

Perpetuating Conflict? On Unintended Consequences of Intervention

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This paper argues that foreign intervention in Chad, humanitarian as well as military, did not efficiently contribute to conflict regulation. On the contrary, it helped to stabilise a status quo at the expense of the concerned population.

An overview of the economic situation, foreign interests and an analysis of the recent conflicts in eastern Chad will be followed by a short interpretation of the war economy.

1. The Economy

Landlocked Chad is one of the poorest states in the world. In 2007/8 it ranked last of 108 countries in the Human Poverty Index for developing countries.¹ 64% of its population lives below the national poverty line.² Eighty percent of Chadians make their living in subsistence agriculture, cattle rising and fishing. Only a small percentage of the population, mainly residents of the capital and other towns, consists of workers and employees receiving a regular income.³

The start of petrol exploitation in 2003 raised widespread hopes for economic betterment. Yet, the oil reserves of good quality are expected to last for ten years only. Hence a future oriented use of the royalties seemed to be mandatory. Accordingly, the World Bank granted a loan for the construction of a pipeline to neighbouring Cameroon under specific conditions: A fixed percentage of the oil revenues should be

¹ UNDP: Human Development Report 2007/2008
<<http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/17.html>>, accessed on 2.10.2008.

² UNDP: Human Development Report 2007/2008
<http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_TCD.html>, accessed on 2.10.2008. Figures on income below \$1 per day are not available.

³ See Dickow, Helga: *Democrats without Democracy? Attitudes and opinions on society, religion and politics in Chad*. Byblos 2005, p. 55.

used for poverty reduction (education, development and health) and for creating a fund for future generations. However, president Déby⁴, in power since his military takeover in 1990, broke this contract after receiving the first transfer: he used it to buy helicopters for fighting rebels in Northern Chad. In 2005, he pushed parliament to cancel the accord with the World Bank, thus putting an end to all international hopes that, in virtue of international contracts, oil revenues could be used for improving the lives of the impoverished groups in the country. This breach of contract was not followed by any sanctions. The Chadian president successfully played on Western fears of China's expanding influence in Africa by ending, in August 2006, a long cooperation with Taiwan and by establishing diplomatic relations with mainland China. China imports oil from neighbouring Sudan and obtained contracts for further prospecting of oil there - and for some regions in Chad, too.

In short, oil revenues⁵ in Chad are in the hands of its present rulers, i.e. of a president who came to power by military means, but whose rule has been repeatedly challenged by other military leaders since. He uses all revenues for armament, not for poverty reduction. The foreseeable end of the petrol reserves – five years of exploitation have already passed – incites the greed⁶ of those members of the Chadian elite who have not yet profited from the revenues.

2. The role of France

Modern Chad gained its independence from French colonial rule in 1960. Shortly afterwards a civil war started between the mainly

⁴ Officially Chad is a presidential democracy. Elections since 1996 were all reported not to be free and fair. The Freedom House Index lists Chad as not free. See <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2008&country=7370>>, accessed on 2.10.2008.

⁵ Chad is expected to earn \$ 1.4bn in oil revenues in 2008. BBC NEWS 9.10.2008, <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/business/7608163.stm>, accessed on 25.9.2008, p.1.

⁶ Collier, Paul: Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective. In: Berdal, Mats/Malone, David M.: Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder 2000, pp. 91-111.

Christian/African South and the Muslim/Arab North of the country. Eventually, the North won, but subsequently, Northerners fought Northerners. In 1990, Idriss Déby evicted the brutal dictator Hissene Habré with French approval. He stayed in power ever since, legally sanctioned by an amendment of the constitution in 2005, in practice by astutely combining co-opting some members of the opposition, while violently oppressing others with the help of the military and the police.⁷

The French remained quite present in Chad, in business as well as in the capacity of advisors to governmental agencies. While worldwide the number of French *coopérants* has receded, in Chad, however, there are advisors to the minister of livestock – livestock being next to petrol the most important export good – and to other important ministries which deal with public finances.⁸

And there is a substantial French military presence in Chad. It has existed since the reign of (southern) president Tombalbaye, and was reduced in the mid-seventies. In 1986, Chad under (northern) President Habre and France agreed on ‘Operation Epervier’, by which France committed herself to keep peace and stability in Chad. Three military bases were established, the biggest one in N’Djamena with close to 1,000 soldiers, and two smaller ones in Faya-Largeau in the North and another in Abéché in the East next to Darfur. This military presence has to be viewed in the context of the special French interest in upholding influence in Francophone Africa.⁹ Military accords – often with secret annexes – exist with no less than 20 African states. But Chad has a central strategic position in the French African power game since the military base in the Central African Republic has been considerably reduced at the end of the 1990ies. From Chad the whole of Africa is in reach. When in 2004 unrest started in Ivory Coast, the Chadian base was crucial for quickly dispatching French troops to that Western African country.

⁷ For the history of Chad, see Dickow: *Democrats without Democracy*, pp. 7-21.

⁸ See homepage of French Embassy in N’Djamena <http://www.ambafrance-td.org/article.php3?id_article=288>, accessed on 5.10.2008.

⁹ See Mehler, Andreas/ Werner, Benjamin: *Der ewige Gendarm? Sarkozys Versuch einer neuen Afrikapolitik*, in: *GIGA Focus Afrika* 03/2008, pp. 1-9, at pp. 4-6.

French politicians frequently praise the democratic credentials of the Chadian president, arguing that he has been elected according to international standards, while election observers from other countries and the Chadian opposition judge these elections as fraudulent. It is obvious that what France wants for Chad is stability, not change. When rebels attacked N'Djamena in April 2006 and again in February 2008, the Chadian army succeeded to beat them only due to French support.

In short, French policy aims at legitimising the authoritarian regime in N'Djamena in order not to lose its influence in Central Africa.

3. The background of the present crisis in Eastern Chad

Eastern Chad has become the theatre of struggle for power in Chad as well as in Sudan. Conflicts in both countries are intermingled.¹⁰ They are about control of quickly diminishing resources, particularly oil. The victims of these conflicts are mainly civilians who are subjected to threats, banditry, forced recruitment and ordinary criminality due to the absence of any regular state authority based on the rule of law – on both sides of the borders.

The history of Chad since its independence is characterised by an endless circle of violence. Already in the mid-sixties Chadian rebel groups, mainly of northern origin, gathered their troops in Western Sudan in order to fight against the one party system of the Christian-animist South under president Tombalbaye. Since the victory of the Muslim Arab North 1979 the enemy changed, but not the procedure: opponents of any regime in power in N'Djamena gathered troops in Sudan and tried to replace one Northern dictator by another one. The present one, Idriss Déby, gained power with the military support of Sudan in 1990, when he succeeded to chase away his former comrade in arms, Hissene Habré.

Since 2003 the power struggle in neighbouring Darfur between the Sudanese government and rebel groups demanding more autonomy has

¹⁰ Berg, Patrick: Eine Krankheit, viele Symptome. In: *weltsichten* 9/2008, pp. 12-17.

destabilised the whole region. In addition to deploying its army the Sudanese government encouraged an equestrian militia, the so-called Janjaweed, to attack the sedentary population. Thousands of persons were killed; tens of thousands had to leave their homes. A substantial number found shelter in Chad. Attacks, however, continued across the border. The magnitude of the massacres was acknowledged by the decision of the chief prosecutor of the International Court of Justice in The Hague in July 2008, issuing an arrest warrant against president al-Bashir, accusing him of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It is not certain yet whether the Security Council will agree to an accusation. At the same time internal Chadian conflicts broke out in the border region. Whole villages were attacked and burnt by hostile ethnic groups, and thousands were forced to leave their homes. Apparently some aggressors belonged to northern groups; hence the Chadian refugees call them Janjaweed as well. According to official sources, Eastern Chad harbours 290,000 Sudanese refugees and 180,000 internally displaced persons. In addition, a population of 700,000 persons is at risk.¹¹

When the Darfur crisis started, president Déby remained loyal to his former ally Sudan and tried to mediate between the conflict parties. But pressure from the Zaghawa, his own ethnic group that is more important in Sudan than in Chad, and also the support extended to Chadian rebels by the government in Khartoum made him change his mind. Meanwhile both states host rebel groups of the respective other state and let them fight proxy wars.¹² Each aggression by one side is followed by a counter aggression. In February 2008 an attack of a new alliance of rebel groups – *Alliance Nationale* – proved to be quite dangerous for Déby. He managed to repel it only due to the support of the French troops based in

¹¹ See United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, 12 September 2008, p. 9.

¹² “The Chadian government is ensuring that it is armed as well as supporting the Sudanese rebels based in its territory – or at least providing them with arms. The Sudanese government is doing the same with the Chadian rebels implying an arms build-up on both sides. See Special Dossier EUFOR Chad/ Car Mission: Information Becomes Crucial in Times of Instability, 24 April 2008.

<<http://global.factiva.com/aa/default.aspx>>, accessed on 5.10.2008.

Chad. In May followed a counterattack, led by one of the main Sudanese rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Though not a real threat for the Sudanese regime, it nearly reached Khartoum. Since then Chad can not deny any longer its alliance with the Sudanese rebel movement JEM. The almost immediate answer from Sudan in June was an attempt by a new coalition of Chadian rebel groups to march into the direction of N'Djamena. Yet they could not reach the capital and had to turn back. The rainy season stopped war activities as it is impossible to traverse the area. However, it is highly probable that armed activities will start again.¹³ The fear of attacks rises every year during the dry season. In January 2009 eight rebel groups united as the Union of Resistance Forces under the lead of Timan Erdimi, one of Déby's nephews.

Chadian rebels operating from Sudan include long-time enemies of the regime, but also defectors from Déby's inner circle of power. When Déby started attempts to change the constitution in order to perpetuate his personal reign, hitherto close allies and even members of his own family, i.e. his nephews, the Erdimi brothers, realised that they would never reach the presidency and its benefits and, therefore, joined the opposition. The Sudanese government generously supports these diverse Chadian groups, financially and military. This support, of course, is not unconditional. Whenever the rebel leaders deviate from strictly following whatever advice they get from the Sudanese government, support is withheld and rival Chadian opponents are favoured.¹⁴ Sudan wants agents, not independent allies.

In summary: Chad and Sudan lead a proxy war. The respective rebels aim at changing their own governments. Peace will not be possible without taking these groups into account and without involving them in any future negotiation process.

¹³ See interview with Mahamt Nouri in TchadEspoir October 2008
<<http://www.tchadespoir.net/news.php?readmore=1528>>, accessed on 11.10.2008.

¹⁴ Interview with a Chadian opposition leader, 3. July 2008.

The actors on the ground in Eastern Chad operate in a context of conflicting international and national interests. First, there are strong Western interests in controlling and exploiting the Chadian oil, and certainly not to leave them to China. These interests also extend to Darfur, given that this area, too, may contain oil reserves. Second, there is a particular French interest to keep its position in Chad as a strategic crossroads in Africa (Francafrique), an interest that is backed by the EU. Third, Sudan would welcome a weak regime in N'Djamena, preferably with a rebel leader installed by its grace as this would strengthen its influence in the region.

Finally, Chadian rebels (but also the internal opposition) want to have their share of the country's wealth. A substantial democratic alternative is missing.

4. Intervention by aid and military intervention

Contrary to the Sudanese president, who was very reluctant to allow any international presence¹⁵ and witness in the war-torn areas, the Chadian president gladly accepted international support first for assisting the numerous Sudanese refugees, then for improving security for refugees and civilians alike in Eastern Chad. Déby is very subtle – and successful – in depicting Chad as a victim of an Islamic aggression arriving from Sudan: the international community strongly supported aid as well as security missions. The UNHCR opened its office in N'Djamena in 2003. Refugee camps were installed along the Chadian-Sudanese border. Since 2004 the presence of the UNHCR and NGOs working in the refugee camps in the East and also in the South augmented considerably as the number of Darfuri refugees as well as of internally displaced persons increased dramatically. *Medicins sans Frontières*, *Oxfam*, *Red Cross*, *Caritas*, *World Food Programme* as well as smaller Chadian NGOs like the Catholic *SECADEV* – all together almost eighty humanitarian organisations – are active in Eastern Chad, providing shelter, clean

¹⁵ The first mission of the African Union in Darfur started in 2004. It was too weak to efficiently survey the region. Only in 2006 a common mission of the AU and the U.N. was decided upon (UNAMID).

water, safe sanitation, medical aid, food, firewood, schooling etc.¹⁶ The logistical challenges are extreme: in a sparsely populated desert-like region with roads cut off during the rainy season, almost half a million refugees have to be catered for. In some areas the local population received the refugees who belong to the same ethnic groups on the other side of the border with open arms and helped them with the little they had themselves. After 30 years of civil war this is also due to the long tradition of Chadians being refugees themselves. But they reached their limits soon and also needed support. In other areas conflicting ethnic groups were faced with each other.¹⁷ Therefore and in order to avoid envy between refugees and locals (who cannot receive direct international aid by airplanes and trucks) special programmes were started to promote rural activities for creating income and improving infrastructure. Originally 10% of the aid of UNHCR was earmarked for the local population. Due to mismanagement, bad planning and corruption however this aid shows little effects on the ground. Too many schools were built, but no sufficient number of trained teachers is available. By now, the school buildings are used for others purposes. The World Food Programme tried to assist the local population with food-for-work-programmes, seeds and other agricultural assets. Yet, these activities were interrupted by attacks and lootings by the local population and finally terminated as roads from Douala or Tripoli were not safe enough for transporting food and goods. For more than four years German cooperation has been supporting the local population living next to some of the camps by constructing new dirt roads, storage facilities and barriers in dry riverbeds for a better water management. Mini barriers help to infiltrate water into the soil in order to facilitate more intensive agriculture. The new roads allow traffic between the villages and refugee camps, thus helping to establish economic exchange between refugees and locals. As a result, the locals profit economically from the refugees and tend to welcome their presence.¹⁸ Oxfam

¹⁶ See Frenken, Raymon: EU Chad/ Car Force Aims to Enhance Stability and Protection, in: European Security and Defence Policy 6/July 2008, pp. 7-16, at p. 11.

¹⁷ Par example Tama and Zaghawa refugees around Guereda. See Oxfam Briefing Paper 119, Mission incomplete: Why civilians remain at risk in eastern Chad, September 2008, pp. 1-27, at p. 8.

¹⁸ Interview with an international consultant working in the region, 26 September 2008.

encouraged dialogue committees between refugee and host community leaders.¹⁹

When all attempts to dispatch an international peace keeping force in Darfur in order to replace the rather insufficient mission of the African Union failed, it was primarily France that insisted on sending a European mission to Chad. French foreign minister, Mr. Bernard Kouchner, underlined already in July 2007 the urgent need to stabilise Chad's border with Sudan, and to protect refugees.²⁰ It became more and more evident that the refugee camps provided no real safe shelter as attacks continued across the border. Local tensions over scarce resources led to violence between different ethnic groups, causing the high number of internally displaced persons.²¹ Criminals, militarization of the refugee camps and forced recruitment worsened the situation. Kouchner went as far as suggesting to create a humanitarian corridor without defining what he meant by it.

As a response to the crisis the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007, creating a UN Mission in Chad and in the Central African Republic. This Mission has three components. MINURCAT, training of the Chadian police, and assistance to Chad's judicial system in order to monitor the human rights situation; the DIS (Détachement intégré de Sécurité) is a new Chadian police and gendarmerie unit of 850 men, trained and monitored by UN police to provide 24 hour security in refugee camps; EUFOR is an EU military force of 3,700 soldiers, recruited from 14 EU member states, in charge of providing a security area for the first two missions and mandated to protect civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons, in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in

¹⁹ Oxfam Briefing Paper 119, Mission incomplete: Why civilians remain at risk in eastern Chad, September 2008, pp. 1-27, at p. 10.

²⁰ The Economist (7 February 2008).

<http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10640856>, accessed on 20.9.2008.

²¹ See United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, 12. September 2008, p. 19.

the area of operations.²² Its commission is for one year. EUFOR's activities include patrols to observe the security situation in its area of operation and to attend to the needs of the population.²³ It will be the biggest EU-led military operation and cost about €300 million. As Javier Solana commented, the EU will also provide assistance for reconstruction in the affected areas.²⁴

On 28 January 2008 the EU decided to send the EUFOR Mission to Chad. A few days later armed rebel forces attacked N'Djamena; hence the deployment had to be delayed.²⁵

President Déby succeeded to repel the rebel attack with the help of the active support of the French military based in Chad, which defended the airport, according to witnesses supplied ammunition and food to the Chadian army and took part in the fighting.²⁶ After the delay caused by the rebels the EUFOR Mission became operational by mid-March 2008.²⁷ Its mandate extends until 15 March 2009 when it will be replaced by an UN Mission.²⁸

In June 2008 EUFOR was caught in the crossfire between Chadian rebels advancing from Sudan into Chad and the Chadian forces loyal to Déby. EUFOR remained neutral to the point that Déby accused them of supporting the rebels. Observers initially had doubted the impartiality of

²² See Tull, Denis M.: Tschad-Krise und die Operation EUFOR Tschad/ZAR. In: SWP-Aktuell 15, February 2008, pp. 1-4.

²³ <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ForceStenghtbyNationsinAOO2092008.pdf>>, accessed on 2.10.2008.

²⁴ Irish Times, 29 January 2008.

²⁵ See Marischka, Christoph: Tschad: Die EUFOR als Brandbeschleuniger, in IMI-Studie 6/2008 – 21.7.2008, pp. 1-6.

²⁶ Other important foreign support came from the Sudanese rebel group JEM. According to Chadian newspapers JEM received 150 land cruiser pick-ups as a reward and used them to march into Sudan in May.

²⁷ The Austrian advance contingent was the first one to arrive in N'Djamena at the beginning of February. It was surprised by the fights while entrenching itself in a hotel.

²⁸ Security Council, Resolution 1861

<<http://un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9569.doc.htm>>, accessed on 26.2.2009.

the European troops.²⁹ ‘When columns of rebels attacked Chad’s capital, the fear in Brussels was not that French troops might be overwhelmed, but that France would intervene so decisively on behalf of the sitting president, Idriss Déby, as to wreck EUFOR’s claims to neutrality.’³⁰ Though EUFOR is led by an Irish general, the majority of troops consist of French soldiers, amounting to 1,178 persons. France also provided most of the military material. In fact, EUFOR depends on the logistic of the French Mission ‘Epervier’.³¹ Establishing military camps in one of the harshest regions of the world proved to be quite a challenge. Everything has to be transported to the east of Chad by air, including water and cement. And the camps needed to be functional before the beginning of the rainy season.³² By August, the troops had completed 850 reconnaissance missions and 690 patrols from its bases.³³

An OXFAM report of September 2008 states that ‘EUFOR has made civilians feel safer through its activities, which include patrolling known dangerous routes, destroying unexpected ordnance, making contact with local leaders, and positioning itself defensively around civilians during rebel and government fighting’.³⁴ On the other hand EUFOR has no police or judiciary powers. Its realm rests limited to the above mentioned actions. Especially internally displaced refugees are too afraid to return

²⁹ Pflüger, Tobias: Die angebliche Neutralität der EU-Mission im Tschad ist unglaubwürdig, in: Informationsstelle Militarisierung e.V. (28.1.2008), <<http://www.imi-online.de/2008.php3?id=1690>>, accessed on 2.10.2008.

³⁰ The Economist (7 February 2008), <http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10640856>, accessed on 20.9.2008.

³¹ See Special Dossier EUFOR Chad/ Car Mission: An Operation with a Complex Management Structure (24 April 2008). <<http://global.factiva.com/aa/default.aspx>>, accessed on 8.10.2008.

³² See Special Dossier EUFOR Chad/ CAR Mission: A Colossal Logistical Challenge (24 April 2008), pp. 1-2. <<http://global.factiva.com/aa/default.aspx>>, accessed on 8.10.2008.

³³ Oxfam Briefing Paper 119, Mission incomplete: Why civilians remain at risk in eastern Chad, September 2008, p. 12.

³⁴ Oxfam Briefing Paper 119, Mission incomplete: Why civilians remain at risk in eastern Chad, September 2008, p. 13.

to their village. The capacity of EUFOR would not be sufficient to protect them when they depart from the camps.

In September 2008 a mid-term evaluation of the EUFOR Mission was due to be effected. As it has not been published yet it is too early for a final assessment of the mission's impact.

5. An interim assessment

However, some preliminary observations on the consequences of both forms of intervention in the East of Chad, namely the humanitarian aid and the military deployment, can be made.

Humanitarian aid to prevent the refugees from starving and dying from thirst in a desert-like area was indispensable, and the world reacted fairly quickly. All the groups in the region profit from the humanitarian aid – also wounded rebels receive treatment by the Red Cross. On the other hand the security in the area remains precarious: armed clashes and attacks continue³⁵ – not only on refugees, but also on aid workers.³⁶

Two different forms of violent action need to be distinguished. On the one hand there are attacks by the Janjaweed aiming at preventing Sudanese refugees from returning home and, more generally, at destabilising the region, while on the other the absence of state authority did not prevent the long-standing internal Chadian conflicts about water and pasture land between the different ethnic groups to turn violent. Some observers believe that attacks on villages were launched by armed militias belonging to the ethnic group of the president. Be that as it may, the general insecurity allows robbers of all types (mostly carrying firearms and uniforms of uncertain origin) to profit from the situation, to steal cars and equipment from aid workers as well as from locals. The

³⁵ For example Bahai.

³⁶ Interview with an international consultant working in the area.

murder of six aid workers, mostly drivers, and armed robbery of more than 100 cars were documented during the last two years.³⁷

The EU's decision to deploy the EUFOR troops in January 2008 prompted an immediate reaction by the rebels: at the beginning of February they started their march from Sudan to N'Djamena. Obviously they wanted to use the time gap between the announcement of the EU's decision and the actual deployment, knowing that it would be far more difficult to reach the capital once European troops would serve as kind of bumper between the attackers and the capital. A second rebel attack in June collapsed rather quickly although the EUFOR Mission meanwhile deployed did not intervene since its mandate is limited to the protection of civilians; it does not include disarmament of militias or rebel groups.

One first conclusion is obvious: the very announcement of an international armed intervention caused a spectacular rise of violence in Chad, foremost of all in the capital itself. Thousands of Chadians took refuge across the river in neighbouring Cameroon. In short, foreign intervention led to an increase in regional and international insecurity.

However, it cannot be denied that refugees feel safer since EUFOR is on the ground and aid workers report that their work has become easier, particularly in remote areas. Yet the UNHCR states that the 'reported security incidents involving humanitarians have actually hit successive quarterly heights since the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008'³⁸. The murder of a French aid worker and his driver in May 2008 is the latest example. It seems that perceived security is obtained at the cost of

³⁷ So far in 2008, 6 humanitarian aid workers have been killed and 107 security incidents involving humanitarian workers have been reported. See United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, 12 September 2008, p. 10.

³⁸ UNHCR, Humanitarian Security Briefing Note, May 2008, cited in Oxfam Briefing Paper 119: Mission incomplete: why civilians remain at risk in eastern Chad (10.9.2008), pp. 1-27, at p. 7.
<http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/publications/briefing_papers/mis-sion-incomplete-why-civilians-remain-at-risk-in-eastern-chad/OA-BriefingPaper_ChadReport2008.pdf>, accessed on 18.9.2008.

increased brutality when attackers see a chance to get hold of relevant equipment, especially four-wheel pick-ups. In short, insecurity has increased, particularly in the city of Abéché.³⁹

6. Who finances the war in Chad?

Waging a war is expensive. Warring factions need subsidies. Looking at ideal types of (civil) war economies, there are four sources of financing wars, be they internal or cross-border.⁴⁰ One is taxation imposed as a legal measure if the state itself is at war. Taxes can also be levied from the population of foreign occupied territories. Second, money can be extorted from enterprises or traders; 'custom duties' may be levied on incoming or outgoing goods or persons. Third, trade with natural resources, drugs or war material can provide cash. Finally, war parties can obtain monetary subsidies, goods or weapons from foreign sponsors, who, of course, follow their own interests. Is this model applicable for the situation in Chad? Or to be more precise, which one of the four options can be applied? Again, we have to distinguish between the two war factions, the Chadian government and the rebels operating from Sudan.

In the case of the government the answer is obvious: the government has the oil reserves at its hands and uses them for buying weapons and for paying the soldiers. Taxation is only a minor source of state income in a country dominated by the agricultural sector.

³⁹ Meanwhile theft of cars happens regularly also in Abéché, before the deployment it was only frequent in the rural areas. See also Oxfam International, *Insecurity Reigns in Eastern Chad as the EU-UN Mission Struggles to Protect Civilians* (10. September 2008). <<http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2008-09-10>>, accessed on 5.10.2008 and Durm, Martin: *Die verfehlte Mission. Die EU und ihr Militäreinsatz im Tschad*. <<http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/hintergrundpolitik/923130/21.2.2009>>, accessed on 25.2.2009.

⁴⁰ See Rufin, Jean-Christophe: *Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten*. In: Jean, François/ Rufin, Jean-Christophe (Ed.): *Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege*. Hamburg 1999. pp. 15-46.

For the rebel groups on the other hand the last option is likely to apply: they enjoy Sudanese assistance in multiple ways, be it logistical support, shelter, financial aid, and, particularly, adequate supply of weapons. According to various reports the rebel groups operate with Chinese as well as with Russian weaponry.⁴¹ The other side of the coin of this arrangement is the dependency of the rebel groups on decisions and interests of the Sudanese government. For example it is assumed that the expected attack during the dry season 2008/2009 did not take place as the Sudanese government uses the presence of the Chadian rebels as a kind of pawn in the pending court case of president al-Bashir. However, the rebels have also some financial resources of their own. Quite a number of Chadian business people have joined the armed opposition and sponsor it with considerable means, often earned abroad. Members of the Déby clan who lately changed sides profited from having been part of the system. They carried, if not all, but at least some of their wealth with them. It has to be noted that the Chadian rebels did not take money or taxes from the local population when they led their attacks against the government. During the February 2008 invasion they announced that no citizen would be harmed. As a matter of fact, the looting that occurred in N'Djamena after the fights ended was committed by neighbours, not by the rebels.

To summarise, dependency on oil revenues on the one hand and support from the 'host'-neighbouring country on the other takes the pressure from the local population to finance the war. At the same time, as financing is somehow guaranteed by other sources for the moment, it seems to be unlikely that the war will end.

⁴¹ See Special Dossier EUFOR Chad/ Car Mission: Information Becomes Crucial in Times of Instability (24 April 2008). <<http://global.factiva.com/aa/default.aspx>>, accessed on 8.10.2008.

7. Winners and losers: the social economy of the war

Nevertheless the local population is suffering of the consequences of the war. According to Klaus Schlichte⁴² and Paul Collier I would like to identify the economic winners and losers of the current situation in eastern Chad. Collier puts it quite clearly: the society as a whole loses: ‘... after a decade of war a society will have an income 20 percent lower than it would otherwise have been.’⁴³

All war economies are characterised by a weak state. Menzel⁴⁴ refers to a ‘quasi-state’: quite often the state is not able to provide public goods such as legal security, property protection, infrastructure or a working monetary system that allow for the functioning of markets – even before the conflict started. In Chad a monetary system exists, as it is linked to the FCFA of the CEMAC states. But legal security for ordinary citizens is virtually non-existent, even in the areas that are untouched by the war.

Ironically Chad has experienced the impact of massive foreign influx not only in a war context, but also in apparently civilian circumstances: the construction of the oil pipeline since 2001. The presence of international donors linked to the oil production drew a high number of foreigners into the country – namely into the capital and into the Doba region. The consequence in an area not touched by violent conflict was the loss of security for the local population. Compensations for land often did not reach the rightful recipients or, if it indeed did, was taken away. A serious concern for everybody in the region was an enormous price increase; especially food and house prices went up, so that locals have real difficulties to make ends meet. The local food production was not sufficient so that supply for foreigners had to be imported from neighbouring Cameroon. The same procedure repeats itself now in the

⁴² Schlichte, Klaus: Profiteure und Verlierer von Bürgerkriegen: Die soziale Ökonomie der Gewalt. In: Ruf, Werner (Ed.): Politische Ökonomie der Gewalt. Staatszerfall und die Privatisierung von Gewalt, Budrich, Opladen 2003, pp. 124-143.

⁴³ Collier: Doing Well out of War, p. 101.

⁴⁴ Menzel, Ulrich: Afrika oder: das neue Mittelalter. Eigenlogik und Konsequenzen der Gewaltökonomie. In: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 48(2003)9, pp. 1060- 1069, at p. 1065.

east of the country, namely in the following areas: price increase, brain drain and rise of crime rate.

Price increase is a phenomenon not only to be watched in Chad but in all areas where there is an influx of foreigners into poor areas. Scarce resources become even scarcer due to the increasing demand. But only international organisations are able and willing to subsidise their staff up to a level that almost no local can reach. Reports show that the food prices have increased for more than 100% since the arrival of the EUFOR troops. A chicken used to cost 1,000 FCFA, now it is more than 3000 FCFA. Not only food but also shelter causes a problem. The prices for rooms have been multiplied by 5. Rent for a room used to be between 5,000 and 10,000 FCFA. Now it is impossible to find one under 25,000 FCFA, which equals the amount of a student's grant. Affected inhabitants of Abéché, among them civil servants and traders, report that they are trying to move their families to remote rural regions as they cannot afford the rent and food in the city. 'Les humanitaires, les éléments de l'Eufor, ceux de la MINURCAT, ont injecté dans la région beaucoup d'argent. Ils n'ont, par contre, importé ni riz, ni pâtes, ni boîtes de conserve pour combler le déficit alimentaire tout décrié dans cette zone aride ... Actuellement la demande est plus élevée que l'offre.'⁴⁵ Coping strategies also include obtaining food from other regions. Even in the capital N'Djamena the prices seem to be lower than in Abéché. This is nothing new: numerous other countries have experienced similar economic distortions. Chad, however, suffers from this pattern in two regions (as well as in the capital) – for very different reasons.

Likewise, another impact of foreign input can be observed in both regions, causing a considerable backlash to the development of the countries, namely an internal brain drain of qualified persons. International organisations need local staff – a limited number for highly demanding jobs. Above all they need literate drivers, watchmen and cleaning personal. No international donor would consider employing an illiterate guardian since he cannot write down details of number plates.

⁴⁵ Abéché: Au rythme des humanitaires, Tchad et Culture No 269, September 2008, p. 12, interview with an international consultant working in the area.

Also a cook should be able to read and write in order to give a detailed statement about the expenses on the market. In a country with an illiteracy rate of 74.3% and a net secondary enrolment rate of 11%⁴⁶ the choice of capable personal is limited and, therefore, salaries paid by the 'internationals' are far higher than those local institutions can afford to pay. This causes a local brain drain, affecting especially low paid but trained teachers and other educated people. Pupils of poor rural schools are left without teachers. Hence the international presence increases the dilemma of a poorly developed educational system harming the state at one of its most sensitive spots.

High insecurity and crime rate was already mentioned. The international aid organisations are part of a vicious circle. Their equipment is crucial for their own survival and for completing their duties towards the refugees and local population. At the same time their equipment attracts rebels, criminals, soldiers in search of cars, cash, and satellite telephones. Reports talk of raids every two weeks. Aid workers and commanders of the international troops seem to view the situation slightly different.⁴⁷

According to Schlichte cultural capital and qualifications lose their value in war situations. Social ties are destroyed, and new hierarchies emerge. The winners are owners of some sort of capital – be it material or social. Winners are also those persons that are good networkers or have special skills like a driving licence, knowledge of a foreign language or organisational skills. Other winners are those who own some kind of 'hard' material such as traders holding a certain stock of rare goods or owners of inflation-resistant property like land or other means of production. Collier⁴⁸ puts it slightly different: he identifies the winners among the opportunists (e.g. people and business groups who tend to change their business practices or good behaviour at the expense of good

⁴⁶ See: <http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_TCD.html>, accessed on 12.10.2008.

⁴⁷ Durm, Martin: Die verfehlte Mission. Die EU und ihr Militäreinsatz im Tschad. <<http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/hintergrundpolitik/923130/> 21.2.2009>, accessed on 25.2.2009.

⁴⁸ Collier: Doing Well out of War, pp. 101-103.

reputation for quick profit), the criminals who tend to steal goods and livestock at the expense of the national economy as individuals tend to take out their goods and money, successful traders and rent-seeking government as well as rebel soldiers.

All these groups can easily be found in eastern Chad, but also in the Doba region. Wholesale traders can charge higher prices, house-owners profit from higher rents. Civil servants or customs officers demand the payment of bribes for importing goods or immediate attention. Educated persons and their wider choice of jobs were already mentioned. But also external players profit: international organisations, traders, providers of some goods that are not available in the respective country. In the case of Chad one only needs to think of water and cement.

Concluding my paper, I would like to cite Collier: in order to reduce the economic incentives for conflict the international community should reduce the risks by ‘diversification of the economies of those societies that are most at risk ... by reducing poverty and increasing growth rate ... and a rapid transition to democracy’.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Collier: *Doing Well out of War*, pp. 106-107.