Summary: Operational Leadership
Basics of the Intellectual History of Operational Command and Control in German-Speaking Countries
Wolfgang Peischel
The efficacy of command and control procedures is measured by the principal ability to reach military strategic goals, despite disadvantages in personnel and material, and is largely independent of size, equipment, and state of technological development of the commanded forces or, for that matter, war experience.
In the German speaking countries, the most essential elements of command philosophy comprise the "fateful” relationship between the leader and the led, characterized by mutual empathy and responsibility, mission oriented leadership principles, and the quality of command decisions derived from the synergy of theory and practical experience, or operational creativity and criticalanalytical thinking, respectively. These elements are to guarantee command and control superiority, despite numerical disadvantages.
In the German speaking world, these principles are part of the Prussian-German, Bavarian, and Austrian command tradition, and subsequently also of the French version derived therefrom. Being in direct contrast to Anglo-American leadership philosophy, they resulted from common or parallel philosophical, political, and legal developments. Therefore, command and control procedures are by no means artificial fabrications that may randomly be "imposed” on forces, but rather are derived from the evolution of the history of ideas.
The basic command principles, as understood today, and their influence on operational thinking in the German speaking countries are a complex, interdependent network, shaped by the influence of Catholicphilosophical thinking, humanism, Humboldt’s educational ideals, and the age of enlightenment. From Catholicphilosophical thinking the principles of hierarchy and observance, the specific relationship between the leader and the led, and the right or duty to resist, respectively, were derived. Humanism added ethical aspects to leadership, in the sense of value standards, which found its response in Clausewitz’s demand to introduce characterbuilding and humanistic educational contents into military leadership training. This constitutes one of the most important prerequisites for the development of mission oriented tactics. Knowledge, personal growth and value consciousness, the ability of making assessments and critical judgements, as well as the capacity of logical reasoning are the criteria that, according to Humboldt’s educational ideal, characterize a good military leader. In turn, the age of enlightenment opened the way for the citoyen to receive education, and in doing so, introduced the educational level as a criterion for quality, thus redefining the individual as such.
The special relationship between the leader and the led, as an element of today’s operational leadership, has its roots in medieval feudal law, which stipulated a mutual trust relationship between the feudal lord and his tenant and correlated with Saint Augustine’s and Thomas Aquinus’s right or duty to resist, respectively. The feudal tenant was only obliged to pay his lord unconditional obedience as long as his lord duly carried out his obligation to protect him.
In the age of enlightenment the principle of mission oriented leadership was developed. It regards the recipient of orders as a selfresponsible, rational soldier who gains his ability to use his limited scope of freedom of action for the greater good, by means of an educational system aimed at rational decision making. Essential to the function of mission oriented tactics is the leader’s attitude and ability to deliberately allow mistakes, in order to promote selfresponsibility. This approach aimed at the capacity of decision making, seeks to develop a leader’s ability to arrive at decisions as fast and as accurately as possible, so that a bystander will get the impression of seeing a "divine spark” or a martial genius.
The synergetic fusion of theory and practice lends command decisions a quality which results in leadership superiority. This is necessary, in order to make up for the superior numerical strength of the enemy.
The "working hypothesis for the procedures of operational leadership”, which, in part, goes back to Clausewitz, fuses empirical science with a theoretical systematicanalytical approach, thus creating a synergetic effect. Combined with operational creativity, it leads to a quality of decision making that exceeds the Anglo-American "Commander’s Intent”.
Examples of "limited” operational thinking, in which the underlying history of ideas did not find adequate consideration, were the defeat of France in 1940 (loss of the sense of reality on part of the military leadership, deficiencies in democratic practices and combat effectiveness within the forces), the defeat of Prussia in 1806 (discrepancy between theory and practice, confusion over strategy and tactics), and the unduly limited interpretation of Clausewitz’s theory of war during the Third Reich (legitimizing "total war” and "destruction thinking”).
Key demands for the orientation of operational thinking within the framework of a leadership tradition relevant for Austria, are the following: to enable general staff officers to discern political contexts, to educate officers on the basis of a broad interdisciplinary scientific approach, to elaborate a comprehensive militaryscientific system, to further develop the working hypothesis for operational command and control procedures, to hold on to mission oriented leadership, and to emphasize the specific relationship between the leader and the led, based on empathy and responsibility.
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