III   Presentations and Papers

1. If You Want Peace in the Balkans, Should You Give War a Chance? or: Current Security Problems in Southeast Europe

I   Introduction

Secessionist conflicts have become a major feature of the European political landscape in the 1990s. International response to them has varied from full-scale military intervention to half-hearted mediation, generally providing for freezing of most active hostilities and for addressing most urgent humanitarian needs. Europe in the 1 990s saw more "peace" operations on its soil than any other region in the world, but still was not able to find satisfactory answers. Kosovo is a tragic illustration of that and the deployment of NATO troops after a massive use of airpower still lacks the framework of a political plan and appears very tentative and opportunistic. Several specifically European factors define the perspective of a possible new wave of secessionist conflicts in the region.[1]

The central pillar of peace, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region is the NATO - the strongest and most successful political and military alliance in history. At the end of the century and of the millennium, ten years since the disappearance of bipolarity in Europe, the NATO has made good steps forward on the road of coming to terms with the heritage of Cold War and making significant contributions to some key areas:

- • To European Integration, by taking new members – Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – into the alliance.

- • To a co-operative relationship with Russia, by creating a permanent NATO-Russia Council.

- • To the transatlantic link, by enhancing its position as the key forum for the European-American dialogue.

- • To joint crisis management Operations beyond NATO territory, by participating, for instance, in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and by managing its Kosovo Operation last year.

According to *Javier Solana*, former Secretary-General of the NATO and now the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs[2] especially the Kosovo Operation was an undeniable success for NATO. He suggests that for the first time an alliance of sovereign nations fought not to conquer or preserve territory but to protect the values on which the alliance was founded. Or was this (as others believe[3]) a punishment in the Balkans, where NATO, dissatisfied with UN ineffectiveness, was taking the law into its own hands?

Was there a real success? In fact there were numerous differences over NATO's mission and procedures in Kosovo - and a kind of unity demonstrated at North Atlantic Alliance's 50th

---

[1]   Pavel K. Baev: External Interventions in Secessionist Conflicts in Europe in the 1990s. in: European Securitv No. 2/1999. pp. 22-51

[2]   Javier Solana: NATO's Success in Kosovo. in: Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec. 1999. p. 114-120

[3]   Michael MccGwire: Why did we bomb Belgrad?. in: International Affairs Nr. I12000.pp. 1-23

anniversary celebration in Washington April last year. And anything less than success in the Kosovo crisis will undermine this unity - an outcome that now seems likely if not inevitable.[4]

II   The Global Players

The allies began the war with high expectations. The allied countries in their majority under centre-left governments, stressed the moral imperatives of reversing ethnic cleansing and saving the Albanian people of Kosovo. The political leaders have defended their solidarity with NATO through moral arguments - the war must "prevent a humanitarian catastrophe", German Chancellor *Schröder* said. The alliance has shown an impressive solidarity, the transatlantic mood was good, NATO was demonstrating its relevance and effectiveness by combating ethnic violence in Europe, a success in Kosovo would guarantee the primacy of NATO in Europe's future. There would be no doubt that NATO was the indispensable security institution on this continent - even the Americans still seemed Eurocentric, at least in understanding Europe's geopolitical importance.

The transatlantic partnership, the European integration process, and the broader, inclusive security co-operation was spanning the entire Euro Atlantic area. No European would seriously question the fact that the United States is, and should remain, "a European power". At the same time, no one wants to create security or stability against Russia, or through closed institutions. NATO has committed itself very strongly to a strategy of security co-operation. Through the Partnership for Peace programme and. most recently, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Alliance has created a framework for military co-operation across the entire Euro-Atlantic space. This approach will remain unchanged even after NATO enlargement. Like the Alliance, the EU is committed to its enlargement and has broadened its relationship with the United States through a joint action plan agreed in 1995. The European Union now has a transatlantic dimension as well. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also is broadening its agenda, and above all, the OSCE remains without an alternative as a framework for Euro-Atlantic arms control or for addressing the countless minority issues in Europe, because it is the sole organisation capable of setting standards of security behaviour, and of legitimising peacekeeping missions. In short, the quality of European security will be determined less by the Operations of the institutional clockwork, but rather by the deepening of political processes - the "invisible" side of the new European security architecture.[5]

But what was the "visible" effect last year, the outcome of NATO's mission in Kosovo?[6] What effect did the mission have on the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe? How will they interpret NATO's zero-risk strategy of bombing from enormous heights which put Serb and Kosovar Albanian civilians on the ground at greater risk than would have been otherwise necessary?. Has the NATO mission strengthened or weakened the case for armed intervention in the name of human rights? All the short-, middle- and long-term consequences of the West's intervention in Yugoslavia remain obscure.[7] The "humanitarian intervention" in Kosovo has resulted in flagrant violations of international law and the UN Charter by NATO countries it has produced the first massive bombings of a European country since World

---

[4]   Peter W. Rodman: Fallout from Kosovo. In: Foreign Affairs July/ August 1999. I 45-51

[5]   Michael Rühle. Nick Williams: "Better Than it Sounds": Europe's Invisible Security Architecture. in: Comparative Strategy Nr. 2/1998. pp. 12 1-123

[6]   MccGwire. Why did we bomb... op. cit.

[7]   Stephen Holmes: Introduction. In: East European Constitutional Review Nr. 3/1999. p. 41

War II. NATO has transformed itself from a defensive alliance into the first aggressor in Europe since Soviet Union's invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.[8]

In the light of the NATO objectives, consider political and military options facing the alliance. Political options include reconciliation, containment, and regime change military options consist of air strikes or a combination of air war and ground combat.[9] The reluctance of NATO to use force against Serbia gave rise to charges of a credibility gap. Threats not backed up with force lead to a diminution of the credibility of NATO threats for future situations. The alliance set a number of deadlines that did not produce compliance. Rather than using force, however, the allies extended the deadlines.[10]

NATO political leaders seemed to have blinded themselves to how the Serbs would react to the threat and actuality of a bombing campaign, NATO was generally misreading how seriously Serbia saw the threat to its survival. NATO was guilty of using the *Dayton* approach of tight deadlines and dictate (rather than concentrating on finding a way, other than the use of force. of persuading *Milošević* to accept an effective international force), guilty of wishful thinking about the Serbs response to air attack., guilty of the tendency to define complex conflicts in oversimplified and moralistic terms (and thereby misshaping policy and public expectations), guilty of insisting that the enemy was *Milošević* of ignoring the complexities of Belgrade and Balkan politics",[11] of cheating itself and the rest of the world by insisting that the military action "was not a war", of weakening the fragile political and economical Situation of neighbouring states like Macedonia, of giving a precedent to Russia and her military campaign in Chechnya - with other words: guilty of a senseless and unprofessional action of showing off NATO political muscle undertaken with best intentions, but resulting in worst consequences for Southeast Europe and entire Europe. The quality and the stability of the international order is at stake, because the Alliance was undermining the foundations of this order established since 1945, by disregarding the Security Council, which is primarily responsible for international peace and security under United Nations Charter.[12]

III   Bombing Belgrade

Why did the NATO bomb Belgrade?[13] The political objective was to avert a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo and/or to prevent a crisis from becoming a catastrophe. This was to be achieved by strategic and precision bombing of military targets in Serbia in order to reduce the capability of Serb forces to

• continue with their violence

• repress the Kosovar Albanians

• order ethnic cleansing.

Bombing Belgrade made sense only if one believed that this demonstration of NATO resolve would cause *Slobodan Milošević* to halt the process himself. That did not happen.

---

[8] Robert M. Hayden: Humanitarian Hypocrisy. in: East European Constitutional Review No. 3/1999. pp. 9 1-96

[9] Raymond Tanter, John Psarouthakis: Balancing in the Balkans. New York 1999. p. 14

[10] Tanter. Psarouthakis. Balancing... op. Cit. p. 83

[11] Robert Thomas: Serbia - Still Europe's Pariah?. European Security Study No. 24. London 1996

[12] Arthur Paecht: "Kosovo as a Precedent: Towards a Reform of the Security Council International Law and Humanitarian Intervention. NATO Parliamentary Assembly - Civilian Affairs Committee. Amsterdam November 1999

[13] MccGwire. Why did we bomb... op. cit.

Why? Later on we were told that no one could have foreseen that *Milošević* could have been so wicked. So the bombing continued and was justified by using exaggerated and emotive language and demonising *Milošević*. But *Milošević* did not create the Kosovo problem - he exploited it. First, the Serbs had historically framed Kosovo as a domain of loss situation. *Milošević* took advantage of this perceived loss for his domestic gain. Second, ancient memories over Kosovo increased its value. Third, the high price of battles fought caused the Serbs to overvalue Kosovo's worth.[14]

Let us try to understand why it all was possible: After nearly half a century of dormant nationalism. all the East European states were suddenly racked by ethnic, regionalist, and autonomist movements demanding some degree of autonomy or self-determination. Both majority and minority populations have been affected by this rebirth of ethnicity, and in some cases the programs and goals of different national communities have clashed, resulting in manifestations of conflict.[15] Does a new fault line separate Western Christians from Orthodox Christians and Muslims? Are The Balkans again "Balkanised along religious lines".[16] Not at all! It has nearly nothing to do with the nature of the Balkan people or with the image of the Balkans as a cauldron of ethnic hatred[17] and it has not so much to do with the devilish power holders (how ever devilish they may be), but it is the consequence of something which is the background.[18]

IV   Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia[19] was - like the other countries - a para-state order which means that it was constituted upon a totally different principle of power, not through the institutionalised set of principles. There was a set of constitutional institutions which was more a kind of constitutional facade: You did have a constitutional framework but from the decision making point of view it was not a constitutional system, not a state order due to the fact that every decision was taken within the Party nomenclature, i.e. within the group of highest ranking leaders and later on the constitutional facade was added to this decision in a constitutional procedure in all Federal republics, but the fundamental decisions were not taken there.

The second factor is the role and the understanding of nation in the meaning of ethnicity - the Balkan's obsession of nation in a pre-political concept of ethnicity. It is the ethnicity which genders the constitution, it is the ethnicity which make the political community and so on. That has a lot to do with the historical background: The Balkan peoples lived for centuries in Empires, the Ottoman and the Austrian, where this feeling of ethnicity was developed in a counter position to the state in which they lived. Something of this remained as a part of political perception - ethnicity as something having the potentiality of elaboration.[20] So in former times the party leaders found themselves in a dilemma of how to control the potentialities of interethnic conflict in a multiethnic society like Yugoslavia was. And on the other hand, the question for the leaders was how to instrumentalise this multi-ethnicity for their own purposes. So the ethnic issue was manipulated as an additionally legitimating

---

[14]   Tanter, Psarouthakis. Balancing... op. Cit.. p. 76

[15]   Janusz Bugajski: The Contours of Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe. in: Balkan Forum No. 3/1993. p. 19-34

[16]   Tanter. Psarouthakis. Balancing... op. Cit.. p. viii

[17]   William W. Hagen: The Balkan's Lethal Nationalisms. in: Foreign Affairs Juli/August 1999. p.52-64

[18]   Following here a lecture given by the Serbian sociologist Lidija Basta-Posavec in Bern (Switzerland) on February 2. 1995

[19]   For a historical overview see Svein Mønnesland: Land ohne Wiederkehr – Ex-Jugoslawien: Die Wurzeln des Krieges. Klagenfurt 1997

[20]   Ljubomir Mažar: The Roots of Nationalism. in: Balkan Forum No. 2/1994, pp. 81-109

ground for their para-state order. In the course of a development full of crises and fading away of instruments like workers' self-government etc. the ethnic issue became more and more relevant as a factor additionally legitimising the power holders. Which means, that the authoritarian balancing of interethnic tensions and conflicts was already in the logic of such a system.

It was by no means a coincidence that the three ex-communist multiethnic federations - Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia - dissolved. Communist power holders perceived every constitution only as an instrument of power and not a limit of power, and so the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 was a complete revision of the federal para-state order - not as a constituted, but as a permanently constituting state. That means that the state's question remained permanently open. The bearers of sovereignty, the constitutive parties of the federal order were nations in their republics and provinces - nations in the meaning of ethnicity. The constitution introduced only this aspect of a federal order - in contrast to every "normal" federal order and its democratic nature and principles. The consequences were fatal ones: There was a massive transfer of political loyalty to republics because only the republics (and autonomous provinces like Kosovo) were perceived as a nation's state in the sense of an ethnic state.[21] As a consequence the society gradually becomes blocked as regards progress and national elites are given the opportunity to exploit their co-nationals in the name of the "national interest", which, conceived as the interest of the whole ethnic nation (including the "Diaspora"), has been an obsession in Serbian, as well as Croatian and Slovenian, politics.[22]

Here we have configurations determining the political situation in the newly emerged states of former Yugoslavia, how ever democratic their facade is: Ethnic states can only exist as such in a defending meaning, in trying to protect themselves against others. Actors of an autocratic nature often dominate ethnic conflicts. Interethnic conflict served the function of reinforcing intra-ethnic political strength.[23] The majority nation as ethnicity is the founder of the statehood and will protect itself against all these who can not due to their birth participate in this ethnicity. This potentiality for conflict was caused by the constitution of 1974 and realised by the constitutions of all successor states defining themselves as "national states" of the given nation. How can you have a democratic consensus based on ethnicity if you have a multiethnic state which is not a Switzerland in the South East, but ruled that way? All you get is an escalation of interethnic conflicts. This fatal potentiality of ethnicity was rooted in 1974 because in every single case the question of state itself seemed to be opened and ethnic republics were unable and unwilling to define and to follow a "common interest" of the common federation. The "socialist" federation could never legitimise themselves in a liberal. democratic sense of the word because they were established by nations (ethnicities) as primarily guaranteeing the quality of nations in the federation. So the federation had to legitimise itself by saying: forget about individuals - the nations are equal in their rights. In communist wav of dealing with politics only collectively was inherent, and ethnicity was the new form of collectivity as an instrument of authoritarian balancing of power. Forget about political equality, individual rights, political pluralism and witness the image of pluralism created by confronting ethnic interests through representing their mother republics. And this was a potentiality for disaster because these mother republics were not ethnically

---

[21] For details see Miranda Vickers: The Status of Kosovo in Socialist Yugoslavia. Bradford Studies on South Eastern Europe No. 1. Bradford 1994

[22] Vojin Dimitrijevic: Democracy versus Nation: The Post-Communist Hypernational State and the position of its "Ethnical Different" Citizens. in: Helsinki Monitor No. 5/1994 (Special Issue). pp. 13-24

[23] Tanter, Psarouthakis. Balancing... op. Cit.. pp. 96 ff.

homogenous, so that every political, constitutional, economic etc. question due to the inherent logic of the political System became an interethnic and tension.[24]

V   The Minority Question

Another problem of the ex-Yugoslav crux is the minority question. How is it possible to have a refreshed Kosovo[25] problem when Yugoslavia on the legal level could really have been boasted of having introduced the international standards of minority protection: Yugoslavia was taken as an example of someone who did give minority rights especially such ones of legal and constitutional relevance. But, viewed in the background above mentioned, Kosovo is not a problem of minority question. Not only the nations, but also the minorities - especially the most numerous in Vojvodina (Hungarians) and Kosovo (Albanians) - was given a constitutional Status which enabled them not to protect their cultural identity, but to act politically as an ethnic collectivity. The minority got a para-state position, too, and perceived it as a guarantee for own liberty which has to be on federal and republic levels. So the logic for these two provinces inside Serbia was that them was given a dual status by directly participating on the federal level (with the possibility of a constitutional, legal and executive veto) and so being provided with a state function of their own. The minority issue has been permanently posed and articulated as para-state issue also. That means, if you have a System which has no positive legitimisation at all - as the system in East Europe and in Yugoslavia were - all political elites within their collectivities, ethnic groups, had to push the differences as a part of their identity. To be different and to have problems with others - this is what makes the respective power holders long living in power! That means your "right" is based on your tactics to remain different and stay away from the others, because the others are always these ones who are potentially endangering your "rights". That is why the Albanian people in Kosovo perceive their "rights", but not only the Albanians: Every people in South East Europe is feeling himself as deeply discriminated, but in fact they all are victims of a manipulation which is a systematic one, perpetuating up to nowadays as a negative legitimacy causing a never ending disastrous outcome.

VI   The Balkan Nationalism

The other Balkan nationalisms in play in the lands of former Yugoslavia are not morally superior to Serbian nationalism.[26] The Slovenians, who in the past were locked in bitter nationalist conflicts with both the Italians and the Austrian Germans, today have a state that has neither irredentist claims against its neighbours (except some smaller conflicts with Croatia about the common borderline at the Dragunja river) nor conflicts with internal minorities (but sometimes playing with the idea of a referendum in order to deprive "foreigners" of Slovenian citizenship). Croatian, Albanian[27] and Bosnian Muslim nationalism are no less free to the temptations of violence and authoritarianism than is Serbian nationalism. Especially Croatia under the dictatorship of general *Tudjman*[28] for nearly ten

---

[24] Stipe Šuvar: Svi naši nacionaliznii. Valjevo 1986

[25] Srdja Popovic et al.: Kosovoski evor - dre ili seci?. Belgrad 1990

[26] Hagen. The Balkan's... op. cit. pp. 60 ff.

[27] For details see The Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Albania (Ed.): The Truth on Kosova. Tirana 1993

[28] Gordana Uzelak: Franjo Tudjman's Nationalist Ideology. in: East European Quarterly No. 4/1998. pp. 449-472; Drago Hedi: Living in the Past: Franjo Tudjman's Croatia. in: Current Histor March 2000. pp. 104-109

years had the obsession to regain its "historical borders", i.e. the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia.[29]

Croatia has proven its nationalism most bloodily by expelling 200.000 or more *Krajina* Serbs in 1995, but also in Bosnia with the participation of its regular Army in the war and by financing Croatian separatists in the Herzegovina over years with 1 - 3 million *Deutschmarks* per day. Had NATO acceptance of Croatian secession in 1991 been conditioned on firm guarantees for the Serb minority there, a better outcome might have occurred not only in Croatia, but also in Bosnia. This would have presented an opportunity to pressure *Milošević* for a quid pro quo guarantee of the minority rights of the Kosovo Albanians, including self-government. In this way, the present tragedy in Kosovo might have been averted.

VII   The Kosovo Liberation Army

UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which provided the basic guideline for the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo, encourages "the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self government for Kosovo, taking full account of the *Rambouillet* accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", and that means that, sooner or later, Kosovo must be reintegrated into the FRY:[30]

With regard to the present situation in Kosovo, nothing could be further from the truth. If the FRY sought to regain control of its territory, this would probably lead to a renewal of internal conflict between it and some form of organised ethnic Albanian resistance. NATO's presence in Kosovo is the presence of an occupying power and that puts a burden on international work in rebuilding Kosovar political institutions. The international community is facing a new set of challenges - it must restore and maintain law and order so that some form of normality can return to everyday life; disarm former KLA and put their weapons under control; rebuild functioning administrative, justice, and police systems; establish the basis of a liberal and non-corrupt economy; and above all, find ways of eliciting a critical mass of goodwill among Kosovo's ethnic communities to begin a reconciliation process. These tasks are difficult and extremely urgent, but nearly all efforts to address challenges remain obviously insufficient.[31]

Why so insufficient? According to Greek analysts the Kosovo was becoming a "grey area" and increasingly "ungovernable" due to a lack of infrastructure, political corruption, the ineffectiveness of the civil government and the collapse of both legitimacy and control over territories after 1989. In addition to this, the anarchy in Albania since July 1997 has led up to one million of light weapons and 1.5 billion rounds of ammunition being available on the black market in Central and Eastern Europe, with obvious security implications.[32] The Kosovo became the main destination for Albanian weapons, significant portions came to Macedonia and Greece. This situation was producing "Grey area terrorism" exercising local violence. In such a way also the KLA operated consisting in the beginning of groups of local population financed and armed from Albanian criminal organisations. For long years it was almost impossible to make a clear distinction between criminal and political activities, but

---

[29]   Ljubo Boban: Hrvatske granice od 1918. do 1991 godine. Zagreb 1992

[30]   Volker Kröning: Kosovo and International Humanitarian Law. NATO Parliamentary Assembly - Civilian Affairs Committee. Amsterdam November 1999

[31]   Guy-Michel Chauveau: Securing Peace in Kosovo: The Challenges ahead. NATO Parliamentary Assembly - Civilian Affairs Committee. Amsterdam. November 1999

[32]   Chris Smith. Domitilla Sagramoso: Small arms trafficking may export Albania's anarchy. in: Jane's Intelligence Review January 1999. pp. 24-28

Serbian propaganda against KLA and the Albanian movement contributed most in bringing the KLA out of deep cover, and even to its development into a public political and popular factor. not only in Kosovo.[33] After NATO's Kosovo mission it is not necessary to make such a distinction - the United States had aligned itself with the KLA. *Rambouillet* and the NATO mission bestowed a legitimacy on the KLA. which emerged from the war with an enhanced military capability, a greatly improved organisational structure, and leaders who saw themselves (and were seen by many) as Kosovos government-in-waiting. Concessions made to the KLA despite their terrorist behaviour and aim of a Greater Albania[34] - consisting of Albania, Southeast-Montenegro, Kosovo and parts of southern Serbia, two thirds of Macedonia and the North of Greece and must be gained against the will of Russia and Italy who are more than others "not pleased with the idea of Albanian national unification"[35] -. further enhanced the KLA's Status and its military capability, storing up trouble for the future.[36] Greater Albanian nationalism is intending such troubles:

While the independence of Kosovo is considered impossible and undesirable by Serbian and international diplomacy and by certain political circles in Tirana, the Albanian people and the KLA arc waging a heroic armed struggle which is of utmost historical importance for the Albanian nation, despite its cost and the outcome in the near future. (...) the independence of Kosovo is not only possible, but unavoidable and a basic requirement to the final solution of the Albanian national question through the unification of the Albanian ethnic Lands. This just and final solution is what Albanians are fighting for, they cannot be satisfied with any solution easy to reach and accepted by Serbia or international community.[37]

VIII   Troubles in Present Times

And there are troubles in present times, too. According to an UNHCR/OSCE-Overview of the "Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo"[38] the overall situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo remains precarious. While the crime statistics released by UNMIK indicate a decline in the overall number of violent incidents, this may be due to the fact that there has been a significant decrease in the overall non-Albanian population. Otherwise there is still a climate of violence and impunity, as well as widespread discrimination directed against non-Albanians.

Nowadays Kosovo is a field of ethnically-motivated crime, violence and terrorism which are increasing every month instigated by groups based in and outside of Kosovo. The remaining Serb population is a major concern: the Serbs, with the exception of some regions, are isolated in small communities and feel extremely vulnerable. Their exodus from Kosovo is continuing, and they have become more and more distrustful of the ability of the international community to guarantee their survival and the protection of their cultural and

---

[33]   N.D.A. Arvanites: Organized Crime and Geopolitics. in: Eurobalkans Autumn 1998. pp. 4-7: to the involvement of Kosovo Albanians into international crime see Miroslay Nožna: Èeská republika na križovatkách mezinárodniho zloèinu. in: Mezinárodní politika Nr. 3/1999. pp. 4-7: (round table) Rossija - Jugoslavskij krizis - Zapad. in: Otkrytaja politika Nr. 5-6/1999. pp. 29-35

[34]   Dritan Peka: Les droits collectifs et le status de la population albanaise dans les etats voisins. in: The Balkan Analvst No. 4/1997. pp.53-88

[35]   Abdi Baleta: Kosova - Albanian Nation in war with the Serbian Nation. in: The Balkan Analyst No. 2/1998. pp. 63-136. cit. pp. 72

[36]   MccGwire. Why did we bomb... op. cit. p. 17

[37]   Baleta Kosova - Albanian Nalion in war... op. cit.. p. 88

[38]   3 November 1999. http://www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/minorities

spiritual heritage, and thereby it is more and more difficult for international agencies to obtain their co-operation.

The Serbs have become collective targets for revenge, and the few Albanian voices who dare denounce Albanian reactions are heavily criticised and even threatened for it. Thus the Albanian journalist *Veton Surroi* came under heavy criticism for publishing an article last August expressing his shame at the violence committed by the Albanians. The most immediate question for the international community is to know to what extent *Hashim Thaci* - the former leader of the KLA who considers himself as the "Prime Minister" of Kosovo - still has control over the former KLA combatants who are demonstrably involved in the ongoing violent acts against Serbs and other minorities. *Thaci* has condemned all crimes but in meetings with foreign guests he plays down the importance of ethnically-motivated violence. Observers doubt that he is doing much to prevent it. The creation of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) last September - commanded by *Agim Ceku* (*1960), the former KLA-commander - seems to be the continuation of the KLA with another name. In a recent interview *Ceku* said: "Today's situation corresponds to our expectations. We do not think about *Milošević*. Kosovo is free, and the international community is responsible for its security and development. Kosovo's independence is our main aim, but we do not press the international community to grant us independence now. Under today's circumstances independence is a logical consequence, and 1 am sure it will come soon. The KLA is not disarmed, but demilitarised, we put our weapons under joint control of KPC and KFOR. KFOR is responsible for Kosovos security, and in co-operation with KFOR we are developing and strengthening KPC as an own system of defence."[39]

Does the situation correspond to international expectations? The establishment of a functioning local administration is still a hopeless task and justice is another huge challenge - because people would rather carry out their own justice and judges themselves are afraid of reaching decisions that could make them targets to retribution. Even the legal basis is a problem: *Bernard Kouchner's* - the head of UNMIK - decision to use the Yugoslav legal code as a basis was perceived very critically by the Albanians, although many experts agree that the code is actually fair in many areas.

UN Resolution 1244 reaffirmed "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and reminded "the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo". Meanwhile, some of the Allies, especially the United States, are beginning to say more and more openly that both objectives are not compatible and that the aspirations of Kosovo Albanians to independence should be looked at favourably. This prospect worries most Europeans who fear its destabilising consequences and who respond cautiously to the Serb plan for the creation of Serb "cantons" in Kosovo.[40]

With other words: The international security and civil presence in Kosovo does not work, the final status of Kosovo is not clear, but an accumulation in the sense of developing an increasing technical, economic and legal autonomy of Kosovo vis-à-vis Serbia would definitely influence the final outcome. Do the Albanians want autonomy or secession? Is that the way to make Kosovo "work" and to gain the confidence of its inhabitants? But these are less important questions - compared with others: Any strategy aimed at ending the Balkan crisis will fall if it does not include the region's centre: Serbia. Western governments face a serious political dilemma as long as Yugoslavia is ruled by leaders indicted for war crimes. Time matters, and the continuing isolation of Serbia makes the process of political change and

[39] Globus (Zagreb) 24.3.2000. pp. 34-36

[40] Chauveau.. Securing Peace in Kosovo... op. cit.

economic reform far more difficult and prolonged. How long? The political will in Europe and North America to act in Kosovo will not last. The two or three years remaining before Western attention turns elsewhere give little time to provide a framework for reform.[41] NATO insisted that the enemy was *Milošević* it demonised one man, ignored the complexities of Belgrade politics and absolved the Serbian people of any blame for the policy in Kosovo - and transformed the whole mission from the very beginning into a punishment of Serbia and all the Serbs. One must raise the question of whether the Allies always respected the principles of proportionality between civilian damage and military advantage. The military value of destroying the Serbian Television building appears quite questionable.[42]

IX   The Results

During the past five years, two international protectorates have come into being on the territory of former Yugoslavia - first Bosnia and Herzegovina, and now Kosovo. In addition, two other Balkan countries, Macedonia and Albania, are vitally dependent on foreign aid, both military and economic. Other states in the region face the threat that in the event of further conflicts or social upheavals, they could slip into a situation similar to that in which Albania found itself in 1997. The countries in question arc Bulgaria, Romania. and to a large extent even Croatia. The only post-communist country in Southeast Europe not affected by the instability of the region is Slovenia.[43]

The result of the events in and around the Kosovo has been a political, humanitarian and potential Balkan-wide security disaster. Direct war-related damage is largely restricted to Yugoslavia, estimated at up to 30 billions USD. Yugoslavia neighbours suffered damage indirectly linked to the war, above all a slump in the sectors of trade, transport and tourism, as well as a loss of confidence on the part of foreign investors. The political damage resulting from the deepening of ethnic animosities is also substantial.[44]

A variety of factors suggest that traditional tactics for achieving a peaceful resolution to the current crisis have been exhausted and are no longer effective. The West has reacted to the Kosovo crisis with a fundamental challenge to the values and security of the democratic world. The crisis dramatically affected all the states in the region, albeit in different ways: through the influx of refugees (Macedonia, Albania), NATO membership (Hungary), support for the allied operations, and economic losses. Never before has the international community come so dose to a consensus on the need for a comprehensive strategy based on a vision for the region as a whole.[45] With its initiative on the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, the EU has taken the lead in efforts aimed at stabilising the region. This will require a durable commitment on the part of the EU and its member states. However, many of the expectations that have been raised are unrealistic as regards both the EU and Southeast Europe. The EU has two options of how to influence stabilisation in Southeast Europe: 1. by giving an institutional shape to relations between the EU and the region, and 2. thru direct economic, political and social co-operation. In the meantime, the EU has made it clear that its proposed

---

[41]   Benn Steil, Susan L. Woodward: A European "New Deal" for the Balkans. in: Foreign Affairs No. 6/1999. pp. 95-105

[42]   MccGwire. Why did we bomb... op. cit. p. 19; Volker Kröning: Kosovo and International Humanit. op. cit.

[43]   Ladislav Cabada. Martin Ehl: The Kosovo Crisis and the Prospects for the Balkans. in: Perspectives No. 13/ 1999-2000. pp. 21-30

[44]   Andreas Witkowski: Southeast Europe and the European Union - promo stability through integration?. in: South East Europe Review No. 1/2000. pp. 79-96

[45]   Ivan Krastev et al.: 2010: The Balkans after Kosovo. in: East European Constitutional Review No. 3/1999. pp. 82-90

initiatives on integration will continue to be conditional on the countries' success in meeting the established criteria. The initiative concerning the new "Stability and Association Agreements" with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia is conditional on the fulfilment of a certain minimum of social and economic requirements. One key problem here is the stability dilemma, i.e. it is precisely those countries that are burdened with the greatest stability deficits which fall to qualify for the EU's initiatives.[46]

Over the past decade, political processes in the Balkans have been shaped by two parallel events: the simultaneous disintegration of the communist System and Titoist Yugoslavia. The post-Yugoslav republics have all become presidential or semi-presidential republics, with a sluggish turnover of political elites, restricted media freedom, and insensitivity to minority rights.[47]

Macedonia is an exception in this respect. Macedonia escaped the fighting that accompanied the independence of the other Yugoslav repub1ics.[48] Macedonia made an agreement with rump Yugoslavia under which the Yugoslav Army 1eR the country in 1992.[49] Its own military force can do little to protect Macedonia from outside aggression. lt is for this reason that the UN, in an unprecedented decision, chose to Station a 1 .000-strong observer force in Macedonia along the border with Serbia in 1993. Skopje's foreign policy is quite simple: ensure secure borders, guarantee independence, and promote economic stability. These can best be achieved through the integration into the European structures of the EU and the Atlantic alliance. Macedonia bas become an important NATO base of operations, with the alliance opening training centres in the country. Skopje's good-neighbour policy - achieved after conflicts unilaterally provoked by Serbia (about borderlines), Bulgaria (about Macedonian language and nation), and Greece (about the state's name and symbols) - has paid off with other countries and has received encouragement with the launching of the Balkan Security Pact in July 1999. Although the peoples of this multiethnic central Balkan country have been confronted with many social and economic problems, they have generally managed to avoid violence, have succeeded in establishing a democratic society, and promoted stability through permanent co-operation with the Albanian minority in all fields and on all levels. Macedonia shows promise of creating a Balkan success story.[50]

The Kosovo crisis did not drastically upset the political status quo in Bulgaria and Romania. The two governments have confirmed their pro- Western orientation Brussels gave Sofia and Bucharest national-security guarantees in exchange for their support of Operation Allied Force. In Bulgaria, the left-wing opposition has taken an overt anti-Western stand, abandoning the pro-European consensus previously shared by all political parties.[51] Bulgarian policy seems designed to: 1. avoid being squeezed between its neighbours, Greece, Turkey and Serbia 2. develop a stable internal system politically and economically in a quieter external environment, and 3. make a good case for earlier rather than later access to NATO and EU. This is all very rational. One wonders why the West does not reciprocate by making better use of Bulgaria as a regional moderator.[52]

---

[46] Witkowski: Southeast Europe... op. cit. p.94

[47] Krastev et al. 2010: The Balkans .. op. cit. p. 83

[48] To Macedonian history in former Yugoslavia see John Parker: The Macedonian Problem Solved?. in: The South Slavic Journal No. 6/1983. pp. 12-21

[49] For details see Mitre Arsovski: Hronika na eden neminoven raspad. Skopje 1995

[50] Duncan Perry: Macedonia's Quest for Security and Stability. in: Current History March 2000. 129-136

[51] Krastev et al. 2010: The Balkans op. cit. p. 85

[52] Victoria Gray: The Albanian Diaspora and Security in the Balkans. in: European Security No. 3/1999, pp. 133-148

In Montenegro the war presented a tremendous, even existential challenge to the reformist government. Three developments seem more or less possible at the moment: 1. *Milošević* may stage a coup attempt, 2. President *Milo Đukanović* may preserve the delicate balance and wait for better times to come; and 3. *Đjukanović* may attempt a radical move towards independence.[53]

In the third case the West was reluctant, but helped Montenegro to gain economic independence from Serbia through the introduction of the *Deutschmark* as a parallel currency. In the most extreme scenario, the FRY could break into three independent states, avoiding co-operation despite the close interconnection of the infrastructure.[54] The issue cannot be resolved simply through a decision to hold a referendum by the ruling coalition. Apart from the Situation within the country, Montenegro's Status will depend largely on international arrangements made for the stabilisation of the Balkans and Southeast Europe, as well as on the future developments in Serbia.[55]

Albania seems to be an opposite to Macedonia. Despite its intentions to establish a democratic society, the historical social, political, cultural and economic conditions in Albania present a lot of obstacles on the way to true democracy. The legacy of the past,[56] the extreme poverty of the country, the lack of democratic traditions make Albania's transition to democracy the most difficult of any East European nation.[57] Albania's recent experiences justify concern about the future democracy in this country, in early 1997, Albania collapsed into anarchy and civil war. Foreign troops arrived, new elections were held, a new government was formed, and international assistance started to help rebuild the country. However, lawlessness and violence are continuing, significant problems remain, and the stability is quite fragile. Albania's most serious internal problems are political intolerance, polarisation and a lack of will for reconciliation on all sides.[58]

Another question remains whether the interplay of the Albanian Diaspora - the Kosovars and their KLA, the Albanian minority in Macedonia numbering 430.000, the Albanian community in the USA numbering hundreds of thousands, the large Albanian community in Turkey and others, all linked with local criminals and/or radical Muslim "freedom fighters" - will push Albania into new conflicts with its neighbours.[59] Certain]y Albania is in no condition to fight with anyone, but the high birth rate of Albanians could be seen as a threat by their Slav and Greek neighbours.[60]

The post-war period of Kosovo is characterised by an institutional and security vacuum. The near future of Kosovo is one of an international protectorate, but in the longer run the Albanians of Kosovo appear determined to pursue their state-building and Greater Albania dreams.[61] At issue is whether there is a solution that would satisfy the ethnic Albanian desire

---

[53]   Krastev et al.. 2010: The Balkans... op. cit. p. 85

[54]   Filip Tesar: What has NATO achieved in Kosovo? In: Perspectives No. 13/1999-2000. . 51-58

[55]   Srdjan Darmanovic: Montenegro Survives the War. in: East European Constitutional Review No. 3/1999. pp. 66-67

[56]   For details see Gjergj Fishta: Introduction into the Canon. in: The Balkan Analyst No. 1/1998. pp. 57-85

[57]   Fatos Tarifa: Albania's Post-Cominunist Transition: Can Democracv Thrive? in: Balkan Forum No. 5/1993. pp. 123-133

[58]   Paul Kubicek: Another Balkan Humptv-Dumptv: Putting Albania Back Together. in: European Securitv No. 2/1998. pp. 78-91

[59]   Gray. The Albanian Diaspora... op. cit.. p. 145

[60]   For details see the polish report Artur Górski. Witold Pawlowski: Ile Albanii? in: Polityka No. 16/1999. pp. 3-8

[61]   Lenard J. Cohen: Kosovo:"Nobody's Country"; in: Current History March 200. pp. 117-123

for independence as well as Belgrade's requirement of maintaining the territorial integrity of Serbia by retaining one of its medieval homelands. Although informal partition may not satisfy either side, it might be the only compromise that even begins to resolve the conflict over Kosovo.[62] Ethnic Albanians would rename their area Kosova. The Serbs would occupy the partitioned entity of the Northeast and Northwest, which would retain the name of Kosovo. With respect to the ethnic Albanian population, Serbia and Macedonia fear that Kosovo might unite with Albania to create Greater Albania. This potential unity is a threat to current states in the region because it attracts ethnic Albanians from other parts of the Balkans.[63]

The *Rambouillet* proposal[64] includes substantial autonomy for ethnic Albanians, withdrawal of most Serb forces, disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army, and a referendum within three years for ethnic Albanians to vote on independence.[65] According to the German journalist *Rudolf Augstein*, Editor of the famous magazine *"Der Spiegel"*, especially this referendum was unacceptable for everybody, not only for the Serbs.[66] The *Dayton* accord's aim was an unified state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, composed of two multiethnic entities. Today's Bosnia consists of three de facto monoethnic entities, controlled by Croats (Herceg-Bosna), Serbs (Republika Srpska) and Bosnians. It also has three separate armies, three separate police forces, and a federal government that exists mostly only on paper. Local authorities continue to demand donor aid in return for partial co-operation, or threaten to maintain open obstruction to Dayton's implementation. The constitution (Dayton Annex 4) requires revision. but if the international community permits the revision of *Dayton*, it will open Pandora's box of competing claims. Bosnia and Herzegovina could be "cantonized" and governed by a reduced central government presiding over relatively strong cantons. This option could allow a more rapid return of refugees, it could permit more responsible local politics, and reduce the possibility of Croat and Serb secession. On paper Bosnia is and remains a protectorate, and the complaints of most Bosnians are not that a protectorate exists, but that it is a dysfunctional one and does not protect them.[67]

X   Conclusion

Some observers argue that the Balkan crisis makes it more urgent for NATO to take in new members like Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria in order to expand the zone of stability in the region. On the other hand, NATO's most recent new members. especially Hungary, were hesitant in participating in the Kosovo war. This was hardly a great advertisement for further enlargement. As for Southeast Europe, sceptics will ask whether allied parliaments will be eager to extend solemn new defence commitments to countries from an explosive region whose problems we do not handle very well.[68]

What does it mean to handle problems in an explosive region? NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis followed the pattern that since the establishment of the United Nations, wars have rarely been allowed to follow their natural course. It is an unpleasant truth that war can

---

[62] Tanter. Psarouthakis, Balancing... op. cit. p. 112

[63] Tanter. Psarouthakis, Balancing... op. cit. p. xv

[64] For details see Wolfgang Petritsch et al.: Kosovo Kosova - Mythen. Daten. Fakten. Klagenfurt! Wien/ Ljubljana/ Tuzla/Sarajevo 1999

[65] Tanter. Psarouthakis, Balancing... op. cit. p. xvi

[66] Petritsch. Kosovo... op. cit.

[67] Jan M.B. Lyon: Will Bosnia survive Dayton?. in Current History March 2000, p. 110-116

[68] Rodman. The Fallout... op. cit. p. 48

resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. War brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of violence - imposed cease-fires interrupt the fighting, and each time, the opponents use the pause to recruit, train, and equip additional forces for further combat. Imposed armistices artificially freeze the conflict and perpetuate the state of war indefinitely. Interventions often fall to protect civilians, because multinational military commands tend to avoid any risk of combat, thereby limiting their own effectiveness. Too many wars nowadays become endemic conflicts that never end because the transformative effects are blocked by outside intervention. Policy elites should actively resist the emotional impulse to human suffering. Give war a chance, and appreciate war's paradoxical logic to serve its sole useful function: to bring peace.[69]

<div align="right">

Prof. Dr. habil. Wolf OSCHLIS
Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche Studien (BIOST), Köln

</div>

---

[69] Edward N. Luttwak: Give War a Chance. in: Foreign Affairs No. 4/1999. pp. 36-44