Summary: The Tag-of-War between Balance and Hegemony within the European Union
Heinz Brill
What is new in the century-long wrangling about hegemony and balance which, according to the theory of neo-realism, does not allow for a lasting unipolar power distribution in the international system, is the Euro-Atlantic dimension that surfaced with the Iraq conflict and subsequently lead to a US-European relationship of demonstrating power and counter-power. In this struggle, Europe does not present itself as a homogeneous actor, since the interests of the member countries differ too greatly.
Nowhere is Europe’s variable geometry more evident than in the various "axes" in which France, Germany, Great Britain, and, to a lesser extent, Italy, Spain, and also Russia are displaying ever changing new power reality calculations. The quarrel about a double majority system for adopting resolutions within the European institutions is only the latest indicator of these timely limited coalitions. German-French considerations of creating a "union within the Union" does not only provoke skepticism with the smaller EU member states but also bears a conflict potential with the USA.
The "Core-Europe" model, aired by Paris and Berlin, would on the one hand lead to a Europe of two speeds, but on the other give all EU member states the possibility to decide on their own integration time schedules. However, this concept is controversial, as it might lead to breaking the EU up into various alliances. To prevent this from happening was, and still is, the real aim of European integration.
Other approaches are aiming at limiting German-French dominance by creating an alternative center of power. Spain’s offer to Poland to establish a strategic partnership may be seen in this category, including their joint opposition against the Constitution draft, while London, playing for time because of wide-spread Euro-skepticism in Great Britain, was not alltogether unhappy about it.
The anti-Iraq Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis has long been replaced by German-French-British trilateralism, whose coordination efforts in industry and security policy have aroused the suspicion of the smaller countries. Notwithstanding growing US skepticism about London’s involvement, it is an indispensable motor for European integration.
Other special regional relationships that are of importance for the European unification process include the Central European Initiative, particularly pushed forward by Austria, that now comprises 16 states after having seen some expansions since 1999. It serves as an important link between EU member states, accession candidates, and those states in the region that do not stand a chance of acceding to the Union within the near future. Austria’s proposal of forming partnerships with neighbor states fell upon fertile ground mainly with those countries that are particularly afraid of German-French dominance. In northern Europe, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland are trying to strengthen their influence in the EU through a new model of cooperation with the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
The tension between hegemony and balance is subject to constant change, not only within international politics but also within the EU. In this context, leading powers as well as medium-size and smaller states are exposed to the formation of changing coalitions. Unilateral strategies of EU member states do not stand much of a chance of success. Cooperation between individual member states results from regional contexts, which, however, would be unfeasible without the institutions of the European Union. What Europe needs is a strengthened identity and political freedom of action in order to be able to come up with conclusive answers to questions like whether or not to conduct accession talks with Turkey or how to define its relationship with Russia.
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