Summary: The Guerilla Forces, the Dwifungsi, and the Currently Stalling Reform - Indonesia’s Military in the Flux
Andreas Ufen
Since dictator Suharto was toppled in 1998 at the acme of the worst economic crisis the country experienced, Indonesia has still not come to peace. Even though the country was economically stabilized and has seen some reforms, there was East Timor that gained independence in 2002, the break-away province of Aceh had to declare a state of emergency in 2003, and in Papua there is still no hope to come to grips with separatist forces. In this precarious situation Indonesia’s security forces play a crucial role.
The Indonesian army emerged from two separate groups - the multiethnic KNIL troops formerly commanded by Dutch colonial officers and the Heiho and Peta support troops brand-marked by Japanese fashism. After the heavy-loss incurring victory over the colonial power, the army had to withdraw to its military premises in 1949 and cede the lead to professional politicians. Yet, after destroying regionalist powers in the mid-1950s, the army became the most influential power that also had a hand in the top management of nationally owned companies.
After a putch attempt blamed exclusively on the communists, Suharto ultimately came to power in 1965, initially only as leader of the "command to reestablish law and order" and Chief of Staff, but as of 1966 also as de facto President. He created his own loyal general staff, cleansed the forces, and filled all command posts with his followers. Because of their dwifungsi (dual role) the military was also employed in state enterprises and all areas of the administration, including the parliament.
Due to the exceptional territorial organization ABRI, the power of the military was ensured from top down to the lowest local level. Until the mid-90s this military control network comprised 475,000 men who managed to escape judicial and legislative control. Aside from that, the military also dominated the governmental party Golkar, the controversial hegemon in the Indonesian tri-party system. The mid-90s, however, saw a phase of estrangement between Suharto and the military, which increasingly put the dual function of the military into question.
In May 1998 Suharto was forced to step down and was replaced by his deputy Habibie who for the first time introduced free elections in 1999. Habibie initiated cautious reforms, inclusive of curbing the double function of the armed forces. The military had to become politically neutral, cede parliamentary seats, withdraw from the administration, and accept the separation of the police forces.
In October 1999 the liberal Muslim leader Wahid was elected president. After the questionable role of the military in East Timor, Wiranto, his Minister for Coordination of Politics and Security was forced to step down. Because of his chaotic office management, he was ultimately opposed not only by the military but also by the parliament, the industry, and large parts of the populace. In July 2001 the People’s Congress removed him from office and replaced him by Megawati Sukarnoputri. Since her term in office the military’s influence has grown again.
President Megawati is obviously not able to make her stand against the military that is determined to solve all problems, ranging from Aceh to Papua, by military force alone. Recently adopted laws on fighting terror granted new far-reaching competences to the security forces, thus counteracting a true reform of the security sector. In addition, there is no military doctrine that would accept civil supremacy, a reorientation of the armed forces in the sense of focusing on national defense, the consistent prosecution of criminal acts committed by members of the military establishment as well as punishment for crimes against humanity.
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