Summary: The Invasion of Normandy
Romedio Graf von Thun-Hohenstein
The invasion of Normandy on 6th June 1944 by the allies was the greatest landing operation in the history of war. Here, crowded together, almost two millions of soldiers fought for the decision. Between October 1942 and October 1943 General Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who was responsible for the repulse of an invasion by the allies, not only had to cope with the assignment of 50 divisions to the eastern front, but had also to face different rules of engagement which could not be converted into a conclusive strategic conception. These rules of engagement demanded to fight against the landing allies along the coastline already, to destroy the adversary before he was able to build up a bridgehead, and at the same time to have operative reserves ready, consisting of at least four or five mobile divisions.
Basically the German formations faced trying to square the circle. The force of solid armoured brigades could not succeed because of the enemy’s air and artillery superiority, and thus free operations made them extremely vulnerable. A deployment next to the coastline would have required timely knowledge about the enemy intentions, and additionally for the armoured formations it involved the danger to wear out in such an infantry role. In the face of an enemy who more than often dictated the courses of operations, most of the time the realization that only night attacks might be successful did not help.
Considering the overwhelming materiel superiority of the allies, warfare was difficult enough. The orders by the OKW usually coming from Hitler himself caused additional complications, because they did not correspond to the quickly changing situation on the front and usually responded too slowly to it. In addition to issuing absurd stop orders, the people in the OKW obviously were unable to assess neither the speed of the fighting nor the air superiority of the allies. Thus, whenever von Rundstedt demanded formations under the OKW according to the situation, this became a long-term problem, because the OKW and Hitler decided according to their own situation assessments, and these rarely corresponded to reality on the defence front.
The allies’ weak moments in the beginning phase of their landing operation could not be made use of, because the allies were able to draw strength from both their superior air force and their heavy navy artillery from the start. Thus, the Germans could not get reinforcements as quickly as the allies because of their air superiority. The reserves could not be deployed in a united front and were split during their advance already. Like the armoured formations they were worn out little by little in the infantry sectors, and this determined the fighting. The Germans’ uncertainty whether there would be another landing operation, Hitler’s refusal to put all available units of all forces under one command, and the sometimes absurd orders, which did not correspond to the situation on the spot, issued by the OKW, finished them off. Finally, the three field marshals were not willing, like Rundstedt and Kluge, or not able, like Rommel after 17th July, to take the necessary steps according to the military situation.
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