Summary: The Strategic Situation at the Turn of the Year
Lothar Rühl
Last year’s outstanding event was the US-British-led coalition war on Iraq, aiming at stripping Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction (DMD) and changing the regime in Baghdad. America’s insistence on Iraq’s possession of WMD turned out to be as counterproductive as did the allegations of Iraq supporting international terrorism. There was no credible evidence for either one of them.
With the US focusing on Iraq, Afghanistan slumped into a secondary war theater that was more than gladly left to US allies to deal with. In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was excluded from the Gulf War scenario altogether, which in the eyes of the Arab world made the US war on terror look like a war against the Islamic world with the aim of securing strategic oil reserves.
The war against Iraq, fought without a UNSC mandate, also led to a deep divide between the US and its European allies, in particular France and Germany who together with Russia were eager not to have it legitimized. Nevertheless, the US acted according to its National Security Strategy adopted in September 2002 that foresees preemptive prevention of terrorism, while disregarding the role-model effect such application of force might have for other states.
The war in Iraq neither saw the pessimistic predictions of high losses within the civilian population and the forces confirmed, nor those of conflict escalation and spilling over into neighboring countries, nor of massive waves of refugees. Likewise, US hopes to find a thankful liberated Iraqi people that would immediately go about rebuilding the country were frustrated. All in all, the occupation of the country was not well prepared, as the resistance potential of Iraqi guerillas as well as the occupation costs were grossly underestimated.
A strategic pullout like in Afghanistan in 2002/3 is not an option for the US, as it would entail a substantial loss of prestige. In addition, an instable Iraq might unbalance the entire Middle East region that has long become a playground for US power politics. For the US it is therefore not only a question of securing strategic resources but also of democratizing the entire region. That might, however, turn out to be too ambitious a goal.
As opposed to Iraq, North Korea, openly admitting to nuclear proliferation, clearly showed the limitations of US power politics. The patience Washington displayed with Pjongjang, as opposed to Iraq (though urged by allies) makes this more than obvious. However, in the case of Iran - the third state constituting the ‘axes of evil’ - combined efforts helped to force Teheran to give in and have its nuclear program inspected.
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