The Role and Position of Three Rimland States Ukraine, Belarus and Slovakia
erschienen in der Publikation "Security Political Dialogue 1999 (2/01)" (ISBN: 3-901328-57-2) - Juni 2001
Autor(en):
Henryk Binkowski
29 Seiten (226 KB)
Schlagworte zu diesem Beitrag:
Europa, Osteuropa, Ukraine, Weißrussland, Slowakei, Sicherheitspolitik, Verteidigungspolitik, Bilaterale Beziehungen, Internationale Beziehungen, NATO, Osterweiterung
Abstract:
Ukraine, gaining independence in 1991 and becoming a sovereign state, was completely unprepared for it in organisational and, first of all, intellectual aspects. It currently has problems to define the term "nation" as there is no precise answer accepted by everybody. There is a definition close to the Galitians (Western Ukraine) who describe the Ukrainian nation according to ethnic and linguistic categories and to cultural and historical heritage. There is also a Kiev concept assuming that a nation can be built on a political and territorial basis. According to Kiev, a Ukrainian is a person who lives in Ukraine, regardless of his/her ethnic roots or of the language that he/she was raised in, summing up, Ukrainians are, due to this concept," a political nation".1
The starting position of Ukraine was incomparably worse than the Polish or the Slovakian one. The Polish People’s Republic was not an entirely sovereign state but it was a real and complete one which had all necessary structures with central governing centres. Soviet Ukraine, however, expressed loyalty to the Soviet Government but it was provided merely with a part of state structures, generally with rudimentary centres or without them. Declaring independence was an act to break away from the Soviet centre, above all, from Russia, but not from a socialist political system. Therefore, during the first three years the Ukrainian leadership, reading rightly its own nation’s expectations, avoided any market reforms and rather concentrated its activities on becoming independent from Russia.
The role of independence guardian is adopted most of all by new governing authorities, most often with communist roots; even if the independence guardian’s particular interest is to maintain power, it has to act so that it will strengthen the Ukrainian state’s independence, otherwise, it would lose its privileged social position.
The starting position of Ukraine was incomparably worse than the Polish or the Slovakian one. The Polish People’s Republic was not an entirely sovereign state but it was a real and complete one which had all necessary structures with central governing centres. Soviet Ukraine, however, expressed loyalty to the Soviet Government but it was provided merely with a part of state structures, generally with rudimentary centres or without them. Declaring independence was an act to break away from the Soviet centre, above all, from Russia, but not from a socialist political system. Therefore, during the first three years the Ukrainian leadership, reading rightly its own nation’s expectations, avoided any market reforms and rather concentrated its activities on becoming independent from Russia.
The role of independence guardian is adopted most of all by new governing authorities, most often with communist roots; even if the independence guardian’s particular interest is to maintain power, it has to act so that it will strengthen the Ukrainian state’s independence, otherwise, it would lose its privileged social position.