

# **The Changing Face of United Nations Peacekeeping**

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United Nations peacekeeping has come a long way since I first went overseas to Cyprus in 1964. Then, it was a matter of interposing a force between two belligerents while awaiting a political or diplomatic solution. While the notion of interim or temporary may have been a falsehood, at least the status quo, in general terms, existed. A cease-fire, consent of the parties and strict impartiality always prevailed. Second Generation Peacekeeping is a world apart. It is multifaceted, multidimensional, with greater demands on professionalism and integration. To add to this over the past 18 months the Organization has had to cope with what we term the 'surge' in peacekeeping. In 1999 the UN had approximately 12,500 troops deployed. Today there are upwards of 75,000 peacekeepers deployed to 18 Missions worldwide. What brought more pressure on the UN was that most of these surge operations occurred around at the same time - UNMIL (Liberia), ONUB (Burundi), ONUC (Cote 'd'Ivoire) and MINUSTAH (Haiti). In addition, attention was focussed on MONUC (Congo).

Right now, UNMIS (Sudan) is the priority and is engaging much of the UN's energy and effort. This extra surge has created enormous pressure which has led to the need for a more professional and effective approach to

how we do peacekeeping. In other words we have had to move from traditional to complex peacekeeping. This process is well under way as can be evidenced, for example, in MONUC where, for the first time ever the UN has established a Divisional HQ. At HQ the notion of an Integrated Mission Planning Process has been progressed, the concept of which is an interactive approach to integration of planning, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The process is described in a linear form of successive steps but, continuous reassessments and updating plans on the basis of new information or changing circumstances actually make it cyclical.

## **Generating Military Capability:**

The sequence of steps which require action from A. DPKO towards the Mission, followed by B. those of the Mission towards DPKO is essential. Both follow on the authority received by the Security Council Mandate and Subsequently, the Rules of Engagement.

### **A. Actions from DPKO towards Mission**

- **Planning:** Planning process, Peculiarities of the UN planning process, Clear levels of operation and delegation, HQ/ Mission responsibilities, Integration.
- **Preparation & Training:** National training, Pre-deployment training, and Induction training.
- **Resources:** Troop ceiling, Force structure coherent units where possible, Troop capability &

sustainability, Logistic supportability, Troop readiness.

- **Mission Establishment / Transition:** Deployment time, Transition arrangements

## **B. Actions from Mission towards DPKO**

- **Capacity building:** HQ cohesion, Doctrine / SOPs, Timely generation & deployment, Inter-mission cooperation
- **Information Management:** Analysis & advice at the correct level, Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC), integrated mission database.
- **Effectiveness:** Proactive operations, Operational management, Joint Operations Center (JOC) (JLOC), Operational depth.

## **The Actions in Detail**

### **Planning**

The planning process requires an initial estimate with a technical assessment, followed by a concept development and the production of a concept of operations. These must be linked to the Integrated Mission Planning Process, which I referred to earlier. Military planning in the UN context produces its own challenges due to the structure and processes within the Secretariat, and the absence of the normal hierarchical relationship between HQ, at least in the early stages of a mission. It is important for the establishment of a clear distinction between the different levels of the operation and of

ensuring that decisions are taken at the appropriate level as soon as practicable. The Concept of Operations developed by DPKO is intended to provide the broad outline of the plan, to justify the number of troops and the resource requirements after which it should be handed over to the Mission to be refined by the Force Commander. However, in practice, this can be problematic when a Force Commander has yet to be appointed, or the Headquarters properly established. The Concept is intended to cover the military contribution to the implementation of the mandate and will have been coordinated with the other functional areas as part of the planning process but the Mission will need to develop its own integrated campaign plan.

## **Preparation and Training**

The training of UN peacekeepers is primarily a national responsibility and for the deployment of many national contingents, particularly a new Troop Contributing Country, there will be a Pre-deployment assessment visit by Military Division. The UN has developed, over the last few years, standardized training modules to ensure that Member States are delivering to their troop's standardized guidance. The UN gives limited assistance to emerging TCCs either by developing training programs at their national training centers, delivered by trainers from Mil Div or, where feasible, sponsoring military students at established international training centers. In the last 12 months the Military Division's Training and Evaluation Service (TES) has initiated Mission specific pre-deployment training for key

personnel aimed at providing essential mission specific information, acting as a step in achieving headquarters integration and establishing key principles of UN operations (including policy on sexual exploitation and abuse). Also included is specific training for military observers and UNMO leader training. The latest initiative undertaken by TES is induction training, which is training undertaken in the mission area where members of the deploying force are trained in theatre prior to becoming operational. There are currently Mission Training Cells (MTCs) in 16 of the 18 Missions in operation, the only exceptions being UNDOF and UNMIS.

## **Resources:**

The troop strength must be adequate for mandated tasks, therefore it is essential to establish the total requirement at the outset and, so, avoid an incremental approach that inhibits both planning and operations. The structure must be balanced. The force should consist of coherent units, have effective command measures in place, possess adequate reserves, and contain key enablers, which is one of the most demanding tasks for Mil Div at any time. In the recent past it has become a critical issue to generate units that are properly equipped and with the appropriate levels of self-sustainment. Many troop contributing countries find the question of self sustainment a particular challenge. This has led to the notion of a sponsorship arrangement. In relation to MONUC DPKO has been pursuing the agreement by Belgium to provide for the equipping, transporting and sustaining of a

battalion from Benin in advance of its deployment to the mission area. It is to be realized and the timeline is slipping further behind.

There is the need for each mission to have an integrated and joint logistics plan in place and for the Organization one of its greatest challenge, is that of readiness for rapid deployment. The whole question of the UNSAS arrangement requires to be examined with a view to seeking better ways to more rapidly deploy, which I believe is very unlikely to improve under existing conditions.

### **Mission Establishment / Transition**

The conventional force generation and deployment may not be fast enough to achieve the desired result. This is one of the reasons why we have seen an increased number of occasions in which a UN mission has assumed responsibility from another force. This leads to an examination of the inherent challenges faced by such an arrangement. The underlying principle is to sustain a level of capability while transferring responsibility from one force to another, and thus ensure continuity of operations. Examples in the recent past are of the operations in UNMIL, ONUB, ONUCI, and more recently, MINUSTAH.

The transition is often difficult to achieve and can make a force vulnerable for a number of reasons:

- a) Command and control is not fully established.

- b) There might be differences in mandates and ROEs between the forces.
- c) The 'rehabbed' force might not be equipped to UN scales
- d) Problems with self sustainment.
- e) Incoming troops require time for induction
- f) The capability might not match the requirement and takes times to achieve.

### **Minimizing the problems**

There will be a need for the in-place and incoming forces to conduct a joint approach to planning to as great a degree as possible so that the transition plan is mutually agreed. There may also be a difficulty in conducting joint planning in the absence of common doctrinal guidelines and the need to develop them. It will be essential to achieve the necessary level of capability for the force to be credible. Self sustainment will have to be looked at as will the all-important issue of command and control as the forces transition. Different levels and standards of training must be considered

### **Capacity building**

To achieve the cohesion necessary for any UN force it must, first of all, exist at the Force HQ level. There is the requirement for fluid integration, a unity of command and effective joint operations. Much of this can be achieved through a common and standardized approach on doctrine and SOPs. There is an increased awareness

on the issue of flexibility in the utilization of resources, and in inter-mission cooperation, particularly in areas where UN missions are closely linked or in close proximity i.e. MONUC - ONUB or UNMIL - UNAMSIL - ONUCI, and again UNIFIL - UNDOF.

## **Information Management**

With the increased complexity of missions there has become a greater need for a better informed decision making process which demands good information and intelligence, as well as a more proactive approach to information management. This demands a unified reporting of information and a better dissemination of intelligence to all elements of a mission. Recent events have led the organization to re-assess its need for being better informed and thus, being better prepared. The fluid and unpredictable environment into which UN operations are often deployed demand new integration capacities than was the case some time ago. These include the ability to process available information, the product of which is intelligence and to plan and act on this product in an integrated fashion. The structural and conceptual mechanism to meet this capability requirement is the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC). It is a multidisciplinary unit that undertakes analysis of information from all sources, analyses it and provides medium and long term intelligence to the senior mission management to assist the decision making process. It covers the main functional areas of a mission and contains military, civilian police and civilian experts. It seeks information from all sources both in, and outside



the mission. As such, it is the only information management mechanism with responsibility across the full spectrum of activity. It is not a military intelligence cell. It provides intelligence input to current operations but has no responsibility for coordinating those operations, which is the job of the Joint Operations Cell (JOC). It is a mission asset that will work under the direction of the Head of Mission and the priorities and guidance given to the organization will be adjusted and refined as the implementation of the mandate proceeds. The current lack of an accepted UN policy on the JMAC allows the Missions to develop what they think is the best solution. While there is some latitude for designing a JMAC to meet a Mission's needs, i.e. some components like police, formed police units, or even formed military units will not always be present in all PKOs, there must be an overall structure which is common. A policy document is currently being prepared for DPKO senior management.

## **Effectiveness**

Operations must be more focussed and the requirement for good intelligence is so important. There should be clear and unequivocal tasking with clear priorities and a means for measuring success. It is essential to move away from the 'static based' approach of the past, we need to be more imaginative in our use of troops. Operations must be designed to achieve maximum synergy between all elements of the military force, i.e. between contingents and military observers. Joint Operations Centers should be established. There must be

operational depth as to enable each level of operation to function effectively while also providing the capacity for the next level to provide support when required.

## **Operational Depth and Strategic Reserves**

This leads to the final portion of this presentation which is the issue of a Strategic Reserve. Operational depth means the ability to provide for a properly structured force with reserves at each level of an operation. At the tactical level a commander will provide for his reserve within a Battalion or Brigade. Within a force there will be constituted a Force Reserve under operational control of the Force Commander.

**However, no such reserve exists at the Strategic level.** It is essential to make good the existing gap in capability without which UN peacekeeping missions risk loss of credibility and increased risk of failure.

### **The Strategic Reserve should be:**

- A balanced, combined arms formation, whose development is credible and
- capable of influencing the situation. It must be capable of independent action, but
- integrated within the command and control structure of the Mission into whose
- area it is deployed. It should be deployable within a timeframe that meets the
- operational requirement on the ground and be matched with the appropriate

- strategic movement capability.

**Its tasks would include:**

- Stabilization operations acting as reinforcement to an existing Mission whose resources can no longer meet the operational requirement and whose inability to respond will undermine the chances of long term success.
- Act as an interim force pending longer term redeployment and / or reinforcement of a Mission.
- A surge capability to cover specific peak activities for which a Mission does not possess the necessary resources (i.e. elections)
- A show of force capability to reinforce a UN presence.

The concept of the Strategic Reserve is being further developed by DPKO. It is expected that in the negotiations on the UN September Summit, it will be supported by the General Assembly, at the level of Heads of State and Government.