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# FAVORITA PAPERS 03/2003

COOPERATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS:  
THE UNITED NATIONS AND EUROPE

33rd IPA Vienna Seminar



International Peace Academy,  
New York

*D*iplomatische  
*A*kademie *WIEN*

Vienna School of International Studies

## **"FAVORITA PAPERS" OF THE DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY VIENNA**

This series is intended to complement the training activities for international careers carried out at the Diplomatic Academy and to reflect the expanding public lectures and seminar programme of the Academy. The series was given the name Favorita Papers according to the original designation of the DA's home, the imperial summer residence "Favorita" donated by Empress Maria Theresa to the foundation "Theresianische Akademie" in 1749. The series will continue to include substantive reports on events in the framework of the Academy's rich conference and lecture programmes which are of particular relevance to the understanding of contemporary international problems facing Austria and Europe. The series also reflects issues relevant to the training for careers in diplomacy, international affairs and business. Contributions to this series come from those actively engaged in the study, teaching and practice of international affairs. All papers reflect the views of the authors.

### **COOPERATIONS IN PEACE OPERATIONS: THE UNITED NATIONS AND EUROPE 33<sup>rd</sup> IPA Vienna Seminar**

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**COOPERATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS;  
THE UNITED NATIONS AND EUROPE  
IPA 33<sup>RD</sup> VIENNA SEMINAR**

PREFACE

Ernst SUCHARIPA

*Director, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna*

The annual International Peace Academy (IPA) Vienna Seminar, co-hosted by the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Austrian National Defense Academy, has traditionally focused on peacekeeping and in recent years has examined the enhancement of cooperation between the UN and European security organizations in the Balkans and the Caucasus. In 2002, the spotlight of the seminar was on Central Asia (see IPA Vienna seminar report, “Central Asia’s First Decade of Independence: Promises and Problems” published in the Favorita Paper Series of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna).

The purpose of the 2003 seminar was to examine – on a more general level - the development of the European Union’s crisis management capacities and its actual and potential role in carrying out United Nations peace operations and the possibilities for the EU to assist the UN in the ongoing implementation of the Brahimi report. In this context the evolving NATO-EU relationship was also addressed.

The seminar took place in the framework of IPA’s continuing activities on the topic of “Strengthening Regional Approaches to Peace Operations” and its work with the UN, the EU, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other European regional actors on strategic and operational cooperation in crisis management and security sector development.

Generally speaking, the seminar confirmed a certain amount of positive tendencies in the areas under discussion. Whereas, not so long ago and with special reference to the arduous tasks of peacekeeping in the Balkans, the lack of effective cooperation among major actors was deplored (“interblocking institutions”), few, if any, would doubt today the existence of both a serious political will to cooperate and also the development of institutional and informal channels of communication.

There appears to be a better understanding on how to share responsibilities and the burdens of peacekeeping. In addition, all the organizations concerned have increased their capacities and streamlined relevant procedures. Also, progress has been made in the better understanding of doctrinal issues, like civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and the complexities of security sector reform. Of course, there is no specific reason for complacency and the seminar revealed a number of persistent problem areas both in the political field, in particular also the danger of an emerging “south -north” in the capacity

and political will to deploy peacekeeping operation, as well as problems on more practical levels.

This issue of the Diplomatic Academy's Favorita Papers Series contains both the report on IPA's 33<sup>rd</sup> Vienna Seminar and the texts of presentations made at the seminar. It thus gives a complete and vivid reflection of the proceedings. I wish to thank the two IPA rapporteurs, Dr. Alexandra Novosseloff and Ms. Clara Lee, for their invaluable work.

The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna was, again, grateful for the occasion to host IPA's Vienna Seminar. Like in previous years the seminar profited from the very efficient cooperation we enjoyed on the part of the co-organizing institutions: IPA and the Austrian Defense Academy and in particular from the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The production of the paper was financed by the City of Vienna to whom we are particularly thankful.

**IPA 33rd Annual  
VIENNA SEMINAR**

**3 – 5 July 2003**

*Diplomatic Academy Vienna*

**COOPERATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS:**

**The United Nations and Europe**

**PROGRAM CHAIRS**

**David M. Malone**

President, International Peace Academy

**General Raimund Schittenhelm**

Commandant, National Defense Academy

**Ambassador Ernst Sucharipa**

Director, Diplomatic Academy Vienna

**Rapporteurs:**

**Ms. Clara Lee**, Publications Coordinator and Program Assistant, IPA

**Dr. Alexandra Novosseloff**, Visiting Fellow, IPA



## PROGRAM

### Keynote presentations:

*The Future Partnership with Regional Institutions: the Role of the United Nations in Conflict Management*

**Major General Patrick Cammaert**

Military Advisor to UNSG, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

*The Role of Regional Organizations in Conflict Prevention*

**Mr. Fredrik Schiller**

Deputy Director, Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), OSCE Secretariat

*The Role of the EU in UN-mandated Crisis Management*

**Ambassador Pieter Cornelis Feith**

Deputy Director General (ESDP), DGE, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU

Discussion

### Political – Institutional aspects of EU-UN cooperation

Chair: **David M. Malone**  
President, International Peace Academy

Panelists: *Political-Institutional aspects of UN-EU Cooperation: UN perspective*

**Mr. John Renninger**

Director, Americas & Europe Division,  
Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

*Political-Institutional aspects of UN-EU Cooperation: EU perspective*

**Ambassador Franz-Josef Kuglitsch,**

Austrian Representative  
EU Political and Security Committee

*Informal Political-Institutional  
Cooperation: Lessons Learned from  
Afghanistan*

**Major General John McColl**  
Commander 3 (UK) Division,  
Former Commander ISAF

## **Operational Aspects of UN-EU Cooperation in Peace Operations**

**Chair:** **General Raimund Schittenhelm,**  
Commandant, National Defense Academy

**Panelists:** *Military aspects of EU-led Peace  
Operations*

**Brigadier General Bernd Lubenik**  
Chairman, EU Military Committee  
Working Group

*The Role and Work of EU Civilian Police  
in Peace Operation, Bosnia-Herzegovina*

**Commissioner Sven Christian  
Frederiksen**  
Chief, European Union Police Mission

**Discussant:** *The Challenges of EU - UN Cooperation in  
Peace Operations*

**Dr. Thierry Tardy,**  
Faculty Member, Geneva Center for  
Security Policy

## **EU-UN Collaboration in Support of the Brahimi Report**

**Chair:** **Ambassador Ernst Sucharipa**  
Director, Diplomatic Academy, Vienna

**Introduction:** The Brahimi Report: Challenges to  
*Implementation*  
**Mr. David Harland**  
Head of the Best Practices Unit,  
Department of Peacekeeping Operations,  
United Nations

**Breakout Groups:**

**BG I:** Rapid Deployment  
**Facilitator:** **Brigadier General Wolfgang Wosolobe**  
Director, Military Policy Division,  
Ministry of Defense, Austria

**BG II:** *Early Involvement of Contributing  
Countries*  
**Facilitator:** **H.E. Mr. Yves Doutriaux**  
Ambassador of France to OSCE

**BG III:** Governance Building  
**Facilitator:** **Ambassador John L. Hirsch**  
Senior Fellow, International Peace  
Academy

**The Evolving NATO-EU Relationship**

**Chair:** **Ambassador Nicolaas H. Biegan**  
Senior Civilian Representative of NATO  
to the Former Yugoslav Republic of  
Macedonia

**Panelists:** **Ambassador Reinhard Bettzuege**  
Professor of International Relations  
(Diplomacy)  
Andrássy Gyula University, Budapest

**Major General Pierre Maral**  
Commander EUROR, FYROM

**Discussant:** **Dr. Waheguru. Pal S. Sidhu**  
Senior Associate, International Peace  
Academy

**Breakout Groups:**

**BG IV** *UN-European Cooperation: The UN-EU  
Cooperation in Periods of Transition from  
the International Police Task Force (UN)  
to the European Union Police Mission*

**Presenter:** **Commissioner Sven Christian  
Frederiksen**  
Chief, EU Police Mission, Bosnia-  
Herzegovina

**Facilitator:** Ambassador John L. Hirsch

**BG V** *Civil-Military-Cooperation: Balkans,  
Kosovo*

**Presenter:** **Mr. Ole Andreas Lindeman,**  
Acting Assistant Director General, Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs, Norway, Former  
Political Advisor to the COMKFOR

**Facilitator:** **General Raimund Schittenhelm**

**BG VI** Challenges and Potentials for EU-UN  
Cooperation

**Presenter:** Ambassador Fernando Valenzuela,  
Deputy Director-General, CFSP,  
Multilateral Affairs and North America,  
East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, EEA &  
EFTA, EU Commission

**Facilitator:** **David M. Malone**

## COOPERATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS: THE UNITED NATIONS AND EUROPE

*Rapporteurs:* Clara LEE and Dr. Alexandra NOVOSSELOFF

*Conclusion:* David MALONE

The 2003 International Peace Academy Vienna Seminar, co-organized with the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and the Austrian National Defense Academy, was held 4-6 July 2003. Roughly seventy participants from the political, diplomatic, and military arenas, as well as members of academia and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) met to discuss how cooperation in peace operations conducted by the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other international actors might be improved in the future. This discussion was conducted with a view towards further implementing the recommendations of the *Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations*, also known as the Brahimi Report.

This conference report presents an overview of the discussion and debate among conference participants during the seminar's plenary sessions and concludes with brief summaries of the smaller breakout groups' findings on specific issues.

### **Introduction: Evolving Cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union in Peace Operations**

Based on their experiences over the past decade, the United Nations, European regional organizations, and other relevant actors have increasingly recognized the need for cooperation in carrying out peace operations, both in Europe and beyond. Though they have worked together with reasonable effectiveness in peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo in the last four years, there is an awareness of the need for further improvement in planning and implementation of United Nations peace operations. That the European Union is developing as a significant actor in this field lends greater complexity to this cooperation.

The EU is not a regional organization in the same vein as NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or other regional arrangements outside Europe. Rather, it can be seen as an integrating process aimed at avoiding new crises between European states, and as such, is a conflict prevention mechanism of its own. In the 1990s, the EU staked out a larger role in international politics, developing structures and capabilities for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) sustained by a common security and defense policy (European security and defense policy, ESDP).

## 1. The Changing Nature of Peacekeeping Operations

### *From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: New Dimensions*

The UN and the international community face new challenges in conflict management now and into the future, as classical peacekeeping has evolved into the more comprehensive approach of peacebuilding, reflecting current political realities. The most significant catalysts for change in peacekeeping approaches over the past decade and in the present are interlinked: the changing nature of war—increasingly, conflict of the sort that one speaker referred to as the war of the “have nots” vs. other “have nots” rather than inter-state or “conventional” civil wars—and the erosion of the state. The larger role for peacekeeping is in weak or failing states and the UN is involved in areas where conflict has not yet ended. Such situations demand more multidimensional operations with the capacity not only to intervene between parties to a conflict but, increasingly, to bring and enforce order and to facilitate humanitarian and development programs as well.

Concurrent with these developments are the trend toward regionalization and the overall expansion of actors in the field of peacekeeping operations, from regional/security organizations to NGOs and even private businesses. This diversification offers obvious benefits for the success of multi-faceted peace operations, as well as benefits specific to involved regional organizations, but simultaneously introduces a host of complications. Key among these are the differing aims and agendas of regional organizations involved and the possibility of competition between these organizations; the impact such competition (and even collaboration) could have on the international security architecture; and the political and practical difficulties of coordination and collaboration.

One of the larger dilemmas is the regional disparity of capacity and resources for conflict management. As one speaker put it, the “good face” of regionalization can be seen in Europe, as the EU and NATO take on growing roles in the European periphery, or in the involvement of Australia, New Zealand, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries in East Timor. On the other hand, increasingly regional approaches to peacebuilding threaten areas lacking a strong regional actor like the EU or NATO. And as EU and NATO countries’ contributions to UN peacekeeping shrink—though the EU member states contribute 40% of the UN peacekeeping operations budget, EU member states collectively contribute about 13.5 % of total UN troops and police deployed—regions like Africa bear the brunt of this double blow.

## *Rich Peacekeeping vs. Poor Peacekeeping*

The UN continues to struggle with the discrepancy between Western member states' support in the Security Council (SC) for peacekeeping operations, and the comparative lack of Western (or 'Northern') contribution to actual operations, particularly in regions where major powers have little vested interest nor the political will to send troops. The perception of a North-South divide in UN peacekeeping persists, with "poor peacekeeping" carried out primarily by Southern countries, in Africa, and "rich peacekeeping," mainly in the Balkans, conducted by Northern countries and regional organizations such as NATO and now the EU. Northern involvement in African peacekeeping is marked by hesitation and limited commitment, both in terms of the scope of the operation and the timeframe of involvement, as with the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) deployment in Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000—6 months—and the EU's Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—4 months. In the latter case, at the time of the seminar, the SC had put off for another month the decision whether to authorize a new mandate for the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), threatening a gap between the scheduled end of Artemis and the UN takeover.

## *Implementation of the Brahimi Report*

Recognizing past failures in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, the UN has attempted considerable reform in peace operations, following the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. Of its four main areas of concern, progress has been made in the areas of rapid deployment capacity; headquarters structure and its planning and support capacities; and information technology. Implementation of the Report's recommendations has been weakest in the area of doctrine, strategy, and decision-making.

As David Harland, Head of the Best Practices Unit at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), pointed out, improvements in the rapid deployment capacity can be seen in the establishment of a Strategic Deployment Stocks facility in Brindisi that enables quick deployment of transport and communications assets; standby arrangements with governments; and the development of extensive on-call rosters for civilian specialists. However, this improvement has so far been largely untested; missions in Côte d'Ivoire and Iraq were deployed within a week of the SC mandate, but participants protested that such small operations—26 people for the UN Mission in Côte D'Ivoire (MINUCI) and 25 for Iraq—could hardly be regarded as triumphs in rapid deployment. A potential UN operation in Sudan, should a peace agreement be reached, would be a more serious test of this capability.

In the area of headquarters reform, an increase in DPKO headquarters personnel from 400 to about 600 people has strengthened planning capability, though weaknesses still exist in early warning and strategic assessment capabilities. A number of participants argued that the UN must rethink capacity rather than simply adding bureaucracy, however, and that accountability is sadly lacking in the UN system (and was not addressed by the Brahimi Report). Participants generally agreed that both member states and the UN are responsible for breaking down bureaucratic barriers and moving beyond rationalization or explanation toward improving capacities.

The final area of progress was that of dealing with peace operations in the information age. Communications and information technology systems have been much improved despite weak expenditure. Harland pointed out that implementation of the Brahimi Report overall was strong on technocratic concerns but weak on doctrine, strategy, and mandate. The establishment of the Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) was not approved, nor was the recommendation that SC resolutions remain in draft form until firm commitments of troops and mission support elements were in place.

Despite the progress that has been made, the UN must move beyond the implementation of the Brahimi Report. A more forward-looking vision is necessary for the UN to adapt to changes in the peacekeeping environment, regionalization in particular; even while seeking European contributions to UN missions, the UN cannot ignore the reality of EU and NATO interests and constraints that stand independent of UN aims. As the United Kingdom's (UK) involvement in Sierra Leone and France's participation as the framework nation in Bunia demonstrate, the UN can benefit from even limited European participation and collaboration, and it was argued that both examples could serve as models for the future. Though participants voiced concerns about imbalanced collaborations of this sort—"peacekeeping apartheid" or "two-speed crisis management," with the potential to widen the North-South divide in peace operations—there was no question that collaborative partnerships and interoperability must be built within the field of actors.

## **2. The UN-EU Relationship**

UN-EU cooperation, in particular, is grounded in shared values and a commitment to multilateral approaches to peace operations. When compared to recent years, the dialogue between the two organizations is more consistent and open, and cooperation exists on a wide range of issues. Certainly, the EU take-over of the UN police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina gave a boost to UN-EU relations. Recent high-level meetings between the two organizations have consistently considered possibilities for



cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management. For example, the Office of the Military Adviser to DPKO now works closely with its EU Military Staff counterparts in retaining EU forces in UN-commanded missions whenever possible, to avoid competition for resources and to build consistent channels of information. Major General Patrick Cammaert, the SG's military advisor, pointed out that now "all relevant DPKO units enjoy regular and productive relations with their EU counterparts." And as Johannes Wimmer points out in his background paper to the seminar, reproduced in this volume, both the EU's high level of organizational coherence in decision-making processes in the UN General Assembly and the improving coordination and information among EU member states in regard to SC matters make the possibilities for coordination between the two organizations more promising yet.

### *UN Demand and EU Supply?*

In the optimistic view, what Thierry Tardy termed the "theoretical convergence of UN demand and EU supply," the UN can benefit from the resources and capacities of the EU, especially with progress in the ESDP process and the development of an EU rapid reaction force capacity. It can, in particular, benefit from the ability of the EU to rapidly deploy troops in force in a non-permissive environment. As for the EU, its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations accords with its declared interest in projecting peace and stability outside Europe, and provides a testing grounds for the ongoing development of ESDP capabilities. The strong political momentum backing the development of ESDP and the past and present involvement of the EU and EU member states in UN peacekeeping operations stands as a backdrop to future cooperation. In this view, increased EU involvement and strengthening suits the interests of both parties, with the EU, a philosophically closer partner to the UN, standing as a counterbalance to the United States (US).

There are serious overarching concerns in regard to this relationship, however. Neither the UN nor the EU can properly be regarded as monolithic, of course: each is very much the sum of its parts and shaped by member states' positions and contributions. Tardy argued that in the field of crisis management, despite the Brahimi Report reforms conducted by the UN, EU member states' perceptions of the UN are less than favorable, as demonstrated by their waning troop and police contributions to UN peace operations. Furthermore, though on the one hand, participation in peace operations provides the opportunity to measure or test ESDP operationality, on the other, there is great pressure on the EU to deliver. Given this pressure, the question is not whether the EU will pursue crisis management capacities and activities, but whether EU crisis management will take place with or without the UN.

Because of the organizations' overlapping membership, the concern persists that enhanced EU capabilities could come at the expense of UN peacekeeping. As one participant questioned, to what degree are EU member states available to the UN rather than, or in addition to, the EU? A number of participants argued that current EU operations in Bunia and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) laid to rest the worries about EU capacity-building at the expense of UN peacekeeping. In general, however, participants were divided about the significance of Operation Artemis; while some regarded it as positive indication of ESDP development, EU rapid reaction capability, and potentials for EU-UN collaboration, others were considerably more skeptical. Small-scale and ad hoc, it was argued that Artemis could serve neither as a litmus test nor as a model for future operations, and that it was little more than an example of an operation conducted in extremis, with tentative and hesitant EU involvement at best. The three major factors for success for Artemis were identified as timely handover to MONUC, non-interference by neighboring states, and further progress in the inter-Congolese dialogue. The likelihood of a gap in the transition between Artemis and MONUC, while a failure by this calculus, need not preclude further operations on this model, however.

In contrast, participants had little but good to say of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The success of the EUPM, a follow-on to the International Police Task Force (IPTF), attests to the possibilities for cooperation between the EU and UN in the area of civilian crisis management in particular. Indeed, the EU appears less ambivalent about its involvement in UN-led civilian operations and activities than in military operations. From the EU perspective, though the EUPM includes non-member-state participants, it is nonetheless an EU operation supported structurally by the Commission, and as EUPM Chief Sven Frederiksen pointed out, it demonstrates the crisis management and civilian police capacity of ESDP.

A potentially more troublesome matter lies in the possibility of ceding a measure of EU autonomy to the UN in cooperative peace operations. While the EU continues to seek UN authorization for involvement in peace operations, particularly those outside of Europe, and respects the international legitimacy that a UN mandate or authorization provide, there are political complications. As both Tardy and General Bernd Lubenik, Chairman of the EU Military Committee Working Group, emphasized, the hallmark of EU-led operations is the involvement of the political-military structure of the EU. Accordingly, it is a key concern of EU member states that such operations remain under the political control and strategic direction of the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC). By implication, EU reluctance to subordinate control of an EU operation to UN authority (control and command) makes the subcontracting model more attractive.

## *Complementarity vs. Competition?*

Such questions about EU-UN cooperation echo issues more commonly brought up in the context of the EU-NATO relationship, particularly the question of complementarity vs. competition, and concerns about the possible erosion of EU autonomy. The structure of ESDP is arguably the crux of the EU-NATO relationship—whether ESDP would be built independent of NATO structures, the path favored by France, or within NATO structures, the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) path preferred by the UK. The French-British Summit of Saint-Malo in 1998 laid the groundwork that ESDP structures should not duplicate NATO’s structures, capabilities, or procedures. Then in March 2003, the so-called “Berlin Plus” agreement has been put into effect between the EU and NATO, granting the EU access to NATO’s planning and command capabilities (in short, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE), and thereby enabling the EU to formally launch its first military operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Operation Concordia in fYROM is the first example of the EU’s vision of global crisis management. Indeed, the EU, along with NATO, was first involved in the diplomatic process that led to the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001, and the Stability Pact and the prospect of EU membership are added economic and political incentives for fYROM. In April 2003, the EU took over from NATO Operation Amber Fox with its own military operation, Concordia, aimed at easing relations between the Albanians and the Macedonians. Despite continued challenges on the ground—the state of corruption and mistrust continues, for example, and institutional reforms progress is slower than expected—there have been no problems of coordination with NATO, and relations between the international security organizations and Macedonian security structures are becoming more constructive, as attested to by Major General Pierre Maral, then Commander of EUFOR, fYROM.

Clearly, the consensus among conference participants was that, in the words of General Cammaert, “complementary arrangements and partnership between relevant organizations should be preferred to competition.”

## *Scenarios for EU-UN Cooperation in Peace Operations*

Participants identified three main scenarios for EU-UN cooperation in UN peace operations:

- Individual participation of EU member states in UN-led operations, in which the EU would play the role of a clearinghouse;
- an EU-led operation, under a UN mandate, opening the way for a UN operation; or

- an EU-led operation, under a UN mandate, existing alongside a UN operation.

For reasons discussed above, the first scenario is unlikely to occur because of the reluctance of EU member states since the mid-1990s to become involved in UN-led operations. In the latter two scenarios, the EU—or rather, the EU PSC—would retain political and strategic control over its operations. Operation Artemis, of course, illustrates Tardy’s observation that the EU is “very much in favor of the sub-contracting model, by which the UN creates an operation, but subcontracts its implementation to the EU. In such a scenario, there is no formal link between the two institutions and the autonomy of decision of the EU is preserved.” Alternatively, the EU might possibly lead a pillar within a UN complex peace operation, as in the case of Kosovo. These scenarios would be slightly different for the civilian aspects of crisis management.

### **3. Recommendations**

Following plenary presentations and discussions, participants divided into smaller breakout groups to discuss specific topics in-depth and to come up with concrete recommendations. The findings of each group are presented below:

#### *Rapid Deployment*

Rapid deployment is specific to each operation, dependent on time, size, and aim, and is only one factor in shortening response time. It is not a strictly military question, and therefore requires political and military coordination. On the UN side, its rapid deployment target was defined by the Brahimi Report (90 days for a complex peace operation, 30 days for a traditional peacekeeping operation). Early commitment depends on the political will of contributing countries, and therefore, information regarding risk and threat analysis must be made available in appropriate time. Though the force generation process can start before a SC resolution is adopted, countries generally wait, thereby losing time. Unlike within the EU, for whom the framework nation concept is particularly valuable, in the UN context, the framework nation process is difficult to implement. On the EU side, deployment can begin only after Council decision, but if the operation is deemed appropriate, troops generally are available. For the EU, then, generic scenarios might save time. The EU has limited forces available to the UN as major countries are overstretched in current operations and restructuring.

#### Recommendations:

- Overcome barriers between organizations through measures such as temporary liaison officer exchanges.
- Make use of existing resources.
- Better processing of information relevant to UN operations. Information exchange and a security agreement would be first steps towards this goal.
- Rethink EU Article 19; clarify use of NATO assets; and engage in strategic dialogue to build confidence and possibly further cooperation.

#### *Early Involvement of Contributing Countries*

Participants raised the issues of the disparity between the contribution from Western/Northern countries and Southern countries, the problem of availability of troops, and the sustainability of commitment. Three concerns were examined: the reforms that need to be further implemented by the UN for early involvement of contributing countries (in the drafting process of SC resolutions and the preparation process of member states); how to assess the effectiveness of stand-by arrangements; and the specific needs of peacekeeping operations.

#### Recommendations:

- Some operational link between regional organizations and the UN could bridge the gap in competencies through common training.
- The EU could help the UN in lessons learned. It could study the case of SHIRBRIG in the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), especially for the transition period and the question of standard compatibility.
- The EU could provide officers in planning structures, help transport troops (for example, through an agreement between the Russian Federation and the EU), and train through peacekeeping courses. Programs such as the French RECAMP (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities) could be developed at the EU level.
- The EU could help the UN Secretariat before any resolution is adopted in providing planning, assessing military equipment on the ground, and in providing access to information.
- The EU could assist member states in preparing papers on emerging crises, so that these states could prepare the ground in domestic matters.

## *Governance Building*

Tensions in governance operations include the inconsistency of means and ends (i.e., achieving democracy and rule of law through benevolent autocracy); the inadequacy of means for the ends (limited time, resources, and attention because of donor timetables); and the irrelevance of the means to the ends (balancing the demand for high international standards against the need for locally sustainable goals). There is a lack of understanding among international actors about what governance means, with an overemphasis on process, statistics, and organization processes. Perpetuating dependency is another danger for international organizations that may use the rhetoric of local ownership but carry out the work themselves, allowing little substantive input and no local control.

Recommendations in three key areas:

### Learning

- Clearer analysis of past operations and knowledge transfer between organizations.
- Better analysis of country situations to contextualize operations, drawing on academic expertise.

### Staff

- Better quality of staff, especially at the leadership level.
- Better staff at other levels as well, local if possible.

### Clarity

- Clarify strategic objectives, timeframes, and commitment.
- Clarify relationship with local population, being transparent about local powers in the present and future.

## *UN-European Cooperation in the Period of Transition from the IPTF to the EUPM*

A major challenge in this transition was making the change in mandate known to the police forces, the public, and political authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EUPM also faced the possibility of destabilization of the security situation once the UN field presence was withdrawn. On the logistical side, there were few difficulties in handover of buildings and equipment, though inadequate handover of files. Personnel carry-over brought valuable institutional memory but difficulties in adjustment to the new mandate and new roles. And though EUPM Chief Sven Frederiksen was himself double-hatted as the head of the outgoing IPTF and incoming EUPM, he argued for retaining different heads of operations through the transition period.

Problems in handover included inadequate or non-existent files/equipment sharing, nor were lessons learned adequately conveyed. In the area of media relations, no information was passed on to the press and there was no press monitoring.

Recommendations:

- A press/public information strategy needs to be articulated.
- Improved mechanisms for information transfer.
- Improved logistics and procurement; consider equipment transfer in the future.
- Recruit qualified police officers.
- Allow for an overlapping period between the heads of the exiting and incoming missions.

*Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations*

The background paper on this topic made a distinction between civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) as a mechanism to assist a military structure cope with taking on the role of a political organization, and the larger sphere of civil-military cooperation and coordination. Group participants suggested that CIMIC could more realistically or conservatively be regarded as ‘military measures to military ends.’ Challenges include the practical and legal difficulties of undertaking military activities in the humanitarian field; the ever-changing staff and UN Special Representatives to the Secretary-General in a constant situation; and human security and gender considerations. The UN, NATO, and the EU have different visions of CIMIC, as reflected in their respective guidelines, making the direction of CIMIC in peace operations led by regional organizations under UN-mandate unclear.

Recommendations:

- Greater clarity on the strategic level before embarking on operations; identify specific needs.
- Greater clarity and coordination on the operational level, in theatre.
- Present a recognizable face for operations and actions, pursuing either a joint or single public information strategy.
- Develop guiding principles rather than strict regulations.

*Challenges and Potentials for EU-UN Cooperation*

General conversational topics included the impact of globalization on the UN constituency; the US role in the shaping of the EU; and the US vis-à-vis international organizations (multilateralism).

The UN regards the EU favorably because of the capacity and resources the EU could potentially provide and because it views the EU as a counterbalance to the US, philosophically closer to UN than is the United States. On the other side, the EU's view of the state of its relations with the UN is mixed: despite the fallout over Iraq, the relationship is strong in peace and security, development, high-level contacts, and humanitarian action. However, there are limits on the relationship as well. The UN makes significant demands on the EU, whose capacity to supply is in question. To EU coherence, which can be seen in the common positions of CFSP and ESDP, the UN represents the threat of a possible splintering of positions or shifting of positions.

#### Recommendations:

- Both organizations need to build on practice rather than theory.
- The EU should seek out areas where it has capacity or comparative advantage and act.
- The UN should be open to various forms of cooperation.
- Aim for progress of action, not improvisation, in future.

#### **Conclusion**

In sum, the discussion at the Seminar suggested that the UN needs to move beyond implementation of the Brahimi Report to anticipate challenges arising from the changing nature of the conflicts the SC has been addressing in Africa and elsewhere. With larger number of staff in DPKO, it will be expected to do better in a number of areas, on which a reasonable start has been made under strong leadership from Jean-Marie Guehenno and with committed, high quality military advice from Patrick Cammaert and others. Because the shape and content of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era has been evolving very fast, with new and difficult challenges, such as the protection of civilians in zones of often very violent conflict, sometimes tacked on to mandates nearly as an afterthought by the Council, the multiple difficulties the UN faces in discharging its diverse peacekeeping responsibilities should not be underestimated. At the same time participants agreed that cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, the EU in particular, although difficult in view of the differences in organizational structures, traditions and decision-making procedures, has improved markedly in recent years, with lessons learned on both sides and real prospects of further improvements in the future.



## **THE FUTURE PARTNERSHIP WITH REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

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‘UN’ and ‘peacekeeping’ do not automatically go together in any vision of the future. Until less than a decade ago, the UN was really the only body in the world that did peacekeeping. Now, everyone does peacekeeping. The UN has 14 peace operations, with 37,000 troops deployed. NATO is leading operations, in Bosnia, Kosovo and now Afghanistan. The EU has a small force in Macedonia, and a ‘police keeping’ mission in Bosnia. The Commonwealth of Independent States has a force in Abkhazia, Georgia. The OSCE is also active in that part of the world. ECOWAS has a force in Côte d’Ivoire. There is a French-led force deploying into eastern Congo. There is even an NGO – the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue – running its own peacekeeping operation in Aceh, complete with force commanders, troop contributing nations, status of mission agreements, and so on. The door is open, and people are rushing in, including private businesses. There is a British firm actively pushing the idea that the United Nations should hire Gurkha units (advertised as ‘NATO standard’ private soldiers) to support its operations in the Congo. Almost everything is on the table.

### **1. Nowadays conflicts**

Let’s first have a look at what conflicts and wars look like today and tomorrow. John Keegan in his article “A brief history of warfare – past, present, future” states that we have witnessed a three-stage drama. 1st act: war as activity between ‘have-nots’ against ‘haves’. 2nd act: to be roughly situated 1500 onwards, ‘haves’ (mainly the European nations) against ‘have nots’, also called colonization. The 3rd act we have witnessed in the 20th century: war of ‘haves’ against ‘haves’. And with his unmistakable logic John Keegan concludes that we now are looking at the 4th act, being the war of ‘have-nots’ against ‘have-nots’. That conclusion does not leave much for interstate war, as we know it, since ‘have-nots’ are not among those we expect to have a state. Martin van Crefeld in his impressive book “On the transformation of war” argues that typically interstate wars between more or less equal partners do not exist anymore. “Future war will not be waged by or against super sophisticated armies, but by people wielding Kalashnikovs, anti-tank rockets, maybe even literally knives, sticks and stones, as in the case of the Israeli-occupied territories”.

A recent report by United Nations investigators and the International Crisis Group, underlined van Crefelds' analysis: Mercenaries fight alongside government forces. Soldiers open their barracks for rebel gun-runners. Veterans of insurrection in country A show up to assist rebels in country B. These are not conventional civil wars. Restoring a measure of normality under these circumstances is among the toughest challenges facing the United Nations. The risks and costs for such complex operations are far greater than for traditional peacekeeping. Increasingly, UN operations are being established in countries where conflict has not yet completely ended.

## **2. Role of the United Nations**

The role of the United Nations in peace and security – the honourable and essential role – is to work for peace in those areas where the Council is united in a threat to international peace and security. Easing the transition of Timor Leste to full sovereignty; ensuring that peace in Sierra Leone doesn't unravel; supporting the fledgling government in Kabul; holding the line in Cyprus, Lebanon, the Golan Heights, the Horn of Africa. And, above all, helping to steer Congo away from the precipice of genocide and regional conflagration. That is the role – a vital role, if I dare put it that way. What capacities do we need? The answer to the question flows from two political realities. One is that of weak states. The other is that of regionalisation. Classical peacekeeping – the interposition of ceasefire observer forces between belligerents – still has a role. But it is a relatively small role. The bigger reality is peacekeeping in weak states. The conflicts of this decade and the last have been wars of disintegration. The major hotspots of the 1990s – Yugoslavia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Somalia, the Great Lakes – were all, in one way or another, a function of weak or disintegrating states.

This is also true right now. What is happening in West-Africa can be understood in realist political terms. At its root, however, is the erosion of the state. That has been true for some time in Sierra Leone. It is true now in Côte d'Ivoire as we deploy. And it may be true in Liberia, in which the institutions of the state have largely collapsed. And it is true in the Democratic Republic of Congo where millions have died, not in combat, but in the chaos that has followed the implosion of state authority.

The second reality around which we must construct our capacities is that of regionalisation. The good side of regionalisation, I suppose, is Europe. NATO and the EU, long rather inward-looking structures, perceive themselves as having an important role on the European periphery. Another positive case might be the opposite side of the world. Australia led a force – with major contributors from New Zealand and the ASEAN countries – in East Timor. The problem with this only-in-my-back-yard approach is that it spells trouble for the regions of the world where there is no power, or

no coalition, around which effective peace operations can be built. Basically, that means Africa. Nigeria and South Africa do have the ability and the will to project some stabilizing force beyond their borders – but it is limited. My vision of UN peacekeeping is one that accommodates these two sets of realities.

In the first case, we need capacities not just to interpose forces between recognized belligerents, but to help bring a degree of order. That might be through the implementation of peace agreements, through demining, through disarmament and demobilisation programmes, through political processes including elections, by facilitating humanitarian and development programmes. And so on. My second point on political realities is that we also need capacities to work within a context of some regional fragmentation. This is more difficult.

### **3. Take NATO as an example**

We have to accept that the NATO countries, for example, will take a lead and bring resources that we cannot, to trouble spots on the European periphery. This is good and specifically envisaged under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. But we also have to stand against a sort of rich-man's peacekeeping – the sort of arrangement that ensures that the full might of NATO keeps a lid on Kosovo, whereas only a battalion of Uruguayans might stand between chaos and genocide in eastern Congo.

And I choose my Uruguayan example deliberately, of course. Because there is some willingness, in the UK and France, to help in the most terrible conflicts in Africa. But it is a complicated willingness. A willingness, perhaps, to work alongside conventional blue beret missions, but also to take advantage of their own tremendous capacities, and to stand slightly apart. As the UK did in Sierra Leone, and as the French-led forces are now doing with the Uruguayans in eastern Congo.

We have to accommodate the realities of regionalisation: to accept it, but also to build structures which will allow some of the capacities of this region to work for the good of other regions, particularly Africa.

### **4. Expansion of EU and NATO**

Two months ago, on March 26<sup>th</sup> 2003, an important ceremony took place in Brussels. The signing ceremony of the Protocols of Accession by 7 countries highlighted a milestone in NATO history. Similar expansions are now taking place in the EU. But will their integration increase their willingness to be involved in multilateral crisis management, including through the UN? Or could greater regional integration result in a reduced commitment to the UN and to UN peacekeeping?

This brings me to outlining the UN's reforms and the UN's needs with regard to peacekeeping. After UN failures in Somalia and Rwanda, the Security Council turned to regional peacekeeping initiatives as the new panacea. From a military perspective this worked fine in Europe, where NATO was able to take over the peacekeeping tasks in Bosnia, and later in Kosovo. In 1995, after a peace agreement was signed, NATO deployed 60,000 troops in Bosnia, which is twice the number of UN Blue Helmets authorized by the UN Security Council when war was still raging.

How many NATOs are there in Africa, however? It took the latter half of the 1990s to realize that regional peacekeeping could not serve as a panacea either. Moreover, NATO is an effective military alliance, but it is not equipped to take on multidimensional aspects of peacekeeping, such as policing or civil administration, tasks the world had to confront in Kosovo. Faced with this dilemma, the world, once again, had to turn to UN peacekeeping as the only technically capable alternative actor, and the only politically viable, with universal legitimacy.

I am aware that the extension of NATO and EU could imply that the UN, EU and NATO find themselves competing for the same limited military resources in the sub-region. We must therefore avoid being faced with a zero-sum proposition while we formulate our collective ambitions for the maintenance of international peace and security. The pursuit of national interests, regional commitments and universal obligations must not be mutually exclusive, but mutually reinforcing. Complementary arrangements and partnerships between relevant organizations should be preferred to competition.

## **5. Regional organizations and peacekeeping.**

Regional organizations and regional forces (or regional coalitions of the willing) have played and still play a significant role as it comes to peacekeeping. In Afghanistan, ISAF was deployed in 2001 after the UN Secretary-General bluntly stated to the Security Council that the conditions in Afghanistan were not ripe for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation, since there was no peace to keep. ISAF has played a major role in improving security in Kabul. Its deployment has been a sign of Western and Eastern European troops' re-engagement in peacekeeping outside of Europe. At the same time, ISAF contributors' unwillingness to expand the force and deploy it outside of Kabul is a limit to that re-engagement.

In Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR have been working hand in hand to ensure the implementation of resolution 1244 and to administer the territory. Was it expected? Certainly, the division of labor between the UN and NATO could have created difficulties. At the outset, in the absence of a single chain of command, the international community was constantly at risk of facing policy discrepancies. Close coordination

and working relationship between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the COMKFOR have been key factors to avert that risk. Besides, I should add that the EU and OSCE have both operated under the UN's umbrella to take charge of reconstruction efforts and institution building, respectively. This "pillar" structure has contributed to greater integration and mainstreaming of international efforts.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN successfully completed its mandate by the end of 2002. This mandate covered police reform and restructuring, but did not extend to military aspects of peacekeeping, which is still vested in SFOR. Indeed, according to the Dayton Peace Agreement, the international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been fragmented between NATO, the High Representative, the UN, and OSCE. In terms of the UN's role, 2,000 UNMIBH monitors have participated in the implementation of the UN's tasks over seven years one third of them originating from European countries. This has been the most significant reform of the security sector in the Balkans.

Now, UNMIBH has handed over long-term police monitoring to the EU Police Mission. That handover is an excellent example of cooperation and smooth transition between the UN and a regional entity.

In principle, peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations both require robust military capacities. Let me insist that, in both cases, the capacities should be strong if the deployment is intended to be anything more than a symbolic one. The difference between enforcement and peacekeeping is that in the case of the former, the deployment is undertaken in a non-permissive environment, without the belligerents' consent, and normally has an objective of defeating an aggressor through the use of force.

Will we be able to achieve deterrence through strength in the future? Will we receive the capable units and the attack helicopters we need? The answer to this question rests with Member States. If they want operations with backbone, they must be willing to provide us the necessary means. I would like to emphasize one area in which regional organizations such as NATO and EU, through its Rapid Reaction Force, can play a particularly useful role. The capacity of these organizations to deploy quickly and to deploy in force in a non-permissive environment, which would not be immediately suitable for a UN peacekeeping operation, is a valuable asset.

## **6. Cooperation with regional organizations**

In order to enhance our cooperation in the field of conflict management with regional organizations and partners we are in the process of developing policy and proposing short term initiatives. Just to give some examples of our cooperation with the European Union. The Office of the Military Adviser works closely with its EU Military Staff counterparts. The Division seeks to retain EU forces-or those of its Member States-in

UN commanded missions whenever possible. At a minimum the Division seeks to avoid competition for resources, particularly in standby systems. The Military Adviser maintains informal contact with the Director-General of the EUMS. My staff has maintained these working level contacts through visits, discussions, and attendance at conferences, seminars and workshops focusing on issues such as CIMIC, command and control, handover/takeover of operations and the possibility of standardization in key areas. In addition to contacts with the EUMS, there has been informal contact with the EU civilian crisis management staff. The EUMS have also provided information on UN efforts to assist the African Union, particularly on operation of a viable Military Staff Committee.

All relevant DPKO units enjoy regular and productive relations with their EU counterparts. In order to move this process forward, here are a few of the proposed concrete, short-term initiatives:

- *Increase technical staff exchanges:* DPKO personnel should exchange places with their counterparts from within the EU Council Secretariat for up to several weeks at a time. The guiding principle of the reciprocal exchange would be “more staff, for shorter periods of time.”
- *Formalization of participation in staff training exercises:* Both the EU Council Secretariat and DPKO now conduct a number of staff training courses, programmes, seminars and projects. Regularized participation would help to harmonize institutional approaches to future crisis management activities, especially in terms of operational aspects of mission management.
- *Increase EU military involvement in Peacekeeping Operations:* Begin working level planning on identifying specific military units available for rapid deployment as either a EU contingent or as a ‘stand alone’ force along the models outlined above.
- *Expand the UN presence in Brussels:* Externally, enhanced coordination would be greatly facilitated by increased direct interaction between UN staffers and their EU counterparts in Brussels, ideally through the expansion of the UN presence in Brussels. The exchange of Liaison officers, help bring the two organizations closer on operational crisis management.

In order to pursue these initiatives most efficiently, DPKO has established an ad-hoc coordination group on DPKO-EU relations. The group meets on a regular basis and provides a forum for the exchange of information on DPKO-EU relations, and an ideal vehicle for the crafting of DPKOs overall strategy vis-à-vis the EU. The EU has signalled its desire to increase institution-to-institution cooperation with the UN on crisis management issues. The ad-hoc communication’s group will provide the ideal forum for advancing and shepherding the proposed initiatives. It will greatly facilitate

both our external and internal communications, and will assist the process of developing a systematized, comprehensive and integrated strategy to inform our interactions with the EU and potentially other regional organizations.

UN peacekeeping is but one of the tools at the disposal of the international community to address threats to the maintenance of peace and security. Recent conflicts have demonstrated that threats emanating from the furthest corners of the globe can be as dangerous as those in one's own back-yard. This threat can take the form, in collapsed states, of providing safe-haven for terrorist groups with global reach. The absence of the rule of law opens the tap for the illicit flow of drugs across the continent.

In his address at the IPA meeting which was held end of June 2003 in New York on Partnership and African Peacekeeping, General Agwai, now chief of the Nigerian Army and former UN deputy military adviser, made it very clear that over the next decades to come conflicts will continue to erupt in Africa and will lead to an influx of millions of refugees and displaced persons. He also emphasized the need to face issues such as child soldiers, landmines, DDR, restoring the rule of law. Appropriate and responsive regional mechanisms are key to the solution. In the next years to come, African regional organizations will take the lead in setting up brigade-sized stand-by forces in the various regions. I see however a clear supporting role for other regional organizations and headquarters that have gained experience in peacekeeping operations. These headquarters, well equipped, up-to-date as it comes to management tools and techniques, could serve as examples and partners. The UN should facilitate and encourage partnership between regional peacekeeping stand-by forces. Advantages are manifold. One of the European Rapid Deployable battalions may find itself in two years from now conducting peacekeeping exercises together with a battalion of the Central-African region, led by a South-African stand-by forces headquarters. The West-African regional brigade may be directing the exercise, with UN DPKO and humanitarian agencies playing hi-con and lo-con, as the military call it.

Only then will we see bridging of the gap between worlds and cultures and at the same time we will be moving towards the ultimate goal of sharing the burden as foreseen in the UN Charter: 'Collective Security', based on contributions from 'All members'.

## THE ROLE OF THE EU IN UN-MANDATED CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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Before discussing the state of our arrangements with the UN in crisis management, let me briefly update you on where we stand with ESDP. Notwithstanding, or perhaps rather as a consequence of recent disagreements during the Iraq crisis, there is strong political momentum to make ESDP work. Witness for instance the convention recommendations for a new constitutional treaty of the EU. The draft foresees that "the Union may use an operational capacity drawing on assets, civil and military, on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter".

These tasks have been expanded somewhat compared to the earlier "Petersberg Tasks" to include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and peace-keeping, tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking, and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories. This list is more than a cosmetic adjustment; it reflects Europe's awareness of the new challenges and threats and of the central legitimizing authority of the UN in meeting them. Elsewhere in the draft constitutional treaty it is foreseen that individual member states may draw together, in the Union framework, for mutual defense in accordance with article 51 of the Charter. However, I am rather sceptical that this provision will be agreed by the intergovernmental conference.

Recently, Javier Solana published a strategy paper, a document that compares well with president Bush's national security strategy of last year. This is in many ways a call for multilateralism, noting that "Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, must be a European priority". But it will also provide the basis for a more robust, assertive policy in dealing with terrorism, weapons of mass destruction as well as failed states and organized crime. Depending on the political will member states will be able to muster, this may include preventive action and the use of force in expeditionary operations. Judging from first reactions in Washington, the European strategy paper has helped bridging the gap with current thinking within the US administration.

EU cooperation with the UN has been a priority for the EU since the outset of its efforts to develop a wide range of crisis management capacities. The timing of the launch of the EU's drive towards military and civilian capabilities - December 1999 in Helsinki - was directly related to events on the ground in Kosovo and the UN-



coordinated effort to bring peace and stability to the province following the Nato-led intervention. At the Goteborg summit in 2001, even before the targets set for civilian crisis management had been met, the EU committed itself to provide assistance and contribution to UN peace operations.

In substance, the development of EU crisis capacities has been shaped by the UN's own reflection on international peacekeeping - the Brahimi report. EU member states have been among the principal supporters of the report. Many of its recommendations have fed into our own process of capacity development. In the field of civilian crisis management these include recognition of the significance of the rule of law in post-conflict stabilization: rule of law is one of the EU's four priority areas in civilian crisis management. This has led us to establish capacity to deploy rule of law experts - judges, prosecutors, penal experts - as well as to develop guidance on the administration of the rule of law in crisis management contexts, an area the Brahimi report identified as in crucial need of development.

Another area which the Brahimi report focused on is the need for capacity to plan and react faster to crises. This has been an important guiding principle for the EU in terms of developing military as well as civilian capacity. All our target goals, be they military, police, rule of law, civilian administration or civil protection, include a rapid response capability target. To make this credible, we need to have a planning and support capacity and this is an area that we are currently focusing on in close consultation with the commission.

It is fitting that the first crisis management operation launched by the EU - the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) - is a follow-on operation to a UN operation (UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina - International Police Task Force). The mandate of the EUPM states clearly that one of the objectives of the mission is to sustain and safeguard the achievements of the seven year long UN operation. The planning of the EUPM reflected this commitment. The head of the EUPM planning team, commissioner Sven Frederiksen, was double-hatted as the head of the IPTF commissioner. This EUPM planning team was collocated in UN House in Sarajevo, alongside IPTF. When the IPTF mandate ended, at midnight on 31 December 2002, the EUPM was standing ready to immediately assume its mandate and thereby ensure a seamless transition from the UN to the EU. The EUPM is now almost six months on the ground. Let me just make a few reflections on the experience of transition and how we in the EU are trying to learn from it.

First, the need for continuing the reform process begun by a UN peace operation. Peace stabilization is, as the UN itself knows better than any, a long term challenge. UNMIBH itself identified the need for a follow-on mission. The EU is potentially in a unique position to bring a range of instruments to bear in order to maintain and consolidate peace implementation and develop selfsustaining and stable governance.

The transition from IPTF to EUPM has demonstrated just how critical follow-up is to peace operations.

Second, transition requires planning. I mentioned some of the steps taken on the ground between the UNMIBH and EUPM planners. But that must be paralleled at the headquarter level. One of the lessons we in the EU have drawn from the experience is that we need close coordination at the strategic level between UN DPKO and Brussels (SG/HR Solana) right from the start of the process. Issues such as information exchange, reporting, joint strategic decision making need to be discussed and procedures elaborated at an early stage.

This is a two-way process and both of our organizations need to adapt. Just as we undertook a review of the EUPM planning process, so the UN is also carrying out a lessons learned exercise and I think we will each learn much from the other in sharing and comparing our separate experiences.

In developing our arrangements for support to UN peacekeeping, consideration is being given to the fact that ESDP is not ment for the Balkans alone, but that the EU wishes to project stability in other geographical areas, including in Africa and possibly the Middle East as well. Another important element in the institutional relationship between the EU and the UN is the presence on the security council of two, possibly three member states at any given time. This provides an opportunity, in accordance with art 19 of the EU Treaty, for exercising influence on the basis of positions held in common, while respecting of course individual responsibilities.

Nevertheless, there was a lingering concern at UN headquarters that, capabilities being a zero sums game, ESDP was going to develop at the expense of UN peacekeeping. Against this background, Assistant Secretary-General Guehenno and I explored last year what added value could be derived from specific forms of practical cooperation in the field of military peacekeeping. Having examined various models, like the chains of command of KFOR and SFOR, we concluded that the UN would greatly benefit from the EU providing an initial entry force for a larger UN force - much like Australia did in the case of INTERFET/UNTAET. Secondly, that the EU could help by contributing specialised force packages to blue helmets operations, including with a rotational element among member states.

All of this may have helped in setting the scene for launching the first EU-led operation in Africa, operation "Artemis", based on a concept for rapid response using a framework nation. Fact is that following an appeal from UNSG Annan and initial consideration by EU ministers in may, it took only three weeks to launch the operation mandated by UNSCR 1484 to stabilize the security conditions and humanitarian situation in Bunia, in the Eastern Ituri province of the DRC.

The interim emergency multinational force finds itself in a situation that is severely constrained in space and time. The joint area of operations is confined to the

immediate surroundings of the town and its airport, and while the mission is feasible from a military point of view, the force has no mandate to protect the civilian population in the wider surroundings. In addition, authorization for the operation ends September 1st. Its success is therefore critically dependent on at least three factors: the timely handover in the course of August to a strengthened MONUC including with a Chapter VII mandate. Secondly, non-interference from the side of neighboring countries Uganda and Rwanda. And thirdly, further progress in the wider inter-congolese dialogue with a view to fostering reconciliation, restoring national unity and establishing transitional institutions in DRC.

On all these issues, the EU will pursue an active and coherent approach based on individual member states' diplomatic actions in the security council and in the region; the use of community instruments such as the commission's rapid reaction mechanism to alleviate the situation in and around Bunia, efforts by the EU special representative Mr. Ajello in his contacts with leaders in the region, and rapidly intensifying contacts between the EU council secretariat including the EU military staff and DPKO in New York to ensure a smooth transition between IEMF and MONUC.

Let me conclude, however, on a note of caution. It is true that over the past two years, the EU has developed operational capabilities along the full range of Petersberg tasks. We have also established a firm base for future cooperation in crisis management with the UN and other organisations. The strategic partnership with NATO concluded at the end of last year is of key importance for developing our military capabilities and conducting operations with NATO support as necessary. And rather than duplicating the OSCE's area of excellence, the scope for cooperation is widening. But much remains to be done. The EU will need to fill important shortfalls in its military capabilities, strengthen its resources for planning and for mission support and equip itself with a mechanism for funding start-up costs. Maybe the progressive integration with relevant commission services, as foreseen in the draft constitutional treaty will help us forward. But all of this takes time. In the meantime, the demand for peacekeeping and other forms of outside intervention will further grow, not diminish.

## POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF EU-UN COOPERATION

Franz Josef KUGLITSCH

*Austrian Representative, EU Political and Security Committee*

Cooperation between the EU and the UN in peace operations is relatively new on the agenda of the two organisations, as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – both in its civilian and military dimension and complemented by conflict prevention – has only been developed since December 1999. EU-UN cooperation is much wider than that. Let me note in this regard the two Framework Agreements signed recently between the European Commission and the UN Secretariat which are aimed at achieving the Millennium Development Goals in a spirit of partnership.

While the UN is looking back on a 40 years experience in peacekeeping, the EU experience is only six months old. Starting from scratch, the EU has in the last three years set up the appropriate structures, a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee, a Committee for Civilian Crisis Management and the EU Military Staff, developed crisis management procedures and a number of civilian and military instruments and concepts as well as an exercise program.

Despite the EU's declaration of being operational as of now, the acquisition of military capabilities will remain a challenge for the foreseeable future.

The EU launched its first operation as recently as January, 1 as a follow-on mission to the UN police mission in Bosnia with 480 civilian police from the 15 EU member states and 17 so-called third states. Last March the EU took over from NATO the military mission in FYROM – some 450 soldiers from the 13 EU states and from 13 third states are currently deployed.

The EU mission "Artemis" in Bunia/DRC with France acting as framework nation was deployed following a request by the UN Secretary General in June 2003. From the number of troops and civilian police involved you can gather that the EU is only at the beginning. No EU operation in the other priority areas of civilian crisis management – that is rule of law, civilian administration and civil emergency – has been undertaken so far.

Still, the EU member states collectively contribute 40 % of the UN peacekeeping budget and there is no single more enthusiastic supporter of UN peacekeeping and the UN in general than the EU.

When developing ESDP, the main preoccupation was to secure an agreement with NATO on access to NATO assets and capabilities as there is only one set of forces in Europe. The perspective of EU-UN cooperation in crisis

management was, however, never lost sight of. The same is true of EU-OSCE cooperation.

All texts on ESDP adopted by consecutive European Council meetings since 1999 are scattered with references to the UN. With the helpful hand of the Swedish Presidency, the scope of EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management was laid down in Council conclusions of 11 June 2001, which still form the basis of specific themes and areas of cooperation between the two organisations. The conclusions of the European Council in Göteborg contain an Annex on EU co-operation with international organisations in civilian aspects of crisis management. Since then a number of contacts between the two organisations have taken place, both at a political level and in the form of staff-to-staff contacts.

Since the inception of ESDP, the UN Secretariat has understandably asked questions as to what impact the fledging ESDP might have on UN peacekeeping activities, in particular in the light of the then recently adopted Brahimi Report. The Deputy Secretary General, Mrs. Louise Fréchette, when she first met with the Political and Security Committee, expressed the concern that contributions from EU member states to UN peacekeeping operations might be complicated because ESDP might bind capabilities exclusively for EU operations.

Admittedly, there was some confusion on the EU side at the beginning regarding which troops already deployed could count against the EU Headline Goal – only those in UN-mandated operations like SFOR or KFOR or also those in UN-led operations like on the Golan Heights or in Cyprus? However, since then the UN seem to be reasonably assured that enhanced European capabilities will ultimately also benefit the UN.

Where do we stand now?

## **1. On Civilian crisis mangement:**

In the texts adopted by the EU, the possibility for the EU to contribute to operations in civilian aspects of crisis management conducted by lead organisations, such as the UN or the OSCE, is explicitly foreseen.

The *guiding principles* for such contributions are added value, interoperability, visibility and EU decision-making autonomy. It should be noted that the model chosen in the case of Bosnia was the takeover by the EU of the UN-led IPTF mission.

In the context of civilian crisis management, the incoming Italian Presidency has presented an ambitious work plan for the EU Committee on civilian crisis management. High on the list of topics are practical aspects of co-

operation with international organisations. Two conferences on “Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management” will be held in the second half of 2003 with the participation of, *inter alia*, the UN. Co-operation in police missions seems to be, for the time being, the most promising area, while civilian administration and rule of law are for the EU still uncharted waters.

Three possibilities of contributions to a UN peacekeeping operation in the civilian field are likely to be retained:

- National contributions
- A coordinated EU contribution
- The provision of a whole EU component in a UN-led operation, based on a Memorandum of Understanding to be concluded with the UN.

## **2. On military crisis management:**

When it comes to EU contributions to UN-led military peacekeeping, the texts adopted by the EU are less clear-cut. There is no explicit reference to this possibility. This matter was discussed extensively in October 2002 between Deputy Director General Pieter Feith and the Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno. Cooperation in this field boils down to two models. The *first model* being an EU operation under the political control and strategic direction of the EU. This could take the form of an UN-mandated operation like SFOR, the form of the EU taking the lead in an operation subsequently to be turned over to the UN (like in East Timor or more recently in Bunia) or the EU taking on a segment in an operation like in KFOR.

The *second model* would be a EU-coordinated support of national contributions to an UN-led operation. There may be advantages for the UN to turn to the EU instead of addressing individual member states for contributions. The possibility of the EU acting as a “clearing house” for national contributions to UN missions, maybe with some common standards, could be studied further. This “clearing house” function must not, however, lead to delays for the UN.

In view of the reluctance of some member states to commit troops to UN peacekeeping for lengthy periods of time, the provision of specialized forces with a rotation scheme, to be worked out within the EU, could be foreseen.

The Council conclusions of July 2003 invite the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, to pursue discussions with the UN aimed at establishing a comprehensive framework of regular contact and consultation at all appropriate levels, in particular between the Council Secretariat and the EU Military Staff on the one hand and DPKO on the other hand. The following elements should be covered by this framework:

- Mutual information on procedures and concepts;
- Regular exchange of lessons learned;
- Cross participation in exercises;
- Inclusion of EU-UN co-operation/co-ordination in future crisis management exercises and training activities;
- Exchange of liaison officers between DPKO and the EU Military Staff.

### **3. On types of mission and geographic regions:**

The EU is well aware of the UN concern that European peacekeeping might focus exclusively on the Balkans or maybe the Caucasus, leaving out the African continent. The ESDP operation in Bunia could perhaps be seen as proof of the contrary but I will refrain from doing so. This operation is still very young, led by France as framework nation and it is at this stage not clear whether this mission will herald a sustained commitment by the EU to resolve African conflicts, notwithstanding our willingness to contribute to a peaceful solution in the DRC and to support African capacity building and ownership in conflict resolution and peace support operations. But it is a start to underline the fact that ESDP is not restricted to Europe.

ESDP is not an end in itself. It is part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union, complementing the available instruments for external action by a civilian and military component for crisis management. ESDP has therefore to fit into the overall objectives of CFSP and should give the EU the means for autonomous action. The EU is of course committed to contribute to the objectives of the UN in conflict prevention and crisis management. But the Union's priorities include also securing the Balkans for eventual EU membership and dealing with the areas adjacent to Europe.

The strong desire for EU autonomy in decision-making and EU visibility may not always sit easily with the expectations of the UN to see a stronger participation of EU member states in UN-led operations.

ESDP is still an infant and co-operation with the UN will increase as we go along. There are limits to what we can achieve on the dry dock. What we would probably need next, is some concrete operation executed in partnership.

# CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE AND THE UNITED NATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Major General J. McCOLL

*Commandant, Joint Services Command and Staff College, United Kingdom*

I have been asked to describe the cooperation between the international security assistance force and the UN in Afghanistan and draw out any lessons that might have indications for the future and EU/UN cooperation in particular. I caveat my remarks by noting that I commanded ISAF for the first six months and therefore I am a little out of date. However, the setting up of the force brought with it particular issues and the problems of cooperation were perhaps more visible.

I intend to cover the subject under 3 headings; force generation, hierarchy of direction and cooperation in theatre. I will speak from a narrow military perspective; others are far better placed to deal with the broader political issues.

## **1. Force Generation**

The force generation process prior to committal to any operation is inevitably fraught with difficulties. The political decision to commit by coalition partners will be late, the forces offered will require balancing to ensure capabilities are complimentary, mandates will require authorising by Troop Contributing Nations (TCNS), command and control agreed, logistic support and deployment sequenced to ensure that the flow into theatre and force build up makes operational as well as political sense. This was a particular issue in Afghanistan due to the distance and access to airfields, which was extremely limited.

There is no doubt that established alliance force generation procedures can ease the process for established operations, but if they are to be used for initial rapid deployment they must be responsive enough to meet very demanding time lines. I would suggest that success in meeting the time lines in December 2001 was at least partly due to the fact that the coalition of the willing was not hidebound by the bureaucracy of alliance procedures.

## **2. Hierarchy of Direction**

In establishing an operation there is a hierarchy of direction, which the commander receives. Usually some or all the six elements I will cover in a moment are present. I will mention each briefly but the main point I am making is the accumulative impact of



the direction on the ability of the commander to cooperate and support the UN and broader political intent.

### *2.1. The Peace Agreement*

In this case Bonn, which outlines the nature of the peace to keep and underpins the role of the force.

### *2.2. UN Mandate*

Our collective UNPROFOR experience tells us that mandates must be strong, and we have learned from that, as the ISAF mandate was strong. However the mandate must be matched by a force capable of delivering it. The presence of overwhelming force deters violence; the absence of it invites challenge. In ISAF, I would suggest, we ran pretty close to the wind and still do.

### *2.3. Military Strategic Direction*

Military Strategic Direction pulls together all the factors of: political direction, intelligence, information, military factors, diplomatic factors, legal and funding issues amongst others. It gives the commander his mission, constraints and freedoms. It is particularly difficult in the early stage of an operation to devise such direction and it cannot be delivered by an ad hoc organisation, it can be delivered by a single nation as for ISAF or a standing multinational headquarters but it requires a high level of expertise and an established system. It would also be helpful if in constructing the strategic direction meaningful communication was established with the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to ensure that the thrust of the military pillar of the campaign was in line with the other lines of operations, political, economic, social etc which will probably be guided by the SRSG who, in the case of Afghanistan, was Mr. Brahimi.

### *2.4. The Military Technical Agreement (MTA)*

The next document is the MTA, which dictates the way in which the force conducts its business day by day. An essential prerequisite in any operation, this should be negotiated by the commander on the ground because he has to deliver it; but will need to be authorised by the TCNS. Into this MTA should be written the mechanism for cooperating with the government you are sent there to support and the UN on the ground. For example in ISAF we mandated regular meetings between the SRSG,

COMISAF, Minister for Defence and Minister for the Interior, thereby establishing the principle of cooperation and of shared objectives, which cascaded downwards.

### *2.5. Rules of Engagement (RoE)*

The RoE will be devised by individual nations in support of the mandate and mission. However in the ISAF example the majority of nations had RoE which limited their involvement to self defence and intervention in armed conflict. The UN expectation however was for the force to fill the security vacuum on the ground including policing and civil disorder. This is the case in the majority of post conflict situations we find ourselves in and the RoE of any force should reflect the UN requirement and the international communities expectations.

### *2.6. Operational Directive*

The final element in the hierarchy is the operational directive written by the commander himself. I point out that all the other five documents are imposed upon him and in so doing I would emphasise that it is important to give the commander enough freedom to support the UN/SRSG in any way that he sees fit. Constraints will limit cooperation. The commander on the ground must be empowered to deliver cooperation across the broadest possible spectrum.

## **3. Cooperation in Theatre**

Cooperation in theatre is largely a matter of local initiative and commitment although some formal mechanism can be put in place through the MTA.

Security is not delivered through the point of a gun. The full range of lines of operation, economic, political, social, educational, medical all need to pull together, however security underpins all progress and therefore the force commander has a central enabling role to play.

That central role is in support of the SRSG. The commander needs to understand that and it needs to be made clear in his military strategic operational direction. Although he does not take orders from the SRSG he should defer to him in all policy matters less those threatening security issues. He should develop a particularly close relationship, which enables each, i.e. the SRSG and the commander, to use the other as a lever to exert pressure to bring progress across all lines of operations. That support should not be restricted to physical security and security information alone, but include

any area where the UN requires support. Some examples of the broader involvement of ISAF:

- Security sector reform;
- Disaster relief;
- Information operations;
- The Haij.

All this could be characterised as mission creep; however it is rather the support of the UN mission in the broadest sense in line with the belief that security is not delivered at the point of a gun. Cooperation is also required through the various staff levels. Within many UN agencies this can pose difficulties. Their attitude to the military is often to keep it at arms length. Communication is the key.

I would particularly stress the importance of force reconstruction efforts to ensure this is in line and not overlapping with the UN and NGO efforts. We benefited from national and EU funding for this element of the operation and did a great deal of it. In my view it is essential from a force protection point of view. It influences local opinion and demonstrates the force as a force of good and around. The activity and military involvement in it is non negotiable but needs coordination with the UN.

In summary informal cooperation between the force commander and the UN on operations ultimately is dependent upon the relationship of the commander and the SRSG. They need to be in each other's minds. They need to encourage cooperation at a lower level in which both staff realise they are there to support each other.

Such cooperation is easy if it is set within an agreed strategic direction. I would endorse the comments made by Ambassador Firth that in the preparation and planning process there is greater scope for cooperation between a coalition of the willing and the UN; particularly in the development of military strategic direction.

## EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Brigadier General Bernd LUBENIK

*Working Group Of The Military Committee Of The EU Brussels*

At the European Council meeting in Helsinki in 1999 it was agreed that the EU would acquire the capacity to take independent decisions in crisis management. Where NATO as a whole is not engaged the EU can launch and lead military operations aimed at the management of international crises. The cornerstone and identifying mark of an EU-led operation, as opposed to an operation led by a Member State or group of Member States in which the EU has an interest or role, is that it comes under the political control and strategic direction of the EU's Political and Security Committee.

Today in Brussels, the decision-making bodies are fully operational and ready to exercise this political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations under the co-ordination of the High Representative for CFSP, Dr. Javier Solana.

The European Union Military Committee, chaired by General Gustav Hägglund, a former Chief of Defence of Finland, acts as the Union's supreme military body. It is composed of the EU Member States' Chiefs of Defence meeting at least twice a year. Outside of that, their permanent representatives, in general two or three star flag officers, convene once a week in Brussels. In terms of practical work, the EUMC mainly provides the political decision-makers with advice on military matters and in conceptual terms the Committee has now almost finalised the work for any crisis management operations. In its support, an EUMC Working Group was created, of which I am the Chairman and is composed, in principle, of the deputy Military Representatives.

The European Union Military Staff functions under the military direction of the EUMC. Its tasks include early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. At 135 strong, it is deliberately small compared with the headquarters structure of NATO, which employs 100 times more people. This is because the EU Military staff has not been designed to act as an operation headquarters. The staff has assisted considerably in developing the EU's readiness in military crisis management by, inter alia, drawing up general operational concepts to facilitate the setting up of an operation. As already mentioned, this conceptual work is now almost complete and has already been exercised and given a full reality check which I will speak about later.

The so called Headline Goal set in Helsinki was that by 2003 the Union would have the capacity to deploy and sustain the forces required by the so called "Petersberg tasks" which are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The force requirement was then scaled to 60,000 soldiers plus supporting naval and air units all deployable within 60 days.

The EU Member States have subsequently offered assets and capabilities to be potentially available to the EU. In a spirit of common values and objectives, the non-EU NATO members and the states acceding to the EU have also offered their force contributions.

As a result, the EU currently has an indication of the pool of forces at its disposal from which to choose on a case-by-case basis the appropriate combination for the respective Petersberg task at hand. It must be noted that the ability to bring suitable force packages together still relies entirely upon the willingness of individual Member States to do so for each specific operation. There are still some limitations, in particular at the most demanding end of the Petersberg tasks and strategic shortfalls still exist.

Based on a Capabilities Commitment Conference held in May of this year, project groups under the leadership of Member States are being launched to remedy remaining shortfalls. But, in some cases, full delivery will not happen before the next decade, for example in the field of strategic air transport. In that sense, the development of military capabilities must be seen as a continuous process.

As a result of the existing shortfalls, the European Union's current limited capability to project power rapidly to crisis areas is a factor influencing our crisis-management capacity. However, the European Union's unbeatable strength is that it can cover the whole spectrum of crisis management instruments including economic sanctions. These are capabilities that the EU has had for years, but the new military crisis management capability significantly widens the Union's selection of available tools and adds to its weight.

The EU's capabilities are strengthened further through its complimentary relationship with NATO. It is clear that NATO and the EU share a unique partnership by definition, but only recently have formal conditions governing closer crisis-management co-operation between the two organisations been established. Ever since the birth of CFSP, and throughout the last four years of concrete building of ESDP and EU military capabilities, a tricky dilemma has challenged the process. How to create and preserve a European autonomy in decision-making without unnecessarily duplicating existing NATO structures and capabilities? The EU has no standing forces and no permanent operational planning facilities or headquarters. The current agreement between the EU and NATO encompasses a guaranteed permanent EU access to NATO's planning capabilities and a presumption of availability of pre-identified NATO assets and capabilities to the EU for operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged militarily. But in the eyes of some Member States, dependence on NATO means limited autonomy.

It is true that NATO has an abundance of officers at different headquarters. In addition, planning co-operation is important, as the forces used by the EU and NATO are largely the same. The EU's first military operation, launched three months ago in the

former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia and known as CONCORDIA, has demonstrated that the co-operation works in practice. NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe is double-hatted as the Commander of the EU Operation. The operational planning was done at SHAPE, where the EU Operation Headquarters also resides. So in a sense it could also be said that one of the EU's strengths in crisis management is its access to NATO resources.

But what could the developing EU do to support the United Nations in crisis management? To set the scene, let me say that a multitude of working contacts already exist between the two organisations on an informal basis. The EU Military Staff has identified its UN Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) counterparts in the different domains of staff work. Regular consultations take place, as appropriate, to ensure coherence and efficiency.

Last winter, an "EU Task Force on the UN" was set up to prepare a roadmap for the development of EU-UN co-operation in the field of crisis management. Four areas of co-operation have been considered. Firstly, information exchange that would be facilitated by an UN-EU security agreement. Secondly, common exercises could be pursued. A third initiative is an exchange of lessons learned from passed or on-going operations.

Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, there could be concrete co-operation in the field. The EU foresees three possible types of situations where the EU Member States could contribute to a UN effort. The first is individual participation in UN-led peacekeeping operations, where the EU could possibly act as a clearinghouse in order to co-ordinate the participation of Member States. This could also encompass the contribution of multi-national force elements such as the NORDCAPS or EUROFOR, or perhaps, in the future, other assets such as multinationally funded transport or intelligence capabilities. A second possibility is that an EU operation could be used to open the way for a subsequent UN operation and finally, the EU could lead crisis management operations with a UN mandate or authorisation, where the EU will maintain political control and strategic direction.

Circumstances have very recently turned this vision into reality and allow me the possibility to demonstrate 3 important points. The first point is that EU-UN co-operation in terms of military operations is already a reality. The second is that the EU is ready and able to act autonomously when required and appropriate without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. And the third point is that a relatively rapid military response can be achieved under the EU flag when the situation demands it. The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in May and in particular in and around the town of Bunia, led to a request being made by the Secretary General of the UN for the EU to deploy an interim military force to the DRC in order to stabilise the situation until the deployment of UN reinforcements to the in-place UN MONUC force arriving

in August. The EU agreed to launch Operation ARTEMIS on 12 June under UNSC Mandate 1484 of 30 May authorising the establishment until 1 September of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia. Javier Solana stated on 12 June that "*...we are determined to succeed in helping the UN overcome the current humanitarian and security crisis in Bunia*". This is a high-risk military operation and the decision to launch it very quickly using many previously untested procedures is testament to the EU's ability, confidence and our willingness to have a fruitful and complimentary partnership with the UN.

The roadmap for further EU-UN co-operation foresees the development of a detailed action plan during this summer. This should then lead to the endorsement of a document on EU-UN co-operation by the European Council and the UN Secretary General in December this year.

Certainly the EU Member States will individually continue to contribute to different UN operations as before. But with these examples of support and co-operation I would like to point out that new crisis management actors like the EU do not have to be in competition with the more experienced ones. Instead, we should see that additional democratically controlled crisis management capability is certainly needed and will eventually be to everybody's benefit. The possibilities for the future are obvious.

I would like to finish with one personal observation on the complexities of crisis management and peacekeeping by saying that the EU represents yet another actor on what is an already very crowded stage. That is not to say that we have too many crisis managers, but that considerable co-ordination is required to bring all the parties together in a single and workable plan. It is beholden upon the big players such as the UN, OSCE and the EU to take the lead and to make a concerted effort to harmonise working practices, suitable arrangements for the direction of operations and even such issues as the harmonisation of allowances and medals. Such differences and lack of co-ordination create unnecessary tensions and substantially reduce the effectiveness of the groups working towards a common goal.

# THE CHALLENGES OF EU-UN COOPERATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS

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## Introduction

At the time when the Brahimi report was released in August 2000, the European Union was going through a process of building autonomous capacities to enable it to conduct peace operations (ESDP process). At about the same moment (September 2000), the UN and the EU started to have meetings at different levels with the objective of developing links and cooperation in the broad field of crisis management.

After some initial misunderstandings (on the compatibility between ESDP and UN peace operations in particular), that process led to some significant achievements: the two institutions have established points of contacts; high-level and working-level meetings take place regularly; three themes of cooperation have been identified (conflict prevention, civilian and military aspects of crisis management, and particular regional issues: Western Balkans, Middle East and Africa)<sup>1</sup>.

The EU is certainly the regional organization that offers the most promising opportunities of cooperation with the UN in crisis management, and is genuinely willing to do so. However, despite regular commitments to strengthen the UN (including in the recently released *European Security Strategy*<sup>2</sup>), such cooperation can hardly be considered a priority for the EU, and should not undermine by any means the ability of the EU to pursue its own policy.

For the UN, cooperation with the EU is a necessity, but should be developed with a clear understanding of what can be expected from the EU and what can not. The UN-EU relationship is an unbalanced relationship: the UN must beg for increased European involvement in peace operations, but it is the EU that will most likely lay down the conditions for cooperation. It is in this context that the UN has to identify where cooperation can be most realistically developed with the EU.

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<sup>1</sup> See General Affairs Council of the EU, "EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management", 11 June 2001.

<sup>2</sup> The European Security Strategy states that "Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, must be a European priority", Javier Solana, "A Secure Europe in a Better World", 20 June 2003.



# 1. The EU and Crisis Management, or the Will to Become a Security Actor

## *The Build-up of Capacities*

Following the Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration in December 1998, the EU initiated the process of building capacities for “autonomous action backed up by credible military forces in order to respond to international crises”. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was then aimed at enabling the EU to become a full actor of military and civilian crisis management, in Europe and beyond.

At the military level, under the Helsinki Headline Goal, the EU was to be “able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 60,000 persons capable of the full range of ‘Petersberg Tasks’”<sup>3</sup>, which refer to crisis management activities, including peace enforcement (called ‘peace-making’ in the EU terminology). Simultaneously, a political-military structure was established in Brussels, composed of a Political and Security Committee (PSC), a Military Committee and a Military Staff. At the civilian level, EU Member States were asked to provide “up to 5,000 police officers to international missions across the range of crisis prevention and crisis management operations”<sup>4</sup>.

In November 2002 EU Ministers “welcomed that the concrete targets” defined in the four categories of civilian crisis management activities (police, rule of law, civil protection and civilian administration) “had been exceeded through States’ voluntary commitments”<sup>5</sup>. In May 2003, the EU further declared its “operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks” in accordance with the Headline Goal, but also admitted that such a capability was still “limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls”<sup>6</sup>.

In the meantime, following the agreement (December 2002) between the EU and NATO on the implementation of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement<sup>7</sup>, EU-led operations can be of two different types:

- EU-led operations with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities;
- EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.

Given the shortfalls of the EU in planning assets, but also in command, control and communications (C3), strategic air- and sea-lift, and logistics, it is currently difficult to

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<sup>3</sup> Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, December 1999.

<sup>4</sup> Presidency Report on ESDP, Feira European Council, June 2000.

<sup>5</sup> EU Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference at ministerial level, Brussels, 19 November 2002.

<sup>6</sup> EU Capability Conference, Brussels, 19 May 2003.

<sup>7</sup> EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, 16 December 2002.

imagine an important EU-led operation that would be conducted without resorting to NATO assets.

As far as the relationship with the UN is concerned, the Council of the EU has reiterated on several occasions that “The efforts made [in the ESDP field] will enable Europeans to respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organizations such as the UN or the OSCE.”<sup>8</sup> More generally, there is a sense within the EU that an increased role for the EU in crisis management activities will contribute to the global objective of maintaining international peace and security, which is the primary goal of the UN.

### *EU Operations*

In 2003, the EU has launched its first three operations (Petersberg tasks):

- EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that took over the UN mission on 1 January 2003;
- operation Concordia in Macedonia, that took over the NATO operation Allied Harmony on 31 March 2003;
- operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, that deployed in June 2003 until 1 September 2003, with France as the framework nation.

The EUPM and the operation Concordia were deployed on the basis of an invitation of the host states, and with no formal UN mandate. For the EUPM, a UNSC resolution “welcomed” the EU operation, but a similar resolution was adopted for Macedonia only in reference to the NATO operation. Operation Artemis was created following UN Security Resolution 1484 (2003).

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<sup>8</sup> Presidency Conclusions, Nice European Council, December 2000.

**TABLE 1 – EU OPERATIONS**

<b>Operation</b>	<b>Legal Basis</b>	<b>UNSC Resolution</b>	<b>Strength</b>	<b>Deployment</b>
<b>EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	Invitation + EU Joint Action	Res. 1396 (5 March 2002) “welcomes the acceptance by the Steering Board of the PIC on 28 Feb. 2002 of the offer made by the EU to provide an EU Police Mission...”	530	January 2003-end 2005
<b>Concordia Macedonia</b>	Invitation + EU Joint Action	Res. 1371 (26 Sept. 2001) “strongly supports the establishment of a multi- national security presence in Macedonia” (refers to NATO)	350-450	March 2003 (6 months)
<b>Artemis DRC</b>	UNSC Res. 1484 ‘Chapter VII Res.’ + EU Joint Action	Res. 1484 (30 May 2003) “authorizes the deployment ... of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force...”	1,800	15 June - 1 <sup>st</sup> Sept. 2003

*Likely Future Developments of ESDP*

There are two ways to look at the current situation of ESDP:

- The optimistic way is to praise the relative rapidity by which the EU turned words into actions, with three operations created in 2003, only five years after the ESDP process began in earnest, and despite the political crisis that preceded the Iraq war. Along those lines, the EU should become increasingly

involved in a broad range of activities, both civilian and military, in and outside of Europe.

- Another approach is to underline the modesty of the on-going operations, the gap between the operations and cohesion at the political level (ESDP/CFSP<sup>9</sup> dichotomy), and the significant capability shortfalls. Taken together, the three operations count less than 3,000 personnel (to be compared with the 42,000 deployed by NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the 35,000 deployed by the UN in 15 operations), and are very limited either in time or in scope. The EU is furthermore very much dependent upon NATO, a dependence that should last into the foreseeable future.

That being said, while the EU will no doubt be under pressure to deliver in the field of crisis management, its future ability to do so will depend on the combination of political will/cohesion of CFSP and capabilities. Political cohesion may be affected by the following parameters:

- diverging approaches to CFSP/ESDP among EU member states;
- US policy ('benevolence') towards the EU;
- EU-NATO relationship;
- EU enlargement.

At the political level, the adoption of the European Constitution (in 2004) may give the EU a higher visibility with, among other things, the designation of a European Foreign Minister. This should also diminish the confusion among external observers (at the UN for instance) about 'who does what' in foreign policy within the EU (between the Commission, the Secretariat of the Council and the Presidency).

Assuming that such a cohesion will exist, the EU will be confronted by the capability issue, which will have a direct impact on the nature of the operations contemplated. In other words, while the EU should be able to conduct *some* crisis management operations, it will remain difficult to conduct the most demanding Petersberg tasks (peace enforcement type operations). The logic behind ESDP is, however, that the EU should be involved in crisis management without excluding any possibilities, be it in terms of activities or in terms of geographical area of deployment. After Europe (Balkans, Moldova), there is little doubt that the EU will look at Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus.

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<sup>9</sup> Common Foreign and Security Policy. ESDP covers the military and security dimensions of CFSP.

## 2. EU-UN Relationship in Peace Operations: An Unlikely Contribution of the EU in the Military Sphere

### *Theoretical Convergence between a UN Demand and an EU Supply*

A quick look at the respective situations of the UN and the EU in the field of peace operations may give the impression that there is a convergence between what can be considered as a UN demand and what can be perceived as a European supply. In the context of the Brahimi Report, ESDP may appear as an ideal tool for the UN. The UN is asking states and regional organizations to provide troops and assets, while the EU has the troops and is building the assets. However, this convergence is only theoretical.

In the field of peace operations, UN wishes *vis-à-vis* the EU can be summarized as follows:

1. The UN would like Europe to participate more in UN peace operations;
2. The UN would like the EU to abide by UN rules (reference to a UN mandate);
3. The UN would like the EU to go beyond Europe (to Africa in particular);
4. The UN would like the EU to cooperate with the UN at both the institutional and operational levels (training<sup>10</sup>, standards, etc.).

Besides those wishes, the UN is concerned that the EU crisis management policy might be developed at the expense of EU contribution to UN peace operations. On the other hand the EU position is strongly determined by two sets of issues: states' policies; and the imperative of autonomy.

### *The EU as a Reflection of States Policies*

The general position of the EU towards UN peace operations is by and large a reflection of the positions of EU states towards these operations. In the field of crisis management, in spite of the reform process following the Brahimi report, states' perceptions *vis-à-vis* the UN are still influenced by the failures of the early 90s UN operations, and characterized by a form of distrust. One consequence is that, individually, EU member states are absent from UN peace operations. The EU contribution to the UN budget is about 37%; this amounts to 40% of the budget for peace operations. But the EU provides only about 10% of the UN troops, with no prospect for an increase.

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<sup>10</sup> The Italian Presidency of the EU is preparing a conference on training.

**TABLE 2 – THE EU AT THE UN**  
**FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION / CONTRIBUTION TO UN OPERATIONS**

EU share of UN regular budget	EU share of the UN peacekeeping operations budget	EU member states contribution to UN operations	EU (at 25) contribution to UN operations
37 %	40 %	9.2 % 3,223 out of 34,947	13.6 % 4,765 out of 34,947
		MONUC: 1 % 44 out of 4,575	

*Sources: EU Website, May 2003 and Monthly Summary of Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations as of 31 May 2003, UN Website.*

The general contribution gives a clear idea about the readiness of European states to participate in UN peace operations, be it on an individual basis or through the framework of the EU. The recent EU willingness to get involved in the DRC was never to be expressed through MONUC in which EU member states account for only 1% of the deployed personnel.

#### *The Imperative of Autonomy*

Four principles should guide EU cooperation with international organizations: added value, interoperability, visibility and decision-making autonomy<sup>11</sup>. Autonomy has been one of the key concepts of the ESDP process. It primarily refers to NATO, but is also a central underlying concept in a more general context. ESDP has not been developed *in reference to* the UN, and it is even fair to say that the UN has not played a significant role in this development. The EU is similarly seeking visibility. It follows that the EU will see with great concern any development that would possibly lead to an alteration of its autonomy and visibility. And autonomy and visibility might not always be compatible with a close and constraining relation with the UN.

These two elements lead us to conclude that the relationship between the EU and the UN in peace operations will most likely remain very limited and be addressed on a case-by-case basis rather than in a formal and institutionalized way. There have been

<sup>11</sup> See “EU cooperation with international organizations in civilian aspects of crisis management”, Presidency Report on ESDP, Annex V, Göteborg European Council, June 2001.

major developments in the cooperation between the two institutions since 2000<sup>12</sup> and the relationship is likely to develop further, but such cooperation is likely to have a limited impact on the EU contribution to UN peace operations.

This seems to be confirmed when looking at the two issues of the mandate and the chain of command.

### *UN Mandate: Not Always a Necessity*

The question of the mandate<sup>13</sup> of EU operations is important because it is one aspect that possibly links the EU and the UN. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed within the UN, the EU does not consider itself as a Chapter VIII regional arrangement, and never invokes this provisions to justify an action falling within ESDP. As far as mandates of EU peace operations are concerned, the EU policy *vis-à-vis* UN mandates has not been clearly defined. EU official documents only refer to the need to act “in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter”<sup>14</sup> and the UN and the OSCE are regularly mentioned as “leading organizations”.

The nature of the operation (coercive or non coercive) and the area of deployment (Europe or outside of Europe) have to be considered when looking at the need for a UN mandate. Simply put, the EU intends to seek a UN mandate for an EU-led operation when the operation contemplated is coercive (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) and/or outside of Europe (case of Artemis in DRC), but assumes that a UN mandate is not legally required when the operation is non coercive and in Europe (case of the EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Concordia in Macedonia; see Appendix). However, the EU policy remains ambiguous on a number of issues at the junction of political and legal questions. The necessity to seek a UN mandate for an operation taking place in Africa but is consent-based and non coercive is not clearly established. Nor is the necessity to seek a UN mandate for an operation that would be consent-based *but* coercive. In Europe, such could be the case for an EU force taking over the SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina<sup>15</sup>. In Africa, a parallel could be drawn with the French-led operation

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<sup>12</sup> On 13 September 2000, for the first time, a ministerial troika of the EU met the UN Secretary General in New York. This event was followed by meetings at different levels, and on the EU side, cooperation between the UN and the EU was further materialized in a document adopted by the Council in June 2001; see General Affairs Council of the EU, “EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management”, 11 June 2001. In the civilian sphere, see “EU cooperation with international organizations in civilian aspects of crisis management”, Presidency Report on ESDP, Annex V, Göteborg European Council, June 2001.

<sup>13</sup> When talking about a UN mandate, one refers here to a UN Security Council resolution.

<sup>14</sup> Presidency Report on ESDP, Nice European Council, December 2000.

<sup>15</sup> The mandate of the SFOR has been renewed every year since 1996. The relevant UNSC resolutions authorize the SFOR to “fulfill the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Dayton Peace Agreement”, which only refers to NATO.

Licorne in Ivory Coast (that would fall within Chapter VII of the UN Charter had a resolution created it).

Those questions raise the issue of the link between the political and legal aspects of a mandate. If there is little doubt that the EU will be willing to act in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, the legalistic approach is not without risks, for it would be misleading to assume that a UNSC resolution only provides a legal basis. A UNSC resolution provides legitimacy and impartiality that a mere invitation from the host state alone does not provide. It is a public document that clarifies the nature of the operation and its level of coerciveness (Chapter VI *versus* Chapter VII) and makes the operation more publicly visible. It therefore helps to attenuate possible resentments coming from the South and criticism about a 'European neo-colonialist' policy (in Africa in particular), under the condition that the UNSC is not perceived as a blank cheque given to the EU.

EU member states are somewhat reluctant to condition their operations to a Security Council vote<sup>16</sup> – especially when such a vote is not legally required – but at a time when the UN authority is challenged, they run the risk of further undermining that authority by not making clear their political commitment to the UN, beyond the legal requirement.

### *Chain of Command: Towards the Sub-Contracting Model in the Military Sphere*

One key element to bear in mind when looking at the EU policy towards peace operations is that what constitutes an EU operation is the involvement of the political-military structure of the EU (Political and Security Committee, Military Committee, Military Staff) rather than the involvement of troops. Here, the bottom line is that an EU-led operation should be placed under the political control and the strategic direction of the PSC. This is a formal requirement<sup>17</sup>, even in the case of an EU-led operation with resort to NATO assets.

The combination of this requirement with the general reluctance of EU member states to be involved in UN-led operations makes it very hard to conceive an EU operation being subordinated to a UN chain of command. The political-military structure of the EU is not to be subordinated to any kind of higher authority (see Appendix). In practice, it is therefore difficult to imagine the EU as such contributing 'EU contingents' to a UN-led operation, i.e. EU contingents placed under the strategic command of a UN representative.

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<sup>16</sup> That reluctance is even greater when the operation is to be conducted with resort to NATO assets.

<sup>17</sup> See 'Political and Security Committee', Annex III, Presidency Report on ESDP, Nice European Council, December 2000.



Consequently, in its relation with the UN the EU is very much in favor of the sub-contracting model (see Appendix), by which the UN creates an operation, but subcontracts its implementation to the EU, without creating a formal link between the two institutions, and thus preserving the autonomy of EU decisions. In line with this model, the EU could also take part in a multidimensional operation that could be UN-coordinated and in which the EU would be in charge of one (or several) pillar(s), without being formally subordinated to the UN (see Appendix). However, a distinction has to be made between the military and the civilian aspects of crisis management. Subordination in the civilian sphere appears to be much more acceptable than in the military sphere. In the civilian sphere (police, judiciary, economic and humanitarian aid, etc.) EU texts explicitly state that EU assets may be “used in operations conducted by lead agencies, such as the UN or the OSCE, or EU-led autonomous missions”<sup>18</sup>.

### **3. Opportunities for Cooperation between the EU and the UN**

One of the key assumptions regarding the EU-UN relationship in peace operations is that the EU will most likely develop its peace operations policy outside the UN framework. The UN will remain a legalizing/legitimizing body but not a primary partner of the EU in crisis management. Such an assessment does not mean however that there is no room for cooperation between the two institutions:

- a) because the deployment of troops in UN-led operations is only one aspect of the broad range of crisis management activities. There are many other areas where the UN is more likely to meet a higher readiness from the EU to cooperate; and
- b) because in several scenarios of EU-led operations, the UN will be involved in different ways, either simultaneously with the EU or subsequently, which makes cooperation an absolute necessity.

#### *Cooperation “Around” Troop Deployment*

Such a cooperation can take place in the three categories of the typology established in the Brahimi report.

*Conflict Prevention and Peacemaking:* The whole field of conflict prevention offers many opportunities for cooperation between the UN<sup>19</sup> and the EU<sup>20</sup>. In the three areas

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<sup>18</sup> See Presidential Conclusions, Feira European Council, June 2000, and “EU cooperation with international organizations in civilian aspects of crisis management”, Annex to the Presidency Report on ESDP, Göteborg European Council, June 2001.

<sup>19</sup> See “Interaction between the UN and other international actors in the prevention of armed conflict”, Report of the Secretary-General on Prevention of armed conflict, A/55/985, 7 June 2001.

of early warning, political action in operational prevention (peacemaking) and addressing the root causes of conflicts (structural prevention), the two institutions have comparative advantages and complementary tools and experiences. Within the EU, the difficult cooperation between the Commission and the Secretariat of the Council should be facilitated after the adoption of the Constitution (2004) and the creation of the position of an EU Foreign Minister. The expertise on Africa that exists in European capitals (especially London, Paris and Brussels) will be a key asset for the EU itself, but should also benefit the UN. In this field, the issue of information-sharing will remain critical as it is unlikely that the EU will accept sharing sensitive information with the UN; however, information informally transmitted to Europeans occupying key positions at the UN is possible.

*Peacekeeping:* If the EU does not participate in UN-led operations through troop deployment, other aspects of those operations may lead to increased cooperation between the UN and the EU. Besides the financing aspect, the EU could cooperate with the UN in the fields of planning, rapid deployment, logistics, equipment, training, and standards.

As far as planning is concerned, the EU could help in strategic planning rather than in operational planning, as it currently lacks an operational planning structure, but individual EU states could play a role at the operational level. The idea that the EU could provide the headquarters of a force, following what the SHIRBRIG did in 2000 in Ethiopia-Eritrea before UNMEE took over, is not to be ruled out, even if that SHIRBRIG model has not been closely looked at on the EU side.

Moreover, in the mid- to long-run, a ‘Europeanisation’ of some aspects (if not all) of the French<sup>21</sup> and British programmes of training and equipping African armed forces to peace missions is conceivable. On the EU side, not only would it improve the efficiency of such programmes, but it would also allow the EU to support African peacekeeping without taking too many risks. Such a process would pave the way for better cooperation between the UN and the EU in Africa (which should also include African regional organizations). On the UN side, it would also be a way to commit the two European states that are permanent members of the Security Council.

Finally, in line with the recommendations of the Brahimi report (‘mission leaders’, ‘on-call lists’), civilian and military personnel coming from EU states could be made available to the UN on an individual basis, as is already the case. More generally, technical assistance from the EU political and military structure (the Military

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<sup>20</sup> See Communication of the Commission on Conflict Prevention, April 2001; “EU Programme for Conflict prevention” and “Council Conclusions on EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management”, Göteborg European Council, June 2001.

<sup>21</sup> The French programme is called RECAMP (Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix).

Committee and the Military Staff in particular) is also a possibility. EU training and equipping of police officers and other civilian experts to the UN benefit may also be considered.

*Peacebuilding:* The EU and the UN already cooperate in the peacebuilding phase, especially in the civilian sphere. The UN has wide experience in peacebuilding while the EU could provide assets and resources that the UN is lacking. In the field of institutions building, the rule of law (police and judiciary), electoral supervision, humanitarian aid, and economic reconstruction, the two institutions display some comparative advantages that would constitute a real added value if correctly coordinated. Moreover, what the EU is doing in civilian aspects of crisis management is coherent with the recommendations of the Brahimi report. However, a certain level of competition between the two institutions will remain as an obstacle to cooperation.

Aside from those three categories of peace operations, cooperation may be developed in the field of lessons learnt, standards and terminology. The transition between the UN IPTF and the EUPM has provided a first opportunity for exchanging lessons learnt, but this could be further explored in other operations (SHIRBRIG in Ethiopia-Eritrea, Artemis and MONUC2 in the DRC among others). The EU could also provide assistance to the UN to help UN peacekeepers meet UN standards.

Regarding terminology, harmonization of terms and definitions should be sought, starting with the EU getting rid of the confusing term “peacemaking” in the Petersberg tasks list, to be replaced by the term “peace enforcement”.

### *Cooperation where the UN and the EU are Involved Simultaneously or Subsequently*

Besides those possible areas of cooperation, EU operations may be deployed in places where the UN is already present or where the UN is mandated to take over the EU operation. The following scenarios are possible:

1. EU deployment following a UN operation (as with EUPM-IPTF);
2. EU deployment alongside a UN operation (as with Artemis-MONUC1, KFOR-UNMIK<sup>22</sup>);
3. EU deployment for a limited time before a UN take over (as with Artemis-MONUC2, INTERFET-UNTAET, SHIRBRIG-UNMEE).
4. EU component of a multidimensional operation in which the UN provides another component (as with the pillar structure in Kosovo).

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<sup>22</sup> The cases not involving the EU are taken as examples of scenarios where the EU could play a similar role.

As these scenarios are not just theoretical, it is crucial that the UN and the EU work on those scenarios to ensure the interoperability of the two institutions on the ground and their compatibility in case the UN takes over an EU-led operation (standards<sup>23</sup>, planning, equipment, mandates, etc.). Insofar as the UN can be seen as providing an exit strategy for the EU (scenario n° 3, which is favored by the EU), possible implications of such a scenario have to be further explored by the two institutions, individually and in cooperation. For the UN, the question of how much it can accept from the EU is to be addressed.

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<sup>23</sup> The issue of the standards was raised when UNMEE took over the SHIRBRIG in Ethiopia-Eritrea.

## THE BRAHIMI REPORT: CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTATION ‘COOPERATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS: THE UNITED NATIONS AND EUROPE’

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The principal challenge to the implementation of the Brahimi report is the fact that the world moves on.

The Brahimi report was, in part, a reaction within the United Nations to the traumatic events of Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. It envisages a UN peacekeeping which is robust, and which doesn't go to places where the mandate isn't clear, the mission isn't achievable, or the resources aren't present.

And much has been done to implement that vision. The Brahimi report focussed on four main areas:

1. Doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations;
2. UN capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively;
3. Headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping operations;
4. Peace operations and the information age.

The weakest of these areas is the first. A major recommendation on the establishment of an information and strategic analysis secretariat was viewed with concern by a number of developing countries, and was not approved. A recommendation that Security Council resolutions be left in draft form until such time as the Secretary-General has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements was likewise not approved. While the doctrine of robust impartiality enjoyed general support, the doctrine remains no more than common law.

Despite the disappointments in this first area, progress has been made in the area of decision making. In many areas *ad hoc* decision making has given way to a more structured and coherent process.

In the second broad area of reform – rapid deployment – there has been considerable progress. The establishment in Brindisi of a Strategic Deployment Stocks facility gives the department a capacity to deploy transport and communications assets, in particular, at very short notice. Rapid deployment of personnel is also easier, thanks both to standby arrangements with governments, and also due to the development of extensive on-call rosters for civilians in various specialist areas.

Small missions in Côte d'Ivoire and Iraq have each been deployed in the past two months. Both were on the ground and operational within a week of the mandate being

approved by the Security Council. The capacity to deploy on a larger scale may arise later in the year if a peace agreement is reached in Sudan, which looks possible.

Progress has also been made in the third broad area of reform, that of headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping operations. The headquarters of the UN department of peacekeeping operations has been reconfigured and expanded, from a strength of roughly 400 to almost 600. This represents about 1% of the total deployed personnel numbers. Thanks to this increase in personnel, the headquarters now has a serious planning capacity. If there is a weakness in the new planning arrangements, it is in the earliest stages – early warning, strategic assessment – where the department still has relatively few resources of its own. To some extent this is compensated for by better links to the policy and academic community.

The last of the four major areas of reform, dealing with peace operations in the information age, has also seen considerable progress. Although the organization still spends only half as much as proportionally, for example, as the World Bank, there has been a significant improvement in communications and information technology systems.

This is not to say that there are not teething troubles with the Brahimi mechanisms – there are:

- There are no systems contracts for shipment out of Brindisi, which could delay the movement of materials from that facility to the mission areas in which they must be deployed;
- Pre-mandate commitment authority approved by the General Assembly has been blocked in the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which asked the department to make better use of pre-existing financial mechanisms.

The real challenge, however, is not in the technical area. It is that while the UN was, through the Brahimi process, learning one set of lessons about peacekeeping, others were learning different lessons. In particular, the nations of NATO and the EU.

The Brahimi report is predicated on the idea of ‘robust’ UN peacekeeping, but the NATO and EU countries that could provide the capacity to be robust no longer contribute troops in any great numbers to UN peacekeeping. No European country is represented among the top ten troop and police contributors, and the total contribution of EU member states represents only about 10% of the total number of the 37,000 blue beret troops and police officers deployed.

Two sets of reasons are given for this, depending on how you see the world. One set says that the UN failed in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, where the NATO countries were involved, and that the NATO countries, wary of that, now operate only when there

are better command and control vehicles. The wisdom of which course is shown by IFOR, where a NATO-led force established peace in Bosnia.

The opposing view maintains that NATO, deprived of the Soviet threat, needs to justify its existence, and sees peacekeeping is a promising line. And that the EU, as part of an essentially political coming of age, wants to have some military and civilian crisis management capacity, and is looking for work to prove that that is necessary.

Both views are simplistic, and factually incorrect in important respects. Yet there is also something in both views, and, regardless of the reasons, it is true that the NATO and EU nations have largely forsaken blue beret peacekeeping.

This is good news for Europe, where the European nations naturally choose to focus their efforts, and where they can bring enormous resources to bear, but bad news for everywhere else. It is particularly bad news for Africa, which doesn't have a regional actor like NATO or the EU to play the role that NATO is now able to play in the Balkans. Where NATO or the EU are willing to act – as happened with the SHIRBRIG deployment to Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000 and as is now happening with Operation Artemis in Bunia – it is a tentative engagement, very circumscribed both in area and in duration.

In Africa, where most robust peacekeeping takes place, the post-Brahimi arrangements barely apply. There is a high-readiness brigade that could, in theory, be deployed, but little political willingness to deploy. Indeed, at the time of writing, there is barely the political will to raise the troop ceiling in MONUC from 8,700 to 10,700 troops. That in a country two hundred times the size of Kosovo, with half as many international troops, and them much more limited in their capacity than those serving with KFOR. That in a country in which the IRC estimates that the war may already have claimed some 3.5 million victims.

As we meet, the Council has decided to wait for a month before it even decides whether to authorize a new mandate for MONUC, under Chapter VII of the Charter. This also makes something of a mockery of the Brahimi rapid deployment provisions, and virtually guarantees that there will be some degree of power vacuum in northeastern Congo if the Operation Artemis ends as scheduled on 31 August 2003.

Brahimi gave no hint of this, so one of the great challenges to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is what to improvise. Events give us a clue.

In Sierra Leone in 2000, the UK decided that it would help to bail out a UN operation. It didn't want to replace that UN operation, or even to stay very long, but it was willing and able to provide a credible capacity to project force against the spoilers. With that support, UNAMSIL has since reconfigured, and has gone on to help Sierra Leone stabilize itself, hold elections, and become something of an island of stability in a very troubled part of Africa. In Congo, France agreed to take the lead in a force that has

a somewhat similar (though also somewhat dissimilar) role as the framework nation for Operation Artemis.

This is viewed with great horror among many member states – as ‘peacekeeping apartheid’ – but as a possible model for the future by some of European countries that actually do it.

My own view, and I think the view of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping operations, is that it is important to accommodate reality. While we must continue to seek European contributions to blue beret missions, we should also facilitate the actions of the Europeans when they feel constrained to follow a different course. And if the real choice is between the NATO and EU countries acting only in Europe on the one hand, and them acting somewhat apart when serving outside of Europe, then we would be unwise to close the door.

We must improve inter-operability. We must train with the European countries for those types of operations. The UK and France already have military-to-military ties with some of the major troop contributors, and these could usefully be expanded. There have been some questions as to whether the major troop contributors in the developing world would welcome such partnerships, but they would, as they restated only last week at the IPA seminar in New York on peacekeeping logistics. We should increase the exchange and deployment of staff officers in such missions. We should stock our quick deployment stores in Brindisi with the communications and other equipment needed to work with these partners in the sorts of arrangements with which they are presently most comfortable. To do otherwise would be a very dangerous counsel of perfection.

With the EU which, unlike NATO, also has an interest in developing capacity in the area of civil crisis management, we should explore arrangements with which they might be comfortable on the civil side, too, such as following on after the UN in their own police mission, as they do in Bosnia; or working as distinct pillars, as they do in Kosovo with the economic reconstruction. I know that the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping is particularly attracted to the InterFET model, where the front-end heavy engagement was led by multi-national force, which then handed over to a lighter UN force, while rehatting some key elements to ensure continuity of capability and credibility of deterrence.

To conclude, there is a need to move beyond the Brahimi report. It represented an important development for UN peacekeeping at a difficult time, and has largely been implemented. But there is now a very different environment in which UN peacekeeping operations must work.

In doctrine, we need to embrace a degree of regionalization. In organization and process, we need now be less concerned with banging home each last nail into the Brahimi framework – there is a law of diminishing returns there. Rather, we have to



focus on ensuring that we have the tools we need to adapt ourselves as fast as the world of peacekeeping changes:

1. We need the strategic planning capacity that we have eschewed for too long and which renders many UN missions very *ad hoc* and even ramshackle;
2. We need a more open professional culture, particularly with the academic community and the media, for without such a culture there is little real accountability; and,
3. We need a commitment to continuous learning – the big bangs of the Brahimi process need to be followed by the steady beat of constant improvement.

## REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLVING NATO/EU RELATIONSHIP

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Let me offer you some reflections on the past and some outlines for a way forward.

When the members of the Senior Political Committee of NATO sat in the Hotel Intercontinental in Berlin in June 1996 to hammer out a first profile for what was then called ESDI - European Security and Defense Identity - negotiations for the Communiqué until the early morning hours concentrated on two terms: “ESDI within the Alliance” and “separable but not separate NATO assets”. We all knew: NATO assets meant US-NATO assets. Everyone in the room knew then: ESDI could not be built without the US readiness to offer essential assets for European operations. The common reading then was to “respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security”. The reasoning behind this was that “by assuming greater responsibility for their own security the European member states create a more balanced transatlantic relationship which in turn will strengthen the Alliance as a whole”.

The Heads of State at the 50th Anniversary of NATO in 1999 in Washington decided on the further development of ESDI. There should be:

- a development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency after the model of NATO-WEU cooperation;
- participation of non-EU allies;
- practical arrangements for EU-assets to NATO planning capabilities and assets.

The basis then was the development of Defense Capabilities in an initiative with the same name. The Prague Summit in November 2002 renewed these commitments.

Again: the principles for ESDI as set out in Washington was to allow EU autonomous action if the Alliance as a whole was not engaged and this should be done in a process of mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency.

Let me now jump to the so called “Praline” Summit in Brussels early this year which as some saw it divided even more what had been called the old and the new Europe. The controversial proposal was to establish a separate Headquarter for EU-operations in Tervuren/Brussels, outside NATO. The discussion went back to where it had started in Berlin 1996. I have never understood why the proposal did not seek to establish this HQ in Shape itself, thus providing the parameters “within the Alliance” and “transparency” – a lot of transatlantic misunderstandings could have been avoided. Yet the geo-psychological mood at the time was different.

Let me also remind you of the Maastricht Treaty 1991 where agreement was reached on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) “including the eventual framing of a common defense policy which in time might lead to a common defense”.

You are also aware of Saint-Malo 1998 where France and Britain formulated their intention to develop ESDI also outside the Alliance. Meanwhile HR Javier Solana has presented first outlines of a new European Strategic Concept. The EU Convent gave new impulses to ESDP (European Security and Defense Program). Operations like EUPM in Bosnia Herzegovina, Concordia in Macedonia and Artemis in Croatia fuel this process, a process which is meant to eventually lead to ESDU (European Security and Defense Union).

The Iraq Conflict was also seen as a conflict between “unipolarists” and “multipolarists”, also within the EU. There were “this is the end of NATO” prophecies. Yet NATO will for a long time remain the most potent pol-mil instrument without alternative. But:

- The relationship between NATO and EU within the Alliance has to be defined newly.
- Europe must use NATO better for the articulation of her own interests.
- NATO must remain transatlantic: therefore a strategic dialogue EU-US is necessary.
- EU-US partnership must remain a two-way street, regardless of the pol-mil US superiority.
- EU must develop its partnership capabilities in order to achieve full action potential in the entire Petersburg spectrum.

That looks like the formula to sharpen the EU profile in NATO.

What are the possibilities to gradually strengthen the European profile and coordination within NATO that would merit support?

Firstly: A coordinated EU position in NATO for any EU-led operations is more than plausible, there is no need here for the ritual of EU-NATO Council meetings.

Secondly: The fight against terrorism and proliferation of WMD as far as a European role is concerned.

Thirdly: An informal EU opinion forming procedure is NATO adequate, the so called Private Luncheons of NATO Ambassadors do just that, the same should be possible for EU ambassadors in NATO.

Fourthly: The future EU Foreign Minister should represent the EU in the NATO Council.

In other words: The European pillar should be strengthened in three dimensions:

- A transatlantic security and political debate should take place in NATO as the central forum.

- The EU-role will be strengthened by more partnership, by its readiness and its practical capabilities to take over security-political responsibilities.
- Political signals could help to kick-start the new transatlantic debate.

We know: such a dialogue will not be easy, there are diverging interests in Washington and Brussels. Yet: only if and when Europe seeks a dialogue with the US in NATO over security-political issues it will be regarded as an actor in this field. The subjects of the debate are clear: EU security strategy, EU strategy on WMD, the security situation in critical regions like the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, the Middle East or North Korea, a joint threat and risk analysis in concrete cases or the relationship between the NATO Response Force and its European equivalent.

Europe must show its will and must produce its capabilities for a security-political burden sharing with the US as done in the Balkans, Afghanistan, the Congo and elsewhere. Europeans should avoid establishing new institutions or duplications.

My conclusion: The debate of the European pillar must have two goals: First, to keep NATO vital; second, to establish a strong ESDP.

If this discussion is led on the basis of concrete content it will be understood even by hardheaded “Atlanticists”. An open and trustful debate presents the big chance to make ESDP a dynamic subject of transatlantic discussions. Timing and tone must take into account that many wounds of recent months have not yet healed. Inclusiveness should be the defining tenor. But the debate in Europe and in and with the US should start now.

In 1990 we formulated the “Transatlantic Declaration”. In 1994 the “New Transatlantic Agenda” was born. In 2003 maybe it is necessary to produce a “New Transatlantic Charter”.

# CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS (CIMIC)

Ole Andreas LINDEMAN

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*“Whatever we call these operations, peace enforcement or peacekeeping, they will require a civilian component and a civil-military interface. That has been the case in all of these operations in the past and most certainly in Bosnia, and it will be one of the key lessons learned for the future.”*

*High Representative Carl Bildt, 1996.*

## **Introduction**

Complex international peace support and enforcement missions call for a composite and multifunctional response. As in the Balkans, military missions are increasingly having to interact with the civilian community. As a rule peace operations comprise not only military, but also political and humanitarian action. The success of such operations depends to a large extent on the effectiveness of the collaboration between civilian and military actors. Nowhere is this more important than in the difficult triangular interface between military peacekeeping, humanitarian action and public security.

Humanitarian agencies and NGOs have become increasingly involved in peace operations. They have guiding principles, roles, and operational cultures that are different from those of military actors, and this must be accepted. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is an example of the complexity of peace operations with both military and civilian components. DD&R is crucial for a successful exit strategy for any peacekeeping operation. The increased focus on security sector reform, rule of law strategies, and improved civil-military co-operation in peacekeeping requires improved co-ordination both at headquarters and in the field. The UN Secretariat’s ability to provide strategic guidance and support in this area is crucial.

## **1. CIMIC versus general civil-military co-operation and co-ordination**

CIMIC is the instrument by which the military component of a peace operation is adapted to working in a civilian environment. Basically it is a mechanism for helping the *military structure* to cope with the role of *political organiser*.

On the one hand, CIMIC does not cover the whole of civil-military co-operation. Co-ordination and co-operation between the political and the military arm of a peace operation encompasses much more than CIMIC alone can or should handle. On the

other hand, CIMIC is more than just a staff function and way of adapting and refining a military structure for managing new tasks. CIMIC has come to signify a range of apparently non-military functions that are – rightly or wrongly – referred to as CIMIC activities.

Rather than looking too closely at what CIMIC is, or is not, we should probably direct our attention towards how CIMIC fits, or does not fit, into the overall design of civil-military co-operation in multifunctional peace operations. Moreover, we should examine whether CIMIC by and large does what it is supposed to do. We are well served if we look at the hard military realities of CIMIC, in order not to get too enthusiastic about how it can be put to use as part of the civil-military interface in peace operations. Differences in the way the UN, NATO and the EU perceive CIMIC could represent a challenge, since CIMIC will take on different forms in operations led by a regional organisation under a UN mandate.

## **2. Some are more CIMIC than others**

The basic thrust of UN DPKO CIMIC policy is that the military and the civil police are primarily employed by the UN for security-related functions. All other tasking is *a priori* a matter for civilian organisations, including IOs and NGOs. If military and civil police are requested to undertake humanitarian development tasks, they have to operate under specialised civilian co-ordination – but not under civilian command. This policy is consistent with the Secretary-General’s guidelines on relations between the SRSGs and Resident/Humanitarian Co-ordinators:

“UN Civil-Military Co-ordination is the system of interaction, involving exchange of information, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military elements (for DPKO purposes this includes civil police) and humanitarian organisations, development organisations, or the local civilian population, to achieve their respective objectives.”<sup>24</sup>

In NATO contexts, CIMIC facilitates co-operation between a NATO commander and all parts of the civilian environment within the commander’s joint operations area:

“CIMIC is the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> DPKO Civil-Military Co-ordination Policy (September 2002).

<sup>25</sup> NATO Military Policy on CIMIC (EACP/PFP (PCG)N(2001)0004

EU-CIMIC is more outspokenly concerned with humanitarian and reconstruction functions. Its “political” orientation derives from the crisis management tasks of the EU Commission. These include mine clearance, emergency aid/food aid, civil protection support, protection of human rights, institution building, election support, strengthening democracy/rule of law, protection of refugees/IDPs, repairs/reconstruction, infrastructure development, economic aid. Thus the implementation of civilian instruments by armed forces may contribute to the “political” achievement of the mission as defined by the EU Council and help EU forces to win “hearts and minds”. The guiding principles governing the civil-military relationship will be implemented through CIMIC framework arrangements between the EU military elements and relevant external civil humanitarian organisations.<sup>26</sup>

In addition to the above, there are the US civil affairs (CA) concept and the British civil-military operations (CMO). These are not CIMIC in the strict sense. CIMIC has a military baseline, whereas CA and CMO enter the realm where military assets are used for political purposes. Both concepts are relevant in Afghanistan and Iraq today. As regards Iraq, it is interesting to note that whereas a relatively small force was sufficient to drive Saddam Hussein from Baghdad, a more sizeable force is needed to uphold law and order and perform the other civilian duties and responsibilities under international law that go with being an occupying power.

### **3. So what does CIMIC do?**

CIMIC consists of practical measures implemented for the purpose of organising a complex environment. The purpose of CIMIC is ultimately to increase security for the military peace enforcement presence. At HQ level it is a staff function, alongside other staff functions such as operations, logistics and communications. It is executed through liaison mechanisms with all civil areas of activity deemed important for the military operation – administration, government, elections, humanitarian action, public security and the like.

Reconstruction for humanitarian purposes or repair and rebuilding of roads, bridges, communications or other vital infrastructure are frequently undertaken as CIMIC activities. Primarily these activities are motivated by the need to stabilise the security situation and improve operational access and flexibility in the military sphere of responsibility. Moreover, they provide value added in terms of creating contact with the civilian population and winning hearts and minds. Apart from assistance to the civilian population, these activities provide increased force protection and promote the aims of

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<sup>26</sup> Ref: EU CIMIC Concept for EU-led CMO - Document 7106/02 - COSDP 67 dated 18 March 2003 Civil - Military Co-operation. Concept for EU-led crisis management operations (work document, June 2003).

the military operation. The bottom line is that CIMIC is about bringing the military operation closer to the end state, and as such it is part of the military organisation's exit strategy.

This brings us back to the initial position, that CIMIC activities are military means to a military end. Accordingly, CIMIC lines of action are fully integrated with the overall military line of operation. The specific responsibilities of CIMIC staff within HQ typically include liaison with civil actors, engaging in integrated planning at strategic and operational levels, monitoring political development, conducting assessments of socio-economic development, working towards the smooth and timely transfer of responsibility to civilian authorities, and, not least, overseeing the conduct of civil-military activities and advising the force commander on all of the above.

The specific tasks normally run along six main axes: institution building and the rule of law, support to the public security sector and the judiciary, democratisation and election assistance, reconstruction of humanitarian and economic infrastructure, facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons, synchronisation of the overall civil-military agenda.

In ISAF (III) the CIMIC mission was defined as “conducting activities in line with the information operation campaign, in order to assist ISAF in strengthening the security in Kabul and its surroundings (ISAF's AOR), by assisting/supporting the civil bodies in improving the quality of life for the population. ... [thus] promoting the overall stabilisation process in Afghanistan and increasing the authority of the ATA with a view to conducting the constitutional Loya Jirga [before the end of the year].”

It should be noted that in all of the above CIMIC is very much oriented towards the political aims of the mission, the so-called end state. At the same time, CIMIC is viewed very much in a military context and from a military standpoint. The most problematic activities, those with a bearing on humanitarian action and public security support, are rarely considered as a separate issue and are generally not covered any more extensively than other less problematic areas of civil-military co-operation. Lastly, oversight and synchronisation of the civil-military effort are regarded as a separate task, and rightly so, but it is highly debatable whether this task is given the appropriate attention.

We will examine this more closely in the following, after a brief review of an attempt at integrated civil-military planning for co-ordinated action in Mitrovica north in Kosovo.



#### **4. The hard case of Mitrovica**

Mitrovica and the areas to the north of the Ibar river have been the source of much politico-military frustration and an object of many an academic study, but they have probably never before been used as an example of the trials and tribulations of CIMIC in strategic integrated planning.

In 2001, the North Atlantic Council became acutely aware through both political and military channels of the problems prevailing in Mitrovica north and the way they were compounding the problems of KFOR and UNMIK all over Kosovo. It was becoming obvious that, if not checked, they could put the entire operation in jeopardy. Mitrovica vehemently resisted KFOR's and UNMIK's efforts to bring it under their sway, and openly defied the authority of SC resolution 1244.

By establishing parallel security, political and administrative structures in the area, the Kosovo-Serbs had in reality established a grey area outside the full reach of UN and NATO in Kosovo. The situation was untenable for at least three reasons: 1) the mandate of UNMIK/KFOR was being challenged daily and the performance of mandated duties was being hampered or even stopped altogether, 2) the wrong signals were being sent to the Kosovo-Albanians, which was leading to growing discontent with UNMIK/KFOR and to the emergence of similar practices or even unlawful self-help by the majority Kosovo-Albanian population, 3) the persistence of this situation was allowing Mitrovica north to gradually drift into the sphere of Belgrade and for the criminal elements that were legion in the area to exploit the power vacuum to organise themselves and their illicit activities across the administrative border to Serbia proper. This was before Milosevic had been taken to The Hague.

Mitrovica was very much a civil-military challenge or, to be more specific, a challenge where a solution based either on purely political or on purely military measures had little prospect of leading anywhere. The problem was aggravated by the fact that both KFOR and UNMIK were critical, at times openly so, of what was perceived as the other's negligence and lack of willingness and ability to act.

To UNMIK, Mitrovica was more than anything a security issue, and one that had to be dealt with by KFOR. To KFOR, Mitrovica was first and foremost a question of unresolved issues that could only be dealt with by robust politico-administrative means, in conjunction with the necessary security measures. KFOR considered it essential to undo the knot that tied politics and crime together, and for the UNMIK police to do their share in upholding public order and fighting organised crime. Both UNMIK and KFOR were waiting for the other to take action, with the result that nothing much happened.

The North Atlantic Council instructed KFOR and requested UNMIK to mount a joint effort to deal with Mitrovica. A joint strategy was to be elaborated and executed in

close co-operation. The CIMIC staff element of KFOR HQ was put in direct contact with the political section of UNMIK Pristina and the office of the UNMIK Regional Administrator in Mitrovica, and tasked with drawing up an action plan. This was a novelty for the CIMIC element and also for UNMIK. The tortuous process that ensued provided many opportunities for lessons learned.

First KFOR's CIMIC draft group came up with a military plan with specific time lines, leading to a clearly defined end state. Then UNMIK produced several long and elaborate papers defining ways and means to start up a multi-pronged political process, which focused on the content of such a process but with no end state in sight. For a long time feelings ran high in both organisations, papers were sent back and forth – and Mitrovica could breathe more easily.

After a while, the frustration mounted from the tactical to the operational top level – that is up to the SRSG and the Commander of KFOR. The political officers of both organisations were instructed to pick up the debris and present a solution before an upcoming meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, with the SRSG and COMKFOR as invitees. Another tormenting period of writing and rewriting of papers followed. Every attempt was rejected. Finally it was decided to go for separate papers under a single hat. But this, too, failed, and the end result was a short “general introduction” to the problem of Mitrovica, which had the SRSG's “approval” but not his signature. The joint strategy was “disjointed”, as each organisation ended up with its own operational papers.

The outcome of this arduous exercise was, however, not all bad. The process generated a greater willingness to try harder in both KFOR and UNMIK. It also heightened these two bodies' awareness and understanding of the underlying difficulties in Mitrovica. Finally, the experience of trying out joint planning across the civil-military divide generated a more profound understanding of the possibilities and limitations of the respective “partner organisation” and thus provided a more robust platform for co-operation, based on complementary and mutually reinforcing approaches.

This anecdotal example shows some of the practical problems of civil-military co-operation at theatre level. But as we have seen, it was not wholly negative. It sparked a dual effort that gradually led to improvements in Mitrovica. But it took an initiative from the political stakeholders of KFOR and UNMIK, constant pressure from the top level of each organisation, and a good deal of work and frustration before the unsuccessful joint planning could be aborted and the real work start – independently, but in fact with better co-ordination and understanding.

Mitrovica was an exercise in co-operation in a specific geographical setting, a sort of micro-cosmos – or, if you like, civil-military laboratory of peacekeeping. Conceptually it is manageable, although common policies may be difficult to develop,

implement and carry through. Considerably more problematic are the functional areas of co-operation, in particular humanitarian action and the public security sector, where the difficulties are of both a practical and formal nature.

## **5. Military operations and humanitarian action (“*bombs and biscuits*”)**

CIMIC is not a military NGO. There is no such thing as a humanitarian soldier. Soldiers are trained and equipped for war - even when their primary task is to build bridges and search for mines and perform other humanitarian tasks.

Since Kosovo, drawing the line between humanitarian and military action has become increasingly difficult. The difficulty arises when the military forces are tasked with humanitarian action as part of the overall crisis response mechanism. The problem is compounded by the fact that relief operations frequently take place in a militarised context. Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan are examples of close interaction between military and humanitarian actors, but Somalia, Sierra Leone and East Timor are also good examples. Today, Iraq is probably the most acute example of all.

Although use of military personnel for humanitarian purposes may be legal, such actions shall not be conducted in a way that blurs the distinction between military objects and civilian objects entitled to protection in accordance with international humanitarian law. Humanitarian aid is by definition provided impartially and solely on the basis of the needs of the victims, and by civil organisations that are independent and neutral of the warring parties. The use of military assets in the delivery of humanitarian aid could easily make the respective functions indistinct and have negative impact on the security of both the afflicted population and humanitarian relief workers, unless it is carried out in an orderly manner and strictly according to agreed rules. When the military are engaged in humanitarian action, it is of critical importance that their *modus operandi* is in strict conformity with international humanitarian principles and international humanitarian law. Otherwise, if the aid is perceived as partisan, the aid itself and civilian relief workers could become war targets and the access to victims denied.

As a matter of principle, the military assets of belligerent forces or of units that are somehow engaged in combat shall not be used to support UN humanitarian activities. The issue is, however, not entirely bereft of difficulties inasmuch as many international military forces either provide assistance to the civilian population in their areas of responsibility or would like to deploy forces to support UN humanitarian activities. The motivation for this can be purely humanitarian and needs based, but rightly or wrongly it could also be perceived as motivated by a desire to legitimise military missions, compile intelligence and enhance force protection, etc. The problems do not stop here, because while there is on the one hand a tangible need to separate humanitarian

activities from political and military agendas, this must on the other hand be balanced with the need for close inter-institutional co-ordination in order to ensure that the assistance provided by military forces does not undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the effort of the humanitarian community.

The Oslo Guidelines (1994) originally dealt with humanitarian activities in connection with natural, technological and environmental disasters. Since that time, the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has similarly regulated the co-ordination of humanitarian response in so-called complex emergencies as well. OCHA's mandate is to co-ordinate the international humanitarian response in conflict situations. The Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) Programme and the Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) of OCHA were created to ensure that military resources are effectively used to respond to the needs of the population in humanitarian emergencies.

However, in recent complex humanitarian emergencies the co-ordination between the international military forces and the responding UN humanitarian agencies and other international civilian actors has been found to be in need of improvement. Examples include Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, and areas of particular concern are information sharing, security, logistics, movement, transport and communications. The need for better guidance and enabling frameworks for improved co-ordination is recognised by most actors. An effective humanitarian response demands that the military and civilian actors co-operate efficiently in critical areas, particularly in the acute phases of a disaster, conflict or crisis.

In international humanitarian law there is a clear distinction between legal and illegal targets in armed conflict. Humanitarian assistance provided by military forces is not illegal according to international law. Whether humanitarian action executed by military forces is illegal or legal depends on the situation in which this action takes place. There is, for instance, a difference between air drops of humanitarian assistance and the establishment and administration of refugee/IDP camps.

Military units engaged in humanitarian action in times of war or conflict are not legal targets provided that their action meets specific criteria, just as humanitarian organisations conducting relief operations under the protection of international humanitarian law are as a rule not legal targets. It follows that military forces may not conduct military operations disguised as humanitarian action or in a way that endangers the security of humanitarian relief workers and the conduct of humanitarian action.

Military operations must not stand in the way of or otherwise hinder the provision of humanitarian assistance by humanitarian relief organisations to the civilian population, which would not otherwise receive life-saving humanitarian relief. Although it may be legal, military action for humanitarian purposes should not be conducted in a way that blurs the distinction between legal and illegal targets according

to international humanitarian law. The integrity of the institution of humanitarian relief must be protected. It would be a matter of grave concern if the perception of these agencies' status as independent and neutral actors were to be threatened by any military operations.

At the end of the day, however, the questions raised by military forces conducting humanitarian action are often more practical than legal, in spite of the importance of the latter. Inadequate co-ordination with the humanitarian community is disruptive to the overall humanitarian effort. The main irritant for the humanitarian community is often what they perceive as the military's ad hoc approach to relief assistance and aid work.

Although the military and humanitarian organisations often find themselves working side by side, they operate quite differently. Both are crucial parts of a multifunctional peace operation, but both tend to take a proprietary view of their own activities and information and are jealous of their respective organisational integrity. Moreover, they both believe that their mission would be at stake if they were to appear to be “co-opted” by the military on the one hand or subject to “mission creep” on the other. Co-operation with the military can spell danger for the humanitarian NGO community since they are bound by a mandate based on the principle of neutrality. The military, on their side, are concerned about operational security, especially when operating in a hostile environment.

The recently launched *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* could advance this difficult issue by several strides. From the standpoint of both OCHA and ECHO, the Guidelines are an enabling framework that should facilitate co-ordination by addressing both legal and practical questions. It reaches beyond solely UN-led operations, and should also have relevance for operations conducted by NATO, the EU and other regional organisations with a mandate from the UN.

## **6. Security sector reform**

Public security is today generally acknowledged to be an important arena for civil-military co-operation in peace operations. The success of a peace operation is assumed to depend largely on the effectiveness of civil-military collaboration in this sector. In Kosovo there was a robust security presence, but a comparatively small presence of international civil police. One had the impression of a lot of security, but little law and order. Could more be done by the security and the civil presences jointly to fill the security gap? Was there an imbalance in the employment of civil and military structures in the public security sector? However, it would be unfair to compare Kosovo outright with Afghanistan beyond Kabul because in Afghanistan the problems

emanating from lack of security are considerably more serious and the resources to deal with them significantly less developed.

According to the OECD/DAC guidelines, the security sector comprises all those institutions and security forces responsible for ensuring the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion. It includes the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and judicial and penal institutions, and also non-statutory security bodies such as armed opposition groups, militias and private security firms.

An important impetus to security sector reform was provided by the Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping Reform, which called for the gap between the development and defence communities to be bridged and for them to work more closely together. Security sector reform is a means to this end. It is closely linked to the human security agenda. Moreover, it is the crux of any governance and rule of law reform strategy. It deals with the proper relationship between the security sector and civil society, and is essential for peacebuilding and development. Security sector reform will often involve separating the police from the armed forces. The judicial and penal or correctional systems are also critical for strengthening the rule of law.

The UN is a key actor in international security and development co-operation. Its growing engagement in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants reflects this trend. This is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the UN's emphasis on the policing component of peace operations. The UN has been the main actor in this area since the Congo operation in the 1960s. At the outset, the mandates were mainly confined to monitoring. Today the UN Civpol is increasingly focusing on assistance with training and capacity building for local police forces. In some cases (East Timor and Kosovo) the Civpol mandate went a step further and included executive policing. The Brahimi panel on peacekeeping operations also called for operational guidelines that focus directly on the security sector. A number of UN agencies are currently involved in security sector reform issues, including UNDP, DPKO and DPA.

The European Union has recently emerged as an actor on this scene. Much of its activities in the field have focused on local capacity building for civilian emergency and crisis management, with an emphasis on assisting police reform in post-conflict reconstruction. The main effort in this field is the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with related activities in the Balkans. The EUPM mandate is comprehensive. In the mid-1990s, the focus was on training and assistance. This has now been expanded to include extensive police reform and the promotion of democratic policing, including support for the justice sector and the penal system.

The EU approach has evolved along the same lines as the general UN approach to policing in peace operations and reconstruction of the judiciary. The EU has emphasised

civilian components and the linkages between the role of the police, the judiciary and the military in its Balkans operations, while NATO concentrates on the military dimension. The EU's approach has echoed many of the views and recommendations put forward in the Brahimi Report.

The security sector reform agenda is ambitious and, if fully implemented, will achieve a great deal. But it requires dramatic institutional changes and a good deal of time and resources. And unfortunately institutional implementation is generally lagging behind the vision. Military forces and the police of the international donor community are playing an active role and transferring expertise for capacity building and direct assistance to security sector reform. These institutions possess valuable technical skills, but they are not always best suited for addressing certain key aspects of reform of the security sector. Although they are recognised as an area for civil-military co-operation, CIMIC structures as such have traditionally had little to do with designing and overseeing military support to security sector development, in spite of the fact that they are normally tasked with providing support to the public security sector and the judiciary.

## **7. Wrapping up - Afghanistan and beyond**

Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor have provided the international community with extensive experience of peace operations. Yet in all these areas there are still problems with regard to public security and humanitarian stabilisation. But at least there is a light at the end of the tunnel. And it is fair to say that the multifaceted process of peacebuilding is well under way and that the probability of these areas returning to large-scale violent conflict is being reduced day by day.

We are not there yet in Afghanistan. We will hopefully get there, but not in the immediate future. The problems there are even worse, and security and humanitarian stabilisation are critical issues. There is still a long way to go before the security situation allows for effective humanitarian action with a view to sustainable economic and social stabilisation for large groups of the population. And there is an equally long way to go before humanitarian stabilisation starts paying dividends in terms of improving the security situation beyond Kabul.

In response to these problems, the focus of operation Enduring Freedom is being shifted from offensive anti-terrorist action to peacebuilding. The US has established three Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as part of the central authorities' effort to gain control over the whole country. The teams have a capacity for self-defence, and can quickly call in reinforcements. However, their main objective is not to patrol but to engage in CIMIC-related activities.

The PRTs will conduct development activities as well as contributing to security and stabilisation in the provinces. Simultaneously the US is training the fledgling Afghan Army, and Germany and others are training the police. An initiative has been taken to mount an ambitious training and capacity development programme for a modern Afghan border guard service.

The PRTs are supposed to co-operate closely with ISAF CIMIC units and staff on several of these fronts. The ISAF's CIMIC capacity has increased considerably. And the CIMIC Group North/South construction of NATO provides the force commander with significantly increased CIMIC competencies and resources that he can draw on in the field.

NATO's decision to lead ISAF IV is a good illustration of the Alliance's political will to engage "out of area". But does this signal that US and British forces as well as NATO are running full speed towards also engaging out of *functional* area, i.e. in tasks that the military should leave to the civil arm of the operation? Probably only experience and the lessons learned in Afghanistan – and Iraq – will tell. But it leaves us with the question of when and where is it "right" – in principle and in practice – for the military to take on tasks normally handled by civilian organisations? This is not unlike the saying: "Damned if you do – damned if you don't".

In the south of Afghanistan, humanitarian action by coalition forces is mostly conducted in areas where NGOs are not operating, and co-ordination problems are minimal. However, the various kinds of military units – regular, civil affairs, special operations, intelligence – are operating in the same area. Some wear uniform, others do not – all carry weapons. From an NGO point of view, armed military personnel in civilian clothes undermine the integrity and therefore also the security of international civil relief and reconstruction workers. In other parts of Afghanistan, where military operations and humanitarian action overlap, especially in urban areas, cost-effective co-ordination becomes another challenge.

Demarcation of action and responsibility is a problem, first and foremost between the military and the humanitarian community. UNAMA and the NGO community would like to see PRT and CIMIC units keeping away from schools, hospital facilities and this sort of humanitarian reconstruction in general, and instead concentrating on reconstruction and repair of public infrastructure, bridges, roads, etc. The military, however, seem reluctant to step out of the humanitarian sphere, partly because some of their funding is earmarked for such action only, but also because this is the main path to contact building with the civilian population and the winning of hearts and minds. As we have seen, these goals are important in terms of force protection and security, and thus central with regard to the force commander's mission.

The UN encourages the PRTs to support and assist the new Afghan national army when army units are deployed to the provinces where the PRTs are operational.



Furthermore, the PRTs are requested to assist local police in the provinces. In Gardez a pilot co-operation project between the PRT and the Afghan army has already been implemented. A comprehensive PRT training programme for the local police in the provinces this summer or autumn is apparently under consideration.

This is work in progress. And the solutions that are tried out in Afghanistan today may very well be employed in Iraq tomorrow.

## **8. Final conclusions – and some questions for further debate**

Maintaining peace and security is job number one for the military presence in a peace operation. Neither effective peacekeeping nor anti-terrorist responses nor humanitarian action or reconstruction is doable without a minimal level of stability and security. CIMIC's job is to take on functions in the interface with the civilian environment in order to promote force protection and enhance the security of the mission.

CIMIC has come to stay – and so have the problems generated by the need to ensure more and better co-operation and co-ordination in the field between the military and civil arms of peace operations in complex emergencies.

It is easy to see that CIMIC has an unfulfilled potential in this respect. It is harder to see how it can be fully realised. The problem is partly that CIMIC is so elusive as a concept. In CIMIC, military operational means and ends are mixed with politico-humanitarian outreach, for example in the winning of hearts and minds. Part of the problem is that as a rule CIMIC is not meant to be fully integrated into civil-military forms of co-operation and co-ordination at all levels. This means that CIMIC staff often lack the ability to maintain an overview and synchronise civil-military activities theatre-wide. Both factors are a source of confusion for external partners, and sometimes within the military organisation itself.

A general rule is that the military should perform CIMIC activities where and when it can provide value added or has comparative advantages. CIMIC staff at HQ are the logical people to handle the planning and overseeing of such activities, but often the execution will have to be performed by other parts of the organisation.

The following are questions for further consideration:

- Where should the diverse and often self-contradictory civilian activities be situated in the military organisation? How should they be staffed? Is today's CIMIC the right answer to the question?
- Is CIMIC suitable as a hub for generating broader civil-military co-operation in the field? Should more be done to integrate CIMIC into the broader civil-military co-ordination, or is it best kept at an arm's length from the real political issues?

- Civil-military co-operation makes good sense, but how far down this road is it safe to go before important distinctions between civil and military responsibilities become blurred or even eradicated? For instance, where do we draw the line between military operation and humanitarian action? How much policing should the military perform?
- At the end of the day, CIMIC is a cost-effective measure for increasing the security of the military organisation and force protection. But does CIMIC at the same time cause extra exposure to the civilian environment? Could CIMIC activities make the military peace component more vulnerable physically and even politically?
- CIMIC has come to stay – in one way or another. But CIMIC is not static, particularly in view of the fact that the overarching civil-military co-operation, of which CIMIC is a part, is in a constant state of flux. Is CIMIC only a small cog in the machinery? Or does it have more influence than it appears to have?

## CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS (CIMIC) - CONCLUSIONS OF BREAKOUT GROUP V

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A conservative but realistic interpretation of CIMIC is that it should be regarded as military measures to achieve military ends. CIMIC is situated somewhere in the broader context of the overall civil-military co-operation and co-ordination in peace operations. But it is difficult to place CIMIC exactly within the triangle represented by *military security*, *humanitarian/human security* and *public security*.

Above all, CIMIC supports the force commander's mission. It enhances force protection and the security of the military operation. CIMIC activities are operational means towards the end-state and the extraction of the military mission.

There is some confusion about what CIMIC is and does. This comes from the fact that specifically CIMIC, or civil affairs, activities are not in themselves military but are done for a military purpose. They are often aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population, and the overall purpose is to stabilise the operational environment of the military operation. These measures increasingly include direct humanitarian relief action, reconstruction for humanitarian purposes and support for local capacity building in the security sector. Recent developments in Afghanistan, for example, especially the establishment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams of the coalition forces, indicate that military activities are tending to expand into domains of peace operations where civilian organisations have traditionally held sway.

The problems this development might cause were discussed in the Breakout Group. It was agreed that military activities in the humanitarian field in particular represented a challenge, for both *legal* and *practical* reasons.

Examples from Kosovo were cited in order to illustrate how many and diverse are the civil activities that have to be carried out in a post-conflict society on its way to meaningful self-government. It was suggested that more should be done both in the military organisation and by civil partners in peace operations in order to promote better understanding and mutually reinforcing approaches to co-operation. One of the factors that makes this difficult is that SRSGs and force commanders are frequently replaced, whereas the spoilers of peace processes remain in place.

It was pointed out that CIMIC neither could nor should be involved in all civil-military areas of co-operation. But force commanders would probably be better served by their CIMIC staff if the latter were more explicitly tasked with keeping an overview of and synchronising civil-military co-operation. At times the roles seem to be reversed: too often, the commander (because he is better informed) is informing and

advising his own CIMIC staff about important civil activities and concerns instead of receiving operational advice and early warning from them.

Human security and gender considerations were felt to be an increasingly important aspect of post-conflict peace operations and peace-building. More should be done in order to mainstream a sound but cautious gender perspective in the planning and conduct of operations.

The group was asked what lessons had been learned and what more could be done to improve civil-military co-operation and co-ordination in the field. It was recognised that although CIMIC had come to stay, it had an unfulfilled potential. However, the direction that civil-military co-operation was taking was not entirely clear, in spite of several years of practical experience in the field. As an example, it was noted that the UN, NATO and the EU had slightly different interpretations of what CIMIC is, and that this was reflected in their different guidelines on the subject. In addition it was noted that individual troop contributors had different CIMIC strategies, for example major troop contributors like the US and the UK.

It was pointed out that, in spite of the number of years it has been in place, CIMIC was still a somewhat new and alien element in military organisations. Likewise, operating closely with the military was an equally new experience for civilian actors. This seems to be particularly reflected in the military's sometimes strained relations with humanitarian organisations and NGOs. With time and experience co-operation does improve through practical co-operation and better cross-institutional and cross-cultural understanding, for instance in the Balkans.

The recently launched *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* is expected to facilitate co-ordination not only of UN-led operations, but also of those led by NATO, the EU or other regional organisations with a mandate from the UN.

Breakout Group V made the following recommendations for strengthening the overall positive trend in civil-military co-operation in peace operations involving the UN, NATO or the EU:

- First, before embarking on specific operations, to achieve more clarity at the *strategic level* of troop contributors and stakeholders by developing general guidelines about what level and type of civil-military co-operation and co-ordination is needed.
- Second, when in theatre, to create more clarity and better co-ordinating mechanisms at the *operational level*, between the force commander, SRSG (or other UN envoy) and other major actors (UNDP, UNHCR, UNHCHR, NGOs) by making better use of the resources available in the respective organisations for this purpose.

- Third, given that the initial stages of an operation are crucial, the same actors should strive for a joint/common information campaign for the local population and the broader NGO community, as well as within their own presences, about how the civil-military distribution of responsibility and division of labour is to be organised and practised.

The Breakout Group considered that it would be inadvisable to create a “grand design” with a fixed doctrinal approach to these recommendations and to CIMIC in general. Instead, the group proposed developing a set of guidelines for designing a flexible and operational *enabling framework* for civil-military co-operation. Institutional complementarity and inter-operability needs to be encouraged. The last thing that is needed is another doctrinal straightjacket or tormenting CIMIC drafting exercise in NATO or elsewhere.

It was reiterated that experiences and lessons learned in Afghanistan and in Iraq could very well mean that the UN, NATO and the EU would soon have new realities in the field of civil-military co-operation to adapt to.

The use of provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan indicates that there is a new generation of military activities that could end up moving beyond traditional constraints on civil-military relations in the field as regards military engagement in human security, humanitarian affairs and security sector reform in particular, and other peacebuilding efforts in the context of development in general.

## CHALLENGES AND POTENTIALS FOR EU-UN CO-OPERATION

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### 1. EU-UN co-operation

- Over the last half-century, the European Union and the United Nations system have evolved from the same fundamental logic - to build an international community governed by rules and policies which take strength and legitimacy from the equal engagement of all members.
- The European Union's commitment to multilateralism is a defining principle of its external policy. The EU has a clear interest in supporting the continuous evolution and improvement of the tools of global governance.
- Indeed, the importance of enhancing co-operation with the UN has been underlined repeatedly by all major institutions of the Union.

### 2. Co-operation in Peace and Security

- Traditional areas for co-operation have been – among others – Development and humanitarian affairs, and Human Rights. The next challenge is to extend this to other areas which are essential to effective global governance such as those related to international peace and security.
- We must, of course, not overlook our close co-operation in the fight against terrorism. We have done much work in the context of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) also in terms of mobilising funds for counter-terrorism assistance. Today, however, let us look at conflict prevention and crisis management, which lie at the intersection of the development and security agendas.
- For the Commission, which manages the bulk of instruments deployed in EU civilian crisis management operations, the necessity of open lines of communication with the UN is further accentuated by the creation of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), which is increasingly being used to support UN operations directly.
- Indeed over these three days we have been looking in great detail at the military/policing aspects of peace and security. We do, however, understand

“peace-operations” as a wide definition including security sector reform, civilian capacities, training, mine action etc<sup>27</sup>.

- There are a number of civilian instruments at our disposal for crisis management in the wider sense, primarily: EC co-operation assistance, humanitarian aid, trade policy and political dialogue, as well as certain internal Community policies that have external effects, such as Justice and Home Affairs (migration, asylum, visas). The Commission’s role in crisis management is to identify and manage, on the basis of the relevant political mandates, these civilian instruments.
- Recent years have seen a clear evolution of joint activities by the EU and the UN in the areas of crisis intervention and post-crisis reconstruction.
- Experience of collaboration now extends from the rebuilding of failed states and territories emerging from conflict to the deployment of military peace-keeping personnel:
  1. In Afghanistan, there has been close co-operation with UNAMA, UNDP and other agencies.
  2. The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina took the baton from the UN task force which preceded it.
  3. The EU Pillar of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is an integral part of the interim administration, with effective co-operation being pursued by the Commission and the UN for the implementation of EU-compatible standards and legislation.
  4. And most recently, the EU launched the ‘Artemis’ emergency military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Bunia), in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1484 and at the UNSG’s request, in anticipation of a strengthened UN military deployment.
- In addition to these headline examples of EU-UN co-operation in peace and security actions, there has been substantial co-ordination between the EU and the UN on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, from the Great Lakes to Cambodia.
- For its part, the Commission now works regularly alongside the UN when putting in place tools of post-conflict rehabilitation, ranging from mine clearance projects to comprehensive reconstruction and assistance strategies as in the Western Balkans.

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<sup>27</sup> This is in line with the approach in the Annual report of the UN special committee on Peacekeeping operations

- Finally it should be highlighted that co-operation in matters of peace and security also covers aspects linked to democratisation and good governance as well as poverty eradication and sustainable development, all of which are areas in which the EU is particularly active in the framework of the UN.

### 3. Future strengthening

- The evolution of CFSP/ESDP has significantly increased the EU's options for engagement in the political, diplomatic and military spheres. Given that EU actions in this area will invariably be consistent with decisions and frameworks elaborated by the UN, the need for effective complementarity with the UN is also crucial.
- Recognition of this fact has already led to a stepping up of high level dialogue from 2001, with the UNSG or his Deputy meeting at least twice yearly with the EU troika. These high-level contacts should now lead to improved contacts at operational level.
- At the level of country assistance, the Commission will work with the UN to ensure co-ordinated actions in target countries, particularly on conflict prevention and peace-building measures.
- Increasingly strengthened co-operation is, of course, supplementary to European Union Member States' role in peacekeeping and parallel to the contribution of the European members of the Security Council. Indeed the Union's founding treaty (art. 19 TEU) foresees the development of the EU's representation in the Security Council<sup>28</sup>.
- If dialogue in these areas is to remain streamlined as it becomes more frequent and more operational, it will need to be carefully organised. With this in mind, the European Commission is working on a new communication on relations with the United Nations which it hopes to adopt in the early autumn.
- Annex 1 - To illustrate the range of EU instruments which can be deployed in crisis situations let us look at a few specific examples:
- *Balkans* - During the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU was for the first time prepared to do more than issue statements of concern and actually tried to broker an agreement that would end the fighting - but it was only after the US decided to enter the peace process that it succeeded and the Dayton

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<sup>28</sup> Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.



agreement was signed. The European Union's capacity to react has developed rapidly since then.

- When troubles began in *FYROM* the European Union responded earlier and more effectively than during previous conflicts in the Balkans. Alongside the intense diplomatic investment, such as that of the High Representative/Secretary General Javier Solana, the Commission acted quickly both before and after the signature of the Ohrid agreement to address the needs of populations directly affected by the conflict, and to ensure the implementation of the terms of the agreement. In the Commission's view, the delivery of EC assistance through the Rapid Reaction Mechanism in the immediate aftermath of Ohrid gave the EU significant leverage in holding the parties to their commitments thereby serving as an effective crisis management instrument (8 May 2001 € 2.4 m, 3 October 2001 € 10.3 m).
- Today, in marked contrast to the past, the EU strategy in the Balkans stands as one of the most relevant examples of a successful integrated approach to crisis management and conflict prevention. Two EU Special Representatives have been sent to the region and a framework is in place through the Stabilisation and Association Process to provide support in a range of areas with the aim of enabling the countries of the region to develop a closer relationship with the Union, leading to eventual membership. It is within the broad rule of law strategy of the SAP framework that the EU Police Mission took over from the UN International Police Task Force at the beginning of January this year, becoming the first EU "crisis management mission" to be so called. This complements activities supported by the Community instrument managed by the Commission (CARDS) which has allocated € 14.9 m to police reform (training, technical assistance, restructuring of police force, equipment).
- In *Burundi* again a range of EU tools have been used to respond to a crisis situation. At political level the EU support to the Arusha Peace Agreement negotiations and on-going political dialogue is aided by the work of EU Special Representative Aldo Ajello. In order to address immediate short term security needs, this has been flanked by support to the South African force to protect Hutu politicians through the CFSP budget line (€ 10 m) and support to the African Union observer mission through the "Rapid Reaction Mechanism" (€ 1,23 from the RRM). In addition EU food aid has supported the cease-fire agreement between the CNDD-FDD rebels and the Government (€ 0.5 m from the food aid budget line). Meanwhile over the longer term a strategy has been developed for Burundi targeting support to the Burundian Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration programme; to the justice sector, human rights promotion and support to civil society organisations (€ 9,6 m from the 8th EDF

NIP); for "good governance" programmes (€ 17,25 m from the 9th EDF NIP); and for overall reconstruction (€ 60 m). As we have learnt again and again, crisis management operations are doomed to failure unless they are set in a broader context of a long-term strategy.

- Finally, *Afghanistan*, where the Community's Rapid Reaction Mechanism has been used particularly effectively. The two RRM programmes in Afghanistan focused on support to the Afghan Interim Authority, including a major contribution to the UNDP Emergency Trust Fund, as well as targeted capacity building of Afghan authorities. These capacity building efforts were preparatory actions for larger scale EU assistance to the civil authorities (as part of the € 775 m aid and humanitarian programme managed by the Commission in Afghanistan). In order to guarantee the necessary coherence between the various interventions, Community actors on the ground work closely with the EU Special Representative Francesc Vendrell.

## THE EU AND UN PEACEKEEPING: A BRIEF SURVEY

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### 1. Current facts and figures

As of 31 May 2003, 3.223 personnel (2085 troops, 249 military observers and 889 civilian police officers) from 14 EU Member States (EU-MS) participated in all of the 14 ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations. The contribution from EU-MS constituted 9,2 % of the UN total amounting to 34.947 personnel deployed in UN operations. As to the civilian police components, the EU countries' share represented 18,3 % of the UN total.

The largest contributions came from Portugal (total 711; focus on East Timor with 654 troops deployed to UNMISSET), the United Kingdom (total 595; focus on Cyprus with 431 troops in UNFICYP and on Kosovo with 115 civilian police in UNMIK) and Austria (total 435; focus on the Middle East/Golan with 375 troops in UNDOF and on Kosovo with 44 civilian police in UNMIK). These were followed by Germany (total 402; 355 civilian police in UNMIK), France (326; 199 troops in UNIFIL - Lebanon, 85 civilian police in UNMIK), Ireland (270; 210 troops in UNMEE – Ethiopia/Eritrea), Italy (171; focus on UNMIK, UNIFIL, UNMEE), Sweden (89; focus on UNMEE and MONUC – Democratic Republic of Congo), Finland (76; focus UNMIK, UNMEE), Denmark (62; focus UNMIK, UNTSO – Middle East), Spain (31; focus UNMIK), Greece (27; focus UNMIK), Belgium (16) and the Netherlands (12; all in UNTSO).

The EU-countries' role is also evident with regard to the mission leadership of UN-operations. UNMIK, until mid-2003, is led by Michael Steiner (Germany), the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo, who is assisted by four Deputy Special Representatives heading the pillars of UNMIK: Jean-Christian Cady (France; Police and Justice), Francesco Bastagli (Italy; Interim Civil Administration), Pascal Fieschi (France; Institution-building) and Andy Bearpark (Great Britain; Reconstruction).

As Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Staffan de Mistura (Sweden) is responsible for coordinating UN activities in southern Lebanon, which include the discharge of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Leading political functions in UN peace operations are also held by Deputy Special Representatives Lena Sundh (Sweden) in MONUC (Democratic Republic of the

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\* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official positions.

Congo), Angela Kane (Germany) in UNMEE (Ethiopia/ Eritrea) and Alan Doss (GB) in UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone).

In the military management of UN missions, five generals from EU-MS hold senior positions: Force Commander UNDOF (Golan) Major-General Bo Wrangler (Sweden), Force Commander UNMEE Major-General Robert Gordon (GB), Chief of Staff UNTSO (Naher Osten) Major-General Carl A. Dodd (Ireland), Chief Military Observer UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan) Major-General Pertti Juhani Puonti (Finland) and Chief Military Observer UNMISSET (East Timor) Brigadier General Pedro Rocha Pena Madeira (Portugal).

Of the 2,63 billion US-Dollars approved by the UN General Assembly for peacekeeping budgets in the period of 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003, the sum of the EU-MS's assessed contributions amounted to roughly 40%, i.e. 1,052 billion USD. In comparison, the US and Japan were assessed at rates of about 28% and 20%, respectively.

## **2. The EU, UN decision making processes, and peacekeeping management**

Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) stipulates that

“(1) Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora. In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.

(2) Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), Member States represented in international organizations or international conferences where not all Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.”

In 2000, France and Spain, referring to paragraph 2 of article 19, jointly presented a proposal aimed at enhancing EU exchange of information and coordination. At Germany's initiative, the EU countries members of the Security Council in 2003/2004,

decided, in keeping with Article 19 of the EU Treaty, to intensify their cooperation and to keep the other EU member countries that are not members of the Security Council fully and promptly informed in this connection. As a result of these efforts, the relevant EU consultations in New York became considerably more regular and extensive in the past three years.

It should also be mentioned in this context that the EU, represented by the Presidency of the Council, delivered common statements in most of the Security Council's open debates.

According to article 19 TEU, the EU positions in the negotiations and decision-making processes in the General Assembly are coordinated by the EU Presidency. With regard to UN peacekeeping, the EU positions on issues considered by the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (5<sup>th</sup> Committee) and on the work of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations – in which the EU-MS are all represented since 1996 – is of particular relevance.

The EU played a leading role in supporting measures to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (“Brahimi Report”), not least with respect to strengthening the relevant capacities of the UN Secretariat by 50%, i.e. increasing the staff of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) from about 400 in 2000 to almost 600. A substantial part of the costs of this measure is covered by the EU-MS.

Military advisers are attached to 14 of the 15 Permanent Representatives of the EU-MS at the UN in New York; Sweden also appointed a civilian police adviser to serve at its Mission. These advisers are not only responsible for the day to day operational management of national personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, but also complement and support the work of the concerned civilian experts in the relevant UN organs and working fora.

### **3. A few observations**

Apart from the considerable share of the EU-MS in the UN's peacekeeping budgets, the personnel contribution from EU-MS to UN peace operation remains significant, despite an obvious decrease in absolute and relative terms of the participation of personnel from EU-MS during the past three years (from 6.768 or 17 % in 2001 to 3.223 or 9,2 % in 2003). EU-MS also contribute with strong troop-contingents to the UN-mandated NATO led-operations in Kosovo (KFOR) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR) as well as to the multinational force in Afghanistan (ISAF). At the beginning of 2003, the overall-strength of these contingents amounted to some 40.000. The newly established EU-led Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Operation "Artemis", which is conducted in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003), includes

another 1.800 troops. The EU has also embarked on its first police mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, taking over from UNMIBH on 1 January 2003, and on its first military peace operation, Operation “Concordia”, in Macedonia (FYROM), taking over from NATO’s “Allied Harmony” on 31 March 2003. Finally, the European Community and EU-MS are major donors with regard to related post-conflict humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and peace-building.

In New York, UN peacekeeping questions are discussed frequently and coordinated among EU heads of missions, political and military experts. The EU speaks with one voice in the relevant negotiation and decision-making processes in the UNGA. As to Security Council matters, coordination and exchange of information between the EU-MS which are permanent members of the Security Council, France and Great Britain, the EU-MS non-permanent members of the Security Council, and the other EU-MS have intensified.

Against the backdrop of this considerable level of EU presence and coherence, the potential for further strengthening EU-UN cooperation in peace operations looks quite promising at the first sight, and the possible synergies with regard to peacekeeping and crisis management have been a regular theme in recent high level meetings between EU and UN.

For a number of reasons, however, the progress achieved since the EU summit in December 2000 - when the EU Presidency had been tasked to identify possible areas as well as modalities for cooperation with the UN in the field of crisis management – appeared somewhat slow. With respect to the operational field, internal EU discussions related to the development of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) concentrated primarily on the establishment of new EU crisis management capabilities, while the question of building on the already existing, solid role of the EU-MS in UN crisis management and enhancing its cohesion was rarely touched upon. On the UN-side, expectations with regard to the Union’s declared commitment to respond more effectively to requests from the UN for assistance in international crisis management were possibly focussing too strongly on immediate requirements, which might have led to a certain sense of stagnation.

As to civilian crisis management, however, the EU seems very close to adopt concrete, practical modalities regarding EU contributions to civilian operations and activities led by the UN. The possibility of military EU contributions to UN-led operations is apparently still a matter for further debate.

#### **4. Conclusion**

Against the backdrop of past and present significant contributions of EU-MS to UN peacekeeping operations, a high level of EU cohesion in the relevant decision making processes in the UNGA and an improved EU-coordination and exchange of information with respect to Security Council matters, the strengthening of EU-UN cooperation in peace operations is not a mere by-product, but rather an integral element in the development of the ESDP.

Although participation in, or support of, UN-led operations certainly do not constitute the only options for an effective EU-UN cooperation in crisis management, the EU, in developing its capacities and modalities of cooperation, could possibly draw more extensively on the potential of the existing expertise and experience of EU-MS in UN peacekeeping, including through EU-coordination on peacekeeping matters in New York, as well as on EU-MS' continued commitment to provide substantial contributions to UN-operations. This argument will gain further relevance with the accession to the EU in 2004 of important UN troop contributors, in particular Poland and Slovakia.

Therefore, possibilities of enhanced coordination and cooperation between EU countries providing personnel to UN peace operations concerning practical questions related to ongoing operations should be thoroughly explored. Apart from UNSC-authorized common EU support, such as the newly established Operation "Artemis", options for a coordinated, visible participation of EU-MS in UN-led operations should also be examined, with a view to putting them into practice.

# COOPERATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS

## The United Nations and Europe

### Seminar Background Paper

#### I Objective

The primary objectives of this seminar are twofold: a), to discuss how cooperation in peace operations<sup>29</sup> conducted by the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other European security organizations can be improved in the future; and b), to analyze the key recommendations of the *Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations*, better known as the Brahimi report, and consider how they can be further implemented.

#### II Background

The annual International Peace Academy (IPA) Vienna Seminar, co-hosted with the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Austrian National Defense Academy, has traditionally focused on peacekeeping, and in recent years has examined the enhancement of cooperation between the UN and European security organizations in the Balkans and the Caucasus. In 2002, the spotlight of the Seminar was on Central Asia (see IPA Vienna Seminar report, “Central Asia’s First Decade of Independence: Promises and Problems, published in the Favorita Paper Series of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna). The 2003 Seminar will examine: a), the development of the European Union’s crisis management capacities and its actual and potential role in carrying out United Nations peace operations; and b), possibilities for the EU to assist the UN in the ongoing implementation of the Brahimi report.

Based on their experiences over the past decade, the United Nations, European security organizations, and other regional bodies (e.g., the Organization of American States, the African Union, etc.) have increasingly recognized the need to cooperate with each other in carrying out peace operations, both in Europe and elsewhere. While the UN and European security organizations have cooperated with reasonable effectiveness in peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo in the last four years, there is an awareness of

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<sup>29</sup> Here the term ‘peace operations’ is used in the broadest possible sense to include the political, economic and social dimensions of peacekeeping, conflict prevention and peacemaking, and peace building. See the *Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations* and “Doctrine, Strategy and Decision-Making for Peace Operations” at [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/). NATO defines ‘peace support operations’ (PSOs) as political-military, multi-layered operations in a context of crisis and/or conflict, which carry out conflict prevention, traditional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Similarly, the EU concept of ‘crisis management operations’ regards crisis management as “co-coordinated actions taken to defuse crises, prevent their escalation into an armed conflict and contain hostilities if they should result.”



the need for further improvement in planning and implementation of United Nations peace operations.

As the EU is still in the process of building up its crisis management capacities, the seminar provides a opportunity for both the EU and the UN to take stock and to discuss the potential for future cooperation, to identify problem areas and to develop substantive recommendations for addressing them, both at the doctrinal and operational levels.

The Seminar also takes place in the framework of IPA's continuing activities on the issue of *Strengthening Regional Approaches to Peace Operations* and its work with the UN, the EU, NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and other European regional actors on strategic and operational cooperation in crisis management and security sector development.

The central theme of the 2003 Vienna Seminar, "Cooperation in Peace Operations: The United Nations and Europe," is divided into three sub-themes:

- 1) Political-institutional aspects of UN-EU cooperation;
- 2) Operational aspects of UN-EU cooperation;
- 3) Further steps toward implementation of the Brahimi report's recommendations and the relevant role of the EU; and
- 4) The evolving EU-NATO relationship.

### **III Proposed Format**

The seminar will include presentations by keynote speakers, panel presentations, plenary discussions among participants, and small working groups. The topics will include thematic issues and specific case studies. The breakout groups following panel presentations will allow for more in-depth consideration of subjects addressed by the panels.

#### *1. Political-Institutional Aspects of UN-EU Cooperation*

Despite the decision by the United States and the United Kingdom to intervene militarily in Iraq without UN Security Council (UNSC) endorsement, the United Nations will continue to have a role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security on a global basis. This panel will examine the normative and doctrinal issues that need to be addressed in determining future political and institutional cooperation between the UN and European security organizations.

With the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the EU is positioned to be an important actor in the future implementation of UN mandates.

The EU has at its disposal a wide range of economic, diplomatic, and military tools for peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as the capacity to support civilian aspects of peacekeeping.<sup>30</sup> Actual deployment, of course, is dependent on political decisions in each case. With this spectrum of means at its disposal, the EU can also contribute substantially to rebuilding state infrastructure, strengthening law enforcement, supervising elections, and providing humanitarian aid to countries emerging from conflict and/or in post-conflict reconstruction. The deployment of an EU multinational force (Operation “Artemis”) under UNSC mandate to Ituri Province in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Resolution 1484 – 30 May 2003), is the latest example of this development. The EU is also a significant economic actor internationally, with the resources to provide major development assistance to countries in transition from conflict to peace. It also can have a major impact in imposing financial sanctions or economic embargoes in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions on regimes and non-state actors responsible for prolonging or aggravating conflict.

Given this background, this panel will address the following questions:

- What is the current state of cooperation between the UN and the EU?
- What are the main political as well as institutional opportunities and/or constraints for closer collaboration between the UN and the EU?
- Through what mechanisms can such collaboration be enhanced?
- What types of missions and geographic regions are most appropriate for UN-EU collaboration?

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<sup>30</sup> The EU’s military capabilities include the ability to “deploy credible and efficient military forces of 50,000 to 60,000 men, supported by the corresponding air and naval resources, which can “be deployed in less than two months” and can “remain in the field for more than a year, for missions ranging from humanitarian operations to peacemaking.” The EU’s civilian capabilities comprise a potential police force of up to “5000 policemen, of whom 1400 can be deployed in less than a month.” In addition, EU members have also undertaken to provide almost 300 public prosecutors, judges, and prison service officers to supplement the work carried out by the police force in crisis situations, as well as a standby civilian administration for which a pool of experts has been established. See EU leaflet: *The European Union, an exporter of peace and security*.

## *2. The Operational Aspects of UN-EU Cooperation*

UN-mandated peace operations carried out by the EU will require careful attention to ensure effective command and control, which will require closer coordination both at headquarters level and in the field. As in Bosnia and Kosovo, the UN and EU will have to interact not only with each other but also with other security and non-security organizations, such as NATO, OSCE, and in Africa, the African Union and/or the Economic Community of West African States, as well as with a wide range of NGOs and humanitarian agencies. The panel will examine operational aspects of military and civilian police cooperation between the EU and the UN.

Based on these issues the panel will address the following questions:

- Given the development of ESDP, what lessons can be learned from previous cases of collaboration between the United Nations and European countries that might serve as a model for future UN-EU collaboration? (e.g., Bosnia, Georgia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and FYROM)
- What are key issues that require special attention in developing this relationship? (e.g., definition of mandates, command structure, timing, rapid reaction capability, etc.)

## *3. EU-UN Collaboration in Support of the Brahimi Report*

“Significant institutional change, increased financial support and renewed commitment of the Member States” are among the three major issues raised in the Brahimi report in order to make UN peace operations a more effective tool for the maintenance of international peace and security. In the last two years, the UN has begun to undertake considerable reforms in the domain of peace operations. In particular, there has been a significant increase in staffing levels in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Other operational aspects of UN peacekeeping missions—for example, improved logistics capacity and closer interaction with troop-contributing countries (TCCs) in developing mandates—are still being developed.

The panel will consider the following questions:

- What further steps need to be taken for the implementation of the Brahimi report’s recommendations (e.g., to facilitate rapid deployment, to enhance the involvement of TCCs in decision-making on mandates, etc)?
- What operational improvements are necessary to make peacekeeping operations more efficient and effective on the ground (e.g., criteria for the use of force, rules of engagement)?

- How can the EU and the UN enhance their cooperation in practical ways to achieve common goals in international peacekeeping?

#### *4. The Evolving NATO-EU Relationship*

In 1998, at the French-British Summit of Saint-Malo, the foundation of ESDP was presented as being a complement to NATO, with the clear understanding that it should not adversely impact on NATO's capabilities. The objective was to build capacities for EU autonomous operations without duplicating NATO structures or procedures. With the development of ESDP and the further strengthening of NATO's capabilities (e.g., the NATO Response Force, adopted at the Prague Summit in November 2002) the complementarity between the EU and NATO needs to be maintained. The current debate among member states centers on how best to ensure that both military capability processes will develop in a complementary fashion.

Questions for consideration:

- Will the EU and NATO military capability processes develop in coordination or independently? What might be the consequences of these alternative trends?
- What mechanisms or procedures are necessary to build complementary processes consistent with the original agreement of Saint-Malo?

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