

*James J. Wirtz, Department of National Security Affairs, Monterey*

## **Ethics and the Return to Strategy**

Today there is a return to strategy in the foreign and defense policies of the United States and its allies. Strategy's return has been prompted by the need to make decisions about when, where and how to use force to deter, disrupt and destroy individuals, groups and states that seek to upset the spread of democracy and free markets. Because force is now being considered not just to deter war, but also to wage war, there is a need to reconsider the ethical challenges created by the return of strategy. These challenges will manifest in a variety of ways, but they are likely to fall heavily on elected officials and military professionals as they grapple with terrorism and other unconventional forms of warfare and integrate new technologies into traditional force structures.

No matter how much elected officials, soldiers or publics might hope, it is impossible to escape the deeply rooted international trends that have forced this return to strategy. Austria too faces fundamental defense and foreign policy decisions that are shaped by this new strategic environment. Whether or not Austria should remain neutral or join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a full member is an issue that will continue to be debated by elected officials. Questions about force structure and defense spending also will preoccupy policymakers and soldiers as Austria continues to adjust to the end of the Cold War and the return of strategy. Politically and strategically important issues such as conscription are likely to become highly salient in the years ahead. Will Austria maintain a conventional capability to defend its territorial integrity or turn to a more specialized and possibly less expensive force structure intended to provide NATO with specialized military capabilities? Most members of NATO, for instance, neglect two areas in which Austria excels, peacekeeping and mountain warfare. If they choose to do so, Austrians can make a real contribution to NATO. To explore some of the ethical challenges created by the return to strategy, the article will first describe the sources of conflict that now confront policymakers and soldiers. It then compares today's international situation with the challenges faced by the West during the Cold War to explore how this new strategic situation is forcing policymakers to develop new approaches to the use of force. The article also offers a survey of current diplomatic and military initiatives to identify both the good and the bad news when it comes to the ethical challenges created by the new strategic situation. It concludes with some observations about how militaries everywhere will begin to confront the social changes unleashed by globalization.

### **Sources of Conflict**

Although several competing explanations exist for the wave of Islamic terrorism that is sweeping the world, a consensus is emerging that two factors — globalization and demographic pressures — are primarily responsible for the violence perpetrated by militants. Globalization, the spread of Western commercial and political culture throughout the world, has placed traditional cultures under siege. Democracy, market capitalism, liberalism, respect for human rights, and ethnic, gender and racial equality, can be highly corrosive to traditional societies because they appeal not to the rich or existing ruling elite, but to the emerging middle class. The revolution in information technologies makes it impossible to prevent democratic ideals and concepts from reaching populations everywhere. In time, these ideas will spread to disenfranchised and poverty stricken people everywhere, offering an ideology and economic system that empowers the individual at the expense of traditional society. Militants decry globalization for the corruption it brings, but behind them stand societies that are fearful that globalization might somehow pass them by, leaving them to watch helplessly as other people grow richer at what appears to be their expense.

Although unrest in the Islamic world is probably the greatest drawback produced by globalization, it also has produced at least three developments that create new challenges for elected officials, government organizations and societies. First, societies everywhere can gain vastly from

wealth that is being produced by the information revolution, but at the price of having part of their way of life replaced by global culture. At the same time, all societies contribute part of themselves to a common culture; in a sense countries can shape the process of globalization by making sure positive and nationally preferred images of their homeland and way of life are shared globally. Second, as individuals become empowered by new communication, computing and transportation technologies, they gain in capability compared to traditional governments and bureaucracies. In other words, the same developments that threaten traditional societies also threaten traditional governing structures. The new information revolution carries with it an imbedded ideology: individuals should use their new skills and technologies to make more decisions for themselves. Officials and bureaucrats can rely less and less on their position in bureaucratic hierarchies as a source of authority; constituents everywhere judge their leaders on their current performance, not on their institutional affiliation or official rank. Third, the same technologies that provide global Internet access, inexpensive international travel, and global financial transactions and trade, can be used by radicals to disrupt globalization. The same technologies that allow scholars to collaborate with colleagues on a global basis in real time also can be used by fanatics and psychotics around the globe to cooperate in some nefarious scheme.

Globalization then, might best be conceived of as a global transmission system of ideas, culture, wealth and people. Clearly, it has enriched and empowered individuals around the world, but at a price. The transmission system runs both ways, sending Western ideas and ideals to places where they disrupt traditional lifestyles, while at the same time transmitting a sometimes highly dangerous reaction from the cultural periphery. Indeed, it is possible that the 11. September attacks marked a new kind of warfare that is not only a response to globalization, but also a type of warfare made possible by globalization itself. Globalization instills in people the idea that they should take their destiny into their own hands. It also empowers and equips them to shape that destiny by shaping world events. In an ironic twist, globalization has not only produced a dangerous political backlash, it has produced a new actor – a syndicate of religious fundamentalists, revolutionaries and anarchists – able to threaten directly the security of the United States and its allies. Moreover, the same forces that are at work along the geographic periphery of the new global culture are at work in Western societies, empowering individuals at the expense of governments and hierarchical organizations. As current events demonstrate, the United States is not immune to these forces and it would be a mistake to believe that any one nation can control globalization to serve only its national interests.

Demographic pressures are a second factor that is forcing a return of strategy. Although population growth rates have stabilized or are even in decline in most industrialized countries, growth rates in the developing world are unlikely to peak for decades. The difference between birth rates in the developed and developing world, however, is exacerbated by female infanticide and the use of modern technologies to increase the likelihood of male births. As a result, in the years ahead there will be tens of millions of unmarried males, “bare branches” to borrow a Chinese phrase.<sup>4</sup> These men will be drawn to the world’s mega cities in search of work, wealth and a wife, but with little education and resources, they will only find poverty, disease, gangs and crime.

Some observers thus fear that the true demographic threat is not created by a general increase in the global population (which will peak in about 50 years anyway), but in the millions of unmarried males that will soon be roaming the developing world. These men might cause rioting and disorder locally, but globally they serve as a willing audience for ideologues and megalomaniacs.

Various observers have noted that in the past, “excess males” have led to violence, especially as states have tried to harness (or rid themselves) of their energy by engaging in foreign adventures

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<sup>4</sup> Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea Den Boer, “A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex Ratios in Asia’s Largest Sates,” *International Security* Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002), 5-38.

and war.<sup>5</sup> Martin van Creveld and Stephen Cimbala, for example, believe that states already are losing their monopoly on the use of force as urban gangs and transnational movements begin rely increasingly on violence to achieve their objectives.<sup>6</sup> It is thus no surprise that Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network appeal to Islamic youth to take matters into their own hands (a modern idea broadcast by the information revolution) and make war against secular society and the spread of modernity.

In sum, the combination of demographic pressures and the reaction to globalization have created a somewhat nebulous but deadly threat to the spread of democracy, technology and free markets. And even though some observers blame the United States specifically for somehow producing this backlash, it is clear that the wave of terrorism sweeping the world is not confined to a specific target. Instead it is directed against ideas and an ever-expanding group of like-minded people. According to Robert Kaplan: “While today’s world is culturally diverse, a singular, upper-middle-class cosmopolitan culture is forming, nevertheless. As this nouvelle cuisine culture expands, so will the expansion of international institutions.”<sup>7</sup> Everyone reading this chapter is a target of the extremists because they are part of this cosmopolitan culture.

### The Return of Strategy

During the Cold War, the bi-polar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, with its danger of great power war, was the major threat to international peace. And the threat took the form of a full-scale nuclear war that would have devastated much of Asia, Europe and the United States. But, the Cold War was stable in two ways. First, the superpowers provided a great deal of international management in their respective spheres of influence and bipolarity tended to order international relations. Allies clustered around the superpowers. Those aligned to the United States tended to follow policies laid out in Washington out of shared convictions, a lack of alternatives or a fear of being abandoned to local enemies or the competing superpower. Moscow tended to enforce its edicts using networks of agents and the threat of force. As the superpowers’ military competition became institutionalized, however, written and unwritten rules of the game emerged that made the competition more predictable, thereby reducing the possibility of accidents and miscalculations that can lead to war.<sup>8</sup>

Second, stability took the form of an absence of great power war, which was in turn produced by the situation of mutual assured destruction. Neither superpower could mount a nuclear attack that could prevent retaliation from the other superpower. Defense dominance existed in the sense that both superpowers could guarantee that their competitor could not win a nuclear exchange. Under these circumstances, major war was removed as a realistic option in dealing with the opposing superpower.<sup>9</sup> Proxy wars occurred on the periphery of the cold war competition in places

<sup>5</sup> There is nothing new about these Malthusian and Darwinian images of how demographic pressures must find an outlet in war. See Henry Mayhew, *London Labor and the London Poor* (Dover: Dover Publishers, 1983); Robert L. O’Connell, *Ride of the Second Horseman* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Daniel Pick, *War Machine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

<sup>6</sup> Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991); and Stephen J. Cimbala, *The Politics of Warfare: The Great Powers in the Twentieth Century* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

<sup>7</sup> Robert Kaplan, *Warrior Politics* (New York: Random House, 2002), 143.

<sup>8</sup> Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” *International Security* 10 (Spring 1986), 105-110; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea,” *International Security* Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), 154-184.

<sup>9</sup> James J. Wirtz, “Beyond Bipolarity: Prospects for Nuclear Stability after the Cold War,” in T.V. Paul, Richard Harknett and James J. Wirtz (eds.) *The Absolute Weapon Revisited* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 137-163; and Colin Gray, *Weapons Don’t Make War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 15.

like Vietnam, Africa, Latin America and Afghanistan, but the nuclear standoff decreased the likelihood that these wars would escalate to threaten the truly vital interests of the opposing superpowers.

The different strategic demands created by the need to guarantee nuclear retaliation and the need to deal with relatively small conventional military conflicts led to rather unique military organizations. The United States, and the Soviet Union for that matter, actually created distinct military organizations to conduct deterrent and war fighting operations. U.S. conventional and paramilitary forces stationed outside Western Europe and South Korea, for example, were intended to respond to and contain the small wars and disturbances that were occurring throughout the developing world. These forces actually saw combat in places like Nicaragua, Vietnam, Grenada and Afghanistan. By contrast, strategic deterrent forces – the bulk of U.S. conventional forces, nuclear armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers – were never actually employed in combat. Strategic nuclear deterrent forces were deployed throughout the Cold War with only one mission in mind: to guarantee the destruction of the opposing superpower under any circumstances.<sup>10</sup>

Given the primary emphasis on deterrence during the Cold War, ethical concerns were most often raised about the fact that peace apparently rested on the mutual threat of nuclear annihilation. The Catholic bishops critique of nuclear deterrence, issued in a pastoral letter on 3 May 1983, actually went so far as to advocate specific arms control measures and to call into question the basis of nuclear deterrence, retaliation. According to the bishops:

“It is never permitted to direct nuclear or conventional weapons to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their populations . . .” (The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, No. 80).

The intentional killing of innocent civilians or noncombatants is always wrong.

Even defensive response to unjust attack can cause destruction, which violates the principle of proportionality, going far beyond the limits of legitimate defense. This judgment is particularly important when assessing planned use of nuclear weapons. No defensive strategy, nuclear or conventional, which exceeds the limits of proportionality, is morally permissible.<sup>11</sup>

These misgivings about the morality of nuclear retaliation were not limited to the clergy. Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, for example, in his “Freedom from Fear” paper, also raised concerns inside the Reagan administration about the immorality of nuclear deterrence as the basis of U.S. defense policy.<sup>12</sup>

Today, the situation has changed drastically. Great power war, or the possibility of a massive nuclear exchange, no longer preoccupies policymakers, officers and publics around the world. Instead, the primary threat facing the United States, its allies and its friends is terrorism, ethnic violence and a few small states that seek to use force to intimidate their neighbors or to enslave their own populations. Even the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. Although Russia and the United States cut back their nuclear arsenals and made major strides toward eliminating their offensive chemical and biological weapons capability, nonproliferation efforts during the 1990s failed to stop the gradual spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems. Today, there is a distinct possibility

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<sup>10</sup> James Smith, “Deterrence and Defense in the Early Twenty-First Century,” Evolution of the Concepts,” paper presented at the workshop “Deterrence and Defense in the Early Twenty-Fist Century,” Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Mclean, VA, 27-28 June 2002.

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on War and Peace May 3, 1983, <http://www.nuclearfiles.org/docs/1983/830503-usrcb-war-peace.html>; for a fine analysis of the bishops' letter see Susan Moller Okin, “Taking the Bishops Seriously,” *World Politics* Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), 527-554.

<sup>12</sup> Daniel Wirls, *Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 150.

that nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists. Many fear that these weapons might be used in relatively small-scale attacks on some distant battlefield or against the cities and military bases of America's friends and allies.

This changing threat environment has prompted policymakers to reconsider deterrence as the cornerstone of defense policies.<sup>13</sup> Terrorists, for example, are difficult to deter because they seek war and destruction; threatening them with war and destruction in retaliation for some unwanted act produces no deterrent effect. Other actors – Saddam Hussein is a case in point – are willing to seize opportunities to achieve their objectives through war. In other words, Iraq can generally be deterred from aggressive action, but when opportunities emerge Saddam is likely to pursue his objectives (e.g., the Iran-Iraq War and the invasion of Kuwait) through violence. Additionally, unlike the Soviet Union, the danger of retaliation posed by states that have recently obtained WMD is relatively low; raising the possibility that military force could disarm opponents before they can strike. These developments mean the preventive motivation for war — the belief that war involving a particular adversary is inevitable — is on the rise. Once policymakers decide conflict is inevitable, they must make one of the most difficult and horrific diplomatic decisions in international relations. Leaders have to make military and political judgments about the level of risk the nation is prepared to accept and decide whether it is better to fight now while the costs are relatively low, or wait and possibly confront a more dangerous adversary.

Changes in U.S. military structure and policy reflect this renewed attention to the issues of preventive war, preemption and war fighting. The cold-war division between deterrent and war fighting forces is beginning to fade. On the one hand, forces that were designed to be part of the strategic nuclear deterrent, e.g., the B-2 bomber, now see action as part of conventional and even counter-terrorist attacks in the skies above Afghanistan. On the other hand, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), unveiled a new strategic triad, consisting of nuclear weapons and non-nuclear precision-strike capabilities, passive and active defenses. The Bush administration's new strategic triad is intended to integrate defenses (i.e., missile defense), nuclear weapons and "non-nuclear strike forces"<sup>14</sup> into a seamless web of capabilities to dissuade potential competitors from mounting a military challenge to the United States,<sup>15</sup> to deter adversaries and to fight and win wars if deterrence fails. The NPR notes that the strike elements

*"...can provide greater flexibility in the design and conduct of military campaigns to defeat opponents decisively. Non-nuclear strike capabilities may be particularly useful to limit collateral damage and conflict escalation. The NPR emphasizes technology as a substitute for nuclear forces that are withdrawn from service. Global real-time command and control and reconnaissance capabilities will take on greater importance in the new strategic triad."*<sup>16</sup>

The ethical challenges created by the return to strategy are different from the challenges created by Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence. Today, elected officials and soldiers must now consider the actual use of force, not just the morality of threatening violence to prevent violence from occurring. They now have to decide issues of when, where and how to employ force

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<sup>13</sup> Keith B. Payne and C. Dale Walton, "Deterrence in the Post-Cold War World," in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin S. Gray (eds.) *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 161-182.

<sup>14</sup> News Transcript from the United States Department of Defense, Briefing by J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy, Wednesday, January 9, 2002, 6.

<sup>15</sup> The concept of dissuasion is a new term in U.S. doctrine. It apparently suggests that U.S. military forces will be so technologically and operationally superior, that potential competitors will abandon efforts to challenge the United States. Efforts at dissuasion, however, might simply channel the military strategies and capabilities of potential competitors away from U.S. strengths to attack U.S. vulnerabilities, i.e., to adopt asymmetric strategies.

<sup>16</sup> The NPR can be found at the [globalsecurity.org](http://globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm) website <<http://globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>> 12-13.

while recognizing that their decisions will have immediate and operational consequences. At the same time, they are likely to face restive publics who demand protection from terrorists. Ultimately, the real challenge faced by military professionals everywhere is to win the war against terrorism on civilization's terms by stopping or destroying terrorists before they can cause states to react in ways that undermine the democratic and ethical principles that govern society.

### **Ethical Issues and Non-Issues**

The ethical issues raised by the return to strategy are mixed. On the one hand, the news is good. There are signs that a global solidarity is emerging against terror and anarchy. Citizens in the United States, Russia and India view terrorist attacks against civilians with a common revulsion and they support the actions taken by governments around the globe to stop the terrorist threat. People everywhere accept the notion that anti-terrorism operations regrettably result in the loss of innocent life, but that does not stop them from supporting a vigorous government response to terrorism. Virtually no criticism of the Russian government was heard, for instance, following the use of gas to disable Chechen rebels holding hundreds of people hostage in a Moscow theater, even though the operation led to the death of at least one hundred hostages. Instead of undermining democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, terrorists are highlighting the important role played by ethics and international law when it comes to the use of force in world politics.

Additionally, there is a happy convergence between the ethical conduct of war and the latest weapons systems. The combination of real time intelligence, precision guided weapons, and the latest communications technology allows the United States and many of its allies to use military force with extraordinary discrimination. Civilian casualties in war can never be eliminated, but it now appears that they can be kept to the absolute minimum. This has not always been the case in warfare. During World War II, "inaccuracy of weapon aim- fostered inhumanity of war aim," as Bomber Command sought to demoralize German workers after finding they lacked a weapon accurate enough to destroy Nazi war industries.<sup>17</sup> The spread of weapons of mass destruction threatens to reverse the trend toward discrimination in military operations by virtually guaranteeing that thousands or even millions of civilians will become casualties in war.

Professional soldiers also are increasingly aware of their ethical and legal responsibilities when it comes to the conduct of military operations. Although it is not particularly well known, teams of lawyers must pass judgment on the morality and legal justification of virtually every significant military operation undertaken by the U.S. military. Operations are assessed on a variety of ethical and legal criteria, including military necessity, proportionality in the use of force and the risk posed to innocent civilians. When mistakes occur, moreover, they are quickly acknowledged and rectified. For example, when analysts realized that cluster bomb munitions and air-dropped humanitarian relief supplies were both painted blue, causing casualties among children who collected unexploded ordinance instead of food, those responsible took steps to rectify the problem.

On the other hand, the return of strategy has produced several important ethical dilemmas. U.S. policymakers are now considering the issue of preventive war (launching a war today to prevent the need to fight a more costly war in the future) and preemption (beating opponents that are about to attack you to the punch by attacking them first). The Bush administration's National Security Strategy states: "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends."<sup>18</sup> The potential targets for action using these assumptions are: (1) terrorists; (2) states that harbor or support terrorist organizations; (3) states that are developing and/or maintaining weapons

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<sup>17</sup> B. H. Liddell Hart quoted in Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 12.

<sup>18</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, Washington DC, September 2002, 14.

of mass destruction that do not conduct themselves in accordance with generally accepted norms of international behavior. Much of the debate over preventive war and preemption, however, is based on the ethical and legal implications of specific initiatives, not on the ethical considerations generally raised by policies to meet today's pressing security threats. The war on terrorism clearly is a war fought in self-defense against actors with little or no standing in international law, who have attacked innocent civilians around the world to advance often non-negotiable agendas. If Iraq's failure to comply with U.N. resolutions continues, then the international community would be within its legal rights to use force to obtain Iraq's compliance with international law. Still, talk of the need for preventive war and preemption highlights the fact that debates about the ethics of various defense policies will now center on the use of force, not just using the threat of force as an instrument of foreign policy.

The growing isolation of military organizations from the rest of society raises another concern. In the United States, this isolation is partly produced by the "ghosts of Vietnam." In other words, members of the U.S. military generally believe that indecisive civilian leadership, not ineffective military operations and strategy or an especially determined opponent, caused defeat in the Vietnam War.<sup>19</sup> As a result, they tend to doubt the willingness of their elected leaders and fellow citizens at home to stay the course in a conflict, especially when the going gets tough. The failure of senior officers and elected officials to provide convincing explanations not only to the rank and file, but also to officers about "why we fight" and the important contribution they are making to international and national security only makes matters worse. Educational programs in militaries everywhere tend to focus on technical and operational matters, not on providing officers with the analytical skills and knowledge they will need to deal with broad political, strategic and ethical issues. When combined, these trends exacerbate the tendency of officers to focus on operational, tactical and technical issues at the expense of understanding the strategic consequences of military action. Consideration of military ethics in such an environment generally falls by the wayside.

The impact of the information revolution on military organizations also will give rise to ethical issues. For the most part, senior officers view emerging communication and computing technologies as force multipliers that might even lead to a so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs." But the same forces unleashed by the information revolution on civil society also will begin to transform hierarchical military organizations. Modern communication technologies tend to undermine the chain of command because they link the most junior person in the military organization directly to the upper most ranks of military leadership. At the moment, staff officers and military protocol prevent these networks from being fully exploited. But as future recruits enter the military – individuals who are more accustomed to using Internet-based communication systems in civilian life – they will attempt to exploit military communication networks to their full potential. Senior officers might even encourage this behavior because future operations will place increasing amounts of responsibility on the shoulders of those populating the lower ranks. With this increased responsibility will come demands by the rank and file for civilian and military leaders to justify military operations and national strategy. It is thus possible that new military organizations and command relationships will begin to emerge, requiring a reevaluation of how to guarantee the ethical conduct of military operations in highly decentralized military organizations.

If technological change creates pressures for the long-term transformation of military organizations, these pressures produce immediate ethical dilemmas for military officers as they face the need to make changes that affect not only their service, but also their very career. "Transformation," to borrow a term popular in the Bush administration's Pentagon, involves the replacement of existing weapons systems, career paths, and preferred ways of conducting business with new weapons and ways of war to respond more effectively to emerging threats. Thus, by

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<sup>19</sup> Conrad C. Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002); and James J. Wirtz, "The 'Unlessons' of Vietnam," *Defense Analysis* Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 2001), 41-58.

definition, transformation poses a threat to existing bureaucratic preferences. This creates all sorts of ethical dilemmas for professional soldiers who are asked to set aside their bureaucratic biases and preferences, to say nothing of tried and true weapons and procedures, to transform their organization to meet new threats. As transformation accelerates, soldiers will face increasing bureaucratic and personal incentives to fight organizational change to preserve specific career paths.<sup>20</sup> In effect, today's military professional faces many opportunities to demonstrate ethical leadership, and not all of these decisions must be made on the battlefield. Today careerism and the need to balance personal, organizational and national interests create real tests of ethics in the military profession. Everyone knows officers who have failed to meet those tests.

## Conclusion

When scholars, theologians and strategists gather to discuss issues of military ethics, they are drawn naturally to the extreme moral dilemmas facing today's soldier. This focus is understandable, given the fact that soldiers make life and death decisions that can affect the health and livelihoods of thousands of people. And today, more so than during the Cold War, policymakers and soldiers need to understand the ethical implications of decisions about when, where and how to use force to achieve national objectives and to protect innocent civilians targeted by the current wave of terrorism. The focus on these grand issues, however, should not obscure the importance of ethical behavior and ethical awareness in the mundane day-to-day operations and decisions undertaken by professional militaries.

Ethical behavior is encouraged by organizations that reward ethical behavior. But in the everyday rush of normal operations, officers are pressured to make decisions based on expediency and the need not to rock the organizational boat. Incentives are clear when it come to ignoring problems or protecting institutional interests. The way officers rise to meet these everyday challenges to ethical behavior, however, communicates much to the rank and file about how true the institution is to its values. Moreover, the communication revolution will make command decisions increasingly transparent to the average soldier, which has the potential either to bolster or eliminate confidence in the moral fiber of an officer corps. It is becoming increasingly difficult to hide questionable behavior from widespread scrutiny. Soldiers and policymakers alike must recognize that ethical behavior is not just desirable on philosophical grounds; it is desirable in a practical sense as a means to enhance organizational performance.

**James J. Wirtz,**  
Prof., Dr., Department of National Security Affairs,  
Monterey, California

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<sup>20</sup> The literature here is extensive. For example see Stephen P. Rosen, *Winning the Next War* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1991); and Robert O'Connell, *Sacred Vessels* (New York: Oxford, 1991).