Civil-Military Interaction: The Test Case of Afghanistan – a Country Background

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Foreword

In order to understand this brief presentation it is useful to take into account the results of the Workshop on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)[1] recently held at the National Defence Academy as well as the respective publications by Markus Gauster[2], Walter Feichtinger and Predrag Jureković[3], dealing with the intervention in Afghanistan. I am using information from earlier visits to Afghanistan (2003–2005) and from a recent visit in August/September 2006.[4] The accessible literature is extensive and sometimes very difficult to observe, with respect to reliability and accuracy. In many cases journalists and eyewitnesses produce more useful primary source information rather than professional observers or experts from their respectively distanced positions. I am careful to use all kinds of sources, however with scepticism including my own ability to interpret things in a comprehensive way. Karin Kneissl has rightly pointed out that many highly valuable sources and early warnings were not adequately used by the politicians in charge, as for instance the numerous articles on Al-Qaeda published in *Jane's*. On the other hand,

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[1] Workshop „Provincial Reconstruction Teams auf dem Prüfstand: Taugliche Instrumente für Kleinstaaten zur Mitwirkung am internationalen Krisenmanagement?" National Defence Academy, Vienna, 17 October 2006.

[2] Markus Gauster: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. Ein innovatives Instrument des internationalen Krisenmanagements auf dem Prüfstand. Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie 11/2006, Vienna, 2006.

[3] Walter Feichtinger and Predrag Jureković (Eds.): Internationales Konfliktmanagement im Fokus. Baden-Baden 2006 (Nomos), pp. 187 (Markus Gauster).

[4] Earlier reports can be obtained and used for comparison with more recent assessments and corrections of previous judgments, although some information stems from sources not to be disclosed. Reports on former missions in higher education and political analyses can be obtained through michael.daxner@uni-oldenburg.de.

less valuable information has gained in importance, simply by being recycled often enough and falling on fertile ground. I am saying this, because some self-appointed experts on terrorism or on the political situation in crisis areas tend to dominate discourses which are so sensitive to human lives and add to the complexity of conflicts so that some caution is necessary, as is openness, which must not bend to opportune political correctness.

Yet another methodological aspect should be pointed out at this point. Sometimes, ordinary news in the media, mainly in serious newspapers and international networks, are diffused and presented as expert studies and research. On the other hand, a lot of data and facts based on prejudice or rumours that have never been looked at with scholarly scrutiny, which makes them unreliable from an analytical point of view. I am pointing this out, because I am following a discussion that is drifting into the dangerous waters influencing both public opinion and political decisions. The situation in Afghanistan is being described either in overly pessimistic terms or in terms of comforting progress reports, however, hardly ever referring to the complexity of the situation or the background as it presents itself to the observers in Afghanistan. In crisis situations news also affect practices and influence political decisions. This is part of another sphere of my interest, which can be called an *anthropological investigation* of the new culture emerging from the post-conflict intervention scenario. Therefore, my scepticism is to be seen as protection rather than due restraints of a scientist moving on political grounds.

Of course, the first question is, whether or not we have a *post-conflict* situation in Afghanistan. I would tend to say no, as there is still *war and bellicose conflict* in large parts of the country, while only some parts of Afghanistan are in a truly post-conflict situation.

1. The return of the Taliban – An interface with history

The Taliban and the drug industry are the most challenging threats to a peaceful reconstruction of Afghanistan: The findings of the UN Security

Council visit to the country are not surprising.[5] Six years after the liberation of the country from the Taliban regime, there is little hope for sustained and durable peace, as long as the Taliban are fighting fiercely to regain liberated areas in the south and east of the country. I shall first deal with the question of why so many people defect to the Taliban, giving up their peaceful positions as citizens, police (Afghan National Police) or military (Afghan National Army). Indeed, there are three plausible answers. One is that the Taliban are simply more convincing and efficient in granting *social protection* to poor people in the rural areas. The international community of states (ICS) has not delivered what would have been necessary[6] and what has been promised since 2001. Secondly and more severe regarding its consequences: People feel that the Taliban better represent what could be called their lifestyle with its rules and traditions.[7] The Taliban's anti-Western attitude – with or without Wahhabi-indoctrination – is gaining ground throughout the country, not only because of the ever so often unfortunate behaviour of the ICS as well as of ISAF but especially of the Coalition Forces. Thirdly, being less obvious but related to the second one: Taliban are predominantly

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[5] Deutschlandfunk, 14 November 2006, and other press releases.

[6] Tom Koenigs, SRSG OF UNAMA, is very outspoken on this point; cf. his interview in The FAS, 5 November 2006, p.12: [*...*] *rebellion comes, where development is only slowly trickling.[...] Reforms of the government haven't yet had impact. In parts, they are not even wanted. In the countryside, people speak of family, religion and harvest, and the government has not had any delivery in these fields [...]. Development is also supply with security, law courts and administration. We realize now that this has been missed [...].* (translation by Michael Daxner).

[7] However, analysts differ with regard to the essential qualities of the Taliban. Pohly, at this conference, attests only little sympathy by the people for the Taliban and contests the qualification of the Taliban as traditionalists against the traditions of tribal kinship. But most other experts agree on the qualification of the Taliban as *traditionalists*, as opposed to the Mujaheddin, who are *fundamentalist extremists*. The difference is important when it comes to practical measures, whenever one of the two groups had or has a grip on power; even the suppression of human rights, women, freedom of information are handled in a slightly different way, apart from the fundamental issue of corruption and legitimacy. Cf. Girardet and Walter, with John Buff: Taliban. In: Girardet and Walter: Afghanistan, 2nd. Ed., Geneva 2004, p.48; this book has a very good bibliography; Kathy Gannon: I is for Infidel. Public affairs, New York 2005; Ahmed Rashid. Taliban. Yale UP 2001; Tom Koenigs explains the popularity of the Taliban with the failure to deliver *expected* improvements.

Pashtun and the Pashtun rules of balancing political differences follow patterns, which are very different from what Western theorists understand as democratic or simply civic. Since all extreme movements in Afghanistan are of rural origin,[8] it is more likely that these traditional patterns are still alive, at least subliminally, and are now *resurfacing*.

All three answers *in combination* make the situation more difficult. What we call defection is a tribal rule, which has been practiced for a long time, at least until the invasion of the Soviet troops.[9] This explains clearly, why so many prominent political leaders, even the most extreme ones, have changed sides against all expectations. "I change, you change, he changes. Everyone changes,"[10] said Hekmatjar, referring to one of his short-lived alliances with formerly detested communist Dostum. It does not make sense to adopt a system of systematic treason or defection as a political pattern[11] Yet, on the other hand, would a more lenient attitude towards defection not allow President Karzai to try at least a partial cooperation and re-integration with the Taliban, as he suggested some time in spring 2006? To become a Talib is a choice, not a destiny.

The system of joining the opposition in order to get maximum gains by minimal moves within a fixed pattern had been observed some 50 years ago, but there is no reason, why this should not be the case today, even if

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[8] Kathy Gannon 2005, p.16

[9] A good survey on diverse tribal political rules is offered by Fredrik Barth: Features of person and society in Swat. Collected essays on Pathans. Selected essays Vol. 2, Routledge and Kegan Paul, (London 1981).

[10] Kathy Gannon 2005, p.17.

[11] It would stigmatise a people, if its leaders were as adaptable and opportunistic as anyone else and, on top of it, followed rules, which have different roots than our positive rule of law. If you will, you can grant them the same privilege of *exceptionalism* as some of our Western political leaders do for themselves. Thomas Franck: Are Human Rights Universal? Foreign Affairs Vol. 80 No. 1 (2001), 191-204. This, by the way, makes Gannon's reports a bit difficult, because she is sometimes quick to label the Taliban as *consistent* or *moderate*, forgetting her own principle of judging only in context.

in a rather residual and downgraded way.[12] This refers to the Pashtuns and I am sure that we can find similar patterns of defection within Tadjik ranks although not to the Taliban but to different fiefdoms of warlords, since it is generally believed that Tadjiks are traditionally less oriented towards tribal structures but more to territorial rulers. There is proof that the Americans, when seeking land for their pipeline, negotiated with tribal chiefs after the Soviet occupiers had left the country.[13]

I have started with this example of resurfacing traditions, as I think that most of the international forces on the territory know too little about the people they are directing. This is remarkable as for decades, Afghanistan had been the object of anthropological and sociological investigations and intelligence gathering. The literature is extensive and many results are well known to the scientific community. Either one did not care about the intelligence information during the operations following 9/11, be it out of arrogance and the feeling of superiority or intentionally because the masters of the intervention aimed at changing the system. The latter would point in the direction of an analogy with the US strategy in Iraq.

2. What should be taken into account and needs to be better understood in the future?

In the recent history of Afghanistan there are not many examples of a national myth that could constitute the vision of a nation state or stimulate attempts to establish such an entity. The notion of a "nation" is rather alien to the majority of the people and building a nation with a central state authority, i.e. government, legislation and judiciary, is a futile undertaking. This is a daring statement, because whenever progress reports are presented, they refer to strengthening the authority of the central government under President Hamid Karzai.

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[12] Barth 1981: Segmentary Opposition and the Theory of Games: A Study of Pathan Organisation, 55-82.
[13] Ahmed Rashid: Taliban. Yale UP, 2001.

What do we know about the needs of the people in a country, consisting of many ethnicities and which are split up into many tribal and local factions? The situation is certainly not post-war, because in the south and some eastern parts of the country there *is* war-like action going on. Certainly, it is a new war. It does not help to denounce the volatile trend to *define* the new wars and conflicts in other ways than earlier confrontations.[14] One of the challenges posed by these new types of confrontations is that the "curve" between peace-keeping and peace-building areas has become blurred and there is no clear line between where and when civil-military action can begin and where the security of the combat forces is determining *all* civilian action. This is one of the main things to be investigated through field research and on-site investigation. No applicable theory is at hand to cope with this challenge. On the other hand, it is important to deal with some theoretical considerations, because the background of all CIMIC and humanitarian justifications has also moved positions.

For Afghanistan the questions are very clear and embarrassing: What issues on the civilian level should be given priority? Where and when is it legitimate to further destroy or change a culture and its traditions, in order to establish the rule of human rights or simply a local rule of law? And under what circumstances is this neither legitimate nor feasible? What elements of culture are emerging from the conflict and are constitutive for a societal constellation unknown before? In brief: How do we cope with the new culture of intervention – with civil or military means or both?

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[14] Cf. Jürgen Wagner: "Neue Kriege" als Wegbereiter des Euro-Imperialismus. *Wissenschaft & Frieden* 3/06, 58-62, is a good example for this denunciation. The author attacks the new theories, especially by Mary Kaldor and Herfried Münkler, as to prepare for new imperialistic policies. Wagner calls them "intellectual arsonists", thus falling into the trap of a nominalist inclination towards a kind of malevolent conspiracy. If we had no new terms for what is happening, we would still have to consider how to cope with the new and unprepared-for situations. I would accept criticism, if the new theories would not point at dangerous changes in the overall constellation, e.g. the weakening of international law or the bypassing of relevant conventions, like in the torture cases. But these events occur because of changes in the political and moral composition of the actors, and not because of a new theory. Cf. also OSCE 5th Seminar on Military Doctrines, Vienna, 2006.

NATO Directions on CIMIC have already addressed these questions. In Section 2 of the relevant document[15] all potential areas of CIMIC implementation are touched upon, though not on the level of guidelines translatable for practical application. I am not criticizing the outline or framework of these guidelines but it is hard to break them down in a reality that calls for daily decisions on PRT-level or under strong pressure from politics and the media, while the soldiers are expected to cope with situations they have never been prepared for.

Let me try to give a few examples for possible answers. All rules, regulations and guidelines provide orientation as to how the military forces are to understand themselves in what they are doing and how they communicate with the local people and with their civilian counterparts in the international community. But there are no rules to define how both groups will actually perceive them. A common interest and common rules of behaviour and communication can be established through negotiation within the international community. But is this also the case with the local people, and if so, does it work on all levels and deal with every issue of concern?

A concrete example: One PRT that I visited was proud to understand itself as a *partner* of a local community, as it constructed new bridges and buildings for them. The work was appreciated by the locals, however not as something coming from friends or partners but as a kind of *spin-off*, which the military has established in order to strengthen *its own* self-protection. Such a tiny difference in perception is very important when it comes to sustainable confidence building and cooperation.

Another example on a more general level: There are CIMIC actions that might be exploited by insurgents or Taliban to fuel adversity and hatred against the operating forces. In such cases it might be that the military is not perceived as an illegitimate occupation force but *only* as a violator of religious or cultural orthodoxy or, in less general terms, as an irritation to the local peers and landlords. It is helpful to know what reaction is likely to occur (sometimes the level of reaction can be determined on the

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[15] NATO MC 411/1 (18-Jan-2001).

basis of reactions that do *not* follow an action). The disgraceful skull-event of German ISAF soldiers did not have the consequences German politicians feared and are still afraid of. But why could rural Muslims then become so enraged when the Mullahs preached about the Danish cartoons? It is not always justified to simply blame the media or to assume that the locals react irrationally. There is a lot of bias and prejudice in such quick assumptions.

3. The background of civil-military cooperation

It is very difficult to develop a single master plan or rationale for CIMIC in a country where you have different war-zones, different civilizations and different approaches on part of the interventionists. This also makes it difficult to follow the simultaneous urge from politicians to either strengthen the military at all costs or to replace combat by civilian action. Perhaps it is better to identify the few aspects, which can be accepted under all circumstances by all CIMIC strategies.

1. If the main aim is to strengthen the central government and the unity of the state, utmost priority must be given to the *sub-central political powers* and to the question whether a central government really means a centralised *nation state*. The only thing we think we know for sure is that there are no attempts to split parts off from the integral territory of the *state*. But this state is not a modern nation-state but rather a corporation of ethnic state elements and other entities that are kept together by enormous pressure from outside. This is not an uncommon situation in the region. I am cautious in my wording, but the way I am asking makes it already clear that neither I believe in the possibility of nation-building under the unifying roof of *a national identity* nor do I think that local governance would be able to avoid a highly differentiated correspondence with cultural, religious or tribal traditions. In other words, we need a clear assessment of *situations or constellations*. There will be no unified strategy to strengthen civil reconstruction, even if we assume that the military operations, wherever needed, will prove successful.

2. What are the parameters of differentiation? An investigation into various situations is not a basic anthropological undertaking; however simple answers to specific questions are not impossible: How are the local rules of allegiance? Can we know about the resurfacing of these rules and/or the opposition against such a development? What experiences are prevalent from exile and return? As to my knowledge this field has never been sufficiently investigated, although the problematic relationship between the returnees and the residents (defined as those who stayed there throughout most of the war and were there, while the war was declared over and the returnees came back). Evidently and similar to experiences made in the context of other missions, the domination of the resident culture is increasing with growing distance from the date of return of the other group. This explains why even President Karzai is less reluctant to invite the re-establishment of older cultural forms than he was three years ago. Is there enough substance to reactivate former modes of production, e.g., agrarian? The answer is no, but this has enormous consequences for all parts of Sharia civil law concerning the distribution of land along with the questions of water supply and ownership. What religious influences from outside are challenging the local traditions? It is known that Wahhabi's propaganda does not take place everywhere with the same effects. Who are the groups moderating foreign influence, without making the local traditions themselves moderate? Where are the small but significant enlightened and secular groups from the past? What do we know about the capacity of the young generation to resist propaganda through neo-radical religious education?

These are common questions and as we know one warlord does not equal the other. Therefore it is important to learn *why* such differences matter or do not influence the situation. Being perceived as partners or not may highly depends on the international attitudes towards ethnic or religious specifications, which are not common.[16]

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[16] In one case, I have heard a Tadjik police commander address local Pashtun tribal leaders, drawing a lot of applause. He criticised the international security forces in stark words, and this was a uniting bond beyond tribal differences; had he tackled another issue, the result might have been quite different.

It is also important to know, *who* is answering the questions. This has been crucial for many years in respect to the human rights questions, especially the ones related to gender. Men, first and foremost husbands or local peers, will not respond in the same way as women. Likewise an Afghan woman in exile or in the safe haven of an international organisation will not speak the same way as one in the local market. You may consider this to be ordinary. However from the beginning of the UN engagement in Afghanistan the gender issue has been secondary to the *bigger* (?) political issues. "Women? Don't talk to me about women. I don't mention women. That is a cultural issue. I am trying to negotiate peace".[17]

Today making clear to everyone that this has changed is rather difficult, and moreover, the view of a predicted new form of society and state must change. The effect is that the former Supreme Judge established with the help of UN, could dictate a ban on women working for international organisations. Another effect is that international protest and resistance were low-key when in recent months, it came to severe drawbacks in the education of girls and women. Due to my knowledge regarding UNAMA's aim concerning gender issues, I am not quoting Gannon in order to blame the UN, but rather to generally point out a quote: "That is a cultural issue". *Peace and conflict* on the one hand and *culture* on the other is a wrong juxtaposition or opposition.

3. I am convinced that all international actors know the question of the rural backgrounds of many refugees. The need to differentiate is evident: rural people have totally different expectations in what may or may not come from the government. According to Tom Koenigs, the government has not delivered much in terms of reforms regarding family, religion and agriculture. In other words, the old traditions will survive, regardless of the government in place. And the tactical delivery of food and security by the Taliban may become more attractive than the hope for change, which, if anything, will be to the advantage of the urban popula-

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[17] Quotation of a saying by Norbert Holl, UN special envoy, no date, in Kathy Gannon 2005, p. 48.

tions.[18] What one can do in rural areas is to restore a rule of law which concentrates on rural production, i.e. on the tight connection of law and land, e.g. with regard to water distribution and the leasing rules for certain qualities of arable land. CIMIC may be involved in processes of "multi-legality", i.e. in establishing *one* rule of law, but *more than one* segment of legal applications, e.g. differentiated by human rights, civil property laws and new penal codes;[19] if CIMIC is able to rediscover the active or living elements of older tribal traditions, a confidence-building application of local laws could establish such a multi-legality. The situation in the big cities is completely different, not only because they are flooded with refugees who bring other traditions with them. The urban mass guarantees more anonymity, which is favourable to those who have nothing to lose as well as those who depend on illegal activities. The city also allows different sorts of multiple contact with the interventionists. It is a typical post-war setting. Multi-legality occurs without intentional strategies, often decided upon by mini-warlords in micro-quarters of a town. CIMIC will have to focus on buildings and the protection of social space to a much higher extent than in rural areas.

4. There are many complaints concerning *corruption* and President Karzai is being blamed for not acting sufficiently act against it. This is undeserved due to Karzai's limited range of influence and the real power of warlords, drug cartels and militia commanders. It is also fair to speak of a plurality of corruption. Some is provoked, as in any intervention culture, by the enormous gap between local salaries and international remunerations. Other types result from restarting life in the big cities, with typical outlaw careers. Organised crime plays an enormously important role and can be subdivided into old-style sectors (land, property, extortion, partially drugs) and new-style sectors (money laundering, drugs,

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[18] Kathy Gannon: Post-Taliban Kabul blossoms for the rich. URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/11/AR2006111100615.html [10.09.2007].

[19] The anthropological dimension of intervention law has been recently highlighted by two Viennese scholars: Gerald Hainzl and Werner Zips: *Rechtsanthropologie und anthropologische Friedensforschung. Juridikum* 2005/4, 191-195; if CIMIC were able to rediscover the active or living elements of older tribal traditions, a confidence-building application of local laws could establish such multi-legality.

women and arms trafficking, legalising illegal actions, white collar corruption). It is really a question of the civic society to fight against all these types of corruption, without running the risk of creating a vacuum into which even more criminal energy can flow. If the term is not deliberately abused, it means applying controlled *multi-illegality*.

5. I am going to provide a case that shows the necessity of a more sensitive introspection on part of the interventionists, without elaborating the larger political implications. In short, it would simply be a call for self-investigation of the ISAF-tribe. The German Prime Minister has declared that there will definitely be no deployment of the *Bundeswehr* to the south of Afghanistan, because this would weaken its position in the north and encourage other EU members to support the military in the south. On the same day, an attack on ISAF German troops in the north was launched (13/11/06), so as if to support the position of chancellor Merkel. Shortly before the NATO summit in Riga in November 2006, Germany got under heavy pressure from its allies, because its focus on the north was considered inadequate to the alliance's code of solidarity. I will not go into any military argument, although the temptation is big, because the situation allows to "know", as I have initially suggested.[20] I want to concentrate fully on the cultural implications for the interventionists and the intervened. The weekly *Der Spiegel* published an article

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[20] I would argue along four lines: 1) The German Army and ISAF cannot effectively fight in the south as long as OEF is under sole US command and strategy. The continuation of this strategy would mean a war that cannot be won exclusively by military means. 2) For the first time, German politicians criticise openly that US/OEF-troops behave like occupation forces; confidence by the locals cannot be attained, and therefore the German army will not be able to enter combat as along as this does not change. 3) The pressure is moral-driven, and not military-driven. If the troops fight within a tactical concept that is considered inappropriate, they become *guilty*. Then they will have to follow the exit-strategy of other guilty partners this is, with some modifications, the collusion-argument of the Iraq coalition. None of the partners can retreat, irrespective of whether the reasons for going into Iraq are considered valid and of whether the allies feel united by the same aims. 4) But one will need more troops in order to fight the Taliban and to enforce civil reconstruction.
These four arguments in a line remain inconsistent. But a good basis for a justification of a new CIMIC strategy can be found in 3) and 4), which require consequences from 2).

entitled *"The Germans must learn how to kill" – How Afghanistan becomes an emergency case.*[21] Two shifts are identified: one *from dying to killing* and another *from a brutal to a peace-building non-militaristic policy* of a re-integrated Germany. Will that be changed by the moral pressure and belittling attitude of moral superiority and thus lose its highly appreciated innocence. This would be an act of *normalisation,* as we know it from Japan under Koizumi and Abe. If the self-perception of the ISAF troops follows this new habit, its cultural approach towards the civilian aspect of their activities must change as well. This would mean that the simultaneous actions of combat and civil development would have to be organised along other co-ordinates. Now, in the north there is *real* CIMIC: civil projects are being ensured by the military and civil assistance is preparing for more Afghan ownership – at least as a programme. In the south, civil simultaneity would require ten times more civil input in the wake of military attempts to eradicate the Taliban, which would be a long-term and almost unlimited undertaking. It can be argued that being prepared to die in order to liberate people, will earn you the respect of the intervened and if you are a killing soldier on their behalf, they should know exactly which side *they* belong to. However, this is not easy for them to decide, and for us to know.

6. Before I conclude, I want to highlight an event, which was very popular in the media and caused more misunderstandings concerning the role of the military and the differences between certain types of intervention forces. The *skull-affair* of German ISAF soldiers, which caused enormous turmoil in Germany, had two significant effects: practically no negative reaction in the country and an almost hysterical shielding of the *Bundeswehr* in Afghanistan from journalists and the public, as ordered by the Ministry of Defence to the bewilderment of the rest of ISAF (according to the media of 13/11/06). The German reaction was motivated by fear, as if playing with the skulls would create reactions similar to those in response to the Danish cartoons a few months earlier. A second line of emotional reaction was drawing totally inappropriate parallels to Abu Ghraib or Bagram, where people were tortured. American gloating

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[21] DER SPIEGEL 47/20: „*Die Deutschen müssen das Töten lernen.*" *Wie Afghanistan zum Ernstfall wird.*

was also feared. A third line was focused on the role in which the German army wants to see itself. After a period of undue and imbalanced hypocrisy in the media and by the politicians, one question remains open: Why did the local Muslim communities not react as expected and feared? The answer brings us back to their habits and traditions, as pointed out at the beginning of this presentation. As long as you break rules of decency and of your own interventionist ethics, the local people are much less affected than one might think, because they do not have anything to do with those alien ethics. Playing with skulls would hurt the German cultural traditions more than Afghan ones. On the other hand, the locals, as intervened people, get much more provoked when a tradition or tribal heritage is offended. It does not make much difference whether a wedding is intentionally or only collaterally bombed, because marriage is one of the strongest and most untouched rituals in their society, while the same number of accidental deaths caused by bombing a busy intersection during the rush hour would create much less grief and irritation.

4. Conclusion

Afghanistan, far from becoming a nation state, suffers from the Taliban and from its structural post-war deficiencies as well as from misplaced nation-building efforts by the ISC. Afghanistan can overcome many of its grievances only by the employment of a combination of three elements:

One is a dramatic increase in civil development aid, especially in the soft sectors of education, health, social protection, environment and administration; the second is a significant strengthening of the local security forces in order to enhance the rule of law and secure the achievements made so far; the third is winning a war against the Taliban, which has little to do with the global terrorist threat, but rather with the power struggle between two different concepts of society in Afghanistan. In order to combine the three preconditions, a closer look into the social reality of the intervened people and the structures of the interventionists is needed. The anthropology of intervention will be co-decisive for the success of CIMIC and peace building in the long run.