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Small States and Alliances – A Swedish Perspective

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Any discussion about states and alliances must take its point of departure in three circumstances:

1. The geopolitical location of the states in question,
2. The history, traditions, political and other domestic circumstances of those states,
3. The alliances available and their relationship to different states.

The President of Finland, J. K. Paasikivi (1946-56) once said, “One thing is certain, we (Finland) can’t change our geopolitical location.”. Finland’s foreign policy has largely been determined by its proximity to the Soviet Union/Russia. Following Finland’s losses in the wars against the Soviet Union – the Winter War of 1939-1940 and the Continuation War of 1941-1944 – the two countries concluded an agreement. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1948, came to determine the content of Finland’s neutrality policy until the agreement was terminated in connection with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. This Treaty forced Finland to show special consideration to the Soviet Union.

Sweden’s policy of neutrality

After the Second World War, negotiations were conducted between Sweden, Norway and Denmark to discuss the possibility of a Nordic defence alliance. These negotiations yielded no results and were wound up in 1949. Sweden was the partner most interested in the negotiations, while Norway and Denmark finally opted to join the new defence alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, which both countries believed could offer better guarantees of security. Both Norway and Denmark had been occupied by German troops between 1940 and 1945, while Sweden – as had also been the case during the First World War – had managed to stay out of the Second World War and consequently considered a policy of military non-alliance to be the best security option for the country.

It is 185 years since Sweden was last involved in a war (1814). That was when Sweden took over Norway from Denmark. The decline of the former Swedish empire, and the loss of the territories east and south of the Baltic Sea in particular, have made it possible for Sweden to avoid being drawn into war for an exceptionally long period.

Sweden’s policy of neutrality evolved gradually starting around 1840. Sweden’s neutrality policy has rested on unilateral decisions taken by the Swedish Government and the Swedish Riksdag (parliament). Thus, it does not build on international agreements in the same way as the neutrality policies of Finland, Switzerland and Austria.

Immediately after the Second World War, Swedish neutrality policy was based on maintaining a strong defence force. In fact, at the end of the 1940s and during the 1950s Sweden’s defence force was one of the strongest in Europe and this was also true in part in later decades. Prime Minister Tage Erlander (1946-69) feared that the Soviet Union might

have plans to expand westward. Secret consultations with NATO began in the 1950s, with contacts often being channelled through Norway. The Swedish people knew nothing about this until a specially appointed Commission on Neutrality Policy presented its report in 1994 (Swedish Government Official Reports 1994:11).

Critics have called this secret collaboration double-dealing. Defenders of the Government's policy dismiss such criticism, claiming that the collaboration amounted to nothing more than the normal intelligence activities run by various countries, and asserting that it focused on potential crisis and war scenarios. Until the 1990s, Sweden's neutrality policy entailed non-alignment in times of peace, with a view to remaining neutral in the event of war. The wording of this policy provided no definite guarantees of neutrality in the event of war, but was more the expression of an ambition to remain neutral. During the Finnish Winter War of 1939-40, Sweden declared itself to be "non-belligerent" as opposed to neutral in order to signal its sympathy for the plight of Finland. Sweden assisted Finland in a number of ways inter alia by donating substantial consignments of military equipment to the country's defence forces.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Government of Carl Bildt reformulated Sweden's neutrality policy, defining it in the following way: "non-participation in military alliances, with the aim of making it possible for our country to remain neutral in the event of war in our vicinity."The reason for this change was said to be that simulated war games had shown that Sweden cannot remain neutral in every conceivable situation. This new formulation has been controversial in the public debate.

Olof Palme (Prime Minister 1969-76 and 1982-1986) said many times that foreign policy constitutes the first line of defence for the Swedish neutrality policy, while military defence constitutes the second. Palme also devised an active policy of neutrality asserting that neutrality did not oblige Sweden to assume a passive stance. After a brief period to consider whether neutrality represented an obstacle, Sweden was quick to join the United Nations. Sweden has been active in this forum ever since, contributing military personnel to most UN peace-keeping operations.

Since the 1950s, Sweden has actively supported decolonisation, supported the struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa, has been an enthusiastic advocate of development assistance in the third world (only Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Holland donate more that 0.7 per cent of GNI – the UN development assistance target) and a keen supporter of global disarmament. In 1982, within the framework of his assignment as head of an international commission, Olof Palme became heavily involved in the formulation of a new security policy (Common Security. A Programme for Disarmament, The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 1982).

In the early 1970s, the feasibility of Swedish membership of the EC was considered. Olof Palme finally swept the question off the agenda when he declared that in view of Sweden's neutrality policy, the EC's plans for supranational economic cooperation (according to the Werner Report) and extensive cooperation in the foreign policy sphere (according to the Davignon Report) would compromise the policy of neutrality and thus precluded Swedish membership of the EC.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact created new conditions for foreign policy – in northern Europe as well. In October 1990, when he presented a package of measures designed to boost the flagging Swedish economy, Ingvar Carlsson (Prime Minister 1986-1991 and 1994-1996), announced that the Government intended to apply for membership of the EC. This announcement came as a great surprise to many people, although Carlsson had indicated in several statements, including one delivered

at the Social Democratic party congress in September 1990, that a shift in Swedish policy on Europe might be imminent. Carlsson's justification for this change of attitude to the EC was that the foreign policy situation had changed since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

In July 1991, the Carlsson Government submitted Sweden's application for membership of the EC. A referendum in November 1994 yielded a narrow majority in favour of membership. Since January 1995, Sweden, along with Finland and Austria, has been a member of the European Union (thanks to the Maastricht Treaty the EC had become the EU), while a "no" in the Norwegian referendum put a stop to plans for Norway's membership of the Union.

During the course of the 1990s, the Swedish Government has ceased to use the term "policy of neutrality", which has gradually been replaced by the expression "non-participation in military alliances". In recent years, Sweden has become involved in more far-reaching international defence and security policy cooperation than would have been possible during the earlier epoch of neutrality. Sweden cooperates with the 'new NATO'. It takes part in the NATO Partnership for Peace, PFP-cooperation and in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; it has sent military personnel to work with NATO, Russia and others to uphold the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. However, Sweden is not prepared to become a full member of NATO thereby committing the country to cooperation under article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, since such a move would entail giving mutual security guarantees and forming part of a common, collective defence system.

New perceptions – new threats

The Swedish Defence Commission has ascertained that the threat to Sweden has changed (Swedish Security Policy in the Light of International Change. Ministry of Defence, 1998). The risk of invasion – by Russia – has disappeared, considerably reducing the need for a territorial defence force. Now, at the end of 1999, the Government is preparing for the most extensive cut-backs ever to the defence system, which has led to massive local protests at the regional level from towns where the Swedish Armed Forces have been major job providers.

It remains unclear what course Russia is likely to take, and this is the greatest element of uncertainty in Sweden's defence and security policy, according to Björn von Sydow, the Minister of Defence. The international community seeks to reduce this uncertainty by initiating cooperation with Russia in the form of concrete projects and an array of partnership agreements. In this context, the Swedish Government has drawn up its own proposal for a programme entitled Russia – A part of Europe. Swedish proposals for an EU policy on cooperation with Russia (Swedish Government, October 1999).

Swedish defence policy focuses increasingly on international cooperation. The same might be said of the Swedish defence industry which has maintained high international standards since the prevailing notion has been that a neutral defence policy requires a country to have its own defence industry. Now, owing to cuts in defence expenditure, suppliers have received fewer and fewer orders and in consequence are manufacturing shorter and shorter series. The Swedish defence industry has undergone a far-reaching process of amalgamation, intensifying cooperation with partners in other countries, principally the United Kingdom.

The threats are no longer primarily military in nature, but are more concerned with international crime, terrorism, the risk of sabotage on essential infrastructure, illegal immigration, environmental damage, shortcomings with respect to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, etc. The new threats call for new concepts and new security policy

instruments. These are to be found in those areas generally known as “soft security” or “civic security”.

The EU – Europe’s most important soft security actor with extended hard security tasks

With its enormous economic and political resources, the European Union is without comparison the most important organisation in Europe when it comes to promoting soft security. The iron curtain between the former military blocs has been replaced by a welfare wall. In the long term, stability and security in Europe can only be guaranteed if the welfare gap between the eastern and western parts of the continent narrows. It will be necessary to initiate a whole series of measures to remedy this situation, a challenge which is best met within the sphere of cooperation and soft security.

From the security standpoint, the interests of the European Union are chiefly linked to three aspects:

- the future content of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP),
- the status of defence policy in the EU,
- the eastward enlargement of the EU.

Within the framework of the EU, Sweden – in collaboration with Finland – has proposed that defence and security policy cooperation in the Union should primarily entail the so-called Petersberg Tasks, that is to say, peace-keeping, conflict prevention, crisis management and humanitarian issues. However, in the light of experiences from the wars in Bosnia and Yugoslavia, there is an ongoing discussion to the effect that the EU must upgrade its defence cooperation. Above all, the fact that the allies in Europe are so heavily dependent on the Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence resources of the U.S. is regarded as a problem, and there is growing awareness that the countries of Europe need their own satellite monitoring capacity, for example. This subject was broached at the EU summit in Cologne in June 1999, where discussions were launched about the possible content of a European Security and Defence Identity, ESDI.

Finland holds the presidency of the EU during the second half of 1999, and with the EU summit in Helsinki in December 1999 in view, Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen stated that the European Security and Defence Identity must be reinforced on three counts:

- strengthening of the EU’s defence capability,
- coordination of members’ defence forces,
- conflict prevention and crisis management.

Sweden is due to hold the presidency of the EU in the first half of 2001. Apart from the more acute matters that every presidency is forced to prioritise, Sweden has stated that it wishes to intensify efforts with regard to the eastward enlargement of the EU and the Northern Dimension launched by Finland, including the integration of Russia with the rest of Europe and continued support to buttress the independence of the Baltic countries. The Northern Dimension and its counterpart in southern Europe – the Barcelona Process – have every prospect of being mutually supportive. Sub-regional networking is more advanced in northern Europe as this region has a greater number of common institutions and more extensive NGO participation.

The NATO question

In 1999, three former Warsaw Pact countries – Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – became members of NATO. More countries – including the neutral states of Europe and other former Warsaw Pact countries – might join NATO in the future. In Sweden, Finland and Austria the pros and cons of NATO membership are being weighed up. In Sweden, membership of NATO is hardly likely in the foreseeable future. A clear majority of parliamentarians and citizens are opposed to membership. A small party, the Liberal Party, and three of the Stockholm dailies, have taken a positive position on Swedish membership of NATO.

Russia has vigorously opposed NATO's enlargement eastwards. Russian resistance is particularly determined with respect to any notion of a former Soviet republic joining NATO. This makes the situation particularly difficult for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as the three Baltic countries have made it quite clear that they are interested in joining NATO.

Naturally, the future military involvement of the U.S. in Europe is of interest in this context. Some kind of transatlantic security policy cooperation will certainly continue. On the other hand, the isolationist tendencies of the American people are strong and embrace demands that the countries of Europe should take greater responsibility for their defence needs. A Republican President in the White House from 2001 could well lead to diminished American involvement in the defence of Europe. The U.S. is ambivalent on this point – on the one hand, there is a feeling that Europe should take greater practical responsibility for defence matters while on the other, there is a desire to retain strong political and military influence in Europe.

Following the war in Yugoslavia in the spring and early summer of 1999, and the war being waged by Russia in Chechnya in the autumn of 1999, relations between Russia and the US have deteriorated, which has a negative effect on the political climate throughout Europe. The dispute has been particularly intense with regard to the question of the status of the United Nations. The NATO allies started the war in Yugoslavia without waiting for a decision by the UN Security Council. Defenders of the military action claim that if the Security Council had been consulted, China and Russia would have blocked the measures that had to be taken to prevent mass expulsion and excessive violations of human rights.

At the end of 1999, the situation has grown even worse. Some people are even saying that Europe might be heading for a new cold war. The diametrically opposed views of the U.S. and its allies and Russia and China respectively on the subject of what action the international community should take in critical situations have contributed to a deterioration in the international climate.

The nuclear arms issue is once again in a precarious position, although, apart from Russia's nuclear arsenal, the focus is no longer on Europe, as it was during the Cold War, but has shifted to other continents, in addition to the U.S., chiefly to Asia and the Middle East. The situation took the first turn for the worse in May 1998 when India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests. Then the U.S. senate refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, CTBT, and far-reaching plans are afoot in the U.S. to set up a National Missile Defence System, an anti-missile weapons system. Such a move would represent a serious threat to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, which is regarded as a key international disarmament treaty. Russia has re-formulated its security policy doctrine, upgraded the significance of its nuclear weapons and withdrawn its "No First Use" commitment declared by the Soviet Union in 1982. There is a very real threat that a number of new countries in Asia and the Middle East will acquire a nuclear weapons capability within the next decade.

According to NATO's new security concept, nuclear weapons form an essential part of its defence strategy, including a deterrent against so-called rogue states.

In 1998 and 1999, Sweden along with six other countries initiated a proposal for a "New Agenda" to the UN General Assembly, with a view to putting a stop to nuclear re-armament and eliminating the world's nuclear arsenals in the long term. The proposal met with broad support, but is being blocked chiefly by the fact that the nuclear-weapon power states all voted against it, with the exception of China, which abstained. Of 19 NATO member countries, five voted against the proposal, with 14 abstentions.

Sweden is in a good position to pursue an international policy of nuclear disarmament because it stands outside NATO.

Sweden, the EU and NATO – facing the future

In an article published on 20 November 1999 in Sweden's largest daily paper, Aftonbladet, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Anna Lindh, and the Minister for Defence, Björn von Sydow, wrote, "our strength lies in non-participation in military alliances. The Liberal Party wishes Sweden to join NATO. Demanding that Sweden join NATO now – in 1999 – seems to be an outmoded and reactionary notion, to say the least. The challenges today lie elsewhere. It is time to ensure that Europe will not have to witness new situations like the one in Kosovo. And the way to do that is to improve the EU's capacity for preventing and managing crises. That is why the upcoming summit in Helsinki in December 1999 is so important.

"The EU is the only organisation that is in a position to use the entire range of instruments in such an endeavour – economic cooperation, diplomacy, development cooperation, trade – and soon military peace missions as well.

"The EU has made armed conflict impossible in large parts of Europe. Now we need to strengthen the Community in order to contribute to security on the rest of the continent.

"When the EU was engaged in negotiations on the Treaty of Amsterdam, Sweden and Finland, two militarily non-allied countries, proposed that crisis management should be adopted as an important task for the EU. This would apply to the full range of measures, from preventive efforts to operations in which military forces are used for peace-making and peace-keeping assignments. However, it is not a matter of a common territorial defence system, as is the case with NATO.

"Sweden has drawn up a special programme on conflict prevention. The Union needs better instruments to facilitate action at an early stage, using development cooperation and trade agreements, observers, peace-keeping forces, and including unambiguous demands for the observance of human rights. If, in spite of these efforts, a crisis flares up, the EU member states must be able to mobilise a peace corps, police officers and other forces.

"It took some time before Sweden and the EU managed to deploy forces in Kosovo. Serb civilians and the Roma were completely unprotected and fell victim to vicious acts of vengeance. The same goes for civil rescue missions in connection with humanitarian disasters such as earthquakes. Countries must respond more rapidly. That is why we feel that it will be important at the Helsinki summit (December 1999) to set up goals stipulating how quickly the EU should be able to deploy peace-keeping troops, police officers and rescue forces.

"The EU also needs an organisation that is adapted to the effective performance of its tasks. Monthly ministerial meeting are not enough when a crisis requires that decisions be taken on a daily basis.

"That is why we are positive to stationing diplomats in Brussels to handle the day-to-day business of preventing and managing crises.

"Civil and military advisers are also needed to give advice and plan missions, in the same way as the UN has a staff of experts.

"The role of the UN must be strengthened.

"Non-participation in military alliances means that we are in a position to pursue an active and independent policy of disarmament. Sweden is one of the countries working hard to counteract the threat of nuclear weapons. This would be a great deal more difficult if we were members of NATO huddled down under its nuclear umbrella.

"Non-participation in military alliances is not the same as passivity. We take an active part in efforts to build peace in Europe and in endeavours to promote the common security advocated by Olof Palme which at long last is a feasible option – thanks to the fall of the Berlin Wall.

"These are the challenges for the 21st century. Not nuclear umbrellas and defence guarantees". So much for Foreign Minister Lindh and Defence Minister von Sydow.

National sovereignty, regional networking and alliance policy

"Small countries have the most to gain from cooperation in international organisations," according to Sweden's Ambassador to Germany, Mats Hellström (former Minister for Europe and Trade), in a new book of memoirs – Political Life – published in the autumn of 1999. Europe has the most multifaceted network for cooperation in the world: OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EU, NATO, sub-regional cooperative organisations, European organisations of political parties, the labour movement, the business community and many other organisations. Furthermore, almost all the countries in Europe are members of the United Nations, many are members of the World Trade Organisation and the Organisation for European Cooperation and Development, and they are involved in a broad variety of other international organisations.

By committing themselves to cooperation in international organisations these nations relinquish a portion of their national sovereignty. The benefits derived from participating in cooperation are said to outweigh the disadvantages of remaining aloof – an approach which usually arises out of concern for national autonomy.

Cooperation in international organisations gives rise to joint decisions and harmonisation of rules, which the countries in question have to approve and ratify in their national parliaments. The Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child are just a few examples of this type of legislation. The CSCE's (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe – the predecessor to OSCE) Paris Charter of November 1990 is another, as complemented at the OSCE´s summit meeting in Istanbul in 1999. Under this Charter, all the member countries in Europe and North America pledge to uphold the principles of democracy, human rights and market economy.

The mass expulsions and ethnic cleansing that we have witnessed in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during this decade have triggered international discussion about the sovereignty of national borders. Much would indicate that "internal affairs" are not sufficient justification for allowing, for example, grave human rights violations. There is a growing perception that the international community has

the right to intervene to enforce peace when serious crimes against humanity are committed in individual countries. This should lead to new developments in international law.

On the other hand, intervention only takes place when alliances (NATO) and other countries feel called upon to act, otherwise no steps are taken. It is inconceivable that any alliance or foreign defence force would intervene against the Russian forces operating in Chechnya in the autumn of 1999, if only for the simple reason that Russia has its own nuclear weapons.

Sweden's security policy is determined by its location in northern Europe and its relative proximity to Russia. During the Cold War, notions of "military balances" had a strong influence on security policy measures. The non-aligned Swedish Government considered it important to try to keep the country out of the confrontations and the propaganda war raging between the USA and the Soviet Union, in order to avoid raising tension in its neighbourhood.

Since the Cold War, the key concepts have been cooperation, partnership, mutuality, transparency, etc. Nowhere else in the world are so many new, broad sub-regional cooperation structures with new institutional arrangements being built up as in northern Europe. Apart from the Nordic cooperative organisations, chiefly the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers, the dismantling of the blocs has served to stimulate the establishment of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, BEAR, along with its cooperative bodies, the Council of Ministers and the Regional Council. In addition, an Arctic Council for wider arctic cooperation has also been set up. Cooperation in these new forums focuses on civil areas, contacts with and between citizens, and civil security.

Every Swedish Government since 1991 has stated that assisting the new Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, to solidify their new independence is a top priority for Swedish foreign policy. Assistance consists of extensive so-called sovereignty programmes in many civil spheres. Sweden also helps the countries to build up their own military defence forces (which take part in peace-keeping missions), civil defence and coast guard systems, as well as more efficient border controls. These measures are also in the interests of Swedish security policy.

Sweden has declared its support for the sovereign rights of other countries to choose their own security policy, in the same way as Sweden demands respect for the choices it has made. In the same spirit Sweden has encouraged the Baltic countries' application for membership of NATO.

Cooperation with Poland is also being expanded, chiefly with a view to boosting trade and economic cooperation. In 1999, the Swedish Government is running a campaign entitled Sweden-Poland: Baltic Sea Neighbours in the New Europe devised to strengthen cooperation between Sweden and Poland. Cooperation with Russia is also evolving, although the approaches are more difficult owing to the financial crisis, political ambiguities and the lack of a civil society in Russia.

Under the Clinton Administration the U.S. has shown great interest in strengthening the Baltic countries and promoting cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, most tangibly manifested in the Northern European Initiative, NEI.

Cooperation, partnership and regional networking have come to the fore in the countries in the Baltic Sea region, above all in the small countries on the Baltic rim. Cooperation is deemed to be of mutual benefit for the players taking part and not merely a sort of zero-sum game. The long-term benefits will prove particularly valuable.

To a certain extent, national sovereignty has been pruned back through the countries' commitments to various international organisations. Globalisation has an increasingly tangible effect on nation-states in terms of politics and economy, and this necessitates more intergovernmental or supranational forms of cooperation in order to counteract the negative aspects of globalisation. This means that national sovereignty is also curtailed.

With regard to the policy of alliances, which in northern Europe in all essentials refers to the relationship of the countries to the NATO military alliance, it is clear that the small and large countries of the Baltic region have different positions and perceptions. Germany is an old NATO member and has no reservations about this. Modern Norway and Denmark are also old NATO countries, but are exempted from certain features of the fundamental policy and the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory. Poland is a new NATO member and a docile follower of the U.S. (for example, Poland voted against the "New Agenda" proposal submitted to the UN General Assembly by Sweden).

The three Baltic countries fervently aspire to membership of both NATO and the EU. In all likelihood, Estonia is the country closest to achieving membership of the EU. The question is whether the Baltic countries will ever be able to achieve article V membership of NATO, as they were previously part of the Soviet Union and border on Russia.

William Perry, former U.S. Defense Secretary, said that in the future, the difference between full NATO membership and partnership in various cooperation projects, chiefly the PFP and the EAPC will be "paper-thin".

As noted earlier, Sweden and Finland will retain their policy of non-alignment for the "foreseeable future" and will stand outside NATO. During the Cold War the "Finnish argument" was used to justify Sweden's policy of military non-alliance. The general gist of the argument was that since Finland was bound up by its 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union (now cancelled), there was a risk that its independence might diminish if Sweden too were to join NATO.

Some commentators claim that Finland is embracing a policy of integration more rapidly than Sweden. Finland has already joined the EMU, which Sweden has not. The same commentators claim that Finland is also closer to membership of NATO. One expression of this would be that Finland abstained from voting on the Swedish nuclear weapons proposal submitted to the UN.

The origin of these differences probably lies in the course that history has taken in the two countries. Finland has fought two wars against the Soviet Union, abolished the Treaty of Friendship when the Soviet Union was dissolved, and has been granted an unprecedented historical opportunity to boost its national independence, helped by an active west-oriented integration policy at a time when Russia has been weakened. Sweden has pursued a policy of non-alignment of its own choosing with immense success for its country and its people, and has managed to stay out of a war for close to two centuries. Even if integration has become a more intrusive reality even for Sweden, the country's history tends to encourage a more gradual transition according to the motto "more haste, less speed".

As mentioned before, Russia is expressly opposed to the eastward enlargement of NATO, and is an even more determined opponent to the inclusion of former Soviet territories in that enlargement. New decisions and steps will be taken in a hardening international climate, in which relations between the U.S. and Russia will in all likelihood deteriorate. The international climate per se is one factor that must be considered in various countries' assessments and security policy calculations concerning their relations with NATO:

This article is based largely upon think-tank projects and books concerning a new security policy approach published by the Olof Palme Center in recent years, for example:

Common Security in Northern Europe after the Cold War – The Baltic Sea Region and the Barents Region (1994);

Visions of European Security – Focal Point Sweden and Northern Europe (1996);

Hard and Soft Security in the Baltic Sea Region, in cooperation with the Åland Islands Peace Institute (1997/98);

Northern Europe and Central Europe Hard, Soft and Civic Security, in cooperation with the European House of Budapest (1999);

Security in the European North – From "Hard" to "Soft ", in cooperation with the Arctic Centre/ University of Lapland, Rovaniemi (1999).