Summary: The Development of Modern Operational Art
Influence on the Austrian Armed Forces
Philipp Eder
"Operational command and control”, "operational art”, or simply military "operations”, which is what this article focuses on, are all semantic terms describing the military command level between strategy or military strategy on the one hand, and tactics on the other. These terms must be clearly distinguished from terms, like "operations in depth”, "information operations”, or "support operations”, the latter of which are all independent of the command level.
The fact that the US, despite its tactical victory in almost all battles, eventually lost the Vietnam War, shows that the missing link between tactical actions and strategic objectives was to blame for the failure. As an immediate consequence, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was set up to develop operational concepts that were published as Doctrine FM 100-5 "Operations” which set the standard not only for the US forces but also for those of their allies.
The FM 100-5 was published in 1976 when, after the Vietnam War the US Army refocused on the European theater, finding that it was inferior to the Soviet Union, not only in manpower but also technologically. The "Active Defense” doctrine, i.e. attrition warfare from delay positions to counter Warsaw Pact attacks was to make up for the deficit. What was overlooked in that context, however, was the fact, that they were operating on the tactical, rather than the operational level.
This deficit was amended by the FM 100-5 of 1982 which formulated the AirLand Battle concept, an offensive operation which was to carry the battle activities into the depth of the theater of operation by attacking the second echelon, the reserve and the support installations of the enemy. As opposed to earlier concepts, the AirLand Battle was only to be realized by the synergy of all services. The extended battlefield emphasizing the factors of force, time, and area was key to the concept of operations.
The FM 100-5 of 1993, issued after the success of Gulf War II, left the essential principles of operational command and control unchanged, but reacted to the end of the Cold War by introducing the concept of operations other than war, which was immediately rejected by critics.
Also, the new term "commander’s intent” shows a clear tendency toward implementing mission oriented leadership.
The FM 3-0 of 2001, the 14th version of the US operational doctrine, combines the classical forms of operations and operations other than war, using four operational procedures - offensive operations, defensive operations, security operations, and support operations - emphasizing the character of jointness. Also, information operations became an integral part of the doctrine.
The Austrian Armed Forces of the Second Republic (AAF) were not directly faced with the problem of an operational command and control level. On the one hand there was the problem of formation, on the other there simply was not the scale needed. The service regulations "Truppenführung” of 1965 defined operations as, "…the movement of large units for the purpose of combat and its command during combat”, but it soon became evident that this meant limiting the operational frame to mobile operations. It was not until the static operations concept of area defense was introduced in the 70’s, that the operational idea came up, which was, however, overshadowed by tactics, due to unclear political objectives and insufficient funds.
The FM-100-5 of May 1986 finally incorporated the conceptive aspects of operational planning, like the concept of the "center of gravity” - by the AAF defined as "the sum of military, economic, and ethical capabilities of a nation, alliance, coalition, or conflict party, which in case of an armed conflict would be decisive for the outcome” - which substituted "operational command and control” by "operational art”.
Operational art has to aim at concentrating all available forces against the enemy’s center of gravity, while securing the own center against enemy attacks. In order to reach that goal, the identification and neutralization of socalled decisive points, with regard to area, force, and information, may be of decisive importance.
In addition, lines of operations or culmination points, respectively will determine the direction of the forces within the time and area frame with regard to enemy forces.
The AAF, because of their increasing participation in peace support operations, see themselves forced to deal again with the operational control and command level, whereby internationally standardized procedures will have to be merged with Austrian command and control principles. Operational planning and operational command has to transform political goals and military strategic intentions into tactical command by defining operational objectives, turning them into concepts, operational plans and operational orders and coordinating the tactical and logistical measures needed for that.
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