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Summary: Putin’s Military Strategy

Hannes Adomeit

The 11 August 2000 security council meeting on Russia’s military development until 2015 was the turning point that ushered in a new round of cumbersome military reform efforts and indicated a change in Putin’s public stance toward the military. The essential points of this reform policy were to be personnel cuts, expenditure reallocations in favor of research, and the development and procurement of new weapons. The political control over the military, the demilitarization of public life, the guaranteed right to refuse national service, the abolishment of conscription, and the introduction of professional forces were to contribute to gaining the armed forces a new rating within society and make military service more attractive.

However, the cut-back program for the armed forces and "other troops" turned out to be mere talk. Originally, the troops under the Ministry of Defense were to be cut back by 30.4%, while the "other troops" (amounting to 1 mio. personnel) were to be reduced only by 6%. These goals were changed in June 2002. The cut-backs were no longer to be reached by 2005 but by 2010 and the total figures were raised. All in all, the armed forces together with the special forces, security forces, as well as "civilian employees" serving in military, paramilitary, and police formations amount to four mio.

Defying all contrary statements, the Russian military cannot do without maintaining conscription. Notwithstanding the general staff’s insistence on calling up only 12% of the year’s age group, reality proves that actually 30% are called up. Putin’s wish of making the transition to professional forces until 2010 will not come true. That is not least due to recruiting problems, resulting from cutting benefits in addition to low incomes.

The internal condition of the Russian armed forces has to be seen as problematic, even after four years of Putin’s term in office. "Demilitarizing public life" turned out to be an empty phrase and cannot be considered a step toward creating a civil society, just as the law on alternative service cannot, for that matter. The servicemen and servicewomen of the armed forces represent a negative selection of society. The political and military lead would have to pay more attention to the problems of internal leadership. The preconditions for improving the situation would include independent media that can freely report on the bad conditions, a professionally well-trained corps of noncommissioned officers, and a military judiciary that proceeds rigorously against perpetrators.

Since 1 January 2004 an alternative service law is in effect. However, its most important stipulations make it very clear that the Russian military is determined to maintain conscription and prevent armed service from being softened. In addition, the military still has great influence on security-related decision-making processes.

After four years of Putin’s term in office, the officially "completed" military reform has not brought about any substantial change. The armed forces’ character of being a massive army prepared to wage a big conventional war has not changed. Neither training nor equipment are adequate to meet new threats and the internal conditions of the armed forces and "other troops" have not seen any improvement. Putin’s lack of determination to prevail over the military leadership is probably not that he fears, or would have to fear, a military revolt. But he knows that he depends on the good will of his armed forces and special troops in order to be able to continue the war in Chechnya as well as for implementing a military reform. These might be the reasons for not wanting to "over-challenge" his militaries with fundamental reorientations.



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