Russia Towards Enlarging NATO
erschienen in der Publikation "Security Political Dialogue 1999 (2/01)" (ISBN: 3-901328-57-2) - Juni 2001
Autor(en):
Dr. Kazimierz Malak
19 Seiten (138 KB)
Schlagworte zu diesem Beitrag:
NATO
Abstract:
Russia’s relations with NATO are undoubtedly one of the most important factors organising Moscow's strategy and political thinking. The NATO enlargement issue has a particular influence upon them.
The viewpoint of the alliance and the states interested in NATO membership is that NATO enlargement is not aimed against any state or any group of states, and the talks with Russia (without the right to veto the Alliance’s decisions but also without surprising Moscow of its decisions) ought to be conducted parallel with the dialogue with countries aspiring to the membership. This restriction is necessary as the Kremlin’s negative attitude delayed the Alliance decision concerning Poland’s, Czech’s and Hungary’s accession. Despite a popular "no veto, no surprise" principle, the relations with Poland were NATO priority. These relations influenced the strategic balance in Europe. Also the question of shaping the partnership basis, evolution directions and the place of the Alliance in the European security architecture were at stake.
Russia has been opposing not only to further NATO enlargement but also the existence of this defence alliance. It has suggested a concept of establishing new relations between international security structures. Russia presented the proposal of such a security system model during the OSCE conference in Budapest in December 1994 and justified it with the necessity to prepare a conception basis for future security architecture. In fact, the aim of this initiative was to introduce a construction into the conference agenda, which would place Russia better in the process to create a post-Cold War security system in Europe. It also included the legitimisation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a "counterbalance" to NATO and subordination of NATO and Western European Union to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The latter one was supposed to be strengthened and to change into a quasi-UN, an elite decision structure as its real centre. Thus Russia would automatically gain recognition of its privileged position.
The viewpoint of the alliance and the states interested in NATO membership is that NATO enlargement is not aimed against any state or any group of states, and the talks with Russia (without the right to veto the Alliance’s decisions but also without surprising Moscow of its decisions) ought to be conducted parallel with the dialogue with countries aspiring to the membership. This restriction is necessary as the Kremlin’s negative attitude delayed the Alliance decision concerning Poland’s, Czech’s and Hungary’s accession. Despite a popular "no veto, no surprise" principle, the relations with Poland were NATO priority. These relations influenced the strategic balance in Europe. Also the question of shaping the partnership basis, evolution directions and the place of the Alliance in the European security architecture were at stake.
Russia has been opposing not only to further NATO enlargement but also the existence of this defence alliance. It has suggested a concept of establishing new relations between international security structures. Russia presented the proposal of such a security system model during the OSCE conference in Budapest in December 1994 and justified it with the necessity to prepare a conception basis for future security architecture. In fact, the aim of this initiative was to introduce a construction into the conference agenda, which would place Russia better in the process to create a post-Cold War security system in Europe. It also included the legitimisation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a "counterbalance" to NATO and subordination of NATO and Western European Union to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The latter one was supposed to be strengthened and to change into a quasi-UN, an elite decision structure as its real centre. Thus Russia would automatically gain recognition of its privileged position.