Bundesheer

Ultimately, the war in Iraq resulted from a potent mixture of fear and opportunity. It is best understood as a classic example of preventive war. Preventive war is a viable strategy when three strategic conditions hold: the ability to secure oneself from major attack is tenuous, the likelihood of serious attack increases over time and military action can potentially reverse the first two conditions. The Bush Administration case for war in Iraq rests on an overall threat assessment that security is scarce for the United States, but military and political victory is possible.
The Bush Administration has published four national security strategy documents that suggest a threat environment that is serious and, most importantly, likely to get worse if nothing is done. The Bush Administration assumes that underlying trends actually lend themselves to serious risks for the United States as the country is viewed as the central target for those individuals, groups, and states dissatisfied with the current international system. Rather than maintain the status quo, there is a security incentive for the United States to challenge the international system it currently leads. Counter-intuitively, the Bush Administration has positioned the United States as a revolutionary force rather than a satiated power.
Interestingly at a moment of enormous power, the national security strategy of the United States assumes that it is a vulnerable society, which, most importantly, will find its security increasingly at risk over the short to medium term.
The Bush Administration came to view Iraq as the transformational fulcrum for the region that poses the most long-term danger for the United States. To reverse that negative future, the United States took an enormous gamble and launched a preventive war.