

The Crucible of Sovereignty: Post-Civil War State Reconstruction, Identity Politics, Radicalism and Geopolitical Pragmatism in Tajikistan

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Introduction

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 thrust the Republic of Tajikistan into immediate existential peril. Unlike its Central Asian neighbours, which managed relatively stable transitions to statehood, Tajikistan devolved into a bloody and long-enduring civil war (1991-1997). This conflict not only shattered the embryonic infrastructure of Tajikistan but also revealed its many-sided vulnerability.

Emerging from this chaos, the landlocked, impoverished country in the Pamir has gradually been consolidated by the strong-handed rule of President Emomali Rahmon. In order to support its fragile economy and society, the Tajik state has deployed a dual strategy: constructing a consciously and openly secular, neo-historicist national identity while navigating an intricate web of regional rivalries and shifting superpower influences.¹

The Civil War and the Ascension of Monolithic Power

The Tajik Civil War was a multi-factional conflagration pitting regional elites and secular authorities against the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), itself a fragile coalition heavily backed by Islamist groups. Besides this conflict, inherited regional rivalries of clans, groups politicians from Khodjand, Dushanbe, Kulob, Gharm, Pamiri people, ex-Soviet war veterans and Uzbek ethnic militias of Tajikistan, Tajik groups of Ahmad Shah Masoud from Afghanistan all had their negative impact.²

¹ As for the Tajiks, their roots and history see: Richard Folz, *The History of the Tajiks, Iranians of the East*, I. B. Tauris: London 2023.

² A very good and recent study on the Tajik civil war: Parviz Mullojonov, *The history of the Tajik civil war, 1992-1997*. Contemporary Central Asia, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022; Akbarzadeh, Shahram, "Why did nationalism fail in Tajikistan?," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48 (7), 1996: 1105-1129.

Paradoxically, the resolution of this conflict was catalyzed by an external shock: the rapid ascent of the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan. The emergence of a fundamentalist Taliban government in Kabul between 1996 and 1997 posed an existential threat to almost all factions within Tajikistan. This shared anxiety forced a partial, pragmatic so-called reconciliation among the warring domestic groups, culminating in the 1997 peace accords, end of which saw the gradual emergence of Rahmon's rule.

Within this volatile environment, Emomali Rahmon of Kulobi origin gradually consolidated his own power. Initially rising to prominence in 1994 as a balancing figure between different political groups. After 1997 Rahmon systematically and gradually dismantled both the opposition and competing regional clans. By 2004, he had emerged as the undisputed, monolithic ruler of Tajikistan.³

Today, Emomali Rahmon governs a landlocked country with more and more signs of connections towards China and Russia. Despite his absolute control, a low level of Islamist militancy remains a localized threat, particularly in the historically rebellious Gharm region and via the cross-border activities of Jamaat-i Ansarullah radical Islamist group in the rugged Afghan-Tajik borderlands of Badakhshan where the Pamir, the Panj and the Amu-darya river hardly represent a barrier between the two countries.⁴

The Engineering of Tajik Identity: Nationalism, Secularism, and the Anti-Islamic Crusade

To legitimize his permanent rule and immunize the population against political Islam, Rahmon engineered a state-directed cultural renaissance. This campaign relies heavily on Pan-Iranism, "Sogdianism", and a romanticized cult surrounding Ismail Samani, the 9-10th-century mighty ruler of the Samanid Empire.

³ See Mullojonov, 2022.

⁴ Helena Rytövuori-Apunen, Furugzod Usmonov, 'Tajikistan's Unsettled Security, "Borderland Dynamics of the Outpost on Russia's Afghan Frontier", in *The Regional Security Puzzle around Afghanistan: Bordering Practices in Central Asia and Beyond*, ed. H. Rytövuori-Apunen, Opladen, Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2016, 131-160; Franz Marty, "How the Taliban Guard Afghanistan's Border (and What It Says About Their Regime)," *The Diplomat*, August 8, 2023.

Modern Tajik nationalism systematically co-opts Old Persian, Sasanian, and Sogdian historical motifs. For instance, the *derafsh-i kavian* – the mythical Kayanian banner of the Sasanian Empire – now serves as the official symbol of the Tajik presidency. The state pantheon of ancient national heroes has been carefully populated with figures who resisted foreign or Arab conquests, including: Isma’il Samani (The most formidable ruler of the Samanid dynasty and the first Tajik ruler), King Dewashtich (The last independent Sogdian monarch in Panjikent before the Arab conquest); Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Achaemenid dynasty and the conqueror of Central Asia, and Spitamenes the anti-Macedonian local rebel, Ya’qub al-Laith, an anti-Abbasid rebel and the founder of the Saffarid dynasty among others.

This historicist ideology is reinforced by sweeping top-down linguistic and toponymic engineering. Tajikistan officially prohibited Russian name suffixes (*-ov, -ova, -ev, -eva*), mandating a return to Persian naming conventions. Towns and geographic landmarks have been systematically purged of Turkic or Soviet names; for example, the city of Ura-Tyube was renamed Istaravshan, and the Pamir Highway’s highest pass, the Kyrgyz-named Aq-Baital, was renamed Hushang. Villages across the country are regularly named after classical Persian poets like Ferdowsi and Hafez. This cultural campaign reached an apex when President Rahmon personally financed and recently donated a copy of Ferdowsi’s epic, the *Shahname*, to every single household in the country which I myself managed to acquire recently in Tajikistan.⁵

Concurrently, Tajik state authorities wage a highly intrusive campaign against public expressions of Islam, viewing religious orthodoxy as a direct precursor to political subversion. A draconian regulatory apparatus enforces the following restrictions: Compulsory bans on beards in case of young Tajik men; attempts to prohibit Arabic-sounding first names;⁶ a ban on the production,

⁵ Абулкосимни Фирдавсӣ, *Шоҳнома, Тӯҳфа аз номи Президенти Ҷумҳурии Тоҷикистон, Асосгузори сулҳу ваҳдати миллӣ – Пешвои миллат, муҳтафам Эмомалӣ Раҳмон ба шарафи ҷаиши 35-солагии Истиқлолияти давлатӣ ба ҳаф як оилаи кишвар*, Ҷилди I, Dushanbe 2025.

⁶ Though based on my own recent experiences, the current situation is changing and in rural Tajikistan many newborn children have Arabic first names despite the official ban of first names of Arabic origin. Ethnic and religious minorities have more freedom to choose an Arabic name in Tajikistan, but I experienced the same among ethnic Sunni Tajiks as well.

import, or export of foreign Islamic literature without strict state approval; criminalization of witchcraft, sorcery,⁷ and related media content. Complete ban on mosque attendance for women and youth under 18; ban on *hajj* for citizens under 40. Prohibition of loudspeakers for the *adhan* (call to prayer); closure of independent madrassahs and ban on unsanctioned foreign Islamic schooling. Ban on all Islamist political parties; up to 12 years imprisonment for providing unofficial Islamic education.⁸

On the other hand, while Rahmon somehow aims at restricting Islamic customs and manners in Tajikistan, he utilizes Islam to bolster his own cult. He performed his fourth *Umrah* (minor pilgrimage) to Mecca alongside senior officials and family members, thus maintaining a state-sanctioned monopoly over religious piety.

Islamist radical groups active in Tajikistan

As far as the Islamist/Salafist groups linked to Tajikistan or present in Tajikistan or influencing Tajik nationals are concerned, there are several groups active in and near Tajikistan.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP): The regional branch of the Islamic State residing in Afghanistan has become one of the most active threats. After its expulsion from Iraq, ISKP has heavily recruited Tajik nationals – both domestically and among migrant workers abroad – and has been linked to high-profile terrorist plots and attacks regionally and internationally. ISKP cells were probably responsible for the terrorist attack in Kerman during the commemoration of the fourth anniversary of the assassination of general Qasem Soleimani in 2024. Possibly an ISIS-ISKP group was responsible for the killing of four western cyclists 55 miles south of Dushanbe in 2018.⁹

⁷ Anna Cieřlewska, “Why is Tajikistan persecuting witchcraft?,” *Turan Tales*, Episode 19, <https://turantalessubstack.com/p/episode-19-why-is-tajikistan-fighting>.

⁸ Carol Morello, “Kerry urges Tajikistan not to go overboard in its crackdown on Islam,” *The Washington Post*, November 3, 2015.

⁹ Dragana Jovanovic, “2 American cyclists among 4 dead in Tajikistan attack claimed by ISIS,” *abc News*, July 31, 2018, <https://abcnews.com/International/american-cyclists-dead-terror-attack-tajikistan/story?id=56911753>.

Jamaat-i Ansarullah: Also known as the 'Tajikistani Taliban', this militant group was founded by dissident Islamists who opposed the 1997 peace agreement that ended the Tajik Civil War. The Jamaat Ansarullah is a fiercely anti-Rahmon political and militant group which regularly threatens Tajikistan's leadership. Its members and leadership moved to Afghanistan after 1997 and are maintaining bases near the Tajik border. Operating largely out of safe havens along the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border, its stated goal is to overthrow the government in Dushanbe. After 2021, the return of Taliban to power in Afghanistan, the Jamaat-i Ansarullah showed more signs of activism, and they have been possibly involved in the attacks against border areas of Tajikistan in the south-western Khatlon provinces in late 2025 and early 2026. These drone attacks mainly targeted Chinese workers hired by Chinese companies mainly active in gold mining or infrastructure development, in some cases Tajik border forces responded to these attacks killing some members of the Jamaat-i Ansarullah. It is not exactly clear what the goals of these attacks are, but these attacks try to weaken the reliability of Tajikistan in the eyes of China. Recently, Tajik authorities are building a new fence system¹⁰ along the Panj river and are strictly monitoring the other side of the river. Afghan citizens are not allowed to enter Tajikistan in order to prevent the infiltration of Jamaat-i Ansarullah members. At the same time Tajikistan is exporting electricity to Afghanistan and despite the ideological and political differences and problems, there is a channel of communication between the two countries where Tajik state partnership and exported electricity matter more than the Jamaat-i Ansarullah sporadic attacks mainly in Khatlon and less in Badakhshan.¹¹

¹⁰ In the past few years, I made field works in southern Tajikistan and the rapid development of border fence system is remarkable when comparing the current situation with that of 2024 and 2025. I visited the areas of Qal'a-i Khum where there are now major efforts of fence construction on the Tajik side of the Panj river.

¹¹ Dr. Mélanie Sadozaï, "The Tajik-Afghan Borderland – What's going on and how we got here," *Turan Tales podcast*, Episode 27, January 2026, <https://turantales.substack.com/p/episode-27-the-tajik-afghan-borderland>.

Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT): Formerly the only legal Islamist-based political party in Central Asia and part of the post-civil war government coalition, the IRPT was outlawed and designated a terrorist organization by the Tajik government in 2015.¹²

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) / Islamic Party of Turkestan: A regional militant group aiming to overthrow Central Asian governments, with historical operational roots touching Tajikistan and affiliations with al-Qaeda. The IMU used to have bases in remote and mountainous areas of Tajikistan which then greatly worried Uzbekistan before 2010.

Transnational and Regional Groups: Groups like Hizb al-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood are strictly banned, and Tajik authorities regularly carry out arrests and trials of individuals accused of affiliation with them.

Rise in transnational terrorism

Between 2012 and 2018, Tajikistan emerged as the third-largest per capita source of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, with more than 2,000 citizens joining extremist organizations. A significant majority aligned with the Islamic State (ISIS), including Gulmurod Khalimov,¹³ the former chief of Tajikistan's OMON paramilitary police, who rose to become the group's War Minister. Following the collapse of the Bashar al-Asad government, Tajik fighters extended their presence by integrating into the military administration of the newly established Syrian regime.

Recent attacks and international scrutiny

Operational cells tied to ISIS-Khorasan (ISKP) have increasingly utilized ethnic Tajik operatives for high-profile regional and international operations: In January 2024, an ethnic Tajik carried out a dual suicide bombing in Iran,

¹² Rahmon's visit to Saudi Arabia to make his umrah in 2015 is generally linked to his breach with Iran when it was revealed that Iran started supporting the by then illegal and banned Islamic Renaissance Party causing an outrage in the leadership of Tajikistan. This Iranian step led to the quick deterioration of contacts between Iran and Tajikistan which were mainly restored in the past few years.

¹³ On the life of Khalimov see: Catherine Putz, "Is Tajikistan's Most Famous Militant Gulmurod Khalimov Dead?," *The Diplomat*, April 18, 2017.

killing nearly 100 people. In March 2024, four Tajik nationals executed a mass shooting outside Moscow in Crocus City Hall, killing 139 individuals and wounding 150. The surge in cell activity led French intelligence to place the domestic Tajik diaspora under strict surveillance as a precautionary measure during the 2024 Paris Summer Olympics.

The Moscow theatre attack triggered a particular political backlash against Tajik populations across Eurasia when anti-Tajik sentiment became very high in Russian and Kazakh societies: Both Russia and Kazakhstan implemented strict anti-Tajik security measures, leading to aggressive deportations of Tajik citizens. The forced repatriation of migrant Tajik workers back to Tajikistan struck a severe blow to Tajikistan's domestic stability, as remittances from abroad – predominantly from workers stationed in Russia – historically constitute over 50% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP).¹⁴

Geopolitical Realignment: Navigating between global power ambitions

Tajikistan's geographical isolation makes it highly vulnerable to foreign influence. Historically dependent on Russia for security, Dushanbe has witnessed a noticeable decline in Moscow's regional hegemony since 2022, a shift accelerated by Russia's preoccupation with its war in Ukraine. Although Russia maintains its sizable 201st Military Base near Dushanbe, its failure to intervene decisively during the 2022 Kyrgyz-Tajik border conflict severely weakened its credibility as a security guarantor.

This vacuum has been partly filled by China at least in the field of economy. In the past decades China has emerged as the sole major economic investor in the Tajik economy. Beijing funds critical infrastructure, including the strategic Rogun Dam, gold mines, and civic architecture such as the parliament building in Dushanbe. However, this economic life raft has some unwelcoming consequences: environmental degradation and territorial concessions on

¹⁴ See an archived Country profile of Tajikistan of the by now regrettably defunct CIA World Factbook:
<https://web.archive.org/web/20050226190634/http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Tajikistan.pdf>, downloaded: 13 July 2026.

behalf of Tajikistan. Following a 1999 border treaty ratified in 2011, Dushanbe ceded approximately 1,000 square kilometres of the strategically vital Pamir Mountains to China based on age-old Chinese territorial disputes with the former Tsarist Empire.¹⁵

For its part, the United States occupies a highly transactional niche in Tajik foreign policy. Following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, President Rahmon apparently exploited Washington's "War on Terror" to marginalize and to ban his domestic opponents by framing them as dangerous Islamist extremists. While the U.S. continues to provide modest funding for counter-narcotics and border management, it offers no substantial contributions to the broader Tajik economy.

Iran: Shared Heritage and Tactical Friction

Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran are rooted in a shared Persian linguistic and cultural past, though they are structurally complicated by religious differences; Tajiks are predominantly Sunni, while Iranians are overwhelmingly Twelver Shi'i. Furthermore, the dominant Kulabi clan headed by Rahmon within the Tajik government remains fiercely anti-Islamist.

One must note, however, that Tehran played a constructive role in mediating the 1997 peace accords, and later constructed the vital Anzob Tunnel north of Dushanbe. However, relations started souring after 2015 when Rahmon accused Iran of harbouring members of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party, resulting in the expulsion of Iranian firms. Recently, however, a modest reconciliation took place, driven by a more pragmatic, less ideologically

¹⁵ For Chinese influence see this short but important paper: Terra Daily Editorial Team, "China's influence grows in poor neighbour Tajikistan," *Terra Daily*, June 25, 2012, <https://terradaaily.com/chinas-influence-grows-in-poor-neighbour-tajikistan-999/>. The bilingual and in Dushanbe widely distributed Chinese-Tajik journal called *Payvand* (Connection) is also a good source for the study of Chinese-Tajik contacts.

biased approach from both sides. This normalization culminated in reciprocal 30-day visa-free travel regimes between the two nations recently.¹⁶

Uzbekistan: From Entrenched Enmity to Pragmatic Alignment

Historically, Tajik-Uzbek relations were defined by demographic friction, closed borders, and sharp anti-Turkic rhetoric from Dushanbe. A massive Tajik minority resides in historic Uzbek cultural hubs like Samarkand and Bukhara, while roughly 15% of Tajikistan's population belongs to the Uzbek community. Despite the critical military aid provided by Islam Karimov, the president of Uzbekistan to Rahmon during the Tajik civil war, disputes over the construction of the Rogun Dam and water distribution in the Amudarya basin caused strained relations between Tashkent and Dushanbe before 2016.¹⁷

This dynamic shifted dramatically following the ascension of Shavkat Mirziyoyev to the Uzbek presidency in 2016. Borders became opened, citizens of both countries were permitted to enter the other country with their ID card, cross-border infrastructure was restored, and the population of western Tajikistan began utilizing the modernized Samarkand airport. Today, both states are bound by a shared secular ideology and a mutual fear of Taliban-induced radicalization.

¹⁶ In 2012 Uzbek-Tajik borders were all closed between Samarqand and Panjikent and between Khodjand and Tashkent. After 2017 there have been major improvement in this sense and now several border crossings are open for citizens of both countries. It is also remarkable to see the posters in the border areas where Tajik-Uzbek eternal friendship is hailed and praised illustrated with the handshaking of Emomali Rahmon and Shavkat Mirziyayev, the presidents of the two countries. Sadokat Jalolova, "Uzbekistan and Tajikistan Launch 10 Joint Projects During Rahmon's State Visit," *The Times of Central Asia*, March 27, 2026, <https://timesca.com/uzbekistan-and-tajikistan-launch-10-joint-projects-during-rahmons-state-visit/>.

¹⁷ However, in 2018 Uzbekistan dropped its opposition during Mirziaev presidency to the Rogun Dam according to this paper: Joseph Hammond, "Uzbekistan and Tajikistan: No more dam problems?," *The DefensePost*, July 30, 2018, <https://thedefensepost.com/2018/07/30/uzbekistan-tajikistan-no-more-rogun-dam-problems/>.

Kyrgyzstan: The Fire of Irredentism

In stark contrast to the Uzbek normalization, Tajikistan's relationship with Kyrgyzstan remains highly volatile. The two states are locked in zero-sum disputes over water allocation and non-ratified, poorly demarcated post-Soviet borders in the Ferghana Valley. This friction erupted into bloody, full-scale border wars between 2021 and 2022.

Exploiting the withdrawal of Russian diplomatic attention, the Tajik military secured modest territorial advantages in disputed exclave zones. Later, however, a comprehensive, mutual peace agreement was signed, stabilizing the border and prompting an exodus of ethnic Kyrgyz from the Tajik Pamirs back to Kyrgyzstan.

Afghanistan: A Dangerous Interdependency

The relationship with Afghanistan is Tajikistan's most volatile foreign policy challenge. Approximately 28% of Afghanistan's population speaks Dari/Tajik dialects, and since the Taliban's return to power in 2021, Rahmon has loudly demanded the inclusion of ethnic Tajiks in the Kabul government.

Despite this harsh rhetoric, Dushanbe maintains a deeply pragmatic approach, continuously exporting electricity southward into Afghanistan. The primary threat remains the safe haven Afghanistan provides to Jamaat-i Ansarullah (JAU), an extremist Tajik militant group. Operating out of Afghan Badakhshan, the JAU occasionally continues to launch sporadic cross-border incursions, including deadly drone strikes against Chinese nationals working in Tajik mining sectors.¹⁸

¹⁸ See our previous chapter about the Islamist radical groups active in and around Tajikistan: Mumin Ahmadi, Mullorajab Yusufi, Nigori Fazliddin, "Exclusive: Taliban Puts Tajik Militants Partially In Charge Of Afghanistan's Northern Border," *Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty*, July 27, 2021, <https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-tajik-militants-border/31380071.html>. Amin Kawa, "Killing of Tajik Border Guards and Taliban Silence: Regional Security Threats on the Rise," *Hasht-e Subh Daily*, December 27, 2025, <https://8am.media/eng/killing-of-tajik-border-guards-and-taliban-silence-regional-security-threats-on-the-rise/>.

The Pamir Dilemma: The Fragile Autonomy of GBAO

No issue highlights the internal contradictions of the modern Tajik state more clearly than the Mountainous Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO). Spanning the vast Pamir Mountains, GBAO covers nearly half of Tajikistan's landmass but holds a mere 3% of its population.¹⁹

The Pamiri population differs fundamentally from the ruling Sunni, Persian-speaking elites in Dushanbe. They speak distinct southeastern Iranian languages and practice Shi'i Nizari Ismaili Islam. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Aga Khan Development Network stepped in to fund local infrastructure, healthcare, and the University of Central Asia and in general to support the Ismaili community in Tajikistan. While initially tolerated by Dushanbe, this independent financial lifeline quickly raised state suspicions, as it fostered a distinct Pamiri identity that resisted assimilation into Rahmon's ethno-nationalist framework.

Consequently, GBAO has been subjected to a stricter state-led militarization. Dushanbe's policy of centralization has triggered periodic waves of civil unrest and violent military crackdowns:

A number of violent clashes and demonstrations have occurred in the region since the end of the civil war, with major incidents of civil unrest in 2012, 2014, 2018, 2021, and 2022 clashes erupted on 24 July 2012 between the Tajik military and militants loyal to the former warlord Tolib Ayombekov after Ayombekov was accused of murdering a Tajik general.²⁰

¹⁹ As for the history of the Ismailis of the Pamir, a very good introduction we can find in the great book of Dagikhudo Dagiev, *Central Asian Ismailis: An Annotated Bibliography of Russian, Tajik and Other Sources*, Tauris, 2022, 1-63. For some cultural and religious aspects of Ismailis of Badakhshan see: Miklós Sárközy Alamūt and Badakhshān: *Newly Identified Sargudhasbt-i Sayyidnā Manuscripts and their Background, Texts, Scribes and Transmission Manuscript Cultures of the Ismaili Communities and Beyond*, ed. W. A. Momin, I. B. Tauris, 2022, 207-235.

²⁰ "What is happening in Tajikistan? Up-to-date information on recent events in Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) and their historical background," *Roof-top Info*, September 5, 2025, <https://wechange.de/project/roof-top-info/file/background-information-on-the-situation-in-kh/download/Background-information-on-the-situation-in-Khorugh.pdf>.

On 18 May 2022, around 200 anti-government demonstrators, led by a local Ismaili leader named Boqir Mammadboqirov blocked a road Roshan which led to the regional capital Khorog. The violent clashes between military forces of Tajikistan and some local Ismaili rebel groups in 2012, 2014, 2018, 2021 and in 2022 are well documented in the press.

Spectators assess that these actions by the government are part of as strategy to gain full political control over the formerly autonomous Gorno-Badakhshan Region, and by eliminating local clans, culminated in the assassination of several influential local leaders.

As a consequence, a significant number of young Nizari Ismailis moved abroad (among others to Poland²¹ and other countries) and the state implemented a stronger control over Ismaili Jamaatkhanas in Khorog and Dushanbe.²²

Conclusion

Thirty-five years after gaining independence, the Republic of Tajikistan stands as a testament to the enduring scars of civil conflict. Under the presidency of Emomali Rahmon, the state has achieved a gradual internal stability. By replacing traditional Islam with a state-engineered, pre-Islamic Persian identity and utilizing secular legal codes, Tajikistan seeks to insulate itself from regional radicalization.

Yet, trapped by its own geography, deeply indebted to Chinese capital, and surrounded by a volatile southern border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan's highly centralized model remains somewhat fragile, while other borders with Uzbekistan, China and Kyrgyzstan look now safe and well-controlled by Tajik authorities. The country's future depends entirely on its ability to balance great power rivalries while controlling domestic discontent along with maintaining stability of its southern borderlands shared with Afghanistan.

²¹ It is important to note that in the past three decades Poland became a place for asylum for several Tajik opposition figures, groups and the Ismailis of Pamir who fled Tajikistan now have at least two jamaatkhanas now in in Warsaw and Rzeszow, in southern Poland based on social media data.

²² Jamaatkhanas are recently closed for non-Ismaili visitors in Tajikistan due to security reasons.