situations thereby defining the emerging relationship between CSOs and AU. Earlier we characterized CSOs and NGOs as epistemic communities, this is because of the accepted understanding that those who belong to such communities have a shared understanding and appreciation of particular issues pertaining to their area of expertise. Thus, such groups have a ‘*common understanding of particular problems in their field of research as well as an awareness of, and a preference for, a set of technical solutions to these problems*’.¹⁸

Of the several stages which civil society and expert groupings can impact the operationalisation of the AU peace and security architecture we will mention three.

- *First, when a high degree of uncertainty exists among policymakers arising from insufficient understanding of complex issues and their causal linkages*¹⁹;

¹⁴ Article 13 of the CADSP.

¹⁵ Article 13 (w) of the CADSP.

¹⁶ See ‘*Civil Society – African Union consultative process: towards a new partnership*’, prepared by CSSDCA/CDO of the AU Commission, (n.d.), pp. 3-4. The concept note identifies several areas for potential CSO contribution and argues that, ‘...analyses of conflict issuing from such indigenous sources have tended to have a different thrust from those of foreign scholars and think-tanks’.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 3. Other areas where CSO can be of help are, (a) mobilizing resources, (b) conduit for early warning. See Murithi, Tim. 2005. *The African Union – Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development* (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 121 -123.

¹⁸ See Andreas Hansenclever, Peter Mayer & Volker Rittberger. 1996. ‘Interests, power, knowledge: the study of international regimes’, *Mershon International Studies Review*, 40, p. 209.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

- *Second, when there is no coherent policy framework as a result of a lack of consensual knowledge among experts, and*
- *Third, when members of such communities gain political power or have relatively unfettered access to those with political power.*

While there is enthusiasm on the part of the AU for this collaborative process, it is also clear that CSOs started their active role, especially in security sector issues, quite late.²⁰ Probably, one can date the respective engagement back to the end of the 1990s. This is true for two reasons: first, the political nature of regimes in power and their overriding penchant for securitizing issues that they did not want to subject to public scrutiny and therefore placed an embargo against closer evaluation, secondly, the sheer dearth of civilian expertise on matters of security. After twelve years of democratic dispensation, only a few African civil society groups are actively engaged in the field.²¹

Contextualising the role of CSOs is important. These groups have generally been identified as having the potential to serve different functions and provide diverse technical inputs to security issues. A central shortcoming, however, is that several security areas are still highly specialised. As a result, there is both limited expertise and interest, sustained by the traditional secrecy with which security-related issues have been cloaked. It has been argued that:

„African CSOs have been reluctant, as well as unequipped, to influence security policy and oversight. ... The problem is magnified by the relative rarity of African research institutes specialising in security issues; certainly the theme of SSR (among others) is striking in its absence from the work of mainstream political scientists and university departments in Africa.“²²

There is a need to broaden the limited circle of experts and expertise, expand the space for SSR debate and democratize popular participation and interrogation of the concepts, norms and practices of security analysis in Africa. There is also a need to avoid complacency in assuming that CSOs are, by their mere existence, structurally superior to state structures and inherently better equipped to contribute positively to the security debates. As already cautioned, civil society may not always be ‘civil’ and ‘may be similarly unrepresentative and unaccountable to society’.²³

4.) Conclusion

Whither this new relationship? The need for successful operationalisation of the emerging relationship between AU and civil society organisations faces several challenges. Tackling the following critical factors will be decisive: First, how can the AU identify and harness the strengths, skills and valuable perspectives that CSOs can bring? Yet another challenge is iden-

²⁰ There is also increasing concern about the need to disaggregate the sum of CSOs pretending to have expertise in particular in security-related areas. Murithi warns about this proliferation and argues that, ‘[t]here is, however, the assumption that all civil society groups are benevolent in nature and purpose. This of course would be a misconception. Civil society ... can be just as authoritarian, in their internal governance, and as corrupt as the governments they criticize. Some civil society organizations are opportunistic enterprises convened for the purposes of taking advantage of donors.’, Murithi, *ibid*, p. 113.

²¹ Institutionally, the media, the religious bodies and African Security Dialogue & Research (ASDR), Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA) and Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), WANEP, ACCORD, Manu River Union Women’s Group, Nairobi Peace Forum are those increasingly gaining expertise in this field.

²² See Eboe Hutchful, ‘A Civil Society Perspective’, *ibid*, p.38

²³ Damian Lily et al, ‘A Goal Oriented Approach to Governance and Security Sector Reform’, International Alert, London, 2002 *op cit*, p.7

tifying and managing to be „heard“ in the policy formulation and implementation framework of the AU. Thirdly, how to develop feedback loops to ensure that the designed and implemented policies are re-evaluated for improvement?

Abstract

Die „Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy“ (CADSP) und das Protokoll zur Gründung des Friedens- und Sicherheitsrats der AU (Art. 11f, 20) bieten einen konkreten Einstieg für den Aufbau von Beziehungen zwischen der Afrikanischen Union und der Zivilgesellschaft. Damit einher geht eine Erweiterung des Sicherheitsbegriffs, wobei die nicht-staatlichen Organisationen ihr Know-How in Konfliktanalyse, personelle Kapazitäten für ziviles Konfliktmanagement, unabhängige Information und ihren Kontakt zu der Bevölkerung durch Verbreitung der AU-Maßnahmen auf dem Gebiet Sicherheit und Frieden zur Verfügung stellen können. Dies ist umso wichtiger, wenn ein hoher Grad an Unsicherheit Politikentscheidungen beeinträchtigt, kohärente Politik an Information mangelt und der Zugang zur politischen Elite für Wissenstransfer genutzt werden kann. Afrikanische, zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen auf dem Gebiet *Friede und Sicherheit*, insbesondere *Sicherheitssektorreform*, sind sehr jung. Ihr „Mehrwert“ für die AU wird sich zeigen, wenn es der AU und der afrikanischen Zivilgesellschaft gelingt, eine wechselseitig fruchtbare Beziehung aufzubauen.

B. Die entscheidende Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft in fragilen Situationen/ The critical role of civil society in fragile situations

Post-war and post-conflict challenges for development cooperation

Sabine Kurtenbach

Post-war and post-conflict spaces are very complex and complicated settings for development cooperation. In most cases there is a lot of hope because war or armed conflict has come to an end. The general assumption is that room and possibilities for civil society engagement increase. But experiences from the ground are mixed and show that challenges for development cooperation go far beyond the discussion on priorities of statebuilding or peacebuilding approaches. The following essay will discuss some patterns of fragility and the main challenges in these contexts.

Fragility in post-war/post-conflict contexts is caused by a variety of factors that might but need not accumulate.

- A first important factor is related to the modes of war and conflict termination. There is a clear difference if a war or armed conflict ends through a military victory, a peace accord or if it just ends by decreasing levels of violence. Statistically today a military victory is the most unlikely outcome but where it happens (e.g. in Sri Lanka) it seems to be the most stable outcome at least in the short-term. The winning party can implement its ideas, maintaining or changing the existing status quo in politics, economy and society. During the last two decades many international state and non-state actors have favored peace accords. Nevertheless these are mostly accompanied by different forms of fragility. Spoiler groups might try to change specific regulations or the overall accords, provisions might be vague and implementation difficult or existing institutions are to be dismantled while new ones are not able to function.
- The changes related to the modes of war termination are closely associated with a second cause of fragility, namely the high levels of uncertainty in relation to future political, economic and social developments. Depending on the intensity of violence there might be a lot of hope for change but expectations are mostly mixed. This is closely related to widespread experiences with violence and the related traumatization and mistrust.
- A third factor contributing to fragility is a highly politicized environment in conflict countries. Most actors lack joint agendas and priorities even if there was a consensus that war and violence have to end. But peace constituencies and reform-oriented actors are just one player besides spoilers and others that can have a very different agenda.
- And last not least, in post-war and post-conflict societies a multitude of external actors are present. Peacekeeping operations, multinational enterprises, international human rights groups are just some examples. These actors have different – sometimes even contradicting – mandates and strategies and cooperate with different internal actors. This makes comprehensive, complementary and coherent strategies even harder to formulate and implement.

Development cooperation in these specific situations of post-war and post-conflict fragility has to confront with specific challenges. Material as well as social consequences of war and widespread violence need to be addressed. Most donors invest heavily in the reconstruction of the economic and social infrastructure. This might be costly but can be achieved in due time. Reconstructing or renewing the destroyed or damaged web of social relations is much more

complicated due to mistrust and trauma as well as due to changes in the spatial distribution of the population. In most countries war and widespread violence are closely related to rural-urban as well as to cross border migration. Settlement or resettlement of refugees and displaced people as well as advocacy for victims of violence and human rights violations is part of most NGO's core agenda.

Different support for and management of the process of the transition out of war has developed as a second core area of development cooperation. This includes the support of DDR processes (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) of former combatants as well as technical and financial assistance for elections and reform or change of constitutions and other legal mechanisms for civil conflict regulation.

Last but not least most post-war and post-conflict countries belong to the group of developing countries where development cooperation faces the "normal" challenges of poverty reduction, empowerment and capacity building. Thus working in these contexts means to do many things simultaneously without sufficient time for planning and coordination.

The complexity on the ground causes three main dilemmas for development cooperation:

- Balancing short-term needs of stabilization with long-term peacebuilding goals: The central aim must consist in building sustainable structures instead of reconstructing pre-war structures. At the same time new or reformed institutions, mechanisms and structures need to be open for future change.
- Reconciling local ownership and external agendas: While strengthening internal reform oriented actors in state and civil society is a must, it is also necessary to bring aboard spoilers and others. Support for win-win situations is ideal.
- Adjusting peacebuilding agendas and other donor policies: Making peace a priority should be the central aim but is difficult in many contexts. Thus peace oriented actors need to develop coherent approaches including state actors as well as non-state actors to enhance their leverage.

Civil society organizations should take into account two specific challenges in post-war and post-conflict contexts. Where there are peace accords they have a very important role to perform in monitoring and advocating for an implementation of peace accords and/or long-term transformation processes. Hence they need to develop a joint agenda beyond war termination. Experiences from the ground show that in many societies civil society organizations cease to coordinate after the end of war and armed conflict and tend to split up along specific agendas (human rights, land issues, delivery of social services). This lowers their role in the political process (in front of governments, political parties) inside the country as well as outside with external actors.

Another important challenge is coping with old and new forms of violence (selected or wide spread) and organizing internal as well as international protection for civil society organizations. While a war or armed conflict might have come to an end, violence on the ground is still an important factor reducing the options for civil society organizations. Although most post-war violence is perceived as non-political and criminal it has political consequences. Intimidation is just one important consequence. Civil society organizations need to cooperate and coordinate closely with external state- and non-state actors in the protection of the spaces for civil conflict regulation and change.

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Zusammenfassung

Die zentralen Herausforderungen für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in fragilen Post-Konfliktsituationen hängen eng zusammen mit der Art und Weise der Kriegs- oder Konfliktbeendigung (Sieg, Abkommen, bloße Beendigung gewaltsamer Auseinandersetzungen), der hohen Unsicherheit in Bezug auf künftige Entwicklungen, einem hochpolitisierten Umfeld (Vielzahl an kompetitiven politischen Visionen und Strategien) und der Präsenz einer Vielzahl an externen Akteuren.

In diesem Kontext kann Entwicklungszusammenarbeit soziale Folgen (Misstrauen, Trauma, Menschenrechtsverletzungen, Migration) aufarbeiten, den Transitionsprozess unterstützen (DDR, Wahlen, konstitutionelle Reform) und Instrumente der Armutsbekämpfung, Empowerment und Kapazitätenbildung einsetzen.

Dilemmata bestehen durch unterschiedliche Zeithorizonte der Maßnahmen, lokale und externe Agenden, die zusammengeführt werden müssen, und die Einbettung von Peacebuilding in andere Geberstrategien.

Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen sollten sich bei der begleitenden Umsetzung von Friedensabkommen nicht nur um Einzelaspekte kümmern, sondern Gesamtstrategien zugunsten von Reformen entwickeln und die Notwendigkeit des Schutzes lokaler zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationsformen im Auge behalten.

Strengths and weaknesses of civil society engagement in conflict prevention

Daouda Diallo Boubacar

1.) Introduction

Analysis of strengths and weakness of civil-society engagement in conflict prevention needs a good understanding of this modern concept. The concept of conflict prevention refers to all measures used to impeach the outbreak of violent events. It differs from general conflict management and resolution which are cost-intensive and of laborious nature. Conflict prevention calls for a holistic (or systemic) approach. This approach needs the overall engagement of the international community in the field of post-conflict reconstruction in countries where rule of law is weak.

Civil society plays a crucial role in the construction of a democratic society in which citizens have access to basic social services and enjoy fundamental rights and liberties. Civil society can act as a counterweight to public power and can outweigh bad governance, corruption and dictatorial bias. However, civil society remains exposed to weaknesses inherent in its proper nature, its financial, human and material means as well as geopolitical, geostrategic and economic interests and intolerance. As highlighted in the underlying concept of the Vienna 3C Conference, conflict prevention necessitates coordinated, coherent and complementary action in the creation of a secure, just and successful world.

2.) Civil society strengths: experiences from West-Africa

The role of civil society in the prevention of conflicts gained more importance in West Africa during the civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the ethnic rebellions in Mali and Niger, the situation in Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry as well as in Casamance in Senegal and the recent political crisis in Togo, civil war in Côte d'Ivoire and in Ogun (Nigeria). During the last ten years, these conflicts have caused several million losses in the sub region. In order to prevent such tragedies in future, many NGOs were founded to fight for a democratic opening of their respective countries as well as for economic and social progress and peace. The added value of these local NGOs lies in their thorough knowledge of local circumstances and their comprehension of realities in the area. With limited financial, human and material means West African NGOs as the Mano River's women Network combat for the reintegration of civil war victims in Sierra Leone and Liberia, in Guinea Bissau and Guinea.

Local NGOs advocate the prosecution of international war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the various civil wars. These actions in the field of international justice helped to arrest and process Charles Taylor. The West-African NGOs are aware of the illegal exploitations of natural resources in the region, money that runs into the traffic of illegal arms. Several members of African civil society contribute to the "Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative" (EITI) in this hope to stop or at least to reduce civil conflicts.

In the Sahel and Sahara Belt, NGOs from Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria try to prevent conflict or relapses to armed conflict in a sense of building on resilient regional policies. In the Touareg's conflict which concerns Mali and Niger, the civil society has fought for dialogue as the only mean to overcome the dispute. So, in all of those countries, representatives of civil society demand the creation of a consensus around values that underpin the path back to peace. This is the case of the "Réseau International d'Etudes Stratégiques sur les Conflits

en Afrique” (RIESCA) and the “Plateforme paysanne” in Niger, the example of the “Association for the Promotion of the Livestock in the Sahel and the Savanna” (APESS) in Burkina Faso and of “Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme” (RADDHO) in Senegal. RIESCA and others NGOs like “Femme Cote d’Ivoire Expérience” cooperate since 2005 to institutionalize a platform of conflict prevention and promotion of peace.

They created the “Strategic Partnership for Peace in Africa” (PASPA)¹. This regional Network is funded by the Austrian Development Cooperation and I would like to thank all responsible persons present in this important conference. The civil society actively participates in processes of conflict transformation by fighting against: bad governance, injustice, poverty, illiteracy and insecurity. These actions can pave the way to establish a culture of peace in West Africa where people consider human life to be of great value. The civil society is active in the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) mechanisms of early warning and rapid reactions. Many NGOs help ECOWAS to implement the Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. Civil society finally acts as a “watch dog” of democracy and is in a position to anticipate developments that can lead to a threat to peace. So, civil-society is able to observe constitutional changes, the democratic ways of peaceful change which are not welcome to those rulers in force or to monitor stabilising factors of elections.

3.) Weaknesses of civil society, experiences in West-Africa

The weaknesses of African civil society are:

- Lack of a solid basis of rule of law , no clear vision about how to prevent conflicts;
- Fragmentation of civil society in different groups;
- Corruption and illicit trafficking of arms and drugs;
- Lack of education and training and weaknesses of human capacities, goods and financial means
- No 3Cs between actors of conflict prevention and promotion of peace
- Rivalries and distrust between states and societies and widespread opportunism of NGOs

4.) Perspectives of an improved participation of civil society in conflict prevention in fragile situations

- Follow closely and anticipate new rivalries in West Africa regarding access to natural resources (petrol, uranium and others) between old colonial powers and emerging powers like China, India and Brazil;
- Fight against the arms and drug trafficking and participate in initiatives of coordination, complementarity and coherence as pertinent approach in conflict prevention;
- Contribute to Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Africa

5.) Conclusion

All social and public institutions engaged in peace operations in fragile situations such as armed forces and civil society must unite their action in order to better accomplish their mission. In Africa where a lack of confidence characterises the relations between army and civil society this way is indispensable for successful peacebuilding processes. Working together permits to find sustainable solutions and to end long-lasting conflicts. The project of coordination, complementarity and coherence (3C) in all actions of conflict prevention and promo-

¹ <http://www.paspa-africa.org/start.asp>

tion of peace in fragile situations is a challenge which the international community and the NGOs can only achieve when clear and efficient strategies and scenarios of cooperation are set in place.

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Zusammenfassung

Afrikanische zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen spielen eine wichtige Rolle im Aufbau demokratischer Gesellschaften. Anders als im kostenintensiven Bereich des Konfliktmanagements und der Konfliktresolution betreiben nationale und regionale afrikanische Netzwerke für den Frieden aktiv Aufgaben auf dem Gebiet Konfliktprävention. Dies bewerkstelligen sie durch Monitoring politischer Prozesse, Frühwarnung, aktive Teilnahme an Transitionsprozessen. Sie fordern „good governance“ ein, bekämpfen Diskriminierung, Armut und Analphabetismus. Die Schaffung einer regionalen Perspektive durch Friedens-Netzwerke ist wichtig.

Beispiele für solche NRO-Netzwerke sind “Réseau International d’Etudes Stratégiques sur les Conflits en Afrique” (RIESCA), “Plateforme paysanne” in Niger, “Association for the Promotion of the Livestock in the Sahel and the Savanna” (APESS) in Burkina Faso, “Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme” (RADDHO) in Senegal oder “Femme Cote d’Ivoire Expérience” in Côte d’Ivoire. Gemeinsam gründeten diese NRO die westafrikanische “Strategic Partnership for Peace in Africa” (PASPA), die mit ECOWAS kooperiert.

Die Arbeit von afrikanischen NRO ist bedroht durch fehlende Rechtssicherheit, Fragmentierungen in verschiedene Gruppen, Korruption und illegalen Waffen- und Drogenhandel. Verbesserungen in ihrer konfliktpräventiven Rolle können afrikanische NRO insbesondere bei der gerechten Verwertung von natürlichen Ressourcen, verstärktem Vorgehen gegen Waffen und Drogenhandel und Maßnahmen auf dem Gebiet der SSR erzielen. Für eine solche Verbesserung ist ein 3C-Ansatz unerlässlich.

Koordinieren in Konfliktsituationen, neutral und unabhängig helfen – ein Widerspruch?

Sonja Greiner

1.) Einleitung

Mit dem 3C-Ansatz, in fragilen Situationen kohärent, koordiniert und komplementär vorzugehen, verfolgt die internationale Gemeinschaft - und mit dem Wiener 3C-Appell auch Österreich - das Ziel, ihr entwicklungs- und sicherheitsorientiertes Engagement in Konfliktregionen effektiver und zielgerichteter einzusetzen. Der dahinterliegende methodische Zugang ist ein abgestimmtes Vorgehen von Akteuren aus den Bereichen Verteidigung, Diplomatie, Justiz, Finanzen und Wirtschaft, Entwicklung und Humanitäre Hilfe. Im Hinblick auf mehr Frieden, Sicherheit und Entwicklung scheint eine resultatorientierte, strategische und koordinierte Ausrichtung von internationalem Engagement in Konfliktsituationen begrüßenswert. Aus Sicht unabhängiger humanitärer Akteure ergeben sich aus dem 3C-Ansatz jedoch zwei Herausforderungen: Erstens müssen trotz des Bestrebens nach vermehrter Koordination und Kohärenz grundlegende humanitäre Prinzipien auch weiterhin respektiert werden und zweitens dürfen humanitäre Aktivitäten politisch-militärischen Agenden nicht untergeordnet werden. Bei der Umsetzung des 3C-Ansatzes ist zu berücksichtigen, dass die obersten Ziele von internationalen Friedensmissionen nicht mit denen humanitärer Akteure deckungsgleich sein können. Das primäre humanitäre Ziel ist die Sicherung von Überleben und die Linderung menschlichen Leids, während Akteure in den Bereichen Peacebuilding, Peacekeeping und Peace-Making die Schaffung von nachhaltigem Frieden als zentrales Anliegen verfolgen.

Das Internationale Komitee vom Roten Kreuz (IKRK) mit seinem humanitären Mandat führt seit seiner Gründung Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts humanitäre Aktivitäten zum „Schutz des Lebens und der Würde von Opfern bewaffneter Konflikte und anderer Gewaltsituationen durch und leistet ihnen Hilfe“¹. Diese Hilfsleistungen werden auf der Grundlage der Prinzipien Menschlichkeit, Neutralität, Unparteilichkeit und Unabhängigkeit sowie weiterer Rotkreuz-Grundsätze (Freiwilligkeit, Einheit, Universalität) durchgeführt. Methoden der Kriegsführung, Konfliktparteien und Konfliktursachen haben sich seit der Gründungszeit des IKRK stark verändert: So gibt es heute mehr innerstaatliche oder regionale als zwischenstaatliche Konflikte und „neue“ Konfliktparteien (z.B. bewaffnete nicht-staatliche Gruppen) bedrohen die internationale Sicherheit. Nicht nur von Staaten und der internationalen Gemeinschaft, sondern auch von zivilgesellschaftlichen und unabhängigen humanitären Akteuren wird deshalb immer wieder eine Anpassung ihrer Strategien an veränderte Bedarfslagen gefordert.

Diese neuen Rahmenbedingungen bedeuten für humanitäre Organisationen wie das IKRK jedoch nicht, dass sie ihre strikt humanitären Mandate, Aufgaben und Ziele aus den Augen verlieren. Ein sektorübergreifendes Zusammenwirken von Akteuren in fragilen Situationen sollte daher unter Berücksichtigung der Komplementaritätsprämisse den Mehrwert unabhängiger humanitärer Aktivitäten in Konfliktsituationen anerkennen.

¹ vgl. die Mission des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz (IKRK), eigene Übersetzung aus dem Englischen. S.4. In: International Committee of the Red Cross 2009: The ICRC. Its Mission and Work. A Reference paper. Geneva. In dem angeführten Policy-Dokument sind Ausführungen zu Mission und Arbeit des IKRK, die für diesen Beitrag herangezogen wurden, umfangreicher erläutert.

2.) Der Mehrwert humanitärer Akteure in fragilen Situationen – am Beispiel des IKRK

Das IKRK als unparteiliche, neutrale und unabhängige humanitäre Organisation ist in seiner Rolle im bewaffneten Konflikt von Signatarstaaten der Genfer Konventionen anerkannt. Seine Aufgaben umfassen die Verbreitung und Weiterentwicklung des humanitären Völkerrechts, medizinische Versorgung, Nahrungsmittelhilfe, Bereitstellung von sauberem Trinkwasser sowie weiterer Hilfsgüter für Konfliktopfer, Besuche von Kriegsgefangenen und Familienzusammenführungen.

a.) Humanitärer Zugang

Für das IKRK ist der humanitäre Zugang entscheidend, um allen Konfliktopfern – Verwundeten, Kranken und ZivilistInnen – gleichermaßen Hilfe leisten zu können. Der humanitäre Zugang wird neben neutraler und unabhängiger Hilfe durch den Dialog mit allen Konfliktparteien – ohne Unterscheidung, ob sie von der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft oder einzelnen Staaten anerkannt werden oder nicht – gewährleistet. Neutralität und Unabhängigkeit tragen entscheidend bei, dass humanitäre HelferInnen von der Zivilbevölkerung und allen Konfliktparteien akzeptiert werden und dass ihnen Vertrauen entgegengebracht wird. Akzeptanz und Vertrauen ermöglichen in Konfliktregionen auch Zugang zu Konfliktopfern, der anderen Akteuren verwehrt bleibt – z.B. der Zugang zu Kriegsgefangenen oder entführten Personen. Unter allen Umständen muss die Vermischung humanitärer Agenden mit politisch-militärischen Strategien oder die Wahrnehmung unabhängiger humanitärer Akteure als Bestandteil westlicher Konzepte vermieden werden. Wenn bewaffnete Streitkräfte deshalb humanitäre Aufgaben in einer bestimmten Konfliktsituation – wie in Afghanistan – wahrnehmen, sollten sie sich auch deutlich als militärische Einheiten identifizieren. Ansonsten ist kurz- und langfristig nicht nur der Zugang unabhängiger humanitärer Hilfsakteure zu hilfsbedürftigen Konfliktopfern gefährdet, sondern auch die Sicherheit von humanitärem Personal, indem eben dieses zur Zielscheibe politisch motivierter Übergriffe werden kann.²

b.) Zeitfaktor und Kontextabhängigkeit

Ein weiterer komparativer Vorteil des IKRK ist die Präsenz in einer Konfliktregion auf Grund humanitärer Notwendigkeit oftmals lange bevor UN-mandatierte Friedenseinsätze beginnen und bei Bedarf die Weiterarbeit, nachdem UN-Missionen beendet werden. So arbeitet das IKRK bereits seit 1978 im Tschad, leistet Hilfe für Verwundete und Amputierte, unterstützt Binnenvertriebene und besucht Kriegsgefangene. Die UN-Peacekeeping Mission MINURCAT hingegen begann mit dem Jahr 2007 auf Basis der UN Sicherheitsrats-Resolution 1778. Bereits zum Zeitpunkt eines UN-Einsatzes besteht bei humanitären Akteuren häufig ein umfassendes Wissen über die Konfliktsituation, Konflikttakteure und politische, soziale, kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Faktoren in einem bestimmten Land oder einer Konfliktregion, das bedarfsorientierte Unterstützung erst möglich macht.

² In den letzten Jahren sind Übergriffe auf humanitäres Personal gestiegen. Am meisten Entführungen, Tötungen oder schwere Verletzungen waren dabei im Sudan, Afghanistan und in Somalia zu verzeichnen. Während die politische Motivation von Übergriffen im Jahr 2003 noch relativ gering war, ist die Zahl an politischen Motiven für Übergriffe im Jahr 2008 deutlich gestiegen. Die absolute Zahl an Übergriffen auf humanitäres Personal der UN und von Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen (NGOs) ist höher als die Zahl an Übergriffen auf IKRK-MitarbeiterInnen. Diese statistischen Angaben lassen sich auf die Neutralität der Organisation, aber auch auf ein verbessertes Sicherheitsmanagement zurückführen. (vgl. Didomenico, V.; Harmer, A.; Stoddard, A. 2009: Providing aid in insecure environments: 2009 Update. Trends in violence against aid workers and the operational response. HPG policy brief 34. Overseas Development Institute (ODI)/ Humanitarian Policy Group. London.)

c.) Local Ownership

Ein weiterer wesentlicher Aspekt, der auch im Wiener 3C-Appell hervorgehoben wird, ist die Bedeutung von „local ownership“ als wesentliche Voraussetzung für nachhaltigen Frieden, Sicherheit und Entwicklung. Das IKRK bezieht bei seinen Aktivitäten alle vom Konflikt betroffenen Personen und Gemeinschaften in seine Hilfsaktivitäten ein. Durch Konsultationen mit der lokalen Bevölkerung können am besten das vorherrschende Wertesystem, spezifische Vulnerabilitäten und Bedürfnisse eruiert und ein partizipativer Ansatz verfolgt werden.

3.) Fazit und Folgerungen für den 3C-Ansatz

Aus humanitärer Sicht ergeben sich drei Folgerungen für die Umsetzung des 3C-Ansatzes. Erstens ist es notwendig, dass die unterschiedlichen Aufgaben, Mandate und Ziele verschiedener Akteure in Konfliktsituationen sowie deren komplementäre Rolle zur Vermeidung von Duplikationen und im Sinn einer effektiven Nutzung eingeschränkter Ressourcen gegenseitig bekannt sind und genutzt werden. Ein koordiniertes Vorgehen in Konfliktsituationen muss sich immer primär an den Bedürfnissen der vom Konflikt betroffenen Bevölkerung orientieren. Zweitens müssen bei der Koordination in Konfliktsituation humanitäre HelferInnen zu jeder Zeit deutlich von militärischen Akteuren unterscheidbar sein. Humanitäre Hilfe muss in erster Linie und wo immer möglich von zivilen humanitären Organisationen geleistet werden, die am meisten Expertise und Erfahrung auf diesem Arbeitsgebiet vorweisen können. Sie darf zu keiner Zeit für politische Zwecke instrumentalisiert werden. Letztlich muss der legitime Wunsch nach mehr Kohärenz erzwungene Allianzen vermeiden. Formen und Ausmaß der Koordination in fragilen Situationen sind immer kontextabhängig und müssen deshalb in der jeweiligen Konfliktsituation immer wieder auf ihre potentiellen, nicht-intendierten negativen Folgen für die humanitäre Arbeit geprüft werden.

Abstract

The 3C approach fosters result-oriented, strategic and coordinated international action by different communities (e.g. defense, diplomacy and development) in fragile situations that should lead to more peace, security and development. However, from the perspective of humanitarian actors, it entails two challenges: First, the fundamental humanitarian principles have to be respected, even though conflict scenarios have changed since their definition. Second, humanitarian action may not be instrumentalized by political-military or Western agendas and a blurring of lines between humanitarian and military actors must be avoided at all times.

The complementary role of humanitarian actors like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in fragile situations is threefold: The neutral and independent character of the humanitarian mission of the ICRC allows for its access to all conflict victims (need for humanitarian access); the humanitarian work is not determined by time-bound political mandates but lasts as long as humanitarian assistance is needed (time factor); the application of local ownership as crucial element in humanitarian action.

In a nutshell, for the effective implementation of the 3C approach in fragile situations and given the precondition of limited resources, it is of utmost importance that humanitarian action is carried out by civil humanitarian organizations wherever possible and led first and foremost by the needs of the vulnerable population. Actors from different communities must understand each others mission and mandates to know about and act according to their added value in crisis regions. Finally, the form and intensity of coordination is highly context de-

pendend and must be carefully examined to prevent negative implications for the humanitarian work and the security of humanitarian staff.

NRO Mediation und Anwaltschaft vor, während und nach gewaltsamen Konflikten

Gudrun Kramer

1.) Einleitung

Mediation als Ansatz zur Bearbeitung von tief verwurzelten, langwierigen Konflikten auf internationaler Ebene findet immer mehr institutionelle Beachtung. Die UNO hat 2006 eine „Peace Mediation Support Unit“ eingerichtet und seit 2008 existiert ein „Peace Mediation Standby Team“¹. Auch die EU hat Mediation als Instrument entdeckt: Die im Dezember 2008 vom Rat adoptierte „European Security Strategy“² verweist ausdrücklich darauf, dass Mediations- und Dialogkapazitäten der EU ausgebaut werden sollen.

Auch NRO bieten immer öfter ihre Mediationsdienste im internationalen Bereich an: IA, CR, HD, CMI, Berghof, Sant’ Egidio, Initiative for Quiet Diplomacy, the Independent Diplomats etc.

Etwas vereinfachend kann man feststellen, dass auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen (Track 1-3) unterschiedliche Ansätze von Mediation zur Anwendung kommen³: Transformative Mediation and Problemsolving Mediation vs. Power Mediation.

2.) Mehrwert von NRO-Mediation

NRO-Mediation kann genutzt werden um das sogenannte „Interdependenz Defizit“ zu überwinden: Es geht also nicht nur darum, horizontale Beziehungen zwischen Konfliktparteien herzustellen, sondern auch um vertikale Beziehungen innerhalb jeder Konfliktpartei. Wichtig ist dabei auch die notwendige Transparenz. Denn zum einen benötigen Verhandlungen Diskretion und Geheimhaltung, aber die Ergebnisse der Verhandlungen müssen transparent gemacht werden. In diesem Kontext nimmt die Kooperation mit nicht-staatlichen Akteuren einen immer größeren Stellenwert ein.

Eine große Herausforderung in der Mediation in internationalen Friedensprozessen sind die sogenannten „Spoilers“, Konfliktpartei, die eine Lösung des Konfliktes verhindern wollen, weil sie daran verdienen und/oder so ihre Macht aufrecht erhalten können, oder weil sie sich im Friedensprozess nicht adäquat vertreten fühlen. Power Mediation ist in diesem Fall oft kontraproduktiv. Drohstrategien und/oder Konditionierungen führen oft dazu, dass Hardliner-Positionen gestärkt werden.⁴

Am Runden Tisch treffen sich oft nur die Moderaten, und die Hardliner werden ausgegrenzt, bzw. grenzen sich selbst aus. Auch hier scheint ein möglicher Ansatz die Mediation innerhalb jeder Konfliktpartei, und Gespräche mit sogenannten ANSAs (Armed Non State Actors), die

¹ <http://www0.un.org/Depts/dpa/peace.html>

² Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World -, Brussels, 11 December 2008, S407/08. S.9.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/reports/104630.pdf

³ Ebda, S. 13

⁴ Report of the Secretary-General on Enhancing Mediation and Its Support Activities, UN April 2009, S/2009/189. S. 11.
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/278/78/PDF/N0927878.pdf?OpenElement>

von der internationalen Staatenwelt als terroristische Vereinigung eingestuft werden, können einfacher von NGOs geführt werden.

Mediation im Vorfeld von Gewaltanwendung ist ein weiterer Beitrag von NRO. NRO haben oft bessere Kontakte zu den Menschen an der Basis und können maßgeblich zu Frühwarnung und „Early Warning“ als auch Early Action im Sinne von Gute Dienste anbieten, beitragen.

Nach dem Konflikt ist der Beitrag der Zivilgesellschaft speziell für Versöhnung unabdingbar. Versöhnung kann nicht von oben verordnet werden.

Die Erfahrung hat schließlich auch gezeigt, wie schwierig es ist, die eigentlichen Konfliktursachen in einem Friedensprozess adäquat zu adressieren.⁵ Wenn dies nicht gelingt, spricht Lederach vom „Gerechtigkeitsdefizit“.⁶ Die Vermittlung in internationalen Konflikten ist immer auch ein Mediiere von unterschiedlichen Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen. Es braucht daher zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure, die sich konstruktiv mit den unterschiedlichen kulturellen Wertvorstellungen auseinandersetzen und zwischen diesen unterschiedlichen Normen und Werten vermitteln.

3.) Schlussfolgerung

Die Komplexität von tief verwurzelten, lang anhaltenden und gewaltsam ausgetragenen Konflikten braucht eine komplexe Vorgangsweise, die nach vielen Akteuren verlangt. Welche Drittpartei qualifiziert sich als „lead actor“ in einem Friedensprozess? Regierungen, intergouvernementale Organisationen wie die UNO oder die OSZE, oder nicht-staatliche Organisationen wie z.B. Sant' Egidio, die als Mediator in Mozambique tätig war? In Bezug darauf gibt es sicher keine allgemeingültige Regel. Aber eines steht fest: Ein Akteur mit zu vielen Hüten ist einem Friedensprozess hinderlich, und damit nicht zu viele Köche den Brei verderben, braucht es 3C.

Abstract

Mediation as an instrument to counter complex conflict situations gains ground in the multilateral arena. NGOs as well focus increasingly on capacity building in this area. In order to overcome the „interdependence deficit“ NGO mediation plays an ever growing role in making (interim) results of confidential negotiations transparent. Spoilers and hardliners especially ANSAs (Armed Non State Actors) may be approached more easily by NGOs.

In the field of mediation before the outbreak of armed conflict - early warning and early action - as well as reconciliation after violent conflict NGOs can build on their special social and cultural knowledge. Different concepts of justice often also have to be mediated between parties involved. Complexity of the root causes of conflicts needs multidimensional approaches promoted by a multitude of actors each equipped with a clear mandate and role. The question of who takes the lead – governmental or non-state actors – is highly context-specific, a 3C approach, however, seems indispensable.

⁵ Allg. siehe UN SG Report, S.12

⁶ Lederach, http://www.gppac.net/documents/pbp/part1/1_justpe.htm

C. Synergien zwischen Akteuren in fragilen Kontexten/ Synergies between actors in fragile contexts

Security sector reform and transitional justice in Kenya¹

David Tolbert

Efforts underway to address the 2008 Kenyan post-election crisis and the conditions that caused it have provided the country with a unique opportunity to address its long history of human rights violations. From the unspeakable atrocities of the pre-independence State of Emergency period, to the dark years of the repressive one-party state, to the emergence of state-sponsored ethnic violence in the 1990s, Kenya's democratic institutions and its framework for human rights enforcement have tended to be unable to stem the tide of human rights problems. In some cases, democratic institutions, such as the police and the judiciary, have even been co-opted into the service of repression.

The post-election crisis has brought into sharp focus the urgent need to fundamentally review the entire edifice of governance in Kenya as it relates to security, human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. The cornerstones of this ongoing reform process are the interlinked issues of transitional justice and constitutional change.² While transitional justice refers to the set of activities and processes that can bring closure to the memory of past injustices and atrocities, constitutional change speaks to the need to create a new, democratic and human rights-responsive framework of governance. The two processes are now running concurrently as stipulated by Agenda IV of the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government (popularly known as the National Accord), which brought an end to the post-election violence (PEV).

Agenda IV sets out a long-term national reconciliation and healing process that takes a deep look into the country's past. As agreed under the National Accord, the state established a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) in July 2009 to spearhead a national process of truth-telling, healing, and reconciliation.³ Arguably, the commission may turn out to be an important mechanism that can enable the country to change its human rights behavior in a lasting way. Agenda IV also mandates the current coalition government to enact a new, democratic constitution before the next general election, in addition to undertaking extensive reforms of state institutions, including security sector and criminal justice institutions.

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² Other important reforms include the establishment of the Interim Independent Elections Commission, the Interim Boundaries Commission and passage of the Political Parties Act, and the National Cohesion and Integration Act (2008). The latter Act establishes the National Cohesion and Integration Commission whose mandate is to counter the problem of ethnic discrimination.

³ The TJRC is mandated to gather evidence and make recommendations on reconciliation in relation to atrocities and injustices that have occurred since Kenya won independence in 1963. The commission's membership consists of six Kenyans and three foreigners.

Security sector reform (SSR) is therefore especially urgent as the Kenyan security sector has been intimately involved with many of the country's human rights problems.⁴ SSR refers to the variety of constitutional, legal, and policy changes that may be required to infuse the principles of accountability, professionalism, and efficiency into a security sector which has had a history of operating beyond the rule of law. Experiences from post-conflict and transitional societies such as Sierra Leone and South Africa show that improving security governance helps create peace and other suitable conditions for meaningful social reconstruction and development to take place. Security agencies must work in the interests of citizens hence the need to transform the framework for security governance.

SSR involves bringing security agencies under civilian control and aligning their operations to international best practices. SSR also involves transforming the underlying values, norms, and politics that frame the operations of security agencies. Successful SSR implementation will therefore partly depend on whether the state actually punishes human rights violations and corrupt acts committed by security personnel. So far, however, the rather slow pace of reforms in Kenya's criminal justice system continues to shield abusive security personnel.

In light of this background, ICTJ brought together eight experts with backgrounds in civil society, academia, and the security sector to share perspectives at a two-day meeting which sought to build new understanding on SSR.⁵ The first presentation contextualized the idea of SSR within the broader issue of transitional justice. The second presentation examined international best practice for SSR as it relates to Kenya. The third presentation focused on the state and performance of Kenya's security agencies, drawing its analysis from three official reports: the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, the Report of the National Task Force on Police Reforms, and the Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. The fourth presentation examined how the practice of vetting might be used to transform Kenya's security agencies, while the fifth and sixth ones discussed the possibilities for a police oversight body and penal reform, respectively. The seventh presentation explored SSR as it relates to the problem of the proliferation of vigilantes, gangs, and militia in Kenya. Finally, the eighth presentation argued for the need to regulate the Kenyan private security sector.

This article is a synthesis and analysis of the eight presentations and the ensuing debate which took place among the broader group of 25 participants. It explores several questions among them: What is the state of security and the security sector in Kenya? What have been the outcomes of SSR measures undertaken so far? What approaches for security sector transformation are desirable for Kenya and how might they be pursued? What kind of linkages are policy-makers making between SSR and other issues in the governance realm?

⁴ In February 2009, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Arbitrary or Summary Executions concluded in that the Kenya Police had carried out systematic and widespread executions of Mungiki members. See United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur. The Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence (CIPEV) similarly accused security personnel of using excessive force against unarmed civilians, which led to the deaths of some 405 people or almost half of all PEV fatalities (See Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 331). The Kenya Government has itself recently admitted before the United Nations Human Rights Council that its security personnel have been responsible for serious human rights violations which call for far-reaching SSR measures. (See Government of Kenya submission to the UNHRC, June 2009).

⁵ The meeting was held on 11th and 12th December 2009 in Nairobi.

1.) The state of security and the security sector in Kenya

Kenya's security governance challenges play out at the local, regional, and international levels. Crime and insecurity persist as major challenges in both urban and rural areas. It seems the daily reality for many Kenyans is defined by the fear of becoming victim to violent robbers, car hijackers, sexual predators, and burglars, among other criminals. The country's northern parts are prone to banditry and international terrorism has also claimed the lives of hundreds of Kenyans.

It appears that greater democratization in the last two decades has been accompanied by growing disorder and the proliferation of organized gangs and militia. Many of these groups now operate extortion rings, in addition to "providing security services" in different parts of the country. Some scholars reason that their rise and role in security governance signals the decline of the state's dominion over security.⁶

Case Study 1: SSR and Vigilantes, Gangs, and Militia

In the past two decades, organized crime groups and informal security groups have proliferated in Kenya; and it seems that some of them are increasingly asserting their presence in security governance. Where the Kenya Police and other state security actors previously monopolized the use of force, there is now a plurality of actors including vigilantes, gangs, and militia.

Kenyan vigilantes tend to be concerned with providing security and enforcing order in their specific areas of operation.⁷ Conversely, gangs operating mainly in urban areas are generally concerned with the control of "their" territory and various enterprises, including levying fees for "protection". Some militia groups such as Mungiki and the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) appear to have political aspirations and an interest in changing the social status quo. As the case of Mungiki shows, the character of organized criminal groups and informal security groups can be indeterminate. Vigilantes can turn into gangs and gangs can turn into armed militia with political interests.

SSR actors grappling with the impact of these groups should therefore try to explain their emergence in Kenyan society. What has led to their formation? Why are they proliferating at this point in Kenya's history? Could it be that informal groups are increasingly beginning to assert themselves in security governance because the Kenyan state is gradually losing its legitimacy and effectiveness or evolving a new structure?⁸

Taking these questions into consideration, how then should SSR actors deal with vigilantes, gangs and militia? If it is determined that vigilantes can play a useful role in security governance, should they then be accorded official recognition like private security companies? If it can be agreed that policy is best informed by those closest to the problem, would it then be

⁶ Some scholars have referred to this fragmentation as the polycentric governance of security. See Bayley and Shearing, "The Future of Policing."

⁷ Vigilantes come in different shades. On the one hand, vigilantism is a social voluntarism that can be practiced by either private citizens or state officials outside of the confines of the official justice system. There is also the possibility of official vigilantism or "establishment violence" in furtherance of "conservative" ends. In this case, governments may surreptitiously form, support, condone or reinvent vigilantes. See Huggins, "Introduction: Vigilantism and the State-A Look South and North" and Pinheiro, "Police and Political Crisis: The Case of Military Police" in Huggins, *Vigilantism and the State*.

⁸ This phenomenon has been termed as "horizontal sovereignties" by South African scholar John Comaroff. See "Forward" in Lazarus-Black and Susan Hirsh (eds.), *Contested States*.

appropriate to try to reach out to gangs and militia in order to involve them in security policy design and implementation?

Complex as it may be, perhaps the best way to address the proliferation of vigilantes, gangs, and militia might be to increase public spending on programs and other interventions that target the drivers of crime and violence. If, however, Kenya decides that the most suitable approach is to continue to confront these groups through the criminal law framework, then SSR actors need to clarify what security agencies need to do to fight crime and how and why those approaches should be used. Needless to say, a “fight crime” approach has its shortfalls: it may lead to increased reliance on force as well as the militarization of policing authorities.

Deteriorating security conditions have been attributed to the uneven performance of some of the country’s security agencies, which are often accused of being operationally ineffective, corrupt, and politically pliant. Some policy-makers and researchers have tended also to associate the high rates of crime and violence with the existence of economic and social inequalities.⁹ They argue that the high incidences of unemployment and poverty among Kenya’s youth are the main drivers of crime. In fact, the framers of both Vision 2030 as well as Agenda IV of the National Accord seem to accept that if left unaddressed, the social and economic exclusion of the youth will lead to higher rates of crime and violence.

That Kenya’s security sector is in need of far-reaching reforms has been evident long before PEV engulfed the country in 2008. To be sure, the post-election crisis vividly exposed the grave shortcomings of the Kenya security sector whose image was badly tarnished by the illegal and unjustifiable actions of some of its members. For a start, many Kenyans perceive the security sector, particularly the Kenya Police, as an inefficient, brutal, anti-people institution that lacks transparency and accountability.¹⁰ According to the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-election Violence (CIPEV), most elements in the security sector threw away all pretence at professionalism during the crisis.¹¹ While some allowed themselves to be actively used for partisan political purposes, others rendered assistance to citizens in distress based on their political alignment and ethnic identity or affiliation. Still others became complicit in criminal acts and committed murder, rape, arson, and theft.¹²

Furthermore, the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (the Waki report) found that the Kenya Police was completely unprepared for the violence.¹³ There was hardly any contingency planning, and where there was some, available intelligence was ignored so it was unsurprising that the police were overwhelmed by the scope and nature of the violence. Members of the Kenya Police were also found to have used unnecessary and disproportionate force. Of the 1,133 people that CIPEV established to have died during the violence, 405 had died from gunshots, a significant number shot from the back.¹⁴ Of the 3,561

⁹ See Ruteere, *Dilemmas of Crime*; Turner and Brownhill, “African Jubilee”

¹⁰ See Kenya Bribery Index (2001-2010), published by Transparency International-Kenya, among other periodic reports produced by Kenyan and international human rights groups.

¹¹ Kenyan president Mwai Kibaki established CIPEV on 23rd May 2008, to investigate PEV and make recommendations on the punishment of the perpetrators of atrocities and the prevention of potential outbreaks of violence in the future (see Kenya Gazette Notice No. 4473 Vol. CX No. 4 of 23rd May 2008). On the decline of professionalism within the Kenya Police, see generally “Chapter 11” in Report on Commission of Inquiry.

¹² Republic of Kenya, Report on Commission of Inquiry, 396-398.

¹³ The report is dubbed “The Waki Report” after CIPEV’s chair, Hon. Justice Phillip Waki, who sits in Kenya’s Court of Appeal. See p. 372 for CIPEV’s conclusion on the unpreparedness of the Kenya Police during the post-election crisis.

¹⁴ Republic of Kenya, Report on Commission of Inquiry, 384-393.

who were injured and treated, 557 had gunshot wounds. CIPEV also identified several occasions where there was direct political interference with the police, the most glaring being the attempt to use 1,600 Administration Police officers as political party agents in Nyanza.¹⁵

In its report CIPEV decried the lack of a national security policy in Kenya and the fact that in dealing with PEV, the security agencies acted separately, with no joint planning or coordination.¹⁶ While the Kenya Security Intelligence Machinery was generally found to have done well at forecasting the likelihood of violence, CIPEV noted significant weakness in translating the intelligence into operational interventions.¹⁷ Even though the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) was found to have been the best prepared of all the security agencies, it was faulted for engaging in questionable activities.¹⁸ These included its attempt to obtain accreditation from the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) to be part of the election process, and purporting to advise the ECK on the electoral process.

However, the Kenyan military was praised for preparing contingency plans, rehearsing how to respond appropriately depending on unfolding scenarios, and sensitizing its members on the need to stay apolitical and uphold military values.¹⁹ In general, the military's involvement in the post-election crisis was identified as supportive of the victims of violence and CIPEV found that the military was never required to and did not use force in the crisis.

Case Study 2: Penal Reform

The prison system rarely receives recognition as a critical security agency, yet it plays an important role in the criminal justice and security governance cycle. As at December 2009, Kenya's 98 prisons remained overcrowded, holding 48,273 prisoners among them 19,142 remand prisoners and 29,131.²⁰ In 1999, the Community Service Orders Programme was developed to bolster efforts to decongest prisons. Since 2003, the sectorwide Governance Justice Law and Order Sector (GJLOS) reform program has facilitated increases in penal reform investments.

While contemporary rehabilitation activities tend to emphasise skills training for prisoners, there is still a lot to be done if Kenyan prisons are to be turned into effective rehabilitation centers. Other challenges include long delays of remand prisoners' cases in the courts and high recidivism rates associated with the lack of economic opportunities for ex-prisoners.

Although there have been nominal improvements in their terms and conditions of service, and plans are underway to provide them with better housing, it appears the capacities of many prison officials are misdirected, underutilized, or are otherwise applied in ways not necessarily beneficial to them or the Kenya Prisons Department. Out of the total of about 19,600 prison officials, 3,000 can be expected to be on leave at any given time. An overwhelming 2,000 officers are allocated administrative duties, while about 500 are essentially full-time sportswomen and sportsmen. About 1,000 are drivers, guards, and even cooks assigned to

¹⁵ 14. Ibid: 364; 405-406.

¹⁶ Ibid: 372-376.

¹⁷ Ibid: 361.

¹⁸ Ibid: 365-367.

¹⁹ Ibid: 367-368; 379-380.

²⁰ The statistics in this case study have been availed by Legal Resources Foundation (LRF). LRF's work focuses on prisoners' rights and penal reform.

various government agencies and senior officials. A further 1,000 have been recruited into regional and international peacekeeping missions or into intelligence gathering work.

In April 2008, prison warders sent shock waves across the country when they downed their tools to protest what they termed poor working conditions. A government task force appointed to study the situation found that warders suffered from overcrowded housing and unsanitary conditions, poor medical care, high rates of HIV/AIDS, and vulnerability to attacks at the hands of violent prisoners. It also found that promotions and deployment are based on ethnicity and political affiliation. The task force subsequently recommended several reforms among them the need for risk and/or life insurance for prison warders.

2.) SSR outcomes: Some achievements and impediments

In 2003, the Kenya Government initiated, for the first time, a relatively extensive SSR process that targeted the Kenya Police in particular.²¹ The police reform program was conceived under the government's Economic Recovery and Wealth Creation Strategy (2003) and the sector-wide GJLOS program. Steered by the National Task Force on Police Reforms,²² the stated goal of the police reform process was to transform the Kenya Police into an effective, efficient, human rights-compliant, people-oriented, and accountable institution. Envisioned to cost at least 52 billion Kenyan shillings over the five year lifetime of the Kenya Police Strategic Plan 2004–2008, the reforms prioritized the improvement of policing and security as fundamental prerequisites of economic growth.

Police officers' welfare, including remuneration, terms of service, and housing have improved somewhat, although it does not appear that there has been a corresponding change in their performance generally.²³ The National Task Force-steered police rebranding program has also improved the public relations capacity of the Kenya Police but it remains unclear how much its public image has actually been transformed.²⁴ Additionally, the National Comprehensive Community-Policing Programme has seen more citizen and police cooperation but its implementation suffers from conceptual confusion.²⁵ In the past year, a Police Oversight Board has been established and even more far-reaching changes to the Kenya Police have been proposed in the Report of the National Task Force on Police Reforms (The Ransley Report) as well as the pending draft constitution.²⁶

²¹ For a review of the police reform process during 2003-2006, see Ajuang, "Police Accountability in Kenya."

²² This particular Task Force is distinct from the Justice Phillip Ransley-led National Task Force on Police Reforms, which was established in 2009.

²³ In January 2004, the Kenya Government doubled the pay of junior police officers from US\$65 to US\$130 per month (see "Huge pay rise for Kenya's police," BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3419293.stm>). In August 2006, the Kenya Government also approved the construction of 27,000 housing units for the junior police officers (see <http://www.kenyapolice.go.ke/News38.asp>).

²⁴ Since 2003, the Kenya Police's Public Relations Department has been much more active, even establishing a website with downloadable forms (see www.kenyapolice.go.ke).

²⁵ The launch of the programme came after a five-year period of growth in police-citizen partnership which had been led largely by civil society groups. A study of these partnerships found that it appears the police expect citizens to act as informers and crime spotters. In many cases, citizens involved in community policing have themselves been unaccountable to the communities they purport to serve. Different forms of community policing in practice in Kenya tend to reproduce human rights violations (See Ruteere and Pommerolle, "Democratizing Security or Decentralizing Repression?") The orientation of the ongoing, official community policing program has not changed much.

²⁶ This report was authored by the National Task Force on Police Reforms, whose establishment in 2009 was recommended by CIPEV (see Kenya Gazette No. 4790 of 8th May 2009). The report is popularly known as "The Ransley Report" after its author, retired Hon. Justice Phillip Ransley, who previously served as a judge in Kenya's High Court.

These reforms have tended to be inadequate and ineffective because they have been implemented on the false premise that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the philosophy, structure, and set up of Kenya's security sector, namely that its problems are really only the result of the lack of capacity and resources. Indeed, in its interactions with the police, GJLOS program coordinators have had to contend with the persistent police assertion that improved performance is contingent on the acquisition of modern equipment and better terms and conditions of service.

Is it possible that the foregoing outlook and disposition of the Kenya Police persists because the country's transition from authoritarianism to democracy is still unfinished business? Must it be the case that SSR processes cannot succeed where security agencies are led by anti-reformists? Would this mean that a purge targeting the leadership of any given security agency is a prerequisite for the implementation of reforms? If this is the case, how then would one reconcile past trends in Latin America where repressive senior security personnel were brought to justice by regimes which themselves had poor human rights records?

Other observers argue that the national debate on SSR suffers critically from unavailability of sufficient media access to accurate SSR information. This situation is compounded by the technical nature of security-related information and the secrecy with which it is handled by security agencies.

3.) Security sector transformation: goals and strategies

The foregoing quote should provoke SSR actors to think critically about the roles Kenyan society needs its security agencies to play in the 21st century. For instance, do Kenyans want their security agencies to play a social work role or do they want "tough" crime fighting agencies? What kind of individuals ought to be recruited into security agencies? Whatever the case, Kenyans and peoples living in developing contexts need to design innovative SSR processes that are responsive to their own unique contexts.

In Africa, for instance, there are different contexts within which SSR may be implemented. Some countries, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, are undertaking SSR having only recently emerged from civil war. Others are transiting from long periods of authoritarian or minority rule to more open forms of government, while others such as Guinea and Zimbabwe are altogether averse to the idea of democracy. This variety of national contexts should illustrate the futility of imagining that there is a universal set of SSR prescriptions that can apply to all cases.

SSR actors should therefore first clearly define the results – institutional, policy, legal, or constitutional changes in the field of security governance – they desire to see before they design a strategy that can help them to realize their objectives. Both the objectives and ensuing strategy ought to result from a national dialogue and consensus on security governance that is carefully tailored to the specific context. At any rate, security governance strategies ought to be reviewed constantly as it is unlikely societies will ever be fully assured of their security.

In setting out SSR goals, there is need to achieve consensus on the definition of the concept of security which tends to be highly contested. Establishing the constitutional basis of the idea of security, especially as it relates to the social contract between citizens and their state, is an important starting point for designing an effective security governance policy framework. Articulating a strong security governance policy that can win public support and cooperation may require an inclusive SSR process that is shaped partly by the broader public. It is likely

that the legitimacy and acceptability of such a process could also be enhanced if it is designed and funded domestically.²⁷

Kenyans have a relatively strong basis from which to start a comprehensive SSR process. For one, the pending draft constitution establishes a constitutional framework for the security sector which sets out the core principles and values that should guide the sector. The adoption of the constitution and the faithful implementation of the other detailed recommendations set out in the Waki Report, the Ransley Report, and the Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (The Alston Report)²⁸ will almost certainly bequeath the country a security sector that is radically different from the existing one.

Both the Waki Report and the Ransley Report identified several broad principles that must be reflected in a reformed Kenya Police.²⁹ These include representativeness to ensure that the police reflect a proper mix of the Kenya communities, impartiality, decentralization of policing, respect for human rights, and accountability. They have recommended that the government infuse these principles in the institution through the implementation of a new training curriculum, a new code of conduct, and vetting of the suitability of serving officers. Similarly, the Alston Report recommended vetting and urged the political leadership to publicly declare its commitment to investigate, resolve, and end unlawful killings by security personnel.

Besides urging the development of a National Security Policy, a National Policing Policy and the enactment of a Police Reforms Act to implement the proposed reforms, the Ransley Report recommended the creation of a Police Reforms Implementation Commission (PRIC), an Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) and a Police Service Commission (PSC). Another radical recommendation calls for a Witness Protection Programme that is independent of the Office of the Attorney General and the security agencies.

Case Study 3: Possibilities for a Police Oversight Body

Some human rights groups argue the establishment of a police oversight body (POB) will improve police accountability in Kenya. If established, such a body ought to be non-partisan and operationally and financially autonomous. Its primary role should be to investigate and review complaints against the Kenya Police, and it should have the authority to issue its findings and make recommendations independently. A POB should also have powers to develop policing policies, set policing budgets, and monitor the general performance of the Kenya Police. Importantly, both security officials and civilians should be incorporated in the POB's leadership to enhance its credibility in the eyes of the citizenry.

Even though Kenya established the Kenya Police Oversight Board in 2009, the institution was created by administrative fiat and lacks a firm legal basis.³⁰ Opportunely, however, the Waki Report calls for the establishment of an independent Kenya Police Service Commission to deal with police management, recruitment, and welfare issues. The Ransley Report also urges the government to establish a proposed Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA)

²⁷ Scholars warn of the potential pitfalls of donor-funded SSR processes. While donor funding is sometimes essential, uncritical use of donor SSR concepts can create the perception that a donor agency enjoys the right to promote its particular vision of security. See Hendrikson, "Key Challenges Facing Security Sector Reform."

²⁸ "The Alston Report" gets this popular version of its title from its author Professor Phillip Alston, who has been the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions since 2004.

²⁹ Republic of Kenya, Report on Commission of Inquiry, 430-440; Ransley Task Force Report: 17- 40.

³⁰ The Kenya Police Oversight Board was established by an order issued by the Minister of Internal Security in September 2009. (See Gazette Notice No 8144 of September 2008).

which ought to have powers to investigate and institute prosecutions against abusive police officers. Be that as it may, the police ought to be checked by a variety of institutions, including parliament, oversight bodies such as the Public Complaints Steering Committee, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, and civil society groups.

Without a doubt, these are important, timely recommendations. But is it possible to undertake effective police reforms without developing a policing policy or a broader national security policy? Have Kenyans critically reflected on the internal, regional, and international contexts within which planned SSR measures will be implemented? How might SSR actors empower Kenyans to participate freely and confidently in the SSR process?

Fortunately, Kenya's stability offers ample room to hold a national dialogue on some of the foregoing questions. However, the SSR process is controlled by the national elite and there is the risk that different interests and concerns, including fears about accountability, can turn the conversation into a conflict. This means that civil society actors need to think critically and innovatively about how they can help to cultivate the level of political will that is required to see the SSR process through.

Case Study 4: Vetting and Transformation of Security Sector Agencies

Vetting refers to the screening and exclusion of public officials from state institutions where they are under investigation, are being prosecuted, or have been convicted of involvement in human rights violations and serious crimes.³¹ Vetting is a critical step in achieving public service reform and transitional justice and the process must therefore be clearly defined in a specific piece of legislation. Vetting should be conducted transparently as it contributes to social reconstruction in post-conflict or post-authoritarian states by disabling repressive structures and replacing them with democratic state institutions. The process also enables states in transition to exclude and punish individuals who may otherwise obstruct reform initiatives and transitional justice efforts. Through the process of vetting, human rights violators and public officials found to be responsible for serious crimes are prohibited from holding public office.

Vetting may be carried out in phases and can affect a variety of public officials ranging from members of the police, intelligence, and military services, to judges and prosecutors, to administrators and politicians. Vetting may, however, turn out to be legally challenging, operationally complex, and politically sensitive. There is the added risk that the process can be sabotaged or manipulated and turned into a politically-driven purge. This particular problem raises the question of who should be vetted in times of transition and who should do the vetting. In a country such as Kenya where it is fairly common for past human rights violators to restyle themselves as "reformists," an official under scrutiny in a vetting process may be tempted to ask his or her screener, "how can you purport to vet me when you too should be vetted?" What, therefore, should be done to insure the legitimacy of the vetting process in a context such as Kenya?

The Waki, Ransley, and Alston reports as well as the KNCHR report³² on the post-election crisis all suggest that reforming the Kenya Police may require some degree of vetting if human rights violators and corrupt officers are to be excluded. Naturally, the targets of the vetting

³¹ Comprehensive information on vetting approaches is available in United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States;" United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) Policy Paper, "Support for Vetting of Police and other Law Enforcement Personnel."

³² See Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, *On the Brink of the Precipice*.

process ought to be officers or specific groups or units linked to human rights violations and other corrupt practices. In any case, there should be a vigorous debate, especially within parliament, about the targets of vetting and the criteria for their disqualification. Of course, the vetting process should safeguard the due process protections of its targets. Ideally, the burden of proof required to exclude an officer ought to extend beyond “the balance of probability” but need not to be “beyond reasonable doubt.” The process might possibly entail the setting up of an interim police service commission that works in conjunction with the KNCHR and the recently established TJRC.

While a reformed Kenya Police, whose members have been vetted, may become much more effective in maintaining law and order and upholding human rights, what, on the other hand, might be the social impact of discharging hundreds or perhaps even thousands of unethical police officers from duty? Facing potential unemployment, might they turn to crime? In fact, some observers argue that Kenya experienced a surge in the incidence of violent crimes soon after the government discharged 3,000 military personnel in the aftermath of the 1982 attempted coup d'état. Might this scenario repeat itself if vetting is chosen as a police reform strategy?

Case Study 5: Regulating the Private Security Sector

Private security can entail the different forms of security provided by individuals, companies, and other organizations to a client at a fee as opposed to public security which is a public good provided by the state.³³ The private security industry fills the gaps that governments may be unable to bridge using their conventional security architecture which typically includes policing, military, and intelligence institutions. Governments also contract private security firms where the option is cost-effective.

In Kenya, the private security industry is one of the fastest growing sectors of the economy and it is a significant employer. In 2004, the industry was valued at 43 million USD and provided employment to about 50,000 Kenyans. It is spread across the country, although it is much more visible in urban centers than it is in rural areas. Many leading companies, both local and international, depend on private security companies to secure their investments.

A better regulated private security industry could possibly improve security conditions in Kenya besides creating more opportunities for employment. Consequently, anticipated SSR measures ought to address the relationship between private security companies and law enforcement agencies. Perhaps a specific policy framework may be required to enhance their cooperation in the areas of crime detection, prevention, and deterrence. So far, a parliamentary bill – the Private Security Regulation Bill of 2004 – has been drafted to provide a framework for state regulation of private security firms.³⁴

The possibility of a well-regulated private security industry also raises a number of problems inherent with the increased privatization of public goods such as security. Is it possible that enhanced regulation of the private security industry will encourage the state to decrease spending on security governance? How might such a development affect less affluent Kenyans? What should the state do if well-regulated private security firms lobby it to grant their officials the authority to bear firearms? Should the arming of private security firms be sanctioned and what impact might this have on security in the country?

³³ For detailed information related to this case study see Wairagu, Kamenju and Singo, *Private Security in Kenya*.

³⁴ The bill lapsed at the end of the ninth parliament. It is yet to be introduced in the current legislation.

4.) Making the linkages between SSR and other governance issues

Reforming the security governance environment partly depends on recognizing the linkages between the idea of security and other issues in the governance realm.³⁵ Some observers argue, however, that SSR actors in Kenya do not make these linkages. They fail to realize that the idea of security is locked into a symbiotic relationship with other elements of governance, including the ideas of democracy, development, human rights, and peace, which all have an impact on how security is conceptualized and experienced.

In fact, conceptual breakthroughs in the studies of economics and development show that the ideas of security, peace, human rights and development are interdependent.³⁶ Even so, it is astounding that though the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) acknowledge the linkages among these ideas, there is no specific MDG devoted to the idea of security.³⁷ Similarly, the national debate in Kenya has not clearly linked the idea of security to human rights. Perhaps for this reason the “right to security” is not enshrined in the Bill of Rights contained in the pending draft constitution.

In relation to law enforcement, SSR measures could consider broadening security sector planning to emphasise the idea of policing budgets as opposed to police budgets. In this way, other sectors of government, such as education or environmental protection agencies, could complement the work of traditional policing agencies more effectively. This approach may also focus greater public and official attention on the need to improve the standard of policing in rural areas.³⁸

Policymakers ought also to be less orthodox in their thinking about security when planning cities, for instance. It can be argued reasonably that homeowners are more likely to take a keener interest in the security of their neighbourhoods in contrast to tenants. Might authorities therefore want to develop specially targeted policy interventions that can encourage homeowners to make greater investments in public safety and security program? How, for instance, would security be impacted if planners increased the scope and efficiency of public transport systems? Would it not be cheaper and potentially easier to police an intra-city train as opposed to a highway with hundreds or thousands of motorists?

5.) Recommendations

1. Comprehensive SSR cannot take place without the input of the diversity of society’s members. Consequently, politicians and the greater Kenyan community will need to work together advocating for, implementing, and monitoring SSR initiatives. Civil society groups and development partners stand to play a critical role in facilitating this collaboration.

³⁵ This argument is supported by security experts Olonisakin, Ikpe and Badong in “The Future of Security and Justice for the Poor.”

³⁶ See Sen, *Development as Freedom*; Ismail and Hendrickson, “What is the Case for a Security and Justice Focus in Development Assistance Programming?”

³⁷ See “Forward” United Nations, *Report of the Secretary General on the Millennium Development Goals*.

³⁸ SSR actors appear to see policing largely as an urban issue probably because the Kenya Police is generally absent in rural areas. In fact, a recent one-month research tour of the Coast Province by the author of this briefing paper found that many Kenyans living in the province look to the Provincial Administration and its Administration Police for security. This dimension has not really been considered in the ongoing national debate on whether the Administration Police should be merged with the Kenya Police as recommended in the pending draft constitution.

2. The different SSR actors and stakeholders need also to reflect on how to better integrate SSR issues into the ongoing transitional justice processes. For instance, there could be discussion about how the TJRC ought to address the security sector's historical involvement in human rights violations.
3. Civil society groups need to publicize the idea of SSR and its linkages to other issues in the governance realm such as human rights, justice, peace, and development.
4. The media is a particularly important channel through which to create public understanding and participation on security issues. Civil society groups need therefore to develop a strategic outlook in their engagement with the media on SSR issues.
5. Research institutions in Kenya need to work with civil society groups to assist them to improve their conceptual understanding of security. This requires making the necessary investments required to locally generate new knowledge on security.
6. There are gaps in knowledge and information about the role civil society groups have played or stand to play in the realm of security governance. Development partners ought therefore to consider supporting research studies that can shed light on the security-centered work of these groups.
7. The SSR debate is still at an embryonic state and security sector players and policy-makers generally are yet to see the benefits of a broader, strategic engagement with civil society groups. This situation may require civil society groups to review their confrontational stance in respect to security-related matters generally and to think critically about what they actually "bring to the table" in this debate.

Key Security Sector Institutions (Kenya)

Intelligence Community and Policy Coordination

Cabinet Security Committee

Provincial Administration

Administration Police

National Security Advisory Committee

National Committee on Security and Foreign Relations

National Security Intelligence Service

Military

National Defence Council

Department of Defence

Kenya Army

Kenya Air Force

Kenya Navy

Kenya Ordnance Corporation

Policing Authorities

Kenya Police

Criminal Investigations Department

General Service Unit

Anti-Terrorism Police Unit

Kenya Prisons Department

Department of Immigration

Parliament

Parliamentary Departmental Committee on Administration, National Security and Local Authorities

Parliamentary Departmental Committee on Administration of Justice and Legal Affairs

Parliamentary Departmental Committee on Defence and Foreign Relations

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Zusammenfassung

Ausgehend von der Krise nach den Wahlen 2008 befasst sich der Artikel kritisch mit der Umsetzung der Sicherheitssektorreform und Maßnahmen von Übergangsjustiz in Kenia. Die kenianische Regierung führt auf Grundlage der „Agenda IV of the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government“ ein Verfassungsreform auch auf dem Gebiet des Sicherheitssektors durch. So werden Verbesserungen der Situation in Gefängnissen, der Arbeitsbedingungen von Polizeikräften, im Stand der nationalen Debatte zu Zielen einer Sicherheitspolitik, der Praxis bei Sicherheitsüberprüfungen etc. anvisiert. ICTJ entwickelt aus der Analyse der Maßnahmen Empfehlungen für effektive SSR: Die Teilnahme der Zivilgesellschaft und der Medien sind ebenso essentiell für die Bemühungen um eine nachhaltige Reform des Sicherheitssektors wie eine Verbindung mit den laufenden „transitional justice“-Programmen im Land.

Operationalisieren des “Comprehensive Approach” im Sinne des 3C-Ansatzes

Thomas Starlinger

1.) Einleitung

Im Juni 2007 publizierte die OECD zehn “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations”; das Prinzip Nr. 8 “Agree on a *practical coordination mechanism* between international actors” beinhaltet:

”Where possible, it is important to work together on: upstream analysis; joint assessments; shared strategies; and coordination of political engagement. Wherever possible, international actors should work jointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and priorities.”¹

Von den sechs Empfehlungen des Genfer 3C-Konferenzberichts inkludiert die zweite: “To respond in a timely and appropriate manner to the evolving situation in the partner country” sowie die Notwendigkeit:” ... foster[ing] the use of *shared tools and methodologies* for assessment, planning, monitoring and evaluation.”²

Im November 2009 betonte der UN-Sicherheitsrat in seiner Resolution 1894 die Notwendigkeit eines “Comprehensive Approach” sowohl für die Mitgliedsstaaten als auch für seine eigenen Organisationen:

“Emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach to facilitate the implementation of protection mandates through promoting economic growth, good governance, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for, and protection of human rights, and in this regard, urges the cooperation of Member States and underlines the importance of a coherent, comprehensive and coordinated approach by the principal organs of the United Nations, cooperating with one another and within their respective mandates.”³

Unter den verschiedenen Akteuren herrscht offensichtlich eine breite Übereinstimmung bezüglich der Theorie des “Comprehensive Approach”, seiner Hauptbereiche und der Notwendigkeit einer entsprechenden Methode zur Umsetzung. Trotzdem sind weder eine gemeinsame Methode und entsprechende Werkzeuge entwickelt worden noch werden sie in der Praxis angewandt.

2.) Der “Blueprint Mechanism” und seine Werkzeuge

Im folgenden Artikel werden eine Methode (= Blueprint Mechanism) und die entsprechenden Werkzeuge für ein erfolgreiches Operationalisieren des “Comprehensive Approach“ im Sinne des 3C-Ansatzes vorgestellt. Als konzeptionelle Basis dient ein 4-Säulen Modell bestehend

¹ OECD: “Principles for good international engagement in fragile States & Situations”, Principle 8 - Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors, April 2007, S. 3, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf>, abgerufen am 13.5.2010

² 3C (Coherent, Coordinated, Complementary) Conference Report: “Improving results in fragile and conflict situations”, 19.-20. März 2009, Genf, Schweiz, S16f; http://www.3C-conference2009.ch/en/Home/The_Conference/media/3C_Conf_Report_v6.pdf, abgerufen am 13.5.2010

³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1894 (2009), adopted at 6216th meeting, Para 28, November 2009, S. 6-7, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/602/45/PDF/N0960245.pdf?OpenElement>, abgerufen am 13.5.2010

aus den Bereichen Sicherheit, Governance, Wirtschaft & Infrastruktur und Sozialsystem⁴. In Analogie eines “Hausbaues” kann der vorgeschlagene “Blueprint Mechanism” für ein breites Spektrum an Situationen angewandt werden: von Haiti bis zum Balkan, von Afrika bis Afghanistan.

Die Realität betrachtend: im Bereich des state/peacebuilding arbeiten die einzelnen Akteure ohne ein gemeinsames Verständnis über “Was wird von wem getan?”, “Wer ist für was verantwortlich?” und “Wie viel ist bereits erreicht worden?“, dabei wird oft mehr Schaden angerichtet als zum Guten beigetragen⁵.

Die Hauptkriterien um den “Comprehensive Approach“ zu realisieren und damit eine kohärente, koordinierte und komplementäre (3C) Vorgangsweise sicherzustellen, stellen sich wie folgt dar:

- Ein klares und aktuelles Bild der Projekte sowie deren Status, um eine fundierte Grundlage für ein effizientes Überwachungs- und Bewertungssystem zu haben;
- Vermeidung von Überlappungen und der Duplizierung von Anstrengungen, um eine höhere Effizienz der Hilfsmaßnahmen zu erzielen;
- Vereinheitlichte Prozesse zur Entwicklung von Sektorstrategien, die zu gemeinsamen Zielen führen und den jeweiligen Erfordernissen Rechnung tragen;
- Permanente Aufzeichnung der aktuellen und geplanten Unterstützungen im Sinne einer effizienten Bedarfsdeckung;
- Ein Aktionsplan mit Prioritäten und Richtwerte, um sowohl statische als auch dynamische Planungen inklusive der Messbarkeit des Fortschrittes zu gewährleisten;
- Ein umfassendes Managementsystem, das auf einer kompletten und permanent aktualisierten, sowie öffentlich zugänglichen Datenbank basiert;
- Die Nutzung eines gemeinsamen und interoperablen Berichtssystems, um ideale Voraussetzungen für Sektorarbeitsgruppen zu schaffen;
- Eine effiziente Schnittstelle zwischen der lokalen Regierung und den Entwicklungspartnern, um sowohl volle Eigentümerschaft als auch Rechenschaft zu gewährleisten.

Im Konkreten besteht der vorgeschlagene “Blueprint Mechanism” aus den vier folgenden Hauptbestandteilen (siehe Flussdiagramm):

1. Das “Blueprint document” mit seinen vier Entwicklungsbereichen (Sicherheit, Governance, Wirtschaft & Infrastruktur, Sozialsysteme) unter Anführung jener Unterebenen, die für die jeweiligen Projekte relevant sind: Dieses Dokument bietet ein klares und aktuelles Bild über alle laufenden Projekte und vermeidet somit Überlappungen sowie unnötige Duplizierungen von Anstrengungen.
2. Die Entwicklung von Sektorstrategien sowie statische und dynamische Planung auf der Basis einer “Strengths – Weaknesses – Opportunities – Threat (SWOT)” Analyse:

Diese Methode resultiert in SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound) Zielvorgaben. Es zeigt ob der Bedarf auf regionaler Ebene unter Berücksichtigung von übergeordneten Länderstrategien sowie derzeitiger und geplanter externer Unterstützungen gedeckt wird. Zusätzlich werden durch diese Vorgangsweise auch diejenigen Entwicklungsbereiche angesprochen, die bis dato unberücksichtigt

⁴ Es existiert ein breites Verständnis über die vier Entwicklungssäulen, manche Modelle splitten die eine oder andere Säule in zwei Bereiche auf.

⁵ OECD: “Do no harm”, Report 2010, S. 20, ISBN Nummer: 9789264077386, Datum der Veröffentlichung: 11/01/2010 <http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/browseit/4310041E.PDF>, abgerufen am 13.5.2010

blieben. Durch logische Ableitungen können Prioritäten und Aktionspläne samt konkreten Richtwerten entwickelt werden.

3. Das “Comprehensive Management System”: Es basiert auf einer umfassenden und permanent aktualisierten Wissensdatenbank die öffentlich zugänglich (z.B. via Internet) ist. Diese Software soll nicht im Kontext von „Künstlicher Intelligenz“ betrachtet werden, sondern vielmehr als Planungswerkzeug das mit dem bekannten Strategiespiel “Die Siedler” vergleichbar ist und weltweit in den verschiedensten Szenarien angewandt werden kann. Es beherrscht die multidimensionalen Aspekte der vier Entwicklungsbereiche, deren Beziehungen und Abhängigkeiten und stellt ein umfassendes Lagebild als Voraussetzung für einen fundierten Entscheidungsprozess sicher. Weiters gewährleistet die Wissensdatenbank ein besseres Verständnis für die entsprechenden Fähigkeiten der anderen Schlüsselakteure sowie deren Interaktion im jeweiligen Einsatzraum.
4. Interoperables Berichtssystem: Die Verwendung eines interoperablen Berichtssystems erlaubt einen einfachen Austausch von Informationen zwischen den einzelnen Akteuren in den spezifischen Aufgabenbereichen. Sektorarbeitsgruppen (topographisch und sektoral) würden auf diese Weise in der Lage sein, Informationen in einer weitaus effektiveren Art und Weise zu sammeln, zu analysieren und auszutauschen; dabei würde die unnötige Duplizierung von Anstrengungen vermieden werden.

Der “Blueprint Mechanism” stellt mit seinen vier Hauptbestandteilen eine effiziente Schnittstelle zwischen der jeweiligen lokalen Regierung und den Entwicklungspartnern dar; damit werden regionale Eigentümerschaft sowie Rechenschaft sichergestellt.

Durch seine inhärente Logik und Transparenz gewährleistet der “Blueprint Mechanism” eine kohärente, koordinierte und komplementäre (3C) Vorgangsweise aller Akteure ohne dass diese ihre eigenen Interessen den Anderen aufzwingen. Weiteres wird dabei unter Berücksichtigung des regionalen Bedarfs sowie der landesweiten Strategien der „top-down” mit dem “bottom-up” Ansatz verbunden.

Der vorgeschlagene “Blueprint Mechanism” unterstützt weiters das “Interacting Triangle of State/Peace Building” das aus folgenden Eckpfeilern besteht:

- Transparenz: Was wird durch wen durchgeführt?
- Eigentümerschaft: Wer ist für was verantwortlich?
- Fortschritt: Wie viel ist bis dato erreicht worden?

3.) Weitere Vorgangsweise : Entwicklung der Hauptbereiche

In einem ersten Schritt ist das “Blueprint document“ generisch zu entwickeln. Dieses Dokument würde sowohl eine bereitgefächerte Teilnahme der Hauptakteure als auch die Nutzung bereits vorhandener Informationen garantieren.

Zur Erstellung einer generischen Wissensdatenbank müssen im nächsten Schritt Richtwerte und gegenseitige Abhängigkeiten in und zwischen den vier Entwicklungsbereichen identifiziert werden. Dies inkludiert auch die Entwicklung eines interoperablen Berichtssystems.

Am Ende dieses Entwicklungsprozesses würde ein generisches Management Handwerkszeug, der “Blueprinter”, sowohl zur Planung als auch zur Durchführung verschiedenster Missionen weltweit zur Verfügung stehen. Ein adaptives Kontrollsystem würde den jeweiligen Start-

punkt für Beurteilungen und Aktionen entsprechend der jeweiligen Situation (z.B. Haiti, Tschad, Afghanistan) setzen.

4.) Zusammenfassung

Eine Operationalisierung des “Comprehensive Approach” im Sinne des 3C-Ansatzes basiert auf den folgenden Schlüsselbereichen:

- Die “sine-qua-non”-Vorbedingung ist der Wille aller involvierten Individuen, Abteilungen und Organisationen, eine wirkliche “kulturelle Revolution”, die konventionelle Denkweisen und alt eingefahrene Prozeduren aufbricht, zu beschreiten und damit die Fähigkeit zu erlangen, effektiver zusammenzuarbeiten.⁶
- Die Entwicklung eines gemeinsamen “Blueprint Mechanism”, um sowohl die multi-dimensionalen Abhängigkeiten der vier Entwicklungsfelder (Sicherheit, Governance, Wirtschaft & Infrastruktur, Sozialsysteme) zu beherrschen, als auch konzertierte Aktionen auf der Basis gemeinsamer Strategien durchzuführen.
- Ein funktionierendes Dreieck für state/peacebuilding, das aus den drei Eckpfeilern Transparenz, Eigentümerschaft und Fortschritt besteht.

Abstract

The Geneva 3C Roadmap, the Vienna 3C Appeal, the OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations and the UNSC Resolution 1894 all call for enhanced cooperation of various actors in fragile and conflict-affected environments. Consequently, the development of shared tools and methodologies for assessment, planning, monitoring and evaluation assumes a crucial role. Common coordination mechanisms can help to operationalise the comprehensive approach in the spirit of 3C and to achieve concerted action on the basis of joint strategies.

The proposed Blueprint Mechanism builds on a four pillar-model consisting of Civil Security, Governance, Economy & Infrastructure and Social System. A Comprehensive Management System based on a permanently updated Knowledge Database which is publicly accessible shall ensure the exchange of information among involved actors. This planning tool allows a better understanding of the respective capabilities of key actors and their interaction in the mission area. Overlaps and duplication of efforts as well as the creation of so-called “donor orphans” shall be avoided in order to ensure increased effectiveness.

The “sine-qua-non” prerequisite for the success of the Blueprint Mechanism based on the 3C approach is the willingness of all involved individuals, departments and organisations to share information and as a second step, to engage in a common way.

⁶ Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, NATO-Generalsekretär, Rede bei der 46. Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz 2010, <http://www.securityconference.de/Rasmussen-Anders-Fogh.459.0.html?&L=1>, abgerufen am 13.5.2010

Searching for the “missing link” between international community, government and civil society in Kosovo

Vedran Dzihic

1.) Introduction

Based on the extensive research and writing on Kosovo and its interrelations with the region, I believe that the first question relevant for Kosovo is to define whether it is fragile or not. There is no general consensus on this difficult question. Recent discussions that I have had with senior US and EU officials revealed their description of Kosovo as a shiny example of almost perfect post-conflict development. It might be that in comparison to Afghanistan and the experiences in Iraq, Kosovo really seems to be a success story, but judging the situation from the inside perspective, and taking the high disappointment and frustrations of the ordinary citizens with the state of the “new-born” Kosovar state and the state of economy into account, looking at the high unemployment rates and missing opportunities for Europe’s youngest population, Kosovo is still rather fragile than stable.

By referring to the subjective perspective as far as the definition of “fragility” is concerned, I want to point out that there is still a need to take the definition of fragility under closer scrutiny, not only because the definitions as “discursive constructions” do have very concrete and real implications on the situation in the field, but also because definitions as “conventions” shape our perception of a particular situation and problems and thus influence our concepts, strategies and approaches towards a specific region.

The question I wish to address in this paper is threefold: The first question is related to the structural and practical limits for the development of a vibrant civil society on the local side and on the international/donor side. Secondly, I explore underlying, substantial problems of statehood and stateness in Kosovo, which prevent the country to make a decisive step forward. Or to pose the question the other way around: what are limiting factors at the political/state level preventing a faster development of the civil society and society in general. Last but not least, the question of the “missing link” between statebuilding and nation-building-processes and the role the government/state on one side and civil society and development processes on the other side is very relevant for this article. Or to put it in other words: Does any kind of concept – or “magic formula” – exist that would enable the civil society to play an optimal role in fragile situations?

2.) Searching for the “missing link” – Concept of social capital or civic-ness revisited

The main argument I want to make here is that the link that is missing between statebuilding-processes and government on one side and the civil society and rather broad understanding of societal development on the other side can be described by the reference to the concept of social capital and basic components of so called “civic-ness”. According to Putnam, key indicator for civic-ness is trust – trust in people, trust in institutions, trust in the potential of civic engagement. What we face today in the Balkans and in Kosovo is quite the opposite – we are facing a huge amount of mistrust: mistrust of one ethnic group into another, mistrust in politicians and institutions, huge mistrust in judiciary, mistrust in good intentions of the international community and its functions as a role model (which is reflected in extremely low support of the international institutions like UNMIK or even EULEX today), mistrust in civil society and mutual mistrust within the civil society.

Facing such a huge amount of deeply rooted mistrust in the society and among different actors surely diminishes the potential for civic-ness, while weakening social ties and diminishing the potential of the state to meet the needs and expectations of the citizenry, and the trust of citizenry in the state and state officials. Fragile societies, like Kosovo today, desperately need nurturing mutual trust between state and citizens/civil society on one hand and – in cases of international intervention like the case of Kosovo – strengthening mutual trust between different international stakeholders as well as mutual trust between international community and local civil society on the other.

As we discussed above, neither of these relations of trust are existent in Kosovo, and our focus is placed on the question how to raise the level of trust instead deepening mistrust as it has been done very often by international community in Kosovo.

Raising trust is crucial for building social ties and relations between the different actors of community. Besides that, Kosovo needs bridging of different forms of social capital and interest of different groups, which is the second feature crucial for the development of civic-ness. Bridging refers to a process of building trust, fostering communications and building networks between socially and ethnically heterogeneous groups and all actors engaged in the process of statebuilding and democratization.

The lack of bridging between the international community and civil society, between state and society and between international actors is visible in Kosovo but also in the wider region (see Bosnia-Herzegovina for example), and this is clearly an issue that international community and donors should focus more on. The complexity of achieving bridging between different actors is surely a real challenge – how to bridge different worlds in a sense that a strong “civic-ness” as a final stage of development can emerge and be sustainable.

The concept of civic-ness requires the answer to the question why building mutual trust and bridging as crucial components of civic-ness (still) cannot fulfill their function as link between government and international community on one side and the civil society and its actors on the other. I will like to show theoretical discussion with concrete insights from Kosovo to support this argument.

3.) Insights from Kosovo – crucial structural problems

There are underlying, substantial problems of statehood and stateness in Kosovo and in this section I explore these problems and identify fundamental structural and practical limits for the development of a vibrant civil society on the local side as well as on the international/donor side.

a.) Kosovo as “unfinished state” – Underlying problems of statehood and stateness

After almost 9 years as a protectorate of the UN with unresolved status, Kosovo authorities decided to proclaim independency in February 2008, which meant creation of Kosovo as the youngest state in the world, but also as a weak state - a state de facto divided between the North and the South part, recognized currently (July 2010) only by 69 countries and facing huge political and socio-economical problems.

As far as the functioning of the state is concerned, there are a number of problems, which interlinked bring very bleak prospects for the state-ness of the new born state. Firstly, Kosovo political elites and institutions have no history and legacy of state bureaucracy and public ad-

ministration. The process of establishing public administration is full of obstacles primarily linked to the lack of understanding of the standards of governance by political elites. Political elites perceive the state as private enterprise. In fact Government posts and positions of power are seen and utilized as the domain of clientelistic parties dominated by strong leaders. As a result, the public administration in Kosovo faces the problem of blocking development of an independent civil service.

This problem is closely linked to the crucial problem in Kosovo - problem of “state capture” featured by corruption, non-transparent decision making and policy processes lead by particularistic interests of political and economic elites and ethnonationalism as a central mode of politics. Finally, the state building process is limited by the failure or non-willingness of Kosovan political elites to develop a kind of open and transparent political state and to push for effective state reforms.

It is clear that states (at least democratic states, and all countries in the region that are pretending to be democratic) make only sense when there is an efficient civil society. And if we turn it around we will see the crucial dilemma and obstacle for the civil society in the region: civil society makes sense and can be efficient only when there is a state willing and able to implement the rule of law, being accountable and able to establish the crucial underlying conditions for the functioning of the civil society.

The development of civic-ness and social capital in the region is not only an issue of good NGOs, good donor practices, the individual engagement of people etc. It is first and foremost the issue of political democracy in the country. Or more concretely: it is first and foremost a kind of obligation for the government. But the governmental structures so far have not been supportive, they rather have been fighting against some civil society members and organizations, judging them as annoying people criticizing too much and often being assessed as persona non grata. Existing NGOs in Kosovo still face numerous obstacles in fulfilling their role as watch-dogs of political and policy processes, which is partly because of political elites who mainly look for ways how to obstruct the work of the critical and anti-nationalistic civil society forces. Support to civil society is very often masked by supporting alternative and state-loyal “civil society” including ethnic NGOs, religious organizations etc.

The second structural factor critical for Kosovo is the economic development. Kosovo today is confronted with a catastrophic economic and social situation. The population’s dissatisfaction, anger and frustration with the state of economy and social affairs in Kosovo is alarming and ever growing. One out of two Kosovars is without a job. Half of the population lives in poverty, on less than 1.40 Euro a day. To make the things even worse, due to the existing Visa-regime Kosovo is the most isolated country in Europe today. All this contributes to the „ticking bomb“ consisting of high unemployment, poverty and frustration in huge parts of the population, which endangers the progress achieved in Kosovo and the whole project of „democratisation of Kosovo“.

Another specific precondition in Kosovo is created by rather conflicting and difficult relationship between Serbia and Kosovo. Looking at Belgrade’s policy towards Kosovo so far hardly any change can be noticed. Kosovo still functions as a kind of holy grail – not so much for the large parts of population, which are mainly worried about the growing unemployment rates and living standards, but for the political elites still using Kosovo as a “reserved domain”. Serbia needs to stop misusing the Kosovo-issues and abuse Serbs in Kosovo for merely political purposes. Such a situation creates obstacles for all parties involved – it is very negative for Kosovo prospects of regional cooperation and development of contacts and ties with its

neighbours; Serbia's EU integrations process is slowed down by the claims and disagreements about the status of Kosovo, while both Serbian and Albanian populations in areas where conflicts still exist have no chance to revert to peaceful and forward looking life. Recent examples like the Serbian blockade of regional processes (see the example of the high level meeting organized by Slovenia in Brdo kod Kranja which has not been attended by Serbia as well as recent cases of violence in the North part of Mitrovica in June and July 2010) prove this situation as not favourable for either of parties involved. It remains to be seen whether Serbia will change its policy as a reaction to the opinion of the International Court of Justice issued on 22nd of July 2010.

b.) International community in Kosovo – A part of the problem

State building is not an easy task for the international community, and the unclear status of the new born state and the lack of coherent approach based on mutual agreement of international community on the steps to be taken, creates a situation where, actually, international community becomes part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

Kosovo's citizens had high expectations that independence would herald a positive cycle of development, of transformation leading towards integration into the EU. This has yet to happen. Many people in Kosovo are now disillusioned, with a sense of having been abandoned. As UNDP Early Warning Reports show, there is great disappointment with the government in Prishtina and the Kosovar local political class as well as with the international presence in Kosovo, including ICR/EUSR, EULEX, OSCE and UNMIK. The years since 1999 – and also since 2008 - have proven that there is no clear and consistent political strategy of the EU towards Kosovo and that the EU's general policy towards Western Balkans (starting at the beginning of the 1990s), and also its enlargement strategy is deficient, inconsistent, reactive and not based on clear picture of the steps to be taken.

At a more general level, the disadvantages of the lack of coherent approach to development of the country have been visible in Kosovo as well as in Bosnia for example: Rivalries are obvious, and there are huge problems in terms of coordination and cooperation between different international organizations, which results in huge overlaps of interventions, inadequate allocation of resources and general non coherent development agenda for the state. Such a situation also opens the floor for abuse of situation by local elites, and furthers the state capture, with abuse of funds aimed at development and reforms. Institutional set-up that should be "interlocking" is still – even in the EU (LEX)-era (similar to the UNMIK-era) – rather 'interblocking'.

Reasons for the rather passive approach of the EU towards the region in general and Kosovo in particular are manifold, but the growing EU fatigue as well as an approach of the EU dominated by the so called "security dilemma" can be seen as crucial: The EU policy in Kosovo is still, to a large extent, reactive and determined primarily by the aim of maintaining stability in the region. Decisions are taken by a small group of politicians and diplomats and are rather unclear and diffuse. The general public both in the EU and in Kosovo is largely kept in the dark about the different positions and approaches of the EU countries towards Kosovo. One of the negative repercussions of such a passive and unclear policy of the EU can be seen in the visa policy of the EU, which directly produces a Visa ghetto which is very dangerous for long-term development and prevents opening up of the Kosovo society to European values. Finally, the security approach is reactive, regressive and is causing more problems than solutions and may have negative repercussions on the overall development of the inclusive and open society in Kosovo. That is why the EU has to move out of that security-oriented approach and move towards alternative and pro-active approaches in the context of the EU-integration processes.

c.) Level of local civil society

The post-war development of Kosovo and huge international community investments have been favourable for the growth of civil society structures, thus the new world of development projects and NGOs has been created. Current data indicate that there are around 5000 NGOs registered in Kosovo, which when compared to the overall population of Kosovo, seems like an NGO paradise. But, that is not at all surprising - it rather points to a crucial problem: the phenomenon of NGO and project business mushrooming. Here, a "project" is understood as a special kind of activity: short term activities with a time plan and a budget, an activity conducted by donors and their contractors, an activity aimed at a target group, which takes account of the various stakeholders involved.

Of course, the NGO and project business certainly has its advantages, as NGOs may be innovative and capable service providers of benefiting especially socially excluded and marginalised groups in local communities. However, they are problematic due to a number of reasons. Firstly, project orientation of NGOs is donor driven and as such does not provide long term vision and strategy of full development and support to empowerment of target groups. NGOs oriented towards project business are donor-driven and change their missions and values as per new donor requirements and strategies. Such an approach is also short-sighted, i.e. project orientation does not allow long term planning and focuses only on results that are achievable in the short term, which diminishes the chances of full commitment to long term development goals. This is especially important as empowerment, development and peace building are long term processes that need ongoing investments, commitment and mutual trust between the final beneficiaries, NGO activists, and donors. The project orientation also creates a space for manipulation of funds and values that are the core of civil society work: empowerment, building capacities and nurturing trust and social ties within and between communities.

Furthermore, the NGO and project world has developed its own dictionary of words that are in use as a sort of mantra of development. These special words like "training of trainers", "capacity building", "empowerment", "mission statement", "transparency", "networking", "fund raising", "sustainability", "Logical Framework Approach" etc. are strong, but mean very little in the real world – loads of trainings, capacity building, etc. do not bring huge benefits to the target groups, as potentially they bring change at personal level, but due to its short-term commitment rarely bring any benefits and changes to community or society level.

At the end, it is important to deal with the benefits the project world brings to some, especially leaders in the civil society who have enormous benefits from leading the projects and organisations, especially ones in favour of donor community. Huge funds that are in circulation through projects without strong monitoring and accountability mechanisms bring the temptation for misuse of funds, but even if such temptations are not strong, bring about negative perceptions by general public. It is hardly surprising that we find disillusionment in the Balkans about civil society, or that many citizens view NGOs as an alternative enrichment channel for intellectuals who are not willing to do other kinds of "real work".

This overview leads us to conclusion that project life may be a subject to being simply some kind of façade or a vehicle for achieving private strategies, especially to those who are the winners of the situation – intellectuals and leaders who are in grace both or either by the international community and the political and economic elites. On a good side, we do have huge number of cases where projects do make a difference and significant results have been achieved. But we have also a huge number of projects being a façade and creating new NGO elites.

Another obstacle to the overall development of civil society in the Western Balkans and particularly in Kosovo is the fragmentation of the civil society along the ethnic and language lines. Kosovo civil society context is coloured by ethnically divided NGOs, Serbian, Albanian organisations as well as organisations and initiatives of other minority groups, all fighting for resources and space in the civil society world. There is a weak and often confronting and dividing communication between these NGOs who, according to official and formal statements, fight for the same or similar cause of development of the Kosovo society, of peace and prosperity.

We have already mentioned the gap and lack of trust between the government and the civil society in Kosovo. This is further rooted by the difficulty of the government to follow the development of the civil society, the lack of capacities and awareness of the government on how to deal with civil society and to develop mechanisms for working with NGOs, but also existence of strong economic and political interests that prevent transparent and accountable allocation of resources that would enable civil society organisations to become sustainable, develop their expertise and professionalism.

4.) Conclusions or how to fill the gap between various “missing links” in Kosovo

The discussion above leads us to the conclusion that there are many “missing links” in Kosovo, which obstruct its development and prevents the development of civic-ness. What we need in Kosovo – and that applies to much wider context too – is a set of very well formulated strategies based on profound assessment of the specific situation done together with local civil society and focussed on strengthening the mutual trust and engaging all relevant actors in effective “bridging” (3C).

1. First and foremost there is a need to tackle and solve small practical problems, which sometimes may seem to of minor importance, but only small steps are able to change the practice in the field. Examples of such investments are strengthening coordination and cooperation of international community, and the first steps would be to simply bring the ICO-chief and the chief of EULEX to talk with each other or for example to create a better atmosphere of communication between different ambassadors of the Western states. Thus there is a need to apply an integrative and interlocking approach and create standards and procedures to avoid communication and cooperation problems between various international actors. Another intervention that international community could strengthen is prevention and severe punishment of cases of corruption or illegal practices like smuggling etc. within the structures of the international community. For example, recent cases of cigarette smuggling by EULEX officials on the Kosovo-Macedonian boarder contributed to the worsening of the image of EULEX within the Kosovo population.
2. Bring the state back in: The state/the government has to fulfil its tasks and has to be made accountable and responsible – only an accountable and responsive state with strong public administration (responsive to the needs and expectations of the people) can bring change.
3. Apply the principle of inclusion as far as various civic voices are concerned: there are lots of them and they are able to provide valuable contributions to decision making processes and service delivery. In order that such an inclusive approach become successful, the inclusion has to be not only declarative and rhetorical, but also true inclusion in decision making and strategic development.

4. Stay focused, don't change aims, principles and strategies while in the country, work with strong and achievable benchmarks on both sides, with long term vision of desired change to be achieved.
5. Engage civil society forces in building bridges between all the actors involved. Only inclusion of all actors can bring about the desired democratisation and change of attitudes and values. Also, simultaneous work with all actors may bring long-term and sustainable development of mutual trust, joint work and change of perception and understanding of democracy, rule of law and participatory decision making.
6. Engage in building trust at all levels by inclusion, transparency and accountability, open communication, etc.

Finally, we may conclude that statebuilding, democratisation and governance are not ends in themselves. They are ongoing and ever changing processes that are very complicated and complex. But even if it is so we have to remain engaged and create a common vision for civic-ness to emerge at the end of the day.

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Zusammenfassung

Die Frage, ob ein Konzept existiert, wie sich Zivilgesellschaft und zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen optimal in fragilen Situationen einbringen können, führt vor dem Hintergrund der Entwicklungen im Kosovo, zu einer schwer zu realisierenden Vision. “Civic-ness“ wie von Putnam gefordert, basiert auf dem Schlüsselindikator Vertrauen, zwischen Akteuren, ethnischen Gruppen und in Staat/Gesellschaftsbeziehungen. Im Kosovo stößt dieses Konzept auf konkrete Barrieren: Die politische Elite kann sich nicht auf eine gewachsene Geschichte oder bürokratische Legitimität stützen, Korruption, Intransparenz und Partikularismus charakterisieren die Umgangsformen. Dazu komme der sozio-ökonomische Faktor: Ein isoliertes Regime, das mit hoher Arbeitslosigkeit konfrontiert ist, kämpft mit bleibender Armut und Frustration. Ein Spezialproblem des Kosovo sind die Beziehungen zu Serbien, die auch nach dem Gutachten des IGH vom 22. Juli 2010 offen bleiben.

In dieser komplexen Situation wurde das internationale Engagement, in sich ein Mehrebnenspiel, durch den unklaren völkerrechtlichen Status des Kosovo verkompliziert. Der Sicherheitsansatz der EU ist reaktiv, in erster Linie geprägt von der Stabilisierung der Region. Fragmentierte Politiken ließen ein “NGO Paradies“ entstehen (etwa 5000 registrierte NRO vor Ort), die projektorientiert und kurzfristigem Planungshorizont arbeiten.

In Peace- und Statebuilding-Prozessen, die einen Weg und nicht ein Ziel in sich darstellen, zählen daher die Bildung von Vertrauen, Netzwerkbildung auf strategischer Ebene vor Ort, inklusive Entscheidungsfindung, klare und mittelfristig verlässliche Prioritätensetzung und Arbeit “am Staat“ (Kapazitätenbildung, Empowerment, etc.).

Teil IV. Konzeptuelle Grundlagen eines österreichischen Engagements für Sicherheit und Entwicklung¹

1.) Konzeptionelle Grundlagen

Friede und Sicherheit sind grundlegende Voraussetzungen für die Verhinderung gewaltsamer Konflikte, wirksamer Armutsbekämpfung, die Achtung der Menschenrechte und Nicht-Diskriminierung, die Entfaltung einer selbstbestimmten Zivilgesellschaft, aber auch der Bewältigung der Folgen des Klimawandels und anderer Faktoren wie Migration oder demographische Veränderungen aufgrund von Pandemien, die in einem Zusammenhang mit der Herausforderung von Fragilität stehen. Fragilität geht oft einher mit so genannten „privaten Gewaltakteuren“ wie z.B. Drogen- und Menschenhandel, Warlords, Rebellion, organisierte Kriminalität, die den Staat systematisch schwächen. Sie sind Quelle für Korruption, Unbleichbehandlung, interne Spannungen etc. Die „privatisierte Gewaltdimension“ macht die Relevanz für entwicklungspolitische Maßnahmen deutlich.

Derartige Situationen tendieren dazu, über Phänomene wie Terrorismus, Flüchtlingsströme oder Formen transnationaler Kriminalität auch regional bzw. global Auswirkungen zu entfalten. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist der Umgang mit der Herausforderung von Fragilität wesentliche Aufgabe aller international aktiven österreichischen Akteure.

Was bedeutet Fragilität?

Fragile Situationen können im Extremfall in einen bewaffneten Konflikt münden. Fragilität kann als nachhaltige Störung der Beziehungen und Erwartungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft aufgefasst werden und ist eine Konsequenz von staatlichem Versagen auf den Ebenen von Autorität, Legitimität, Rechtsschutz und Leistungsbereitstellung, sei es durch mangelnde Kapazitäten oder fehlenden politischen Willen.² Der SLF bezieht sich daher auf den Zeitraum vor, in und nach Konflikten sowie auf fragile Situationen, in denen eine latente Eskalationsgefahr gegeben ist.

2.) Neuer Institutionenbegriff

Fragile Situationen sind komplex in Ursachen und Erscheinungsformen. Die DAC-Prinzipien konzentrieren sich daher auf die Entwicklung von grundlegenden Funktionen von Staatlichkeit, allerdings nicht in Form einer künstlichen Errichtung von Institutionengebilden, sondern im Sinn einer „good enough governance“, die garantiert, dass die dynamischen Prozesse in den mannigfaltigen Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft in friedlicher und möglichst produktiver Form gestaltet werden können. „Resilience“ soll als Fähigkeit zu gewaltfreier Konfliktaustragung einer Gesellschaft gestärkt werden.

¹ Dieser Abschnitt fußt auf den parallel zur 3C-Konferenz geführten Arbeiten der Redaktionsgruppe für den „Strategischen Leitfaden Sicherheit und Entwicklung“. Mitglieder der Redaktionsgruppe waren Dr. Jan Pospisil, Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik (OIIP), Günther Barnet, BMLVS, Dr. Dominique Mair, Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Leitung: Mag. Dr. Ursula Werther-Pietsch, BMeiA. Der Strategische Leitfaden wird nach Annahme der neuen österreichischen Sicherheitsdoktrin von der Bundesregierung mittels Ministerratsbeschluss angenommen und auf www.entwicklung.at veröffentlicht.

² OECD/DAC: Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, 2008: 16ff.

Die Einbindung der Zivilgesellschaft, insb. in den Partnerregionen, ist dabei ein wesentliches Anliegen. Dennoch liegt die Priorität auch in fragilen Kontexten in einer möglichst weitgehenden Nutzung der Systeme des Partnerlandes. Im Sinne des „Do No Harm“-Grundsatzes soll damit das Entstehen paralleler Geberstrukturen, die eigenstaatliche Leistungsfähigkeit mehr hemmt als unterstützt, hintengehalten werden.³

3.) Handlungsansatz – Der 3C-Ansatz

Die internationale Entwicklungspolitik hat bereits 1997 begonnen, Kapazitäten im Bereich Konfliktprävention und Friedenssicherung aufzubauen. Die Erkenntnis, dass fragile Situationen Entwicklung hemmen, hat die Gebergemeinschaft in den im Jahr 2007 veröffentlichten OECD/DAC „*Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*“⁴ anerkannt. Die Beschäftigung mit fragilen Situationen wurde damit zunehmend auch Aufgabe der OEZA.⁵

Parallel dazu hat die internationale Gemeinschaft in Reaktion auf die komplexen Herausforderungen in fragilen Situationen multidimensionale, „integrierte“ Friedensmissionen (peace (support) operations) ins Leben gerufen, die zunehmend auch zivile Aufgaben umfassen.⁶ Die Gründung der *Peacebuilding Commission* (PBC) im Jahr 2005 ist ein Meilenstein in diesen Reformbestrebungen. Auch die Europäische Union hat einen vergleichbaren Weg eingeschlagen.⁷

In der internationalen Diskussion hat sich damit eine Herangehensweise durchgesetzt, die zivile und politische Dimensionen sowie die notwendige Verschränkung von Konfliktprävention, Friedenserhaltung, Friedenskonsolidierung und den Aufbau staatlicher Strukturen hervorhebt.

Eine Vielzahl von Akteuren nimmt diese Aufgaben wahr. Koordination, Komplementarität und Kohärenz sind maßgebliche Arbeitsprinzipien für das entwicklungspolitische, diplomatische, finanzpolitische und wirtschaftliche, humanitäre sowie militärische, justizielle und polizeiliche, staatliche und nicht-staatliche Engagement geworden. Dieses Spektrum der Zusammenarbeit (Kooperation) kann eine Interaktion von Akteuren auf der Stufe von Konsultationen bis hin zur Integration umfassen, dh es soll situationsabhängig möglichst koordiniert, komplementär und kohärent vorgegangen werden.

Der 3C-Ansatz, der auf der operativen Ebene alle nationalen und internationalen, staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Partner erfasst, ist entlang der Prinzipien der *Geneva 3C Roadmap* 2009 und des *Vienna 3C Appeal* 2010 zum zentralen Orientierungspunkt geworden.

³ OECD DAC: Do No Harm. International Support for Statebuilding.

⁴ DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, April 2007, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf?bcsi_scan_0AB3C-D11C6E4C963=0&bcsi_scan_filename=38368714.pdf.

⁵ 1997 Guidelines „Helping Prevent Violent Conflict“; 2007 Principles; 2006 OEZA Leitlinien

⁶ Damit wird der Ansatz des primär militärisch ausgerichteten *Peacekeeping* mit Komponenten im polizeilichen und zivilen Bereich erweitert. Die VN-Missionen im Kosovo (UNMIK), Ost-Timor (UNMIT), DRC (MONUC) und Sudan (UNMIS) sind konkretes Resultat dieses Prozesses; siehe auch VN Capstone Doctrine 2008

⁷ Schlüsseldokumente (mit dem Göteborg Programm von 2001 und der Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie von 2003 (wird noch ergänzt)

4.) Das erweiterte Sicherheitsverständnis

Fragilität hat unmittelbare Auswirkungen auf die Möglichkeiten der Menschen, ein selbstbestimmtes Leben zu führen. In seiner grundlegenden Ausrichtung ist der Leitfaden von einem umfassenden Sicherheitsbegriff und insb. vom Konzept der „*menschlichen Sicherheit*“ geleitet, die dem Ziel des Friedens, der Armutsbekämpfung und Erreichung sozialer Gerechtigkeit, politischer Partizipation sowie dem Wohlergehen der Menschen verpflichtet ist.

Das in diesem Ansatz widergespiegelte erweiterte Sicherheitsverständnis orientiert sich an Grundbedürfnissen und Menschenrechten. Die spezifischen Bedürfnisse der von durch bewaffnete Konflikte betroffenen Zivilbevölkerung, insb. von Frauen, ihre tragende Rolle in Friedensprozessen, sowie besonders verletzlichen Gruppen, insb. Kinder, Menschen mit Behinderung(en), intern Vertriebene und Minderheiten, wie in den VN-Sicherheitsrats-resolutionen 1325 und 1889 sowie 1894 zum Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung verankert, sind dabei wichtige Entwicklungen.

Menschliche Sicherheit ist zugleich eine grundlegende Voraussetzung für die kollektive Bewältigung fragiler Situationen. Sie steht daher nicht im Widerspruch zur Frage der strukturellen Stabilität staatlicher und regionaler Strukturen, sondern gibt dem Aufbau tragfähiger staatlicher Institutionen eine spezifische Orientierung.

5.) Fragile Situationen als multidimensionale Herausforderung

Jede fragile Situation und jeder Konflikt haben einen unterschiedlichen Verlauf. Dennoch können wichtige zusammenhängende Handlungsstränge verfolgt werden. Das Ineinandergreifen überlappender kurz-, mittel- und langfristiger Strategien hat dabei oberste Priorität. Dies setzt eine einheitliche Begrifflichkeit und ein damit einhergehendes gemeinsames Verständnis der jeweiligen Herausforderungen und Zielsetzungen voraus.

Fokus/Situation	Fragile Situation im Vorfeld eines bewaffneten Konflikts	Offener gewaltsamer Konflikt	Fragile Situation nach Beendigung der bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen
Stabilisierung (kurzfristig)	Maßnahmen der Konfliktprävention/-transformation und Deeskalation	Maßnahmen des Konfliktmanagements: <i>Konflikttransformation</i> und <i>Stabilisierung</i>	Maßnahmen der Konfliktnachsorge: <i>Peacebuilding</i> und <i>Statebuilding</i>
„ Resilience “ (mittelfristig)			
Menschliche Sicherheit/Friede (langfristig)			

Multidimensionales Konfliktmanagement im Kontext fragiler Situationen
Pospisil/Werther-Pietsch 2010

Dies gilt auch für die staatlichen Akteure, die für die Erfüllung ihrer Aufgaben auf eine enge Abstimmung und Kooperation mit Organisationen der Zivilgesellschaft angewiesen sind.

Zudem bettet sich das Engagement in den gegebenen internationalen Rahmen, sowohl auf multilateraler als auch auf bilateraler Ebene, ein.

Eine besondere Rolle kommt dabei den staatlichen wie zivilgesellschaftlichen Partnern vor Ort zu. In der *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* und der *Accra Agenda for Action* sowie im *Code of Conduct on Division of Labour* der Europäischen Union hat sich die internationale Gemeinschaft verpflichtet, auf eine enge Abstimmung mit den Partnern vor Ort zu achten und die lokalen und regionalen Systeme zur Umsetzung der Ziele prioritär zu nützen.

6.) Zu den Anforderungen an sicherheits- und entwicklungspolitische Akteure

Alle sicherheits- und entwicklungspolitischen Akteure treffen bei ihrem Einsatz in einer fragilen Situation auf spezifische Bedingungen. Diese bestehen in der frühzeitigen gemeinsamen Analyse mit den staatlichen, internationalen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Partnern in der Zielregion, der wichtigen Entscheidung der revolvierenden Priorisierung von Aktivitäten und in der Berücksichtigung folgender Faktoren, die das Verhalten der Akteure in jeder Phase nachhaltig beeinflussen. Wo gewaltsame Konflikte bereits den Raum für Humanitäre Hilfe zulassen, müssen diese von Beginn an nachhaltig orientiert sein⁸. Friedenserhaltung, Friedenskonsolidierung und der Aufbau staatlicher Strukturen („peacekeeping“, „peacebuilding“ und „statebuilding“) müssen gut aufeinander abgestimmt und die konfliktpräventive Funktion der Akteure gestärkt werden.

a.) Sicherheit und Entwicklung kommt nicht von außen

Prozesse, die zu einem gesellschaftlichen Gleichgewicht und funktionierenden staatlichen Institutionen führen, sollen inklusiv und selbstgesteuert verlaufen. „Ownership“ ist für die Etablierung von Staats-Gesellschaftsbeziehungen besonders wichtig. Sowohl Entwicklung als auch Sicherheit sind langfristig nicht durch Intervention zu erreichen, sondern hängen von den richtigen Bedingungen ab, die dafür geschaffen werden. Dazu gehört auch die demokratische und justizielle Kontrolle der Sicherheitskräfte.

Die lokale Zivilgesellschaft ist ein Schlüsselement in fragilen Situationen. Die Stärkung ihrer konfliktpräventiven und stabilisierenden Funktionen ist daher ein wichtiger Faktor.

b.) Eine neue starke Rolle für regionale Organisationen

Im Rahmen der Harmonisierungsbemühungen der internationalen Engagements spielen Regionalorganisationen eine besondere Rolle. Ein Beispiel ist die 2002 Charta der Afrikanischen Union, die eine gestärkte Schutzverantwortung innerhalb der Mitgliedstaaten vorsieht. In Reaktion auf die Erweiterung der Aufgabenstellungen internationaler Friedensoperationen der VN, EU, OSZE, AU und anderen regionalen Organisationen ist insb. der verstärkte Aufbau ziviler Kapazitäten wichtig.

c.) Zum Grundprinzip nachhaltigen Agierens

Alle Akteure verbindet in ihren jeweils unterschiedlichen Aufgabenbereichen und Schwerpunkten ihrer Orientierung immer die Verpflichtung, im Sinn des Grundprinzips nachhaltigen Agierens sowohl kurz- wie auch mittel- und langfristige Perspektiven gleichermaßen zu berücksichtigen. Ziel dieses multidimensionalen Verständnisses von Nachhaltigkeit in fragilen Situationen ist die Fokussierung auf den kontextualisierten Aufbau staatlicher Legitimität. Alle Akteure sind sich dabei bewusst, dass gerade die Frage staatlicher Legitimität als komplexer Ausdruck von Beziehungen zwischen Gesellschaften und Staat einen wechselseitigen

⁸ Siehe Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, <http://www.reliefweb.int/ghd/a%2023%20Principles%20EN-GHD19.10.04%20RED.doc>; European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid 2007

politischen Lernprozess für alle Beteiligten darstellt, in dem keine allgemein gültigen Modelle oder Muster bestehen.⁹

Jede Form der Legitimität kann jedoch mit menschenrechtlichen Maßstäben gemessen werden. Das österreichische Engagement als Beitrag zu einer umfassenden menschlichen Sicherheit ist daher von der Orientierung an den Menschenrechten geleitet.

⁹ OECD DAC: The State's Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity

Part IV. Conceptual foundations of the Austrian engagement in the field of security and development¹

1.) Conceptual foundations

Peace and security are fundamental prerequisites for the prevention of violent conflicts and effective poverty reduction, respect for human rights and non-discrimination, as well as the development of an independent civil society. Furthermore, the handling of the consequences of climate change and other factors such as migration and demographic changes due to pandemics, are to be seen in the challenging context of so called “fragile situations”. Fragility is often accompanied by so-called “private armed groups” and warlords active in drug and human trafficking and organized crime that weaken the state systematically. They are a source of corruption, discrimination, and internal tensions. This dimension of “privatized violence” highlights the relevance for international development work.

Such fragile situations tend to have an impact on a regional and global scale through phenomena such as terrorism, refugee flows and forms of transnational crime. Against this background, responses to fragility are an essential task for all Austrian and international actors that are active worldwide.

What is fragile?

Fragile situations, in severe cases, can lead to an armed conflict. Furthermore, fragility can be a huge disruption in the relationship and the mutual expectations between states and societies. Fragility therefore can be seen as a consequence of state failure on the levels of authority, legitimacy, legal protection and service provision, generated by a lack of capacity or a lack of political will.² The activities of any intervention consequently should concern the period prior to, during and after violent conflicts, as well as fragile situations in which a latent danger of escalation is present most of the time.

2.) A new perception of state institutions

Fragile situations are complex in their causes and manifestations. The DAC “*Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*” therefore focus on the development of basic functions of statehood. Herein, the building of artificial state institutions and structures is to be avoided. Instead, the focus should be on developing “good enough governance”, which guarantees that the dynamic processes of the manifold relations between the state and society can shape itself and can develop in peaceful and productive ways. “Resilience” shall be strengthened as an important aspect of the non-violent conflict resolution skills in a society.

¹ This section is based on the work of the Editorial Team for the “*Strategischen Leitfaden Sicherheit und Entwicklung*”, parallel to the 3C Conference. Members of the Editorial Team were Mag. Dr. Jan Pospisil, Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip), Günther Barnet, Ministry of Defence, Dr. Dominique Mair, Austrian Development Agency (Austrian Development Agency), led by Mag. Dr. Ursula Werther-Pietsch, Federal Ministry for European and international Affairs. The “*Strategische Leitfaden*” will be approved by the collective decision of the Austrian government and published on the website www.entwicklung.at after adoption of the new security doctrine.

² OECD/DAC: Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, 2008: 16pp.

The active involvement of civil society, especially within the partner regions, is of fundamental concern. However, priority in fragile contexts is on the use of the systems of the partner country, as extensively as possible. According to the “Do No Harm” principle, it is of utmost importance to avoid the creation of parallel structures (a so called “dual public sector”) that restrain the performance of the partner state in the long run.³

3.) Course of Action – The 3C Approach

Already in 1997, international development policy began building capacity in the field of conflict prevention and Peacebuilding. The insight that fragile situations hamper development has led to the elaboration of the 2007 OECD / DAC “*Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*”⁴. These principles are accepted as binding by the international donor community. The work on fragile situations thus became increasingly important also for the Austrian Development Cooperation.⁵

At the same time, in response to the complex challenges in fragile situations the international community developed the concept of multidimensional, “integrated” peace missions (peace [support] operations), which increasingly include civilian tasks.⁶ The establishment of the *Peacebuilding Commission* (PBC) in 2005 is a milestone in these reform efforts. The European Union also has taken a similar path.⁷

The international debate thus has led to an approach that highlights the necessary interrelationship between conflict prevention, Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in a way that integrates the civil and political dimensions.

A variety of actors works on these tasks. Coordination, complementarity and coherence have become key operating principles for the involvement on a developmental, diplomatic, fiscal and economic, humanitarian and military, judicial and police, government and non-state level. The spectrum of cooperation and interaction between the actors involved can reach from consultations to integration; i.e. according to the situation the best possible coordinated, complementary and coherent way to proceed is sought.

The 3C approach, which on the operational level tackles all national and international governmental and non-governmental partners, has become the focal point of orientation along the principles of the *Geneva 3C Roadmap* from 2009 and the *Vienna 3C Appeal* from 2010.

³ OECD DAC: Do No Harm. International Support for Statebuilding.

⁴ DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, April 2007, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf?bcsi_scan_0AB3C-D11C6E4C963=0&bcsi_scan_filename=38368714.pdf

⁵ Besides the „Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations“ (OECD, 2007), other relevant documents in that context are the OECD / DAC-Guidelines from 1997, „Helping Prevent Violent Conflict“. In Austria, the 2006 „OEZA Leitlinien Friedenssicherung und Konfliktprevention“ are of particular relevance.

⁶ Therewith, the approach of primarily military-oriented *peacekeeping* is significantly widened with policing and civilian components. Concrete results of this process can be seen in the UN-Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK), East Timor (UNMIT), DRC (MONUC) and Southern Sudan (UNMIS); see also the 2008 UN Capstone Doctrine.

⁷ See for example the 2001 „EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts“ (the so called Gothenburg Programme), the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2009 European Development Report „Overcoming Fragility in Africa: Forging a New European Approach“.

4.) A comprehensive understanding of security

Fragility has immediate effects on the ability of people to live a self-determined life. In its basic guidance, the approach taken draws on a comprehensive concept of security. In particular, the concept of “*human security*”, which aims at peace, fighting poverty and achieving social justice, political participation and the welfare of the people, is highly relevant.

The comprehensive view of security reflected in this approach is guided by a focus on basic needs and human rights. The specific requirements of the civilian population, especially of women, affected by armed conflicts, and their key role in peace processes, as well as vulnerable groups, in particular children, disabled persons, internally displaced persons and minorities, are a fundamental concern. This is highlighted in the UN Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1889 as well as in the resolution 1894 for the protection of the civilian population in violent conflicts.

Human security furthermore serves as a fundamental precondition for the collective handling of fragile situations. It is therefore not contradicting the question of the structural stability of the state and regional structures, but instead adds a specific orientation to the establishment of sustainable state institutions.

5.) Fragile situations as a multi-dimensional challenge

Each fragile situation and every violent conflict has a different history and a different course. Yet it is possible to identify common strings of action. The smooth transition between and even integration of overlapping short-, medium- and long-term strategies have top priority. This requires a common terminology and a correlated collective understanding of the respective challenges and the goals ahead.

Focus/Situation	Fragile situations in the before the outbreak of a violent conflict	Open violent conflict	Fragile situations after the cessation of violent hostilities
<i>Stabilisation</i> (short-term)	Measures of <i>Conflict Prevention</i> <i>/ Conflict Transformation</i> and <i>De-escalation</i>	Measures of <i>Conflict Management:</i> <i>Conflict Transformation</i> and <i>Stabilisation</i>	Measures of <i>Post-Conflict-Management:</i> <i>Peacebuilding</i> and <i>Statebuilding</i>
<i>Resilience</i> (medium-term)			
<i>Human Security</i> <i>/ Peace</i> (long-term)			

Multidimensional conflict management in the context of fragile situations
Pospisil/Werther-Pietsch 2010

This also applies to governmental actors, which for a successful performance are dependent on a close coordination and cooperation with civil society organizations. In addition, any commitment has to be embedded in the prevailing international context, both on the multilateral and the bilateral level.

The partner state and the civil society partners on the ground are playing a special role. In the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* and the *Accra Agenda for Action* as well as in the *Code of Conduct on Division of Labour* of the European Union, the international community

commits itself to closely coordinate its actions with local partners, and to use the local and regional systems (“country systems”) primarily in the implementation process.

6.) On the requirements for security and development actors

In the course of their interventions in a fragile situation, all security and development actors encounter specific conditions. Therefore, an early joint analysis with state actors, international agencies and civil society partners within the target region is indispensable. Such analysis guides the important decisions regarding the revolving prioritization of activities and the consideration of all relevant factors that have lasting influence on the behaviour of actors in each phase of their engagement. Where violent conflicts already allow a space for Humanitarian assistance, such assistance has to be guided by the principle of sustainability from the very beginning.⁸ Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Statebuilding must be well-coordinated. The conflict prevention capacities of the actors have to be strengthened as well.

a.) Security and development are not coming from outside

Processes aiming at a social equilibrium and the functioning of state institutions shall run self-regulated and shall be socially inclusive. For the establishment of resilient state-society relations, “ownership” is of particular importance. Both long-term development and security cannot be achieved by intervention, but depend on the right conditions created for it. Such conditions also include the democratic and judicial control of the security forces.

The local civil society is a key element in fragile situations. Strengthening its capacities and its role in conflict prevention and stabilization therefore is an important factor.

b.) A new strong role for regional organizations

Within the actor harmonization efforts of the international community, regional organizations play a vital role. An important example is the 2002 Charter of the African Union, which is calling for strengthened protection responsibilities within its Member States. In response to the enlargement of tasks for international peace operations of the UN, EU, OSCE, AU and other regional organizations, the increasing development of civilian capabilities is particularly important.

c.) The basic principle of sustainability

All actors in their different areas of responsibility and with their different emphasis and priorities are always connected by the obligation to act along the basic principle of sustainability, and to take short-, medium- and long-term prospects equally in consideration. The aim of this multidimensional understanding of sustainability in fragile situations is the focus on the contextualized building of state legitimacy. All actors shall be aware that the question of legitimacy is to be seen as an expression of complex relationships between societies and the state. Such relationships are a mutual political learning process for all parties, where no universally accepted models or patterns exist.⁹

⁸ See the Initiative on „Good Humanitarian Donorship“, <http://www.reliefweb.int/ghd/a%2023%20Principles%20EN-GHD19.10.04%20RED.doc>; European Consensus of Humanitarian Aid (2007).

⁹ OECD DAC: The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity

Still, any form of legitimacy can be measured by human rights standards. Austria's commitment therefore is designed as a contribution to a comprehensive human security with a particular focus on human rights.

Annexe

A. Programm 3C-Konferenz

Programme

5 May **Public Opening¹** in cooperation with UNA-Austria
18.00 h **Venue:** National Defence Academy; Stiftgasse 2A, 1070 Vienna, reachable by
underground (U3)
Welcome address
Major General Johann Pucher, Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports
Key-Note from H.E. The Federal Minister for European and International Af-
fairs Michael Spindelegger (per video-message)
Purpose of the Conference
Ambassador Irene Freudenschuss-Reichl, Ministry for European and Interna-
tional Affairs
Expectations of NGOs
Ruth Picker, Global Responsibility – Austrian Platform for Development and
Humanitarian Aid (“AG Globale Verantwortung”)
Host Lecture from Cristina Hoyos, Swiss Agency for Cooperation and Devel-
opment (SDC), „3 C approach in fragile situations“
Followed by a reception

International Conference

6 May **3C response to fragile situations and civil society**
Venue: National Defence Academy (NDA)
9.00 Welcome coffee
9.30-9.45 Opening of the Conference, Amb. Freudenschuss-Reichl
Address by H.E. The Federal Minister of Defence and Sports Norbert Darabos
10.00-10.45 **Setting the scene: How to include civil society - conceptual challenges, 4
perspectives**
1. Alina Rocha Menocal, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), UK, „State-
building for peace: navigating an arena of contradictions“
2. Wolfgang Petritsch, Austrian Delegation to the OECD, „Independent ac-
tors – common visions – a contribution to a peacebuilding and statebuild-
ing consensus“
3. Rosan Smits, Clingendael Institute, Conflict Research Unit, NL, “Working
mechanisms for engaging with local civil society organisations”
4. Emma Birikorang, Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Training Cen-
tre, Ghana, „The new peace architecture in Africa – is there a place for
civil society engagement?“
Chair: MG Johann Pucher, Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports
Comments by:
Juana de Catheu, OECD, International Network on Conflict and Fragility (IN-
CAF)

¹ The kick-off event and the evening lecture will be held in German, the main conference day on 6th May in English (without translation).

- Gerhard Jandl, Security Policy Director, MFA Austria
- 10.50-11.30 *Plenary Discussion*
- 11.30 *Photo*
- 11.35-11.45 *Coffeebreak*
- 11.45-12.30 **Roundtable 1: The critical role of civil society in fragile situations – the value added: 4 voices**
1. Sabine Kurtenbach, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, „Post-war and post-conflict challenges for development cooperation”
 2. Daouda Boubacar Diallo, Réseau International d'Études Stratégiques sur les Conflits en Afrique (RIESCA), „Strengths and weaknesses of civil society engagement in conflict prevention“
 3. Gudrun Kramer, Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding (IICP), „NGO mediation and advocacy before, after and during violent conflict“
 4. Max Santner, Austrian Red Cross, “NGO security and monitoring in humanitarian scenarios“
- Chair:** Professor Othmar Höll, Austrian Institute for International Affairs (AIIA)
- Comments by:**
 Katja Ahlfors, European Commission, Crisis Response and Peace Building
 Brigitte Öppinger-Walchshofer, Managing Director, Austrian Development Agency (ADA)
- 12.35-13.15 *Plenary Discussion*
- 13.15 h *Lunch, offered by the MFA*
- 14.30-15.15 **Roundtable 2: The need for addressing a clear value added – synergies between actors in the context of peace operations: 4 impulses**
1. Stefani Weiss, Bertelsmann Foundation, „The 3D lense: lessons learned for 3C“
 2. David Tolbert, President of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “Fragile states: Building more inclusive policies and societies”
 3. Thomas Starlinger, Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports, Former Force Commander/Kosovo, “Operationalising a Comprehensive Approach”
 4. Vedran Dzihic, University of Vienna, Department of Political Science, “A researcher’s perspective on the Kosovo example – how NGOs perform their tasks“
- Chair:** Amb. Irene Freudenschuss-Reichl, MFA
- Comments by:**
 Susan Pond, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO
 Arno Truger, Director, Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR)
- 15.15-16.00 *Plenary Discussion*
- 16.00-16.30 **Wrap up and way ahead**
 Tour de Table, next steps
- 16.30 *Wine reception*

Vienna 3C Appeal
Format „Negotiators only“

- 7. Mai** **Folgerungen für den Strategischen Leitfaden „Sicherheit und Entwicklung“**
Veranstaltungsort: Österreichische Gesellschaft für Außenpolitik und die Vereinten Nationen, Reitschulgasse 2 („Stallburg“), 1010 Wien
- 11.00-13.00 h Begrüßung und Vorsitz:
Ursula Werther-Pietsch, BMeiA
Günther Barnet, BMLVS
Ruth Picker, AG Globale Verantwortung
Präsentation „3C Appell“ im Lichte der Tagung
Diskussion und Finalisierung
Prozess Strategischer Leitfaden: weiteres Vorgehen
- 13.00 h *Ausklang bei Brötchen und Sekt*

B. Genfer 3C-Roadmap

3C Roadmap Improving results in conflict and fragile situations

The 3C Conference, meeting in Geneva on 19-20 March 2009, brought together members of the defence, development, diplomatic, finance and economic, humanitarian, and justice and police communities.

The Conference:

1. *Reaffirmed* individual and collective responsibilities for the advancement of stable, effective and accountable states, as well as of long-term sustainable peace, security, development and human rights, in conflict and fragile situations;
2. *Emphasized* that it is crucial to address the nexus between peace, security, human rights and development, to help prevent conflict and to successfully achieve recovery, statebuilding and peacebuilding objectives, and to address the root causes of conflicts;
3. *Recognized* that the international response in fragile and conflict situations would benefit from increased coherence, coordination and complementarity between actors responsible for defence, diplomatic, justice, finance and economic affairs as well as development and, where appropriate, humanitarian assistance and others; this would increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the support provided by the international community;
4. *Recognized* also that this need for increased coherence, coordination and complementarity calls for improved approaches by both bilateral donors (Whole of Government approaches) and multilateral actors (Whole of System approaches); noting further that a Whole of Government approach should also be implemented as much as possible by partner countries' governments¹;
5. *Reaffirmed* the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, and *reiterated* that independence means the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political, economic, military or other objectives;
6. *Stressed* that, where governments demonstrate the political will to foster peace, security, human rights and development, the international community should seek to align with partner countries' national strategies and priorities to address the challenges of fragility and conflict;
7. *Recognized* in this connection the importance of the national budget as a tool for the partner government for setting priorities, coordinating actions and accounting for results;
8. *Recalled and underlined* the importance of existing political commitments[1] that underpin a 3C approach and recognized the importance of the many practical steps[2] already adopted by participants to encourage a 3C approach;

The Conference reached the following conclusions and recommendations, referred to as the 3C Roadmap:

¹ The term partner country in this document is used to designate countries in situations of fragility and/or conflict.

3C Principles

A coherent, coordinated and complementary (3C) approach is needed to improve the effectiveness of support to countries and communities affected by conflict and fragility. Coherence, coordination and complementarity require both Whole of Government and Whole of System approaches. 3C is understood as collaborative and mutually reinforcing approaches by international actors and partner countries, including civil society, to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their support to peace, security, and development in situations of conflict and fragility. The 3C Roadmap is intended to reinforce related ongoing international processes, such as those led by the 3C conference coconvenors, the UN, the WB, the OECD and NATO, and to promote synergy amongst them.

Against this background, the Conference agreed that the following principles should be given particular attention:

1. Strengthening national ownership and national capacities;
2. Responding in a timely and appropriate manner to the evolving situation in the partner country;
3. Strengthening mutual accountability of partner countries and international actors;
4. Reducing the burden of aid management on partner country capacity;
5. Making efficient use of limited resources and avoiding duplication and funding gaps;
6. Improving and deepening joint learning, and increasing response capacities.

Recommendations

The Conference encouraged all parties to strive to implement the following recommendations in order to achieve coherent, coordinated and complementary (3C) approaches in conflict and fragile situations:

1. To strengthen national ownership and national capacities

a. Systematically associate partner countries' authorities and relevant stakeholders at all levels, including civil society, in assessing needs, in analysing root causes of conflict and fragility, and in identifying priorities to strengthen national and local ownership and in contributing to confidence building and reconciliation.

b. Give priority to strengthening partner countries' institutions and capacities at all levels, including the local level; to enable the state to fulfil its core functions. Priority functions include:

ensuring security and justice, mobilizing revenue and managing budget and public finances, establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, strong economic performance and employment generation. Support to these areas will in turn strengthen citizens' confidence, trust and engagement with state institutions. Civil society has a key role both in demanding good governance and in service delivery.

2. To respond in a timely and appropriate manner to the evolving situation in the partner country:

a. Encourage regularly updated joint assessments and analysis of the evolving situation, challenges and trends, including crisis and risks dynamics. These joint assessments should initially be as light and rapid as possible, including partner countries wherever appropriate, and progressively become more comprehensive. They should involve those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development and humanitarian assistance and other policy areas, as appropriate.

b. Using these assessments as a basis, partner countries and international actors, as appropriate, should develop shared and realistic peacebuilding, statebuilding and recovery objectives that are sensitive to the changing environment, as well as strategies that address the root causes of conflict and fragility and help ensure the protection and the participation of the population. These strategies should promote gender equality, social inclusion and human rights; and should progressively be adjusted to the evolving situation. The critical path of priority actions, their sequencing and how they mutually reinforce each other should be identified at the outset, with enough flexibility for periodical readjustment. They should make use of the comparative advantages of all different actors, while preserving the humanity, independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid. In this context, where a peace operation with a Security Council mandate has deployed, ensure that it is part of a whole of system approach to peacebuilding which helps to create the conditions for a sustainable and lasting peace. The positive socio-economic impact of the peace operations should be optimized, taking into account their security objectives.

c. Foster the use of shared tools and methodologies for assessment, planning, monitoring and evaluation which address the needs of all actors to encourage coherence, coordination and complementarity.

d. The international community, as a matter of priority, should deploy demand-driven resources in support of local capacities, wherever possible; it also should stand ready to provide direct support for the delivery of priority activities for critical state functions and for early and sustained recovery when national capacity is seriously lacking, mindful of the need to systematically support national implementation capacity and rely upon it increasingly as it develops. It also should foster the development of capacities at the international level that can support state- and peacebuilding objectives; in some cases this requires building new capacities to tackle these complex tasks, in others it is about recognizing where those capacities currently exist and providing adequate training.

3. To strengthen the mutual accountability of partner countries and the international community:

a. Maintain a continuous dialogue between the partner country and the international community to ensure that their shared objectives are reflected in appropriate mutual accountability mechanisms where relevant, such as comprehensive frameworks detailing actions and resources required, associated with mutually endorsed benchmarks, and submitted to regular mutual assessment reviews.

b. Where governments demonstrate the political will to foster peace, security, human rights and development, but lack capacity, the international community should seek to align assistance with country strategies. Where this is not possible because of particularly weak governance or violent conflict, they should seek opportunities to maximize alignment with plans developed in a participatory and inclusive manner at the sectoral or regional level.

c. Donor agencies, including multilateral agencies, should ensure full transparency in their support, including funding through non-government channels. Partner countries' governments should ensure full transparency in the national budgets and in the use of national resources.

4. To reduce the burden of aid management on partner countries capacities:

a. Simplify and harmonize aid management to the extent possible, by reducing the number of aid coordination mechanisms and aid channels, and agreeing common business practices. Each donor should try to adapt its representation in the field in line with partner countries'

needs, and define clear lines of authority for its various activities; practical approaches could take the form of joint offices, agreed division of labour, delegated cooperation agreements, multi-donor trust-funds and common reporting and financial requirements.

b. Recognizing the critical role of the United Nations in conflict and fragile situations, clarify in the context of the ongoing reform processes, the division of roles and responsibilities within the UN, and between the UN, the international financial institutions and other donors, to ensure a coherent and coordinated approach.

5. To make efficient use of limited resources, to avoid duplication and funding gaps:

a. Provide flexible, rapid and predictable long-term funding, including pooled funding where appropriate; funding should be adequate and commensurate with pledges made, and be made available in a timely manner to sustain progress in stabilisation and address recovery and peacebuilding needs.

b. Develop and maintain a clear understanding of all commitments and investments made, as well as of all capacities available at both the national and international community ends, with a view to optimizing their utilization, based on comparative advantages, identifying clear but sometimes shifting priorities, and aiming to avoid duplication of efforts and to bridge critical gaps.

6. To improve and deepen our joint learning and increase our capacities:

a. Promote more systematic joint learning, training and capacity development activities across agencies within donor governments, as well as among the various international organizations operating in conflict and fragile situations; in this context, the insights gained and best practices identified by relevant international, regional and sub-regional organizations and bodies should be promoted and disseminated; moreover, the expertise of the international, national and local civil society should be fully mobilized.

b. Carry out joint monitoring and evaluation of activities, including real-time evaluations, more systematically, to the extent possible; these joint efforts should involve all relevant departments/ministries/agencies of both the international community – bilateral donors as well as international organizations - the partner country and its civil society as appropriate; they should also ensure that the respective perspectives of all these actors are duly taken into account, and reflect the partner country's priorities and strategies.

Follow-up

The Conference invited all participants to take this agenda forward in accordance with their individual mandates. The Chair will bring the outcomes of the 3C meeting to the attention of the different policy communities represented, with a view to taking this agenda forward through all relevant on-going international processes, including in the follow-up to the UN SG's report on 'Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict' and in OECD's implementation of the Ministerial Declaration on Policy Coherence for Development.

A number of participants also entered into individual and joint commitments in support of these principles and recommendations. A consolidated list of these commitments will be made available with the conference report, and would subsequently be annexed to the Roadmap.

The Conference also agreed that stock should be taken of individual and collective efforts made and results obtained in these areas by 2011, in a way to be determined.

The 3C Roadmap was adopted at the 3C Conference 2009 on a coherent, coordinated, complementary approach in situations of conflict and fragility, 19-20 March 2009, Geneva, Switzerland, www.3C-Conference2009.ch.

[1] Existing commitments include but are not limited to:

- The UN 2005 World Summit Outcome, acknowledging the interlinkage of peace and security, development and human rights, and emphasizing the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace (A/RES/60/1 para.9 and para.97)
- The civil-military coordination, including as set forward in the March 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies and the “Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies” endorsed by the IASC in 2008
- The Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (paragraph 21) (2008)
- OECD Ministerial Policy Commitment to improve development effectiveness in fragile states (DCD/DAC(2007)29), OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (DAC/DCD(2007)29) and OECD Ministerial Statement on Security System Reform (2007)
- OECD Ministerial Declaration on Policy Coherence for Development (approved by Ministers of OECD countries at the Ministerial Council, on 4 June 2008)
- The Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative
- 2007 European Council Conclusions on Fragile Situations, and 2007 European Council Conclusions on Security and Development

[2] Examples of practical steps already undertaken are:

- The undertaking of thematic meetings in the framework of the OECD-DAC to enhance coordination and complementarity, including whole of government/whole-of-system approaches (e.g. Development, Diplomacy and Integrated Planning (11-12 February 2008, Oslo); Whole-of-Government Approaches in Public Financial Management (17-18 March 2008, Paris); Security System Reform (9-10 April 2008, The Hague);
- The International Dialogue with partner countries to define shared statebuilding and peacebuilding objectives launched at the Accra High-Level Forum 2008
- The development of joint frameworks for analysis and mechanisms to facilitate common and coherent understandings of fragile, conflict and post-conflict situations (e.g. Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA) and Transitional Results Frameworks (TRF));
- The promotion of funding and reporting mechanisms to avoid duplication and enhance a complementary approach – including shared standing capacities, multi-donor trust funds and basket/pooled-funding.
- The creation of innovative organizational units and processes that combine civil-military competencies to better respond to the challenges of stability and development under conditions of conflict.
- The follow-up processes on the implementation of the UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security and UN SC Resolution 1612 on Children in Armed Conflicts.

C. AutorInnen/Contributors



Günther Barnet is Coordinator of the National Security Council in the Austrian MOD, where he is responsible for whole of government process in the field of comprehensive security. He also works in international groups on topics related to the development of comprehensive crisis management concepts. Before 2007 he was political director of a parliamentary group in Austria and from 2000 to 2003 member and deputy chief of the cabinet of the former Minister for Defence. From 2002 to 2005 he was also member and chairman of a parliamentary group within the legacy of the federal state and city of Vienna.



Prior to joining Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KA IPTC) as Programme Coordinator **Emma Birikorang** worked at the African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), a think-tank in Accra as Senior Programme Assistant. She is currently a Research Fellow at KA IPTC and undertakes research on African Peace and Security Mechanisms and the ECOWAS/AU Standby frameworks. She also facilitates training modules on Security Sector Reform and Conflict Prevention.



Boubacar Daouda Diallo since 2002 Coordinator of RIESCA (Réseau international d'Etudes Stratégiques sur les Conflits en Afrique). From 2002 to 2006 he was head of the Modern Literature Department at the Abdou Moumouni University of Niamey. He is a member of the African civil society 2002. In 2006 he began his work at RIESCA as regional coordinator of PASPA (Partenariat Stratégique pour la Paix en Afrique). Since 2004 he has been a member of WANSED (West African Network on Security and Democratic Governance). He has done research work regarding sources of conflicts, African identity conflicts and the contribution of Arts and Literature to peace in Africa like the Islamic songs for peace. Consultancy and training in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.



Vedran Dzihic, senior researcher, lecturer; director of CEIS Center for European Integration Strategies. Since 2000 Assistant and Senior Lecturer at the Institute for Political Sciences, University of Vienna and at the MA-Postgraduate Studies “Balkan Studies” in Vienna and Bratislava; Lecturer at the MA-Programme “State management and humanitarian affairs” at the University in Sarajevo; Lecturer at the Institute for Slavic Studies, University of Vienna. Senior Researcher and Co-Chief of Party, Project: Transformation and Democratization of the Balkans, Coordination of the Research Platform “POTREBA” (www.univie.ac.at/potreba). Inaugural Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS - School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.



BG Dr. Walter E. Feichtinger: 1976-1979 Theresian Military Academy, Tank Officer. Studies of Political Science at the University of Vienna, Graduation to Dr. phil 2002. 1998-2001 Deputy Director of the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management at the Austrian National Defence Academy; 2001-2002 Security and Defence Policy Adviser at the Austrian Federal Chancellery. Since 2002, Director of the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management; numerous publications, lectures and interviews on security political issues and aspects of international crisis management.



Ambassador **Irene Freudenschuss-Reichl** served as Deputy-Director at the Austrian Press and Information Service in New York and deputy Head of Mission ad interim. As Alternate Permanent Representative of Austria to the UN in Vienna she was responsible in the fields of combating drug abuse, money-laundering, crime prevention and criminal justice and women's issues. From 1995 to February 1998 she served as Head of the International and EU-Affairs Department at the Ministry for the Environment, Youth and Family and was appointed Permanent Representative of Austria to UNIDO, IAEA, the UN Office in Vienna and CTBTO-PrepCom in 1998. As of 2001 Assistant Director-General for UN Affairs and Director of the UNIDO office in New York, Freudenschuss-Reichl reached her actual position as Director-General for Development Cooperation, MFA, Ambassador, in 2005.



Sonja Greiner is employed with the International Aid Department of the Austrian Red Cross. Between 2005 and 2007, she worked at the UNHCR EU office Brussels, the Permanent Mission of Germany in Geneva (ECOSOC) and the European Parliament in Brussels/Strasbourg. She has a background in Sociology, Political Science and Social Anthropology from the Universities of Vienna and Würzburg (Germany) and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London.



Cristina Hoyos: Since 2009 Special Advisor for Development, Security and Fragility in the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Development of the Concept and Realisation of the 3C Conference in Geneva (March 2009) "Improving results in fragile and conflict situations". Since 2009 Co- Vice-Chair of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and from 2006-2008. Co-Chair in the DAC/OECD of the Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation Network. Head of Division Conflict Prevention and Transformation in the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (2005-2008). Participation in peace negotiations with subversive groups in Colombia Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC).



Gudrun Kramer is co-founder and director of the Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding – IICP. From 1999 – 2005 she was Program Director for projects related to conflict regions at the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution - ASPR. She was also responsible for the ASPR training courses that are designed to prepare civilians for peace-building activities in crisis areas.



Sabine Kurtenbach: Senior Researcher of the Institute of Latin America Studies, GIGA. Current research interests: peace and conflict, security policies, youth. Regional focus Central America, Andean Region, Southeast Asia. Recent publication: 2010 Development Cooperation after War and Violent Conflict. Debates and Challenges, INEF-Report 100, Duisburg: Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden (with Matthias Seifert).



Originally from Mexico, **Alina Rocha Menocal** is a Research Fellow at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in the Poverty and Public Policy Group, where her focus is on Politics and Governance. She has done extensive comparative research in Latin America and Africa, with particular focus on the challenges of democratisation and state-building. Since joining ODI in February 2005, Alina has been involved in a series of projects and assignments that seek to bridge the gap between research and policy in thinking about governance issues from a political economy perspective.



In 1998/99 Ambassador **Wolfgang Petritsch** was the EU's Special Envoy for Kosovo and EU chief negotiator at the Kosovo peace talks in Rambouillet and Paris. Between 1999 and 2002 he served as the International Community's High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 2002 to 2008 Ambassador Petritsch represented his country at the UN, since 2008 he is the Austrian Representative to the OECD in Paris.



Ruth Picker is managing director of “Global Responsibility – Austrian Platform for Development and Humanitarian Aid” (“AG Globale Verantwortung”). The platform represents the interests of Austrian NGOs working in the field of development and humanitarian aid, including sustainable global economic social and ecological development. Mrs Picker holds a degree in psychology (University of Vienna/ New York University) as well as a degree on human rights and democratisation. She has done research on transitional justice and conflict resolution in South Africa and used to work as political researcher and consultant.



Major General **Johann Pucher** held many leading posts at the Ministry of Defence and in international missions. From 1994 onwards Pucher has served as Head of Section for Arms Control, PfP issues and from 1995 he was Coordinator for International Assistance; Austrian representative in the international project groups for SHIRBRIG and Central European Cooperation in Peacekeeping, then Military Advisor at the Federal Chancellery, Prime Minister's Office, and the Bureau for Security Studies. From 2002-2004 he was Director of the Regional Arms Control Verification Assistance Center (RACVIAC) in Zagreb. Since 2003 Member of the Board of Directors of the International Military Sports Council CISM Pucher had specific responsibility for the Western Balkans during the Austrian EU presidency. As from 1 March 2007 he is Defence Policy Director of the Directorate General for Security Policy.



Rosan Smits joined Clingendael as a CRU Research Fellow in 2009. She has a background in International Relations and Development Cooperation, with a particular focus on peace building and security. Prior to joining Clingendael, she worked with non-governmental organizations on conflict transformation and political analysis in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region. Within CRU she works on policies regarding the role of non-state actors in fragile states, gender & conflict and fragile states aid architecture.



Brigadier-General **Thomas Starlinger** was engaged in several Overseas Missions in Syria, Iran, Cyprus and Tajikistan. From Nov 2008 to May 2009, he commanded the Multinational Task Force South in the framework of NATO / KFOR in Kosovo. From 2003 to 2007 he was deployed to Brussels where he was responsible for short to long term Force development – at first in the EU-Military Staff (EUMS) and thereafter within the European Defence Agency (EDA).



David Tolbert currently serves as the third president of the International Center for Transitional Justice, a global human rights organization with headquarters in New York. Previously, Tolbert worked with the UN for almost 15 years, i.a. acting as a senior legal advisor, deputy chief prosecutor and assistant secretary-general, chief of the General Legal Division of UNRWA in Vienna and Gaza, Deputy Prosecutor of the ICTY. He has served as the Executive Director of the American Bar Association's Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative. Tolbert has published widely regarding international criminal justice, the ICTY and the ICC and has represented the ICTY in the discussions leading up to the creation of the ICC.



Ursula Werther-Pietsch is Deputy Director in the Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs, with a special focus on security and development, and human rights. She works as an associate lecturer at University of Graz, Department for International Law and International Relations, and University of Vienna, Department of Development Studies. Werther-Pietsch is initiator of the Vienna 3C Conference.

D. Abkürzungen/Acronyms

ASF	African Standby Force
ASPR	Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution
AU	African Union
BMeiA	Bundesministerium für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten
BMLVS	Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CDC	Community Development Council
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIPEV	Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence in Kenya
CISM	Conseil International du Sport Militaire
CMI	Chr. Michelsen Institute
CR	Critical Reasoning
CRU	Conflict Research Unit
CSO	civil-society organization
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of ex-combatants
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic Congo
ECK	Electoral Commission of Kenya
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
GIGA	German Institute of Global and Area Studies
GJLOS	Governance Justice Law and Order Sector
HD	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
IA	Independent Advocacy
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICR	International Civilian Representative
ICTJ	International Center for Transitional Justice
ICTJ	International Center for Transitional Justice
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDPs	internally displaced persons
IGH	Internationaler Gerichtshof
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IICP	Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding
IKRK/ICRC	Internationales Komitee vom Roten Kreuz, International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
INGO	international non-governmental organization
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
KOO	Koordinierungsstelle der Österreichischen Bischofskonferenz für internationale Entwicklung und Mission
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO/NRO	non-governmental organization, Nichtregierungsorganisation
NSIS	National Security Intelligence Service
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PASPA	Strategic Partnership for Peace in Africa
PBSB	Peacebuilding-Statebuilding
PCSC	Public Complaints Standing Committee
PEV	Post-election Violence
POB	Police Oversight Body
PSC	Peace and Security Council
SHIRBRIG	Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations
SLDF	Sabaot Land Defence Force
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSR	Security Sector/System Reform, Sicherheitssektor/systemreform
TJRC	Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission
UFD	Union des Femmes pour le Développement
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIK	Interim Administration in Kosovo
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSC	UN Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WC	Washington Consensus