



FACT SHEET IRAN

21 September – 2 October 2025

OUTLOOK

Developments in recent weeks have demonstrated that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to face significant security-political dynamics. The reactivation of snapback sanctions and the renewal of EU measures exacerbate economic and diplomatic tensions and keep the nuclear issue at the centre of international attention. At the same time, Tehran attempts to create new foreign policy leeway through regional diplomacy – such as Larijani's visit to Lebanon – and closer ties with Russia and China. At home, domestic policy measures remain in place, while the situation in Sistan-Baluchistan shows that unresolved ethnic and sectarian tensions may escalate at any time despite individual cases of rapprochement. Added to this are conspicuous signals in the military sphere: missile development, tests, and the concurrent cancellation of traditional parades illustrate the tension between a show of force and concern about further escalation with Israel and the US. All in all, Iran's scope for manoeuvre remains limited and is characterised by a constant balancing act comprising domestic stability, regional positioning, and international pressure. On 27 September, the United

FOREIGN POLICY

Kingdom, France, and Germany initiated the snapback mechanism in the UN Security Council, charging Iran with violations of the 2015 nuclear agreement. Although the motion to extend UN sanctions did not receive the required majority, the European Union independently imposed new sanctions on 29 September, including the freezing of Iranian bank assets, an oil embargo, and export bans on nuclear-related technologies.

Iranian officials condemned this as "psychological warfare," declared the measures to be contrary to international law, and pointed to Russia's dismissive stance: Moscow's UN ambassador, Vasily Nebenzya, declared that Russia did not recognise the return of sanctions – a signal that Tehran explicitly banks on. Concomitantly, the US announced the cancellation of exemptions for the port of Chabahar, which, above all, puts Indian operating companies under special sanctions pressure. This also threatens to impair a key trade and aid corridor to Afghanistan and Central Asia – a corridor which Iran considers a geopolitically important project in

the field of regional competition. Against this backdrop, Tehran has intensified its regional diplomacy. On the same day, Ali Larijani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, travelled to Beirut, where he met with, inter alia, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to secure Iranian influence in Lebanon and strengthen measures against ongoing efforts to disarm Hezbollah.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL DYNAMICS

On 1 October, the system's arbitration council (*majma'e tashkhis-e maslahat-e nezam*) approved the ratification of the CFT Convention on terrorist financing. This means that Iran has fulfilled the final condition for possible removal from the FATF blacklist. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an international body dedicated to combating money laundering and terrorist financing, whose classifications have a decisive influence on the integration of countries into the global financial system. President Pezeshkian already stated in 2024 that the government had "no choice but to resolve the FATF issue."

The reinstatement of the sanctions mechanism has significantly intensified debates in Iran about future nuclear policy. 71 members of parliament called for a revision of the defence doctrine, distinguishing between the Supreme Leader's 2011 fatwa prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and the potential production of such weapons for purposes of deterrence. It was also publicly confirmed in parliament that withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was being seriously considered and that the relevant legislative preparations had largely been completed. While Ayatollah Khamenei described talks with the US as "futile," President Pezeshkian emphasised that negotiations could be resumed in principle – but only on condition that sanctions be lifted, which effectively means that the political stalemate persists. At the same time, parliament used the tensions to emphasise the country's "nuclear rights": On 20 September, MP Mohsen Zanganeh announced that Iran had successfully tested one of the "most advanced missiles" and explicitly referred to an "inter-continental ballistic missile test."



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ETHNIC GROUPS

On 25 September, the Sunni Baloch militia Jaish al Adl attacked a vehicle of the security forces near Zahedan (Zahedan-Khash axis). Two soldiers were killed, and the police chief of Sibsuran, Colonel Ebrahim Fazilati, later succumbed to his serious injuries. The group claimed responsibility for the attack. It must be noted that for several years, Jaish al Adl has directed its operations almost exclusively against security forces and avoided attacks on civilians. Since the nationwide protests of 2022 and the subsequent violent clashes with the security forces, the scope and intensity of their activities have significantly increased.

Tensions in Sistan-Baluchistan remain high. Three years after "Bloody Friday" in Zahedan, in which around 100 people were killed, Sunni clerics such as Molavi Abdolhamid continue to try to direct protests into institutionalised channels and prevent major escalations. On 22 September, a remarkable act of reconciliation took place in the main mosque of Zahedan, where the provincial governor, together with representatives of the security forces, asked for forgiveness. Under President Pezeshkian there have been first signs of a rapprochement between the state and the Sunni community, but deep-rooted mistrust and unresolved structural problems mean that the conflict remains unresolved.

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

At the end of August and beginning of September, Iran began repairing its missile production facilities in Parchin and Shahroud damaged during the Israel-Iran war – a clear signal of its efforts to restore the weakened capabilities of its missile programme. Just a few weeks later, at the Semnan Space Centre on 18 September, Tehran tested a ballistic missile which state media described as one of the country's "most advanced missiles." At the same time, high-ranking military officials intensified their inspections. On 29 September, Brigadier General Sabahi Fard inspected air defences in Dezful, while Chief of Defence Staff Abdol Rahim Mousavi inspected units in Hormozgan on 30 September. At the same time, the Revolutionary Guards cancelled the traditional military parades in Hamedan and Kurdistan – officially because of "new threats." The cancellations underscore the nervousness of the Iranian armed forces in a period of heightened regional tensions, in which Israeli political and military decision-makers have repeatedly emphasised that the conflict with Iran is not over yet.

ANALYSIS

Recent developments show that Iran is caught between external pressures and internal divisions. The reactivation of the snapback mechanism and EU sanctions increase Iran's international isolation and intensify debates about its future nuclear policy. The measures taken to restore military capabilities – from missile tests and the reconstruction of damaged production facilities to increased troop inspections – point to Tehran's efforts to reestablish its deterrence capability after the Israel-Iran war.

At the same time, the snapback mechanism has exposed internal divisions: Economic hardship and political disputes persist, but are accompanied by cautious liberalisations – for example, in dress code and the granting of cultural freedoms – which are intended to contain social discontent and stabilise the system. The central challenge for the leadership is to secure legitimacy by redefining the fragile balance between control, concessions, and self-preservation. The development from JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), known in Iran as BARJAM (associated with FARJAM – "good ending"), to *mekanism-e masheh* ("trigger") symbolically illustrates the shift from hope to disillusionment. Officials portray the snapback as illegitimate and emphasise the support provided by Russia and China. However, whether a narrative of resistance, adaptation, or resignation ultimately prevails will largely determine how Iran acts domestically and internationally in the coming months.

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Hessam Habibi Doroh, Walter Posch

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